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Preface
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nenne: Professor Dr. Bertrand Lançon, Dr. Tobie Walther, Dr. Johannes Bernwieser, 
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ben ist jedoch vor allem Dr. Fraser McNair, dessen Korrekturen, kenntnisreichen 
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Auch drei weitere Personen seien besonders hervorgehoben: Natascha Wanninger, 
für ihre Freundschaft und für ihre sprachlichen  Korrekturen, Fabien Cerbelaud 
von der Université de Limoges für die fantastischen von ihm erstellten Karten 
sowie Dr. Claudie Paye für ihre Anleitung durch den Publikationsprozess.
Herzlicher Dank geht darüber hinaus an Professor Dr. Martina Hartmann, 
nicht nur für die Möglichkeit in den Hallen der Monumenta Germaniae  Historica 
zu arbeiten, sondern auch für die mir dabei eingeräumten Freiheiten und die 
Unterstützung.
Schließlich danke ich meinen Freunden—unter ihnen insbesondere Dr. Hannes 
Hain—die mich in den vergangenen Jahren unterstützt, mit mir gelacht und gelitten 
haben und mit mir ungezählte Kilometer auf  verschiedensten  Gewässern gerudert 
sind. Die letzten Worte seien jedoch meiner Familie  gewidmet: Ohne sie, ihre Liebe 
und ihre Zuversicht hätte ich diese Arbeit weder beginnen noch beenden können.
Hamburg, Juni 2018 Horst Lößlein

Summary
Charles  III the Simple (893/898−923) only became king when nobles rebelling 
against the Robertian Odo were in need of a candidate for the West Frankish 
throne. Posthumously born to Louis  II the Stammerer, he was of Carolingian 
blood and thus able to provide the rebellion with an appearance of legitimacy. 
The rebels on the other hand offered Charles the opportunity of a lifetime: after 
14 years of being ignored by the leading nobles of the West Frankish realm, he 
was finally able to succeed his father. Yet, while his reign lasted for 25 years, it 
ended how it had started and Charles was deposed by a rebellion led by Robert 
of Neustria. The circumstances of Charles’  elevation and deposition are among 
the reasons for his image as a weak king, unable to control the nobles, and why 
he counts as a prime example of the “decline and fall” of the Carolingian empire 
towards the end of the 9th century. Yet, what does “weak king” mean? Modern 
scholarship has long discarded the view of kingship as a question of royal orders 
and noble obedience. Instead, it is understood as the result of a process involving 
both the ruler and those around him. Successful kingship depended on the ruler’s 
ability to integrate the nobles into this process, to mediate between their and his 
own interests and to create consensus.
This understanding serves as basis for this new approach to fathoming out 
the possibilities and limits of late Carolingian royal power. First, the focus is set 
on the relations between the king and the nobles around him, interpreting royal 
 actions as the result of their interactions. Second, the customary hierarchy of the 
source material is inverted. Royal diplomas, ideally suited to reveal the networks 
of royal power, are placed at the centre of the analysis and subjected to rigorous 
 contextualisation, treating narrative sources as secondary. Third, the timeframe 
of this study is extended back to the late 870s, covering the decades during which 
the political landscape of the West Frankish realm underwent drastic changes that 
determined the framework for Charles the Simple’s rule. Thus, not only these de-
velopments are revealed, but also comparisons can be made.
Charles’  first task after he became the sole king of the West Frankish realm 
was to integrate his old opponents into his rule. This meant that he had to 
bridge the old rivalry between these individuals and his allies from the struggle 
with Odo, allies who now occupied key positions in the circle around him. A 
dominating group of nobles agitating against their political rivals at the royal 
court was nothing new and can also be observed during the reigns of Louis the 
Stammerer and his sons Louis III and Carloman II. Under Charles the Fat this 
situation changed. The emperor was able to promote men of his own choice 
since his power base was located in the East Frankish realm and, equally im-
portant, key members of this dominating group such as Hugh the Abbot and 
Gauzlin died. Death also opened the door to new political solutions for Charles 
the Simple. In his case it was the murder of his key supporter, Fulk of Reims, 
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which allowed him to integrate his most important opponent into his rule: 
Robert of Neustria.
Ensuring Robert’s cooperation was certainly a crucial factor to Charles’  rule. 
Yet, his dependency on the marchio (or others like him, notably William the 
 Pious or Richard the Justiciar) should not be overestimated. Early on, Charles 
was able to create a network of alliances that served as a counterweight. However, 
to  stabilise the realm in the long run, such opposition needed to be overcome. 
Charles’  remarkable gift in integrating Robert and other powerful nobles into 
his rule is demonstrated by the great successes of his rule: the change in strategy 
towards the Northmen represented by the treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte as well as 
the integration of the leading Lotharingian nobles into the circle around him after 
the acquisition of the regnum was accomplished without estranging those of the 
Western realm. This acquisition also reveals how his political room for manoeuvre 
had increased compared to his predecessors: given to Louis the Younger as a 
lease after the death of Louis the Stammerer, Charles’  brothers efforts to regain 
the regnum had been thwarted by their dependency on the alliance with the East 
Frankish rulers to defend the realm against the Northmen and the rebellious Boso. 
Charles, unhindered by such alliances, was able to pursue his interests much more 
aggressively against his neighbours. However, the lack of such alliances meant that 
he missed out on their stabilising effects in regard to the relations between him 
and his nobles, a circumstance he tried to correct when his relations with the said 
nobles deteriorated.
The key to understanding this deterioration lies in the importance of trust in 
the relations between the ruler and the nobles around him. The rebellion against 
Odo was the result of a crisis of trust that developed when Odo repeatedly acted 
against the interests and expectations of the West Frankish nobles. Similarly, 
Charles also appears to have developed a strong tendency to emphasise his  majesty 
and royal prerogative towards the end of his rule, his famous favouring of the ill-
liked Hagano being but one example. Yet, where Odo also achieved suppression 
of the rebellion by taking actions that restored trust in him, Charles continued 
on his path up to the point where even his closest allies turned away from him. 
Thus, Charles’  neglect of ensuring the cooperation of the nobles and the creation 
of consensus deprived him of the foundations of his rule and marked the limits of 
his royal power.
Abbreviations
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OI Otto I
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Introduction
Karolus stultus (“the Stupid” or “the Foolish”) and Karolus follus (“the Crazy”), but 
also Karolus pius (“the Pious”) and Karolus sanctus (“the Saint”)1−these are only some 
of the cognomina that 11th to 13th century authors attributed to Charles III, who in 
modern times is called “der Einfältige” in German, “le Simple” in French and “the 
Simple” in English. The meaning of the most common byname, simplex, has long 
been analysed by Bernd Schneidmüller,2 who notes that it carried a positive meaning 
up until the 11th century, depicting a virtue rather than carrying the negative conno-
tations that became dominant later and which are still reflected in its modern trans-
lations. Recently, however, Geoffrey Koziol has criticised Schneidmüller’s results as 
revisionist.3 He argues that simplex is a word typically associated with monks, equated 
with “innocence” and thus conveys the image of a disadvantaged ruler. According 
to him, it was Charles’ naivety which was perceived as having caused him to fall 
into Count Heribert II’s hands−the event that branded him as simplex in the eyes of 
the medieval chroniclers.4 However, Koziol’s own judgement differs fundamentally: 
“Charles went down in West Frankish histories as ‘simple’ because once defeated at 
Soissons, he trusted the word of the count of Vermandois and foolishly walked into 
a trap. But Charles was anything but simple. He was one of the most intelligent and 
complex of the Carolingians.”5 Charles the Simple as a kind of failed genius? This as-
sessment is far removed from the judgement of Auguste Eckel, author of the first and 
so far the only study of the Carolingian’s reign, who depicted him as “naturellement 
bon, un peu faible de caractère et crédule, mais ne manquant, au besoin, ni d’énergie 
ni de volonté”6 and even more removed from that of Ernst Dümmler, who described 
him as incompetent, unwarlike and far less intelligent than his grandfather Charles 
the Bald, yet ambitious all the same.7 Of course, those latter characterisations are 
mainly based on Charles the Simple’s final failure, his deposition at the hands of the 
nobles and his inglorious capture by Count Heribert II of Vermandois in 923. Also, 
perhaps, episodes described by the late 10th century authors Richer of Saint-Remi8 
and Dudo of Saint-Quentin9 may have been influential.
1 Eckel, Charles, 140−144 (appendix I) with the sources. Other cognomen used are insipiens, hebes 
and parvus, but also minor, sanctus and pius.
2 Schneidmüller, Einfältigkeit.
3 Koziol, Politics.
4 Koziol, Politics, 461−465.
5 Koziol, Politics, 529.
6 Eckel, Charles, 139. 
7 Dümmler, Geschichte III, 436.
8 For example on Charles’ relation to Hagano, Richer, I, c. 15, 51−52: Nam cum multa benignitate 
principes coleret, precipua tamen beatitudine Haganonem habebat, quem ex mediocribus potentem 
 effecerat, adeo ut magnatibus quibusque longe absistentibus ipse regio lateri solus hȩreret, pilleum 
etiam a capite regis sepissime sumptum, palam sibi imponeret.
9 I refer to the famous foot kiss by a Northman, who instead of kneeling down before the king, lifted 
the latter’s foot to his own mouth, making the king fall on his back. Dudo, De moribus II, c. 29, 169: 
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Evaluating Charles’  reign is a difficult task indeed. Louis II the Stammerer’s 
third son, posthumously born by his second wife Adelaide, Charles disappears 
from the sources for ten years after his birth, although undoubtedly there would 
have been plenty to report about him. Passed over for the throne after the deaths of 
his half-brothers Louis III and Carloman II, as well as that of his relative Charles III 
the Fat, it is only due to the ascent of the Robertian Odo to the throne in 888 that 
the sources permit a second glimpse at Charles in the context of the new king’s 
first visit to Aquitaine. Then again the sources remain silent about him for another 
five years until he suddenly reappears in Reims being crowned king himself by 
a group of nobles around the archbishop of Reims, Fulk, who were in rebellion 
against Odo. Over the following four years, a war ensued in which the Robertian’s 
military superiority became increasingly evident. Nevertheless, in the end, the two 
parties reached an “astonishing”10 agreement: Charles not only remained king over 
a part of the realm, but would also succeed Odo on the throne−an event that took 
place only some months later, when the latter died in late 897.
The narrative sources do not tell us much about Charles’  reign. The Annales 
Vedastini alongside Regino of Prüm’s chronicle, our main contemporary sources 
for the late 9th century, break off in the year 900 while the annals of Flodoard, 
the sole record of the early 10th century, only resume the narration in 919. While the 
former are mostly neutral towards Charles, some remarks should be made on the 
latter. In his annals, Flodoard betrays a hidden bias against Charles. An example 
of this is his portrayal of Charles as a king who repeatedly violates God’s laws by 
attacking his enemies on the most important Christian holidays and ruthlessly 
devastating the realm that had been entrusted to him.11 One can hardly doubt that 
Charles did pillage his opponents’  possessions and did not halt his war to celebrate 
Pentecost; yet Flodoard’s silence on what his enemies were doing speaks volumes. 
It is hard to imagine that their actions differed in any way from those of the king 
they tried to depose.12 While his annals are not propaganda, they are victims of 
the circumstances of their creation, namely the dominance of Charles’  enemies.13 
Francorum igitur precibus compulsus, jussit cuidam militi pedem regis osculari. Qui statim pedem 
regis arripiens, deportavit ad os suum, standoque defixit osculum, regemque fecit resupinum. Itaque 
magnus excitatur risus magnusque in plebe tumultus.
10 Schneidmüller, Karl III., 27.
11 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7: Anno DCCCCXXII, Karolus regnum Lothariense, ob persecutionem Gisle­
berti et Othonis, rapinis, sacrilegiis atque incendiis, etiam in tempore Quadragesimae, sicut et tota 
hieme vastat. Flodoard, Annales 923, 13: Et in crastinum, die dominica, hora jam sexta praeterita, 
Francis dehinc illa die proelium non sperantibus, plurimis quoque prandentibus, Karolus Axonam 
transiit, et super Rotbertum cum armatis Lothariensibus venit.
12 Other examples for Flodoard’s unrealiability would be his clearly wrong mention of a united 
front of the West Frankish nobles against Charles (see Lecouteux, Contexte II, 289−292) and his 
 refusal to depict Charles as king after the coronation of Robert apart from his death notice in 929 
( Flodoard, Annales 929, 44: Karolus quoque rex apud Perronam obiit.) On the careful choice of 
titles by Flodoard, see Jacobson, Titel.
13 Lecouteux, Contexte II, 287−298. On his bias against Charles, see also Jacobsen, Flodoard, 15–16 
and Glenn, Politics, 207.
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Thus, Flodoard’s account does not lose its credibility, but we should be aware that 
as often as he reported some events, he also turned a blind eye to others.14
As mentioned, for most of his reign there exist hardly any sources at all. There-
fore, we know about two of the main events of Charles’  rule almost exclusively 
from the meagre accounts composed east of the Rhine, later narratives, like 
those of the aforementioned Richer of Saint-Remi and Dudo of Saint-Quentin 
and Charles’  royal diplomas. In an event traditionally dated to 911, after the bat-
tle of Chartres, Charles granted the Northmen under Rollo a territory that was to 
become the heart of the future duchy of Normandy by the treaty of Saint-Clair-
sur-Epte. Later during the same year, Charles became king of Lotharingia when 
the nobles of this regnum chose the Carolingian over the new king of Eastern 
Francia, Conrad I. Flodoard alone provides more detailed information about the 
last years of Charles’  reign, which were overshadowed by different conflicts. In 
Lotharingia, the king fought Count Gislebert while in the West the nobles around 
Odo’s brother Robert rebelled against him. This latter conflict proved to be fatal 
for Charles’  reign: the nobles made Robert their new king and even after his death 
shortly afterwards in the battle of Soissons, they chose his son-in-law, Raoul, over 
Charles. Seeking new allies, Charles put himself in the hands of Count Heribert II 
of Vermandois, was imprisoned and was then used by the count to exert pressure 
on Raoul until his death in 929.
It may be because of the general lack of sources for Charles’  reign that scholars 
have devoted little attention to him and his reign. Since Auguste Eckel produced 
a biographical analysis in 1899,15 only Geoffrey Koziol has published a number of 
articles16 and dedicated parts of his monography on the politics of memory and 
identity to him.17 That is not to say that Charles’  time, its problems and its general 
developments have been completely ignored by scholarship. A number of studies 
on specific aspects of this period have been brought forward, covering key politi-
cal figures like Archbishop Heriveus of Reims,18 Count Heribert II of Vermandois19 
and Count Hagano20 or key events such as the conflict around the episcopal siege 
of Liège in 920/92121 or the conversion of the Northmen under Rollo.22 Most com-
monly, however, Charles has been treated as one amongst many rulers in general 
surveys23 or handbooks.24
14 For the biases of Flodoard’s other great work, the History of the Church of Reims, see chapter III.3.
15 Eckel, Charles.
16 Koziol, Robert; Koziol, Charles the Simple; Koziol, Charles.
17 Koziol, Politics.
18 Schmitz, Heriveus.
19 Schwager, Graf.
20 Depreux, Comte.
21 Zimmermann, Streit.
22 Guillot, Conversion.
23 For example Hlawitschka, Lotharingien; Schneidmüller, Tradition and Guillot, Formes.
24 For example Schneidmüller, Karl and Bruand, Francie.
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Scholarly discussion about the reign of Charles the Simple revolves around 
three main axes. The first concerns the general state of the realm, that is to say, the 
balance of power between the king and the nobles. The old view, emphasising the 
infidelity of the nobles towards the king as the main problem of Charles’  reign,25 
reading royal-noble relations as a constant struggle for power,26 has long been 
challenged and modified. For example, Bernd Schneidmüller, although still close 
to the old readings, has brought forward the creation of a new ministerial class 
created from the Lotharingian lower nobility by Charles, which was supposed to 
act as a counterweight to the powerful higher nobility.27 More influential was Karl 
Ferdinand Werner’s proposal of cooperation between the king and the highest no-
bles in relation to the emergence of the principalities in the West Frankish realm. 
According to him, in return for giving those powerful men a vice-regal position, 
Charles would have gotten their support and thus stabilised his reign.28 While the 
overall image of powerful nobles becoming marchiones and controlling large parts 
of the regnum has been generally accepted,29 Werner’s suggestion that this system 
was consciously and purposely created by Charles has been criticised. Instead, it 
has been emphasised that the foundations of this development had already been 
laid earlier, during the reigns of his immediate predecessors30 or even during the 
reign of Charles the Bald31 and that his grandson Charles the Simple only slowly 
succumbed to circumstance.32 Thus, his rule is not seen as having been built upon 
the investiture of powerful individuals as his surrogates, but founded on changing 
alliances with different groups of nobles.33 Further criticism of Werner’s  hypothesis 
highlights the differences in Charles’  control over the various regions of the realm. 
While intense in the area north of the Loire, south of the river his rule would have 
been no more than nominal.34
A second line of thought revolves around the problem of Charles the Simple’s 
legitimacy and its influence on his position as king. His father’s two marriages 
and their validity have always been subject to scholarly study,35 yet whether this 
actually played a role in late 9th century politics remains controversial. Those em-
phasising its importance claim it was the reason why Charles had been passed over 
for the throne, at least in 883/884,36 or why he underlined his Carolingian decent 
25 Eckel, Charles.
26 Classic Dhondt, Études.
27 Schneidmüller, Tradition. In a later publication however (Schneidmüller, Karl) we find no more 
traces of this idea.
28 Werner, Westfranken and Werner, Ursprünge.
29 See, for example, also Guillot, Formes.
30 Guillot, Formes.
31 Sassier, Hugues.
32 Kienast, Vasallität.
33 Ehlers, Anfänge. Like Schneidmüller, Ehlers later changed his view and supported a view closer to 
Werner’s (Ehlers, Strukturen).
34 Riché, Carolingiens. 
35 For example Eckel, Charles, 1−2.
36 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien.
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once he had become king in order to strengthen his rule.37 Charles certainly seems 
to have possessed a strong consciousness of his family background and of ques-
tions of legitimate and illegitimate birth—according to Geoffrey Koziol, this latter 
also resulted in a distinct dislike of his half-brothers Louis III and Carloman II.38 
However, while this emphasis on his Carolingian heritage seems to be the general 
consensus of scholarship, the political significance of Charles’  problematic legiti-
macy is more often doubted than stressed. In particular, other reasons have been 
brought forward concerning its role in the royal succession,39 thus questioning the 
political significance of Carolingian legitimacy for the late Carolingian age.
A third discussion centres on the reasons for the final failure of Charles’  reign, 
which culminated in his deposition. Some scholars attribute the rebellion of the 
nobles solely to the promotion of Charles’  intimate Hagano.40 Others interpret the 
king’s favourite as an example of a general policy pursued by Charles, emphasising 
the royal prerogative to choose his councillors, as opposed to the seemingly more 
successful strategies of Berengar I or Henry the Fowler, who acted as primus inter 
pares.41 Still others argue for a change in the structure of Charles’  rule, caused by 
more aggressive royal policies against the leading nobles.42 This view of a change 
in royal politics has been criticised by Geoffrey Koziol as an argument a silencio 
based on the lack of sources for most of Charles’  reign. In turn, he argues that 
Charles’  rule was characterised by a constant rivalry between the king and Rob-
ert of Neustria.43 In this context, special roles have been attributed to the effects 
of the treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte as well as to the acquisition of Lotharingia. 
Thus, Rollo’s investiture with the pagi along the Seine is sometimes interpreted as 
an effort to establish a counter-balance against Robert.44 Similarly, the extension 
of Charles’  rule over Lotharingia, while sometimes seen as having had a stabilis-
ing effect on his reign,45 is more commonly interpreted as having had a negative 
influence on his relations with nobles from the Western realm. Royal presence in 
Lotharingia is supposed to have led to a shift of Charles’  main power base away 
from Western Francia, which resulted in him being estranged from the Western 
nobles,46 or, at least, in an increased competition for influence at the royal court, 
thus destabilising the newly found balance.47
37 Schneidmüller, Tradition and even stronger Schneidmüller, Karl. This thought has been taken up 
Brühl, Deutschland and Koziol, Canons.
38 Koziol, Canons.
39 See for example Brühl, Deutschland; Sassier, Hugues; Offergeld, Reges pueri and Bruand, Francie. 
Ehlers, Anfänge and Riché, Carolingiens do not discuss the problem at all. 
40 Eckel, Charles; Riché, Carolingiens. Against this view Brühl, Deutschland, who reads the re-
proaches of the nobles because of Hagano as mere pretexts for their rebellion.
41 Le Jan, Élites et révoltes, 418−419 and Royaume, 93−94.
42 Werner, Westfranken; Ehlers, Anfänge.
43 Koziol, Charles; Koziol, Politics.
44 Le Jan, Élites et révoltes, 418; Plassmann, Normannen, 75−76.
45 Werner, Origines; Sassier, Hugues.
46 Schneidmüller, Tradition and Bruand, Francie.
47 Schneidmüller, Karl; Ehlers, Strukturen and Le Jan, Élites et révoltes, 418.
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This reading of Charles’  reign as a struggle for power between the king and 
the leading nobles points to the wider discourse among scholars over the struc-
tures of Carolingian rule and the diminution of royal power over the course of 
the 9th  century. Step by step, the boundaries for the beginning of this decline 
have been moved from the last years of Charlemagne’s reign48 to the end of that 
of Louis the Pious,49 then to the death of Charles the Bald50 and finally to the 
deposition of Charles the Fat.51 However, there are some important gaps left in 
the study of late Carolingian kingship. Leaving aside Charles the Simple, for Louis the 
Stammerer and his sons Louis III and Carloman II no published studies exist at 
all52 and the sole monograph on the reign of Eudes dates back to 1893.53 This lack of 
modern analysis may be a reason why the period after 888 is often still assessed as 
a time when royal rule is supposed to have suffered from a crisis of legitimacy and 
 authority.54 Especially concerning the reign of Charles the Simple, these assess-
ments are often particularly pessimistic, with Gerhard Schmitz’s (already rather 
dated) conclusion about the restraints placed on his rule representing the low point. 
According to him, Charles’  “Handlungsfähigkeit nach innen und nach außen 
[war] nicht nur begrenzt, sondern fast aufgehoben. Letztlich hatte sein Königtum 
nur so lange Bestand, wie die großen Vasallen es zu tolerieren bereit waren; Un-
terstützung konnte Karl von ihnen nicht erhoffen, einen Konflikt mit ihnen aber 
auch nicht riskieren, denn dessen Ausgang war bereits zu Ungunsten des Königs 
vorprogrammiert.”55
Possibilities and limits of late Carolingian rule
Schmitz aims to capture what in more general terms can be described as the king’s 
room for manoeuvre or, to apply another term, as his Handlungsspielraum. This 
latter concept provides a great basis for the exploration of the limitations a ruler 
was subject to and the possibilities available to him in political situations. How-
ever, while this term is frequently used especially by German historians, attempts 
to actually define its meaning and to use the concept behind it as an analytical 
tool are, given the number and variety of publications on the matter, very rare.56 
48 Ganshof, Fin.
49 De Jong, Penitential state.
50 Nelson, Charles.
51 MacLean, Kingship.
52 Closest are the introduction of Bautier, Recueil Louis  II, Louis III et Carloman II and Werner, 
Gauzlin as well as the chapters III.3.1.−3.2. of Offergeld, Reges pueri.
53 Favre, Eudes. Not counting Guillot, Étapes, a study limited to Odo’s accession to the throne.
54 Le Jan, Élites et révoltes; Le Jan, Royaume and Falkowski, Monarchie. Against this reading, see now 
McNair, Development, esp. part I.
55 Schmitz, Heriveus, 82.
56 Examples for its usage without outlining its meaning are Haverkamp, Einführung; Fössel,  Königin; 
Widder, Margarete “Maultasch”; Huber, Handlungsspielraum; Stickler, Handlungsspielraum. 
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“Political Handlungsspielraum is the sum of possible options of action which can 
be implemented successfully by the political decision-maker”57 is a simple defini-
tion used by political scientists. The existence of Handlungsspielraum is therefore 
bound to two conditions: a) a political situation requiring the political actor to 
become active and b) this actor having at least two different options that may lead 
to success and that he can choose from.
However, the range of options available to the actor is subject to certain con-
straints.58 One of these is the human limitations of the actor himself. The knowledge 
available to him is limited, as are his cognitive abilities to process this knowledge 
in regard to the possible consequences of his options. Thus, he only acts under 
“bounded rationality”59 Hence, human nature itself limits the actor’s options by 
preventing him from knowing about all of them and everything about them. Yet, 
there are also other constraints to his pool of options. In sociological approaches 
Handlungsspielraum defines the degree of freedom of an individual embedded 
into a society. “The more choices this individual has in decision situations, the 
more limited the restrictive conditions, the bigger is the Handlungsspielraum.”60 
Thus, the decision-making individual is conceived as part of a bigger group, a soci-
ety, which in turn limits his options. The practical philosopher Werner Stegmaier 
has included these restrictive conditions in his own definition: “A [Handlungs]
spielraum is the ‘space’ of a movement limited by rules, in which another, ‘playful’ 
movement, not subject to these rules, in this sense a ‘play’ free of rules, becomes 
possible; in short: the regulated limits of unregulated behaviour. ‘Within’ these lim-
its the behaviour may very well be subject to its own rules.”61 Thus, if an individual 
decision-maker is part of a greater community, he is subject to the rules existing in 
this society. Each of his actions underlies these predefined rules, yet, within these 
rules a certain space for own choices exists, which may possibly be dependent on 
other rules. The rules existing in a society are defined by whether other members 
of said society will consider the actual action decided upon as normatively and 
cognitively appropriate or inappropriate.62 Therefore, as a set, the rules existing 
Resch, Freiheit, gives some thoughts on the restrictions of individual Handlungsspielräume. 
 Notable exceptions are Auge, Handlungsspielräume and Poguntke, Handlungsspielräume.
57 “[Politischer Handlungsspielraum ist] die Menge möglicher Handlungsoptionen, die politische 
Handlungsträger umzusetzen in der Lage sind.” Sattler and Walter, Handlungsspielraum, 465.
58 See Tilly and Goodin, It depends.
59 Simon, Human Nature, 294. 
60 “Handlungsspielraum bezeichnet das Maß an Freiheit, welches die gesellschaftliche Einbettung 
dem Individuum belässt. Je mehr Alternativen in einer Entscheidungssituation zur Verfügung 
 stehen, je geringer die einschränkenden Bedingungen, desto größer ist der Handlungsspielraum.” 
Lautmann, Handlungsspielaum, 271.
61 Stegmaier, Philosophie, 221: “Ein Spielraum ist ein durch Regeln begrenzter ‘Raum’ einer 
 Bewegung, in dem eine nicht diesen Regeln gehorchende ‘spielerische’ Bewegung, ein in diesem 
Sinn von Regeln freies ‘Spiel’ möglich wird, kurz: eine geregelte Grenze ungeregelten Verhaltens. 
‘Innerhalb’ der Grenze kann das Verhalten wohl eigenen Regeln gehorchen.”
62 March and Olsen, Logic, 479. See also Lagroye, Sociologie, 168−171, who argues that these rules 
are also influenced by the party acting within the society. While this is certainly correct for the 
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in a society constitute the framework defining appropriate behaviour within this 
society. Thus, each decision taken is the result of a process of negotiations to which 
rules apply and regarding which of those rules are to be considered stronger.63 In 
some cases, this framework limits the possibilities of how to act in certain situa-
tions, while in others a large pool of options may exist. The range of these options 
within a given framework is expressed by the term Handlungsspielraum.
However, these frameworks are not static.64 Rules may change over time and 
actions that have been considered acceptable before can, in similar situations at 
later points, become unacceptable and vice versa. Especially in times of crisis and 
disorientation, the existing framework is questioned and shifts within it may take 
place.65 It would also be wrong to assume that at any given time only one frame-
work exists which determines the appropriateness of actions for any member of 
the society. In fact, different frameworks may coexist at the same time, each with 
its own set of rules. An example for these would be rules of behaviour stemming 
from one’s perception of oneself, that is to say, from one’s identity. These often 
collide with frameworks provided by society, thus leading to behaviour outside 
the limits of what is generally considered appropriate.66 This is especially the case 
in less stable and well-defined political systems,67 such as those existing in the late 
Carolingian era.
Hence, sounding out Handlungsspielraum is a process of negotiation between 
different systems of rules. However, this implies that there is a certain degree of 
flexibility inherent to these rules. Following Philippe Buc, it seems appropriate not 
to speak of “rules,” but rather of “norms” to emphasise this aspect.68 When refer-
ring to the realisation of these processes of negotiation, we can go even further and 
introduce another nuance. In the end, these processes are not only determined by 
the norms of the participating actors, but by their expectation that their opposite 
knows, acknowledges and acts not only according to his own norms, but takes 
also those of the other participants into consideration. This expectation can be 
described as trust, with the assumed probability that this expectation will be met 
by the other according to the degree of trust in the other.69 Hence, the existence of 
a certain degree of trust can be described as the prerequisite for negotiating since 
macro-environment described by Lagroye (the Church or another big organisation partaking in 
the political competition), this influence would be rather limited when it comes to individuals.
63 Crozier and Friedberg, Acteur, 36−37.
64 March and Olsen, Logic, 485−489. 
65 Eder, Societies. See Lagroye, Sociologie, 49−53 for the influence of a society’s environment on its 
development.
66 Orren and Skowronek, Iconography. On the role of appropriateness in the decision-making 
 process, see also Lazega, Appropriateness. 
67 March and Olsen, Logic, 482.
68 Buc, Review, 253, responding to the term “Spielregeln” introduced by Gerd Althoff to the 
 historiography. On the development of “Spielregeln”, see Kamp, Macht, 1−10.
69 On the concept of trust and its implications, see the introduction to chapter VI.
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it ensures the willingness to cooperate70 and thus becomes an important part for 
determining one’s Handlungsspielraum within a society.
When determining the possibilities and limitations of late Carolingian rule 
this leads to another question. The result of these negotiations is not only a ques-
tion of the norms of each individual actor and of the trust existing between the 
participants. The strength of the individuals’  identities also plays a role, as does 
the assessment of the situation as well as the available resources to realise any 
option.71 The importance of the last point is revealed when taking into considera-
tion that this process of negotiation was not always one of equal interaction in 
the late Carolingian age. Late Carolingian politics were a constant flux of negotia-
tions between the interests of the king and the nobles and, therefore, as Simon 
MacLean put it, “potentially unstable.”72 Each of these negotiations can be read 
as sounding out the possible ways of action, for the ruler as well as for the other 
nobles participating in the decision-making process or affected by their results. If 
the latter disliked the royal actions, they would offer resistance, either forcing an 
adjustment to or even change of the royal politics (possibly even by changing the 
king himself) or else being forced by the king to submit to his view. Thus, the royal 
Handlungsspielraum was not only determined by norms, but also by the capacity 
the king had to enforce his own norms over those of others. This even goes so far 
as to limit the importance of trust: overwhelming power on one side could simply 
leave no other option than to submit. The ratio of the power between the ruler and 
the nobles opposing his politics thus defined the possibilities and limits of royal 
power. When asking for these possibilities and limits during the late Carolingian 
era, it is therefore best to start by analysing the actual functioning of royal power 
during this time.
The functioning of royal power
The traditional starting point in analysing the potential power of any Carolin-
gian king is the royal fisc.73 The lands under direct royal control had originally 
been created by taking over the Roman civitates and imperial estates during the 
5th century and later supplemented by the Carolingian family lands when they 
superseded the Merovingians as the ruling dynasty. From the fisc, the kings drew 
the resources to equip their soldiers, to supply the court on its travels through the 
realm and to maintain their palaces and estates, the latter standing as reminders of 
70 For the importance of trust in interpersonal relations, see, for example, Marzano, Confiance.
71 March and Olsen, Institutions, 22; March and Olsen, Logic, 492−493 and Gulati and Srivastava, 
Agency.
72 MacLean, Kingship, 96.
73 On the problems associated with the fisc, see Barbier, Fisc. Fundamental also Brühl, Fodrum and 
Barbier, Palatium. 
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their authority even in their absence.74 Trying to establish the extent of the fisc at 
any given moment, however, poses problems that are impossible to solve. Almost 
all of our knowledge concerning royal property derives from the royal diplomas 
donating parts of it to individuals and institutions,75 telling us only which parts 
the king had decided to part with and not how much he actually possessed and 
controlled. Yet, it seems clear that it was concentrated around the palaces and in 
the core regions of royal power,76 while those parts given away were often situated 
outside these heartlands, where they would have been difficult to control.77 But the 
fisc did not simply undergo a process of continual diminution through grants; it 
was also replenished by acquisition, inheritance, gifts or confiscation of property 
in cases of treason, all of which were hardly ever documented by royal charters. 
Thus, the fisc was in constant flux and, given the gaps in our sources, any attempt 
to reconstruct it at a certain moment or shorter period must prove futile.78 In any 
case, the landed possessions only provided part of the royal income. Other wealth 
was also drawn from different fiscal rights on trade, such as tolls and markets, or 
from minting, which is equally impossible to quantify.79 In times of war, plunder 
and tribute could be obtained from the defeated, which provided an important 
means of rewarding armies.80 Finally, becoming ever more important during the 
second half of the 9th century, the kings could also access the resources of eccle-
siastical institutions, churches and abbeys, both being under royal protection and 
therefore open to royal influence.81
Counts were charged with the care of the royal estates, as well as keeping the 
peace in their counties, doing justice, putting royal decrees into practice and rais-
ing levies for royal campaigns, thus transmitting royal power to every corner of 
the realm.82 West of the Rhine, these counties appear to have been often centred 
on the old Roman civitates; east of the river, they were newly created and  oriented 
towards landscape and settlement structures. However, within these counties en-
claves existed, chiefly landed possessions of ecclesiastical institutions that had 
been granted royal immunity. Still others were created by the control of the unfree 
by the free. Since counts only had jurisdiction over the free, those areas which 
74 Renoux, Architecture, 25.
75 On these donations, see Dhondt, Études and Ganshof, Note.
76 Barbier, Palatium, 28.
77 Martindale, Kingdom; Barbier, Palatium, 50−53; Innes, State, 204 and Airlie, Palace, 11.
78 Although efforts have been made: concerning Charles the Simple, see Eckel, Charles, 41−43 and 
concerning the region between the Loire and Moselle, Barbier, Palatium (although covering the 
period from the 5th to the 10th century and not at a specific moment).
79 Endemann, Markturkunde, 105−61, Nelson, Charles, 19−40. On the Carolingian economy in gen-
eral, see Devroey, Economy and Verhulst, Economy. On tolls, see Adam, Zollwesen.
80 Reuter, Plunder.
81 Nelson, Kingship, 389−391 and West, Reframing, 42−44.
82 Nelson, Kingship, 410−411; Innes, State and West, Reframing, 20. For an early example of the idea of 
the counts (or better, office holders in general, including ecclesiastical ones like bishops) being agents 
of the king, controlled by him and deriving their ministerium from him, see Guillot, Ordinatio.
 The functioning of royal power 11
were inhabited only by the unfree remained outside their direct control.83 While 
the importance of these offices is clear, more interesting for us is the question 
of royal control over the office holders. One possibility for the kings to exercise 
control was to install counts of their choosing. However, the ability to do so 
appears to have been limited. Most of these cases documented by the sources oc-
curred when the county system was introduced in newly conquered territories 
and even then, the choice often fell on local nobles, since they had to rely on their 
own resources and connections to fulfil their tasks.84 Another possibility was to 
take control of a county after its count had died. For a long time, scholars as-
sumed that, from Charles the Bald’s capitulary of Quierzy at the latest,85 the office 
of count had become hereditary.86 While this reading misses the true character 
of the clause, which in fact confirms the royal prerogative to control succession,87 
nevertheless, the passing of a county from father to son already appears to have 
been common practice for a long time.88 Actual royal control over the countships 
appears to have ranged between these two extremes. The redistribution of counties 
was a generally accepted right of the king, as long as he could claim that the office 
holder had failed to properly fulfil his duties.89 Kings certainly claimed to exercise 
influence in such matters, yet whether they were actually able to implement their 
view differed from case to case.90
Next to the counties, a parallel and at least as important administrative system 
existed based on ecclesiastical organisation. Episcopal power was typical of the 
way Carolingian society worked, as it was situated at the frontiers between the 
profane and the sacral worlds and thus reached into both.91 Apart from their spir-
itual responsibilities, within their dioceses bishops were also responsible for keep-
ing public order and speaking justice. Like the counts, they participated in public 
assemblies and political decision making and provided, probably more reliably 
than the counts,92 substantial resources for royal politics.93 Like counts they acted 
as royal legates, like counts they acted as conduits of royal power. However, unlike 
83 Deutinger, Königsherrschaft, 148−149.
84 Nelson, Charles, 51. 
85 MGH Capit. II, N° 281, c. 9, 358.
86 For the development of this idea dating back to Montesquieu, see Bourgeois, Capitulaire, 155−205. 
The idea is still prevalent among scholars, see for example Werner, Naissance, 432.
87 As already pointed out by Bourgeois, Capitulaire. See also Guillot and Sassier, Pouvoirs I, 144−145.
88 Nelson, Charles, 53−54. 
89 As laid down in the treaty of Coulaines 843 (MGH Conc. III, N° 3, c. 3, 16). Guillot and Sassier, 
Pouvoirs I, 141−145. For the treaty of Coulaines, see Apsner, Vertrag, chapter I. On the process of 
the investiture of counts as well as on their deposition, see Depreux, Investitures.
90 Deutinger, Königsherrschaft, 153−158; Glansdorff, Comites, 24−31 and Nelson, Charles, 54.
91 Bührer-Thierry, Épiscopat, 147.
92 Nelson, Kingship, 390.
93 An example would be Heriveus of Reims who, according to Flodoard’s History of the Church of 
Reims, aided Charles the Simple with 1.500 men against the Hungarians (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 14, 
407). For episcopal lordships, see Kaiser, Bischofsherrschaft. For episcopal participation in royal 
assemblies and decision-making, see Eichler, Reichsversammlungen, 29−38 and 73−76.
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that of the counts, episcopal investiture was officially regulated by canonical law, 
that is to say, their election resided with the clergy and people of their respective 
dioceses.94 Reality, of course, was different, as Carolingian kings often aimed to 
install their own candidates.95 For example, Charles the Bald exercised close con-
trol over the sees of Reims, Sens and Rouen.96 Therefore, while the royal role in 
these elections led to conflicts with important ecclesiastical dignitaries, most often 
both parties appear to have sought a consensual agreement, resulting in the West 
Frankish realm in the integration of the royal prerogative into the canonical pro-
cedure of the appointment of a new bishop.97 Besides the king, the local nobility 
also had its say in the elections, trying to raise their own candidates, often rela-
tives, to the episcopal throne. This did not necessarily counteract royal aspirations 
since the member of a local family might well be the choice of the king too if said 
family belonged to the circle of his own supporters.98 Thus, episcopal succession 
presents itself as the competition of various, sometimes opposing, interests, yet it 
was one with seemingly more possibilities for the rulers to install candidates of 
their choice.
Limiting our view to resources and offices, however, fails to portray the func-
tioning of Carolingian kingship. As has already come through in the previous 
comments, we can make out its true basis: relations between the king and the 
nobles.99 Counts and bishops provided resources and transmitted royal power 
even into the distant regions of the realm, but royal control over both was lim-
ited. The kings tried to influence elections and install their own candidates, yet 
to succeed, they depended on the cooperation of the local nobility. In the words 
of Martin Gravel: “L’Empire carolingien doit être conçu comme un réseau de 
relations, comme l’enchevêtrement des liens du baptême, du sang, de l’alliance, 
de l’amitié, de la servitude et d’une multitude de fidélités.”100 Only by creating 
bonds between themselves and the nobles, by creating consensus about their king-
ship in general and each individual decision, could their rule succeed.101 Kingship 
was not simply the giving of orders, but necessarily needed to show consideration 
for the interests of those involved. In consequence, ruling consisted of constant 
  94 On the development of the royal investiture, see Schieffer, Entstehung, 10−26.
  95 See Schieffer, Bischofserhebungen.
  96 Bührer-Thierry, Épiscopat, 153. His influence on the episcopal sees in the south of his realm on 
the other hand, appears to have been almost inexistent.
  97 An example of this is Hincmar’s letter to Louis III in 881 (Migne, PL 126, col. 112B): in electione 
episcopi assensio regis sit, non electio. See also Schieffer, Bischofserhebungen.
  98 Basic for the episcopal election in Western Francia, de la Tour, Élections. More recent also Erk-
ens, Bischofswahl; Schieffer, Bischofserhebungen; Bührer-Thierry, Épiscopat and Deutinger, 
Königsherrschaft, 111−128. On episcopal power, see Kaiser, Bischofsherrschaft and Patzold, Epis-
copus. On royal−episcopal relations, see Bührer-Thierry, Évêques.
  99 Rosenwein, Politics; Innes, State and Innes, Charlemagne, 86.
100 Martin Gravel, Distances, 413.
101 On consensus in medieval rule, see Hannig, Consensus; Schneidmüller, Konsensuale Herrschaft; 
Apsner, Vertrag; Patzold, Konsens; Deutinger, Königsherrschaft; Nelson, Carolingians and Le 
Jan, Élites carolingiennes. 
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negotiations between different interests and each balance found between these 
interests was fragile and in need of constant care.102
A key factor for the relations between the king and his nobles was the distribu-
tion of honores, that is to say, land and offices.103 The former could be part of the 
fisc, belong to abbeys or churches or be confiscated from disloyal nobles; the latter 
could be counties or, more often, abbeys, commonly in the form of lay abbacies. 
Receiving a donation from the king reinforced the bond between himself and the 
receiving noble,104 who then acted as a conduit of royal power, transmitting the 
ruler’s will even to the frontiers of the realm. This does not mean that donations 
created loyalty. Far more often, they are instead the sign of already existing ties. 
For example, in border regions, small and unimportant abbeys were granted to in-
fluential nobles to install trusted men in potentially endangered zones, thus ensur-
ing royal control over these areas.105 Hence, giving away honores served to create 
and expand networks of power consisting of a larger number of individuals who 
would lend their support to the king. These networks were the means to exercise 
control over the realm and to transmit royal power even into regions that hardly 
ever saw the king in person.106
But to reduce the relations between the king and the aristocracy to a mere 
model of giving (making donations) and taking (withdrawing honores in the case 
of infidelity) would mean to limit our view. Besides honores, influence, partaking 
in the decision-making process, could draw the nobles to the king. In the ideal 
court as described by Hincmar, the king was surrounded by close advisors with 
whom he discussed the affairs of the realm before deciding on which measures 
to take.107 This circle only consisted of those closest to the king, those in the pos-
session of the most Königsnähe.108 As Hincmar notes, these men close to the king 
participated in the decision-making process and thus were able to influence its 
outcome.109 Therefore, being close to the king directly translated into political 
power. As we have already noted, the nobles close to the king served as conduits, 
transmitting the royal will into the regions of the realm. This also worked the other 
way round, with locals coming to the respective noble asking him to bring their 
102 MacLean, Kingship, 75; Becher, Gedanken.
103 On the importance of donations of the fisc, see Dhondt, Études and Ganshof, Note. On their as-
sumption of a dissolution of the fisc, see above. On the role of exchange in the relations between 
the king and the nobles, see Le Jan, Histoire, 305−306.
104 On the role of honores in the investiture, see Depreux, Investitures, 172−175.
105 Nelson, Charles, 57; MacLean, Kingship, 90 and Helvétius, Abbatiat, 285−286 and 297−298. See 
also the studies of Werner, Adelsfamilien; Rosenwein, Politics and Innes, State on the installation 
of nobles in certain regions to transmit royal power.
106 Wickham and Reuter, Introduction, 1−16. On these networks, see also Althoff, Verwandte 134−181 
and Werner, Adelsfamilien.
107 Hincmar, De ordine palatii, c. VI, 82−90, esp. 82−86. On the different types of assemblies and 
their importance, see Althoff, Colloquium and Eichler, Karolingische Höfe.
108 Nelson, Kingship, 403−404.
109 On the role of advisors and their influence see also Althoff, Kontrolle.
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wishes to the king.110 Thus, having access to the king meant to possess the ability to 
grant this access also to others or, in other words, to exercise control over the ac-
cess to the king.111 Like participating in political decisions, this was a further guar-
antee of political power since, on the one hand, it allowed the noble in question to 
influence the topics being discussed in the circle around the king and, on the other 
hand, strengthened his position at home. Since only he could provide access to the 
ruler, the petitioners needed to court his favour. Being close to the king and thus 
managing the affairs of the realm, being able to influence the decisions made at 
court and controlling the access to him was certainly an incentive for cooperating 
with the king that was at least as strong as getting donations from him.112
These thoughts can be developed even further: Stuart Airlie has argued that 
royal service not only served noble self-interest in honores and offices but also be-
came a constitutive factor of noble identity.113 Belonging to those around the king, 
counselling him and serving him, meant being part of the most privileged elite, a 
status that elevated them not only over their peers but also over their  relatives—
those with whom they were in competition for social advancement and proximity 
to the king. Their own and their family’s past actions served as sources of legiti-
macy and so did the prospect of future deeds done in service of the king, creating 
a line of continuity stretching from the times past to the times to come. Social 
status depended on how one was perceived by other nobles around oneself, and 
for contemporaries the significance of one’s family depended first of all on its con-
nections with the royal household and its access to the court.114
However, this leads to another problem: who belonged to these other nobles? 
Trying to find a convincing, all-encompassing definition for “aristocracy” proves 
to be a fruitless undertaking. To be noble meant to belong to the leading mem-
bers of the society. In some cases this was undisputable but in others it was hard 
to draw the line. “‘Nobility’  was a moral distinction, a moral distinction which 
(as moral distinctions usually do) tended to reflect social status. To be ‘noble’ in 
this sense was to exercise social power in the proper manner.”115 Thus, the aristoc-
racy consisted of individuals for whom belonging to this group depended on their 
own behaviour and the acknowledgement of their status by other members of the 
same group.116 Access to this group was open while within it a hierarchy existed in 
which advancement was possible.117 When talking about the aristocracy, we there-
110 Hincmar, De ordine palatii, c. IV, 67.
111 On the access to the king, see Althoff, Verwandtschaft; Scior, Ohr; Garnier, Kultur, 24−28 and 
Depreux, Hiérarchie.
112 See, for example, Rosenwein, Politics, 249 and Scior, Ohr.
113 Airlie, Semper fideles.
114 Airlie, Semper fideles, 133−134. See also Le Jan, Famille, 32−57 on noble identity and the recent 
contribution of Bougard, Bührer-Thierry and Le Jan, Élites.
115 Innes, State, 83. On the problem of “aristocracy,” see Innes, State, 82−85 and most of all Goetz, 
Nobilis.
116 For a sociological definition of “group“, see Tajfel and Turner, Identity.
117 On factors determining the position within the hierarchy, see Depreux, Überlegungen, esp. 94−95.
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fore should avoid imagining one single block in opposition to the ruler, but rather 
think of individuals and groups consisting of relatives and friends118 competing 
with each other for social advancement.119
Crucial for social advancement was the cooperation with the king. As Régine Le 
Jan expresses it: “Le roi carolingien fut le pivot de la circulation des honneurs et 
des richesses, contrôlant la hiérarchie sociale par le système du don, imposant la 
mobilité et la fidélidé en confisquant les honneurs pour cause d’infidélité.”120 The 
king was the pivot in the competition for influence over the affairs of the realm as 
well as the source of noble identity. He could take advantage of his position within 
this system by choosing his councillors and promoting them at his pleasure. Yet, 
there were limits to his choices. Having reached a certain level within the hierar-
chy, the nobles not merely passively hoped for the king’s goodwill. From their own 
self-conception they derived a right to be treated according to their position, to 
take part in the affairs of the realm and to receive honores.121 What is revealed here 
is a complex system of sometimes diverging claims. On the one hand was the king, 
exerting his right to choose whom to favour and further, on the other hand, was 
the noble, deriving from his already elevated position the belief that he needed to 
be chosen by the king. This system of relations between the king and the nobles 
was an unstable one, one that needed constant care and one in which there was 
often no ideal choice which could satisfy all parties involved, only one that would 
limit the damage done within a bigger part of the network.
Our comments up to this point have been aimed at casting some light on the 
functioning of royal power and the determining factors in the relations between 
the king and the nobles. However, the political landscape of the late 9th century 
underwent some important changes that need to be taken into consideration 
when studying this period. Since the reign of Charles the Bald, within Western 
Francia some nobles had created large conglomerates of honores that were to be-
come the future principalities.122 The original perception of these developments by 
Jan Dhondt,123 who promoted the idea of the “rise of the aristocracy” as a struggle 
of two opposing powers—the Carolingian kings and “the aristocracy”—has since 
been questioned and modified. For example, Karl Ferdinand Werner emphasised 
royal consent in this development, describing the principalities as sub-kingdoms 
led by nobles in vice royal positions who exercised powers delegated by the 
kings.124 Furthermore, as Simon MacLean in his study on the reign of the Emperor 
118 On such groups, see Althoff, Verwandte; Althoff, Amicitiae; Le Jan, Famille, 77−85 and Epp, 
Amicitia.
119 Airlie, Semper fideles, 133.
120 Le Jan, Royaume, 91. 
121 MacLean, Kingship, 15 and Althoff, Kontrolle, 302 and 329−330.
122 Examples for studies in this field are Werner, Enquêtes; Sassier, Recherches; Bur, Formation; Robbie, 
Emergence and McNair, Development. General assessments are provided by Dhondt, Études and 
Dunbabin, France. For criticism on the concept of “principality,” see McNair, Development, 14−20.
123 Dhondt, Études.
124 Werner, Westfranken, 738−379.
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Charles III “the Fat” has explained: “Carolingian kings and emperors had always 
been accustomed to dealing with powerful aristocratic individuals, and not with 
the ‘aristocracy’ (or individual aristocratic families) as a monolithic entity.”125 The 
rise of powerful individual nobles was not something that was only typical of the 
late Carolingian period. Kings already had had to cope with such individuals and 
managed to integrate them into their rule. Therefore, we should not perceive this 
period as a constant struggle between the “aristocracy” and the kings, but rather 
as one in which their cooperation, their joint work towards a well-ordered world, 
should be emphasised.126
This is not to claim that the framework of late Carolingian politics was static. 
Duke Boso, who in 879 convinced the local nobles at Mantaille to elect him king, 
struck a first blow against the functioning of this system. Although married to 
a Carolingian princess, he destroyed the illusion of a Carolingian monopoly on 
kingship and made the office targetable for other ambitious nobles.127 In addition, 
noble families became more and more autonomous from the royal centre as the 
noble self-conception became increasingly detached from royal service and in-
stead depended on family traditions and property rights.128 They now developed 
a dynastic identity and began to ascribe their power not to royal generosity but to 
God’s will.129 This effect became pronounced when in 888 kings came to power 
in the former Carolingian regna whose kinship with the Carolingian family was 
at best problematic. To name only two examples, in Eastern Francia, Arnulf of 
Carinthia, an illegitimate son of Carloman of Bavaria, now assumed power while 
in Western Francia, Odo, a Robertian without a single trace of Carolingian blood, 
made his move for the throne. Carolingian legitimacy remained a strong argu-
ment in the political theatre130, but from now on one could also become king by 
possessing sufficient power to impose oneself on the other nobles.
These two developments, the rise of individual nobles amassing honores with 
royal consent on the one hand and the loss of the Carolingian monopoly on the 
throne on the other, may have commenced independently of each other, yet by the 
end of the 9th century, they were inseparably linked. Boso had only been able to 
claim a crown because he had already risen to a position from which he was able to 
do so, yet he had chosen a moment in which the Carolingian monopoly still stood 
unwavering. However, his rebellion was a first crack in the dam which broke nine 
years later when dynastic coincidences had done away with all legitimate male 
Carolingians north and south of the Alps, apart from a nine-year-old boy, Charles 
the Simple. These developments, the weakening of Carolingian legitimacy and the 
increasing power of some nobles in combination with their growing emancipation 
125 MacLean, Kingship, 77−78.
126 West, Reframing, 100−102.
127 Airlie, Semper fideles. On Boso’s rebellion, see also chapter VI.4.
128 Airlie, Semper fideles, 139−140.
129 Le Jan, Royaume, 90.
130 Le Jan, Royaume, 88.
 Analytical approach 17
from the crown, led to a shift in the relations between the king and the nobles 
which started to unhinge the old system.131
Analytical approach
While it is undeniable that such shifts took place, the basis of royal power did 
not fundamentally change. Its basic principles remained intact and ensured the 
cooperation of the nobles. The better they were integrated into the king’s rule, 
the better the royal will was transmitted even into the most distant corners of the 
realm. When it comes to determining royal influence, this understanding also has 
a major impact on the value of the royal itinerary. It has been rightfully noted that 
in the late 9th/early 10th century, West Frankish kings were limited in their travels 
to the north-east of their realm,132 yet the conclusion that their sphere of action 
was as limited is misleading. As long as the king was in contact with nobles from 
the regions outside the radius of his movement, he could influence the local poli-
tics. Thus, analysing royal power means that an approach focused merely on direct 
royal actions is too limited. Defending the realm, dealing with conflicts and ensur-
ing the royal prerogative certainly can be used as benchmarks for the possibilities 
of royal power,133 yet these actions are only the surface of the underlying network 
of nobles centred around the ruler. An analysis of the possibilities and limits of 
royal power has to take these two levels into consideration.
Networks can be understood as ensembles consisting of individuals (or groups) 
who are linked with each other by social relations,134 or in other words, are ex-
pressed by the sum of their interactions and connections.135 While they do consti-
tute rather stable collectives,136 the individuals belonging to a network can compete 
with each other.137 This means that networks are dynamic structures which develop 
over time and which may become fragile up to the point of breaking even under 
the occurrence of only minor pertubances.138 Therefore, when analysing networks 
the focus has to be set on the nature of the relations between the different actors,139 
131 On this, see also Le Jan, Famille and the conference proceedings Bougard, Feller and Le Jan, 
Élites; Depreux, Bougard and Le Jan, Élites as well as Falkowsky and Sassier, Monde.
132 Kienast, Wirkungsbereich.
133 See for example Le Jan, Élites and Royaume, using royal control over the distribution of honores, 
or Althoff, Spielregeln, 21, who focuses on conflict situations to determine the ruler’s Hand­
lungsspielräume. See also Auge, Handlungsspielräume, 8, according to whom each of a rulers 
decisions, each measure enacted, whether made consciously or not and whether successful or 
not, was subject to the judgement of the nobles, allowing us to use their consequences as a margin 
to determine the possibilities and limits of royal power.
134 Rosé, Reconstitution, 207; Preiser-Kapeller, Calculating, 101−102.
135 Preiser-Kapeller, Calculating, 103; Dumézil, Culture, 556−557.
136 Dumézil, Culture, 556−557.
137 Hitzbleck and Hübner, Netzwerkgrenzen, 8−9; Hitzbleck, Verflochten, 21−24.
138 Preiser-Kapeller, Calculating, 102.
139 Stegbauer, Netzwerkanalyse.
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or in the case of this study, on those between a ruler and the nobles in contact with 
him. Only by analysing these in regard to continuity, intentionality and quality 
can the position of an individual within a network be determined.140 Based on this 
analysis, within a network different zones, or layers, can be identified, as defined 
by these relations:141 while frequent and intense contacts between a ruler and a 
noble indicate the importance of this noble for the ruler and their central position 
within the network, a single contact might not even be deemed sufficient to place 
a noble within the network at all.
This leads to a key problem of network analysis for historians and especially 
for those studying early medieval history. Even in best-case scenarios, the sources 
available are so scarce that it becomes questionable whether the identification 
of general structures and developments is possible at all.142 While the scarcity of 
sources is especially true for the late Carolingian era, there is one type of source 
that offers considerable advantages when it comes to analysing networks and de-
termining the relations between individuals: charters and specifically royal di-
plomas.143 They not only allow us to establish relations between individuals (in 
the case of the royal diplomas the ruler and the nobles petitioning and receiv-
ing these), but also offer insight into the quality, frequency and intensity of these 
relations.144 Therefore, these royal diplomas form the basis of those parts of this 
study dealing with the networks of royal power while narrative sources are used 
to complement and contextualise the information gained from the diplomas. This 
approach also allows us to mitigate the problems caused by the gap in said narra-
tive sources between 900 and 919.
While this study is dedicated to exploring the possibilities of Charles the Sim-
ple’s royal power, his rule cannot be fully understood without going further back 
140 Hitzbleck, Verflochten, 31−35. Similar also Preiser-Kapeller, Calculating, 103, who focuses on 
the category, intensity, frequency and dynamics of interactions and relations. Rosé, Reconstitu-
tion, 207−208, emphasises the importance of the number of relations of an individual within a 
network, the geographical proximity between two individuals in contact with each other and 
whether an individual acts as an intermediary for others. We consider the last point as one of the 
key factors for our own analysis.
141 Hitzbleck and Hübner, Netzwerkgrenzen, 9, emphasising the implications of these for the limits 
of a network.
142 Preiser-Kapeller, Calculating, 103; Hitzbleck and Hübner, Netzwerkgrenzen, 8. Furthermore, 
certain biases may also be caused by the nature of some kinds of sources. Letters, for example, 
while providing unique insight into the relation between individuals, owe their existence to the 
regional distance between composer and recipient. Using letters as the main basis for a network 
analysis may therefore lead to a bias towards those relations over others, in which contact did not 
depend on written exchange but was mainly oral. Hitzbleck, Verflochten, 31−32.
143 On the advantages of charters for network analysis and the methodology see Rosé, Reconstitu-
tion, 212−213. Rosé has demonstrated that the methods of digital data analysis can also be used 
for research on early medieval history. On the drawbacks of digital data analysis of networks such 
as the problem to portray the dynamics of relations, see for example Lemercier, Time. Consider-
ing these drawbacks as well as the fragementary nature of the sources at our disposition and our 
need to contextualise each diploma and each appearance, we have refrained from using digital 
data analysis for our own study.
144 On the interpretation of diplomas see chapter II, introductory remarks.
 Analytical approach 19
to the 870s, to the times of his father, Louis II the Stammerer, his brothers Louis III 
and Carloman II, to the Emperor Charles III the Fat and finally to the  Robertian 
Odo. It was during their reigns that the frameworks determining at least the early 
years of Charles the Simple’s own developed. Taking the study back to the years 
following the death of Charles II the Bald allows us to make comparisons  between 
Charles the Simple’s reign and those of his predecessors and to reveal the conti-
nuities and changes without having to revert to the questions of “structures” often 
used in research on the 9th and 10th centuries. It allows us to analyse the rea-
sons for Charles’  very late succession to his father and the basis of his kingship 
(chapter I), to reveal the networks of royal power and the ruptures they underwent 
before and during Charles’  reign (chapters II and III) and to use the results gained 
from these to assess the rulers’  actions towards their neighbours, the Northmen, 
and their own nobles (chapters IV, V and VI).145 Each chapter of this study adds 
 another layer to the analysis of the relations between rulers and nobles and thus to 
the possibilities and limits of royal power in the late Carolingian age.146
145 On the importance of relations between different actors, for the context of their actions and the 
analysis of their room for manoeuvre, see Preiser-Kapeller, Calculating, 105. 
146 This approach means that we will return to the same events at numerous times over the course 
of this study, leading to certain redundancies. Given the advantages of being able to assess each 
event and each action from different perspectives and in different contexts, this is a price we 
consider to be worth paying.

I. Becoming king: The questions of legitimacy and support
In hindsight, Charles III the Simple’s accession to the throne appears as a surprise. 
Born posthumously as Louis II the Stammerer’s third son, he was passed over in 
the royal succession no less than four times until finally, a rebellious noble fac-
tion chose him as king. Although the ensuing war was lost, he was nevertheless 
confirmed as king and succeeded the victorious Odo shortly thereafter. This brief 
account raises a number of questions which serve as a starting point to understand 
Charles’  rule and the possibilities and limits of his royal power. Why was Charles 
passed over in the royal succession so many times? Or, in other words, why did 
the nobles rebelling against Odo chose Charles as their king when seemingly his 
claim to the throne was weak enough to be ignored until that moment? This, in 
turn, leads to the issue of the composition and structure of the network these no-
bles formed and to the question of their various motives. Essentially, this means 
examining the basic conditions under which Charles became king: to evaluate the 
nature of his legitimacy as well as its importance as an argument in the politics 
of the West Frankish realm and to analyse the composition and cohesion of the 
network of nobles elevating him to the throne.
I.1 Charles’ claim to the throne
When Archbishop Fulk wrote his letter to King Arnulf of the East Frankish realm 
in 893, announcing Charles’  elevation to the throne and asking for the king’s sup-
port, he made some remarks concerning certain rumours that had apparently 
reached Arnulf ’s ears, according to which Charles was not Louis  II the Stam-
merer’s son. Fulk, however, assured the king that these rumours were unfounded, 
and that in fact the young Carolingian resembled his father in a way that made his 
descent above suspicion.1 From what we know from the sources, these rumours, 
probably spread by Odo’s supporters to contest Charles’  claim to the throne, 
were never spread again. It is nevertheless interesting to note the way they were 
constructed. Undoubtedly referring to his posthumous birth, they denied Louis’ 
parentage and consequently Charles’  Carolingian blood, the basis of his claim. 
This strategy certainly made sense, yet it is surprising that they did not attack the 
youth’s legitimacy in any other way.
1 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 382: Denique, quod audierat ipsi Arnulfo dictum fuisse, quod hic Karolus 
filius Ludowici non fuerit, asseverat neminem se posse credere fore, qui, eum si viderit et parentum 
ipsius effigiem cognoverit, non recognoscat illum de regia processisse progenie; quedam quoque patris 
sui  Ludowici signa gestare, quibus agnoscatur filius ipsius fuisse.
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I.1.1 Louis the Stammerer’s two marriages
The problem of the legitimacy of Charles’  birth, or more precisely that of his fa-
ther’s two marriages, has long been the subject of scholarly discussion.2 Louis the 
Stammerer and his own father, Charles II the Bald, had had a difficult relationship. 
Several times, the son had revolted against the father, been reconciled and then 
revolted again.3 During one of these cases in 862, Louis, following the advice of 
some of his supporters, had married Ansgarde, daughter of Count Harduin and 
sister of Odo, count of Châteaudun, one of his close supporters.4 Louis’  revolt was 
subsequently put down, but the marriage with Ansgarde remained, soon to bear 
fruit in the form of two sons, Louis III and Carloman II, as well as a daughter, 
Hildegard. Some time later, Charles forced his son to abandon his wife and marry 
Adelaide, daughter of one of Charles’  own close supporters, the Burgundian mag-
nate and count of the palace, Adalard.5 This count’s importance is also underlined 
by his appearance in the capitulary of Quierzy from 877, in which Charles laid 
down preparations for his journey to Italy: Adalard was among those appointed 
to stay close to Louis during the emperor’s absence and was also in charge of the 
royal court of justice.6
According to Karl Ferdinand Werner, Adalard, and consequently Adelaide, 
came from an old family, going back to Bego, count of Paris, who had restored and 
reformed the abbey Saint-Maur of Fossés and died on the 28th October 8167, and 
his wife Alpais, daughter of Louis the Pious. In addition, Bego’s nephews, Count 
2 Eckel, Charles, 1−2; Brühl, Hinkmariana  II, 60−77; Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 221−240 and 
 Werner, Nachkommen, 438−441.
3 For details see Kasten, Königssöhne, 443−465.
4 Annales Bertiniani 862, 91. For the circumstances of the revolt see Nelson, Charles, 204 and 
 Kasten, Königssöhne, 446−449. For the family of Odo of Châteaudun see Levillain, Essai.
5 Regino, Chronicon 878, 114. On Adalard’s paternity of Adelaide see Werner, Nachkommen, 
429−441. The date of the divorce of Louis and Ansgarde as well as his remarriage with Adelaide 
remains debated. While Regino states that Charles forced the divorce and presented Louis with 
his new wife-to-be, Hincmar’s Annales Bertiniani remain quiet on the subject, undoubtedly out of 
political considerations (Offergeld, Reges pueri, 344 with n. 146). Brühl, Hinkmariana II, based on 
an early 11th century source, proposed that these events in fact took place only after the death of 
Charles the Bald in 877 and were forced upon Louis not by his father, but by an influential party 
of nobles opposing him as part of their agreement to Louis’ succession. This theory has been 
 resolutely opposed by Werner, Nachkommen, 437−441, followed by Hlawitschka,  Lotharingien, 
225−228, and Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman, XXVIII, n. 2. Brühl defended his 
theory in another article (Miszellen, 355−370). Offergeld seems unconvinced by Brühl’s  arguments, 
yet does not deny the theory, due to it being “politically more plausible” and chronologically possible. 
He proposes that the marriage might well have been forced on Louis by the nobles before the death 
of Charles and without his knowledge or consent, comparable to the resistance of the nobility 
against the emperor’s Italian policy (Offergeld, Reges pueri, 345−346).
6 MGH Capit.  II, N° 281 c.  17, 359. Before, Adalard had already served as missus. Recueil Saint-
Benoît I, N° 24, 57.
7 Charles the Simple calls him genitricis nostrae proavus (DChS 108). On this count see also Depreux, 
Prosopographie, 120−122 and Depreux, Dimension.
 I.1 Charles’ claim to the throne 23
Gerard of Vienne8 and Adalard the Seneschal, uncle of Charles the Bald’s first 
wife Ermentrude,9 were influential under Charles the Bald. Bego’s son Leuthard 
held the county of Paris and his second son Eberhard became well established 
in northern Burgundy, while his daughter Susanna10 married a certain Wulfard, 
who fathered yet another Wulfard, count of Angoulême, and finally Adalard, Ad-
elaide’s father.11 Adelaide also had a brother, also named Wulfard, who became 
abbot of Flavigny and was a member of the royal chancellery.12 The family also 
branched out into southern Lotharingia13 and had relatives in Aquitaine.14 Louis’ 
marriage to Adelaide thus tied him to an important family with close links to his 
father. It also ensured the continuing influence of the faction of nobles Adalard 
belonged to, even after the death of Charles.
However, the circumstances of the two marriages gave rise to questions con-
cerning their validity and thereby also the legitimacy of the offspring produced 
from each. Hincmar’s Annales Bertiniani refrain from even mentioning the sub-
ject. Neither the divorce nor Charles’  birth is mentioned and while the archbishop 
refers to the queen, he does not use her name, thus giving the impression that 
nothing had changed.15 The archbishop did not entirely succeed in his endeavour 
to hush up the affair, however. When treating Louis’  meeting with Pope John VIII 
at Troyes in 878, he reports how the pope crowned Louis as king (Charles the Bald 
had died the year before), yet refused his explicit request to do the same for his 
wife, still not mentioning her name.16 John’s own position on the matter is less 
clear than it appears at first sight. While he refused to crown Adelaide, he nev-
ertheless stayed with Louis and his wife for several weeks. His refusal, therefore, 
seems not to have been taken badly, and appears more to have been the result of 
an unwillingness to take a clear position in the issue.
Louis himself, as the incident with John VIII shows, did his best to establish 
Adelaide as queen. Yet, when considering his own succession, he did not disinherit 
 8 The Girart de Roussillon of the famous Chanson de Geste.
 9 On this personage see Lot, Mélanges and Depreux, Prosopographie, 80−82.
10 In opposition to Werner, Nachkommen, 433, Hlawitschka, Anfänge, 166–168 with n. 64, argues 
that Susanna was not the daughter of Alpais, but descended from an earlier (unknown) marriage 
of Count Bego, thus avoiding the problem of Louis the Stammerer and Adelaide being cousins of 
the 6th degree. 
11 Werner, Nachkommen, Exkurs II, 429−441. On the family see also Le Jan, Famille, 442, table N° 57 
“La descendance de Gérard de Paris” adding Wulfgrim, Imo and Hildeburg to the children of 
Wulfard and Susanna.
12 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman, LXV–LXVIII.
13 Hlawitschka, Anfänge, 164−168.
14 Werner, Nachkommen, Exkurs II, 435−436.
15 This behaviour of the archbishop appears in stark contrast to his attacks on Lothar II concerning 
the latter’s marriage. See Brühl, Hinkmariana II.
16 Annales Bertiniani 878, 227. On this Befestigungskrönung see Brühl, Hinkmariana II, 63 with n. 31. 
Werner, Nachkommen, 440, followed by Offergeld, Reges pueri, 344, argued that this refusal to 
crown Adelaide was due to the uncanonical character of the marriage, Louis and Adelaide being 
related in the 6th degree. Le Jan, Famille, 320 in contrast points out that marriage of this type was 
widely tolerated and practiced. 
24 I. Becoming king: The questions of legitimacy and support
his sons by Ansgarde. In the treaty of Fouron, made with Louis the Younger, king 
of Eastern Francia, and negotiated with the consent of the magnates, he considered 
them equal to any male children he might have in the future.17 His sons’ personal 
importance to him can also be deduced from a letter to Archbishop Hincmar in 
which the king asked for the cleric’s aid for them.18 Furthermore, their political 
relevance is underlined by the fact that the king used Carloman to strengthen 
his ties to the powerful Boso by means of a marriage alliance. However, on his 
deathbed, Louis suddenly changed his plans for the succession and appointed his 
oldest son Louis  III as his sole heir.19 This gave rise to a complicated situation, 
and thereby provided ample opportunity for those looking to gain an advantage 
to impose their own view of things. The legitimacy of Louis and Carloman was 
questionable to those who considered Louis the Stammerer’s marriage with Ad-
elaide valid. On the other hand, if this second marriage were uncanonical, the 
same doubts would be cast on any male offspring from that union.20
Indeed the legitimacy of the boys was soon openly questioned. Not even a 
year later, in October 879, Boso of Vienne proclaimed himself king,21 arguing, as 
Regino reports, that the throne was vacant due to the absence of legitimate heirs 
to King Louis,22 thus claiming that neither of Louis’  marriages had been valid. 
However, an inspection of the circumstances of this new claim reveals the purely 
opportunistic character of this reasoning. With Louis dead, yet without any drop 
of Carolingian blood himself, Boso needed an argument explaining why he him-
self could now claim the throne. He constructed a claim by simply casting away 
that of Louis’  sons, to one of whom, Carloman, he had engaged his daughter only 
a year earlier at Troyes.23
17 MGH Capit. II, N° 246 c. 3, 169: Si autem vos mihi superstes fueritis, filios meos Hludowicum et 
 Karlomannum et alios, quos divina pietas mihi donare voluerit, ut regnum paternum quiete tenere 
 possint, similiter et consilio et auxilio, prout melius potueritis, ut adiuvetis rogo.
18 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 19, 261.
19 Annales Bertiniani 879, 234−235. Kasten, Königssöhne, 483, on the other hand, interprets the 
treaty of Fouron not as a decision to divide the realm among Louis’ sons, but only as an “Eventu-
alklausel” securing the rights of all the sons to follow their father in case of the death of the eldest. 
Accordingly, Louis would not have changed his succession plans at the last moment, but simply 
followed the tradition of the ordinatio imperii and the preferential treatment of the eldest son. She 
states that Louis, remembering his own succession problems, thought that his son Louis would be 
more likely to follow him if he were to be the only candidate. The treaty of Fouron, however, does 
not differentiate between the sons; they are all equally to hold their father’s realm after his death 
and there is no mention of any preferred succession of the eldest, Louis. See also Offergeld, Reges 
pueri, 351, n. 164.
20 As has been argued by Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 235, for Charles the Simple. Undoubtedly, this 
problematic situation also shaped Charles’ own youth, with would serve to explain his distinctive 
consciousness for legitimacy, brilliantly analysed by Koziol, Canons, 173−178.
21 On him and these events, see chapter VI.4.
22 Regino, Chronicon 879, 144. In Boso’s electio Louis’ sons are being passed over, Boso arguing that no 
suitable person (except for himself) could be found to succeed Louis. MGH Capit. II, N° 284 C, 368.
23 Annales Bertiniani 878, 229. See also Werner, Gauzlin, 425.
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I.1.2 The question of Louis’ succession
As we can see, due to the questionable status of Louis the Stammerer’s marriages, 
Charles’  legitimacy certainly offered possibilities to attack his claim. Nevertheless 
in 893, and in contrast to Boso fourteen years earlier, Odo’s supporters chose not 
to exploit this issue but to question the paternity of Louis. So did the question-
able legitimacy of Louis the Stammerer’s sons carry any political relevance at all? 
It has been argued that, due to the questions over the validity of both of Louis 
the Stammerer’s marriages, the decision to crown the sons from his marriage 
with Ansgarde invalidated any rights Adelaide’s offspring might have had, thus 
explaining why Charles was passed over in the royal succession at least after the 
death of his brothers.24 An analysis of the royal successions between 879 and 898 
will help to cast some light on this question.
It is possible Charles was even passed over in 879, before his birth. After Louis 
the Stammerer’s death in April, the leading nobles around Hugh the Abbot did 
not follow his last wishes and crown his eldest son Louis, but called in an assem-
bly at Meaux to discuss future proceedings.25 Yet before Hugh and his allies were 
able to put any plan into action, a rival group around the former archchancellor 
Gauzlin had already assembled bishops, abbots and other important noblemen at 
Creil, inviting Louis the Younger, the partner of the treaty of Fouron, to come to 
the kingdom.26 According to Hincmar, Gauzlin acted out of a thirst for revenge 
and ambition; yet his real motive appears to have been his rivalry with Hugh the 
Abbot.27 While the latter has been made out as the driving force behind Louis the 
Stammerer’s decision that only his eldest son should succeed him, Gauzlin appears 
to have favoured a partition of the realm between both Louis and Carloman.28
Faced with Louis the Younger invading the realm, in May, Hugh’s faction sent 
envoys to the king at Verdun. In the subsequent treaty, Louis the Younger received 
Lotharingia in return for his withdrawal from the realm and a guarantee that the 
rest of the Western kingdom would remain with Louis the Stammerer’s sons.29 
This agreement indicates that Hugh’s and Gauzlin’s factions had also come to 
terms by this point. However, whether this meant a return to the original arrange-
ment of Fouron, securing the succession of all of Louis’  sons and thus including 
the possibility of rule for another prince from the pregnant Adelaide, or whether 
24 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 235−240, argues strongly in favour of this reading. The argument 
has been revived by Schneidmüller, Karl  III., 25, although he does not add new points to the 
discussion.
25 Annales Bertiniani 879, 235. The Annales Vedastini (879, 44) report that the group around Hugh 
wanted both sons to succeed. Whether their account is correct remains an open question, for 
events took another turn.
26 Annales Bertiniani 879, 235−236. We will discuss these factions in more detail in chapter II.2. For 
a thorough reconstruction of these events, see Werner, Gauzlin, 406–437.
27 Werner, Gauzlin, 422−428.
28 Werner, Gauzlin, 420−422.
29 Annales Bertiniani 879, 236−238; Annales Vedastini 879, 44.
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the succession was now restricted to the older sons of Ansgarde is not clear from 
the sources. In any case, Hugh and his allies failed to put the terms of the agree-
ment into practice and Gauzlin again summoned Louis the Younger. The latter, 
occupied with the succession to his brother Carloman of Bavaria, promised only 
to return to the Western kingdom as soon as he could.30 At this point, and just 
before Adelaide gave birth to Charles, Hugh and his allies sent for Archbishop 
Ansegisus of Sens to anoint and crown Louis and Carloman.31
As Thilo Offergeld has rightly noted, Hugh’s faction could have delayed the 
coronation for a few more weeks to wait for Adelaide’s delivery.32 The threat posed 
by a potential second intervention on the part of Louis the Younger was certainly 
crucial in provoking Hugh to act, yet Offergeld is right to wonder whether Ad-
elaide’s imminent delivery might not also have contributed to Hugh’s decision.33 
Unusually, Charles’  birth was noted by the sources, a fact that points towards its 
political importance.34 Moreover, the boy certainly had at least some support: his 
closest relatives did try to further his rights. As Regino notes, he was named by his 
mother after his grandfather, Charles the Bald.35 During the 9th century, a strong 
tendency had developed to give possible heirs to the throne a name from a very 
exclusive corpus: Pippin, Louis and Lothar, Carloman and Charles.36 The choice 
to name the boy Charles therefore was not random, but followed a political pro-
gram, emphasising the legitimate birth of the child and his right to the throne, fur-
ther strengthened through linking him to his ancestors Charlemagne and Charles 
the Bald. After Adelaide, one should also consider her brother Wulfard, abbot of 
Flavigny. Wulfard had risen under Louis the Stammerer, becoming first notary−
chancellor, then archchancellor, succeeding Gauzlin in early April 879.37 Yet, for 
almost two years following the death of Louis, the office of archchancellor seems 
to have remained vacant, and the first diploma of Carloman II was witnessed only 
by the notary Norbert.38 Only at the beginning of 881 does Wulfard appear again as 
archchancellor,39 at the moment when Carloman was staying near his abbey in the 
30 Annales Bertiniani 879, 238. See also Werner, Gauzlin, 427−430 on the subject, dealing with the 
difficulties of the biased and incomplete account given by Hincmar.
31 Annales Bertiniani 879, 238−239; Annales Vedastini 879, 45.
32 Offergeld refers to a number of later examples, after the death of Louis X in 1316 and of Charles IV 
in 1328, when the question of succession was indeed delayed until the respective widows had given 
birth. The case of Empress Agnes in 1057, when the Duchy of Bavaria remained vacant until her 
pregnancy ended, is also similar. Offergeld, Reges pueri, 363, n. 204.
33 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 359−360.
34 Schieffer, Väter, 155.
35 Regino, Chronicon 878, 114.
36 On the subject of Carolingian names see Becher, Arnulf, 665−668.
37 DLS 31, 29th March or 10th April 879. See also Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, 
LXVII–LXVIII.
38 DCmII 49, 30th November 880.
39 DCmII 50, 12th February 881. Wulfard appears to have regained his office between 30th November 
880 (DCmII 49) and this date. See also Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, LXVIII.
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Nivernais between the first and second campaign against Duke Boso.40 It there-
fore seems likely that the party around Adelaide, amongst them Wulfard, lost its 
position at court with the death of Louis and subsequent assumption of power on 
the part of Hugh the Abbot. Wulfard apparently only regained his office after the 
revolt of Boso, when Hugh and Carloman needed the Nivernais as a base for their 
campaign against him. He may have become part of the inner circle around the 
king very quickly, as two intercessions in Carloman’s diplomas show.41 If  Wulfard 
indeed had lost his office due to his support for his nephew, it seems safe to deduce 
that a part of the price for reassuming his old position at the court would have 
been to renounce Charles’  claim.
Certainly, at the moment of Louis’  and Carloman’s coronation, Charles’  claim 
was a mere possibility. Yet, given the political tensions at that moment, it does not 
seem unreasonable to assume that Hugh wanted to avoid the possibility of any 
further complications by creating a fait accompli. The coronation of Ansgarde’s 
sons, however, did not solve the problem of Gauzlin’s faction. Since both boys 
remained with Hugh, the spirit of the agreement with the abbot and his allies—as 
well as Louis the Younger—had been violated, for the realm had not been divided 
between the brothers. Louis again invaded the realm and joined forces with those 
of Gauzlin, forcing Hugh to confirm the treaty of Fouron. The partition of the 
realm followed only a couple of months later, in March 880, at Ribemont. Louis, 
under the tutelage of Gauzlin and his allies, would rule over Francia and Neustria; 
Carloman, guided by Hugh and his party, Burgundy and Aquitaine.42 Charles, no 
longer a hypothetical figure but an actual claimant, was not mentioned.
Did the questionable legitimacy of Louis the Stammerer’s sons play any role in 
these events? As already noted, Boso was the only one to deny their claim to the 
throne, at the moment he himself reached out for the crown. His was a general 
attack, not differentiating between the sons of Ansgarde and Adelaide—indeed, 
how could he if his aim was to create a situation in which he would not appear as 
a usurper denying a legitimate heir his right to the throne? The behaviour of the 
other leading nobles is more interesting. Did they cast aside Charles because they 
considered him illegitimate in comparison to his brothers?43 Louis the Stammerer 
had done his best to strengthen Adelaide’s position at court while at the same time 
also promoting his succession by his sons from Ansgarde.44 The most important 
document in this matter is the treaty of Fouron, securing the succession of sons 
from both marriages. As the leading nobles of the realm had been included in this 
40 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, LXVIII.
41 DCmII  61, 1st December 880−before 6th September 881, (together with Hugh the Abbot and 
Count Wido) and DCmII 59, 29th August 881.
42 Annales Bertiniani 880, 241−242; Annales Vedastini 880, 47.
43 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 235. According to him, once the nobles had opted for Louis and Carlo-
man and therefore acknowledged Louis the Stammerer’s marriage with Ansgarde as valid, they 
would in turn have automatically considered Charles as illegitimate.
44 See above.
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decision, the treaty seems to reflect the official position of the court.45 Of course, 
this might have changed with Louis the Stammerer’s death. Eduard Hlawitschka 
has argued that in fact Gauzlin and his allies leant towards Louis the Younger 
because of their doubts concerning the legitimacy of Louis and Carloman, thus 
denying their right to the throne. Hugh’s faction, on the other hand, focused on 
the preservation of the independence of the Western realm.46 Yet, as Karl Ferdi-
nand Werner has argued, Gauzlin was most probably one of the driving forces 
behind the treaty of Fouron and had supported Ansgarde earlier on,47 with no 
source mentioning such doubts being the motive for his turn to Louis the Younger.
It indeed seems that, for the most part, pragmatic reasons determined the 
courses of action of the leading factions around Hugh and Gauzlin. Hugh had 
opted for a single king, or, if necessary, for two, with both of them being under 
his control. Gauzlin urged for a real partition of the realm that would leave one of 
the boys in his care. Had Charles been born earlier, before or just after his father’s 
death, he would undoubtedly have played a role in the political rivalry. Yet then, 
in September 879, none of the factions was in need of another claimant, especially 
since, given the high mortality rates among infants, supporting Adelaide’s new 
baby might soon have left them without a candidate.48 The final solution to the 
conflict, the treaty of Ribemont and the partition of Amiens, agreed in March 
880, was the natural consequence of these early decisions: Given the political situ-
ation with two rival factions, there was also no need for a third candidate. It was 
therefore a mere question of political expediency as to whose claims were to be 
recognised or be disposed of.49 Charles, in any case only a baby, simply did not fit 
into the plans of the policymakers and thus was passed over in the succession for 
the first time.50
I.1.3 Passing over Charles
Over the course of the next ten years, three more occasions arose in which Charles 
could have become king and yet was passed over in the succession. On 5th August 
882, his older half-brother Louis III died, yet the Frankish nobles turned towards 
Ansgarde’s younger son, Carloman II.51 Two years later, after the latter had also 
passed away, their choice fell on Emperor Charles  III the Fat, son of Louis the 
45 MGH Capit. II, N° 246, 169. See Werner, Gauzlin, 423.
46 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 221−240. Earlier also Sickel, Thronfolgerecht, 129−130 and Boehm, 
 Rechtsformen, 328. Parisot, Royaume, 433−434 and Dümmler, Geschichte  III, 116 considered 
 legitimistic reasons as a plausible assumption.
47 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 19, 261. See also Werner, Gauzlin, 421−422 and 423−424 with n. 96.
48 See also Offergeld, Reges pueri, 364−365. In addition, an infant king would have been an unprec-
edented situation.
49 Werner, Gauzlin, 426.
50 See also Offergeld, Reges pueri, 365.
51 Annales Vedastini 882, 52.
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German and by then ruler of the East Frankish kingdom, Lotharingia and Italy. 
Another four years later, after the death of the emperor, Charles was the last sur-
viving male Carolingian, yet Odo, a powerful noble from the Robertian family, 
seized power. The transition to the Robertion family did not go unchallenged. A 
group of nobles from Francia first invited Wido of Spoleto to take the crown, but 
then turned to Arnulf of Carinthia before the former had even crossed the Alps. 
In none of these cases is Charles mentioned as a possible candidate by the sources.
Why did the nobles chose to ignore Charles and to opt for other candidates 
instead? Archbishop Fulk in 893 argued in a letter to Arnulf that he had not sup-
ported the young Carolingian in 888 because of his youthful age, which made him 
unfit to rule, especially in the face of the threat posed by the Northmen.52 This 
argument was persued in older research53—yet as the examples of Louis the Blind 
in Provence and Louis the Child in the Eastern kingdom show, boys of Charles’ 
age could be crowned kings if the nobility agreed on them.54 Eduard Hlawitschka, 
on the other hand, argued that Adelaide’s son Charles lacked legitimacy once the 
nobles had declared his brothers as kings. According to him, only one of Louis the 
Stammerer’s marriages could be valid, and the nobility had decided that it would 
be the one to Ansgarde, thereby making Charles an illegitimate child.55 However, 
as discussed, no sources indicate that the nobility had ever seriously questioned 
Charles’  legitimacy. It might have been used as an argument against him, yet was 
certainly not the main issue which prevented him from being chosen as king.56 
Rivalries between the Rorgonid group close to the emperor and Adelaide’s family 
have been made out as the reason behind the call to Charles the Fat in 884,57 but 
again, no sources indicate that this was the case. Concerning this succession, it has 
recently also been claimed that the magnates preferred a weak and mostly absent 
ruler, allowing them to follow their own interests.58 Yet, as Simon MacLean’s study 
of the emperor has shown, Charles the Fat’s policies towards the nobility in no 
way differed from those of his predecessors59 and this argument can be dismissed 
accordingly.
The absence of Charles the Simple from the sources concerning the question of 
the subsequent successions is striking and appears to indicate that he simply was 
52 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381: Quod, quando Karolus imperator decessit, et idem Arnulfus regimen 
huius regni suscipere noluit, hic Karolus adhuc admodum corpore simul et scientia parvulus ex­
istebat nec regni gubernaculis idoneus erat et instante immanissima Nordmannorum persecutione 
periculosum erat tunc eum eligere.
53 For example Dümmler, Geschichte III, 233; Eckel, Charles, 3 and Favre, Eudes, 78.
54 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 405.
55 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 235−236. 
56 On the question of how to deal with illegitimate children, see Kasten, Chancen.
57 Werner, Nachkommen, 441 and Werner, Gauzlin, 455−458.
58 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 407. This reading appears to be influenced by older research following 
Dhondt, Études, seeing the nobility as opposed to any rule other than their own (See MacLean, 
Kingship, 13, on that question).
59 MacLean, Kingship, 77−79.
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not seriously considered as a potential ruler. In 882, as well as in 884, the realm had 
been under the immediate threat of Viking attacks, and the sources reflect a con-
sistent unity amongst the nobility when they decided to ask first for Carloman and 
two years later for Charles the Fat. Louis III had won a battle against the Northmen 
at Saucourt in 881 that had forced that group of Vikings into Lotharingia60 and had 
concluded a treaty with Hasting and the Northmen along the Loire in 882.61 Just 
before his death, he appears to have prepared a campaign against the group now 
devastating the neighbouring regnum; and the nobles now invited Carloman to 
take over the realm and the army as fast as he could.62 Their haste demonstrates 
that, despite Louis’  last measures, the realm was far from secure: Hasting and his 
group returned to haunt the coast63 while the other group also returned and took 
position in the Condé from where they then devastated the countryside.64 Consid-
ering the previous rivalry between the groupings around Hugh and Gauzlin, the 
decision to unite the realm under Carloman after his brother’s death may seem 
surprising, all the more so as Gauzlin appears to have played an important part in 
it.65 Hugh’s influence at court, despite his rival’s return, remained untouched, at 
least for the time being. Gauzlin stood back for a moment, yet soon resumed his 
office as archchancellor and became bishop of Paris.66 Facing the Viking threat, the 
two factions had seemingly found an agreement acceptable to both sides. Carlo-
man would rule the entire kingdom, led by both groups in concert.
The situation two years later was not much different. Carloman, following 
fruitless efforts to defeat the Northmen, had finally concluded a treaty with them, 
paying a huge tribute for them to leave the realm. Yet, according to Regino of 
Prüm, when he suddenly died, the Vikings returned, claiming that the agreement 
had lost its validity with the king’s demise. Faced with the option of either pay-
ing them again or fighting them, the magnates chose to send for the emperor, 
Charles III the Fat.67 Once again, the sources emphasise the unity with which the 
decision to invite the emperor to the crown was taken.68 As before, we find that 
60 Annales Vedastini 881, 50−51. The victory is also mirrored by the famous Ludwigslied.
61 Annales Vedastini 882, 52.
62 Annales Bertiniani 882, 246: Primores autem regni expeditum nuntium miserunt ad Karlomannum, 
mandantes ut, relictis qui Viennam obsiderent et seditioni Bosonis resisterent, ipse quantotius ad eos 
uenire festinaret, quoniam hostiliter ipsi praeparati erant in occursum Nortmannorum, qui ciuitates 
Coloniam et Treueris cum monasteriis sibi contiguis iam incensas haberent…
63 Annales Bertiniani 882, 247.
64 Annales Vedastini 882, 52.
65 See his role in the reading of Carloman’s oath to the realm. MGH Capit. II, N° 285, 370 (legente 
Gauzeleno) and Werner, Gauzlin, 452−453.
66 Werner, Gauzlin, 453−454. Offergeld, Reges pueri, 373, speaks of a “schnelle und reibungslose 
Herrschaftsübernahme Karlmanns im Nordreich,” while at the same time admitting the loss 
of power by Gauzlin’s party. While it seems correct that Carloman’s accession to his brother’s 
throne went smoothly and quickly, the integration of the North into his realm posed some severe 
 problems. See chapter II.2.
67 Regino, Chronicon 884, 121−122.
68 Regino, Chronicon 884, 122: Territi huiuscemodi mandatis optimates regni ad Carolum impera­
torem missos dirigunt eumque ultro in regnum invitant. See also Annales Vedastini 884, 56: Franci 
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Hugh and Gauzlin played key parts in the process, with other important magnates 
from the Paris region and Neustria acting alongside them.69 The former factions 
now being at peace with each other, only one candidate was needed, and Emperor 
Charles appeared as a logical choice considering the Viking threat.
Charles the Fat had already been in contact with the West Frankish magnates in 
the summer of 879, when Archbishop Hincmar of Reims had asked him to adopt 
one of Louis the Stammerer’s sons and to take care of the boys and the affairs of 
the realm, a matter in which Hugh was also involved.70 Hincmar’s letter was fol-
lowed by a meeting in October between Louis, his brother Carloman and Charles 
at Orbe. However, the question of whether one of the boys really was adopted by 
Charles remains open.71 The archbishop sent another letter to Charles, probably 
at the end of 879 or the beginning of 880,72 making the same request and asking 
him to provide tutors for the adolescents.73 Whether Hincmar’s successor, Fulk, 
pursued these plans any further is not known, but he was also in contact with 
the emperor as early as June 884.74 Charles thus had connections with the highest 
ranks of the West Frankish nobility long before Carloman’s untimely death.
The emperor became quickly and widely accepted in the Western realm. As 
the diplomas he issued during his two visits to the West show, he possessed a 
wide-ranging network of support.75 This unity he inspired amongst the leading 
magnates of the realm, especially in view of the past rivalries between the differ-
ent factions, was without a doubt the biggest point in his favour. If Charles the 
Simple, still a mere five years old, had been made king, a divided nobility fighting 
for control over the child and therefore a regency might reasonably have been ex-
pected. Charles the Fat, on the other hand, had proven his capability to integrate 
capiunt consilium et Theodericum comitem Italiae dirigunt ad imperatorem Karolum, uti veniat in 
Franciam. In contrast to Regino, the annals do not make a direct connection between the Viking 
threat and the decision for Charles the Fat.
69 MacLean, Kingship, 102−115. He also argues against Werner’s reading that Hugh’s influence mas-
sively declined towards the end of Carloman’s reign and that his role under Charles the Fat became 
marginal. MacLean, Kingship, 104−105 and Werner, Gauzlin, 455.
70 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 24, 327. On the political background of the letter see Schneider, Erzbischof, 
35.
71 Annales Bertiniani 879, 240. That Carloman is described as adopticii filii nostri in one of Charles’ 
later diplomas (DChF 145) seems to support such an outcome. It is noteworthy however that this 
is the only reference to Carloman under this expression out of his mere three mentions in Charles 
the Fat’s diplomas (DDChF 122, 145 and 149, with only DChF 145 being clearly composed by the 
chancellery). Moreover, that Charles did not mention this fact at the assembly at Ponthion in 885 
during his first visit to the Western kingdom, but instead waited until October 886 after the siege 
of Paris was ended, arouses suspicion about the value of the diploma as proof for the adoption. It 
seems to me that Charles, under these special circumstances, tried to construct a special connec-
tion to the Western kingdom.
72 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 234, n. 34.
73 Migne, PL 125, cols. 989−994. On Hincmar’s idea behind the adoption see Kasten, Königssöhne, 
487−488 and Schneider, Suche, 415−419. Kasten seems to overestimate Hincmar’s influence during 
this time, however. 
74 DChF 106, Metz, 30th June 884.
75 MacLean, Kingship, 100−101.
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the other parts of the Carolingian empire under one ruler and it could be expected 
that he would also succeed in doing so in West Francia.76 The equilibrium among 
the magnates was new and potentially fragile and, in the face of the Viking threat, 
no-one seems to have been ready to risk a new civil conflict. Finally, this unity also 
points to another issue: the emperor seems to have had a claim to the West Frank-
ish throne strong enough to go uncontested. His succession to the throne appears 
to have come so naturally that Archbishop Fulk of Reims, when explaining to the 
emperor Arnulf in 893 the reasons why he had not previously supported Charles 
the Simple’s claim to the throne, referred only to the situation after the emperor’s 
death, not to that after Carloman’s.77
I.1.4 A Robertian on the throne
Three times had Charles been passed over in the succession so far and three times 
political reasons appear to have been predominant. In 879/880, the factions had 
already settled on their positions before Charles had been born and therefore had 
no need for him. In 882 and 884, the Viking threat created an atmosphere that 
 enforced political unity amongst the leading nobles. The sudden deaths of Louis III 
and Carloman II were thus followed by quick decisions concerning the succession 
question, and in each case the candidate behind whom the nobles could rally the 
most easily appears to have been chosen. This in turn implies that Charles lacked 
sufficient support. By way of explanation, his youth and the problem of the legiti-
macy of his birth have been brought forward. Both may have played a role, yet 
other examples demonstrate that they were certainly not a hindrance.
This was even more the case in 888 after the death of Charles the Fat. As Regino 
of Prüm famously noted: “After his death the kingdoms which had obeyed his 
authority, just as though a legitimate heir were lacking, dissolved into separate 
parts and, no longer waiting for a natural lord, each decided to create a king from 
its own guts.”78 The death of the emperor had created a vacuum which was now 
used by a number of powerful nobles to seize the crown: Arnulf of Carinthia, ille-
gitimate son of Carloman of Bavaria, in the East Frankish realm; Berengar, son of 
Eberhard of Friuli in Italy; and Odo, son of Robert the Strong in the West Frankish 
kingdom, to name but three. Over the preceding years a “crisis of authority”79 had 
76 MacLean, Kingship, 120−122. See also the positive accounts of Charles the Fat by Regino,  Chronicon 
888, 128−129, and Abbo, Bella I, 18, v. 48−52 and II, 98, v. 442−443. On Abbo’s view of Charles see 
MacLean, Kingship, 55−62.
77 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5 380−383: De hoc etiam, quod idem rex in culpa trahebat, quare non id ante 
fecissent, reddit rationem, quod, quando Karolus imperator decessit, et idem Arnulfus regimen huius 
regni suscipere noluit…
78 Regino, Chronicon 888, 129: Post cuius mortem regna, que eius ditioni paruerant, veluti legitimo 
 destituta herede, in partes a sua compage resolvuntur et iam non naturalem dominum prestolantur, 
sed unumquodque de suis visceribus regem sibi creari disponit.
79 Airlie, Nearly Men, 26.
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developed, a legitimacy deficit of the Carolingian dynasty resulting from the con-
tinuous threat generated by Vikings, Hungarians and Saracens as well as the quick 
series of successions since the deaths of Charles the Bald and Louis the German. 
When Boso had initiated his own coronation in 879, four Carolingian rulers had 
allied themselves to crush this attempt.80 Their alliance demonstrates how serious 
they considered the threat to be.81 Boso’s case had unlocked the door for all those 
who wanted to challenge the Carolingian monopoly on kingship, and the death of 
Charles the Fat, which left his realms without an heir,82 pushed it wide open.
One of the new kings, and in our case the most interesting one since he claimed 
the West Frankish throne for himself, was Odo, son of Robert the Strong,83 who 
had risen from count of Paris to marchio of Neustria under Charles the Fat. Odo 
had proven himself a more than capable military leader during the siege of Paris 
in 886 and, due to his family ties and his proximity to Charles, he had acquired the 
inheritances not only of Gauzlin,84 but also of Hugh the Abbot after their deaths. 
As such, Odo united the military command over Neustria with the counties Tours, 
Angers and Blois, as well as the abbeys of Saint-Martin of Tours and Marmoutiers, 
with the county of Paris and the abbey of Saint-Denis.85 In his person, therefore, 
the Western kingdom now had a magnate powerful enough to dominate the other 
nobles and be able to legitimise himself through military victory.
80 Annales Vedastini 880, 47.
81 Airlie, Nearly Men, 26.
82 Airlie, Semper fideles, 139−140. On the efforts of the emperor to avoid this situation, see MacLean, 
Kingship, 129−198.
83 Robert the Strong, one of the leading magnates under Charles the Bald, at the time of his death 
holder of a march in Neustria. On him see Kalckstein, Robert; Werner, Robertiens and Baccou, 
Débuts.
84 Gauzlin and Odo may have been related via Odo’s wife Theodrada. Werner, Gauzlin, 213.
85 On the rise of Odo see Werner, Gauzlin, 461−462; Guillot, Étapes, 200−207 and MacLean, King-
ship, 50−55 and 64−66. Guillot argues that Odo had usurped royal prerogatives even before the 
deposition of Charles the Fat, based on a letter collection dating to 887 and the Gesta Pontificium 
Autissiodorensium. MacLean argues against Guillot’s view and, using charter evidence, emphasises 
Odo’s proximity to the emperor. Odo’s taking over of the Neustrian command is mentioned by 
Regino, Chronicon 887, 126−127. The counties Tours, Angers and Blois seem to be indicated by the 
reference made by the Annales Vedastini (886, 62) telling us that he was given his father’s honores 
(Robert the Strong had been count of Tours and Angers (Dhondt, Études, 93−94. See also Werner, 
Robertiens, 21, who adds the counties of Blois and Châteaudun to the list. It was also proposed 
that Robert held Marmoutiers as a lay abbot, based on his identification with the illustris viri Rot­
berti in DChB 147. On this subject, however, see Baccou, Débuts, who argues that this was in fact 
another Robert.) Viscounts of all three counties appear in one of Odo’s private charters, the same 
which also names him as abbot of Saint-Martin of Tours (Recueil Eudes, N° 55. See Favre, Eudes, 
72−74, for the identifications of the witnesses). For his abbacy over Marmoutiers, see Favre, Eudes, 
77, n. 1, referring to Martène, Histoire Marmoutier II,1 [ms], 26 (= BNF lat. 12867−12880). Odo 
is named count of Paris in a charter for the church Notre-Dame of Paris (Cartulaire Notre-Dame 
de Paris I, 298−299, N° XVI). He had probably become count of Paris in succession to Conrad by 
the end of 882 or the beginning of 883. Favre, Eudes, 15. For Saint-Denis, see Werner, Gauzlin, 461 
with n. 220 and Gallia Christiana IX, cols. 448−449 for Morienval, where Robert succeeded count 
Theoderic of Vermandois as abbot. Saint-Amand seems to have been passed on directly to Robert 
(Series Abbatum S. Amandi Elnonensis, 386).
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However, this same situation also offered new opportunities for Charles the 
Simple. If the problem of his mother’s marriage to Louis the Stammerer had thus 
far been an issue for the nobility, now, in the face of the lack of other Carolingi-
ans, his claim by blood was stronger than that of any others, and his position thus 
changed dramatically. It is therefore hardly coincidental that Charles reappears in 
the sources at this very moment. Once Odo had consolidated his rule in the North 
and overcome the initial opposition, he moved to Aquitaine, where he met with 
Ramnulf II of Poitiers.86 The latter also brought Charles to the meeting and swore 
an oath not only for himself, but also for the Carolingian, “lest anything evil be 
suspected of him.”87 Ramnulf himself might have attempted to take the crown for 
himself, although this is only reported by the Annales Fuldenses.88 It is clear, how-
ever, that Odo considered Charles a threat, and this threat could only stem from 
Charles’  Carolingian blood.
This is also emphasised by other sources. “And when at the day mentioned 
above they gathered at Reims, they placed him on his father’s throne, consecrat-
ing him king”89 the Annales Vedastini report for the year 893 when the rebellious 
faction around Archbishop Fulk finally crowned Charles. This reference to his 
Carolingian descent undoubtedly reflects the official standpoint of the group: it is 
the same argument used by Archbishop Fulk in his letter to Arnulf from the same 
year, in which he named Charles the last descendant of the royal family, whose 
predecessors and brothers had been kings.90 Fulk’s argument however should not 
be taken out of context. The archbishop was defending himself against the accusa-
tion of unjust rebellion. Charles’  claim served to justify his own actions while he 
presented Odo as “a stranger to the royal family [who] had tyrannically abused the 
86 The claim that Charles’ mother Adelaide had married Ramnulf (e.g. Ewig, Kaiser, 580) has been 
successfully refuted by Werner, Nachkommen, 455, n. 17. Adelaide’s father’s relatives in Aquitaine 
(see above) may be an explanation for his stay there. Werner, Nachkommen, 436, further adduces 
Ramnulf ’s opposition to Odo as a reason, but this appears to be an argument based on the as-
sumption that Charles only went to Ramnulf after Odo’s coronation. Since there is no evidence 
of Charles’ whereabouts before this mention in the sources, this remains mere speculation. Fulk’s 
tutorship of Charles as mentioned by Richer, Historiae I, c. 16, 53 is not contemporary and appears 
to be an interpretation made in hindsight, a projection of the situation after 893 to the period of 
Charles’ boyhood.
87 Annales Vedastini 889, 67: Post nativitatem vero Domini cum paucis Francis Aquitaniam perrexit, 
ut sibi eos sociaret. Quo audito Ramnulfus dux maximae partis Aquitaniae cum sibi faventibus venit 
ad eum, adducens secum Karolum puerum, filium Hludowici regis, et iuravit illi quae digna fuerunt, 
simul et de ipso puerulo, ne quid mali de eo suspicaretur.
88 Annales Fuldenses (Ratisbon continuation) 888, 116. Brühl, Deutschland, 374, believes this 
 account. Favre, Eudes, 122, n. 1 and Werner, Westfranken, 229, are doubtful. The account has been 
rejected by Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 86 and Kienast, Herzogstitel, 175. We hesitate to dismiss the 
account completely, even though it seems odd that an East Frankish source should be the only one 
to know about Ramnulf ’s ambition to become king.
89 Annales Vedastini 893, 73: Et die supra dicti Remis adunati eum in paterno solio benedictum in 
regem collocant.
90 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381: …quem solum post ipsum de regia ipsius habebant progenie et cuius 
predecessores ac fratres extiterant reges. And again 382: …vel in hunc regie prosapie Karolum… and 
…propterque rectum congruumque regii generis principatum…
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royal power.”91 The argument of Charles’  legitimacy was therefore not only used to 
emphasise his claim, but also to deny Odo’s right to rule.
This last point mattered more to Fulk than enforcing the rights of the Caro-
lingian youth. The opportunistic nature of his argument becomes clear from the 
archbishop’s behaviour in 888. After the death of the emperor, a group based in 
Francia and Burgundy, centred on Archbishop Fulk,92 invited Fulk’s relative, Wido 
of Spoleto93 to the realm, only to abandon him even before he arrived.94 Wido was 
still crowned as the choice of a number of Burgundian nobles by Bishop Geilo 
of Langres, but returned to Italy on the news of Odo’s coronation.95 Odo, for his 
part, seems to have been able to bring the resisting nobles from Francia over to 
his side using promises and threats;96 however, he failed to quickly integrate them 
under his rule. Soon after, Fulk, together with Count Baldwin II of Flanders and 
the latter’s cousin, Abbot Rodulf97, turned towards Arnulf, king of the East Frank-
ish kingdom, and invited him to the Western realm.98 Negotiations were still in 
progress when Odo won a decisive victory against the Vikings at Montfauçon.99 
On hearing this, Arnulf refused Fulk’s offer “without council or conciliation.”100 
Instead he opted for the victor of Montfauçon and not only invited him to a meet-
ing, but also sent him a crown soon after. Fulk’s party immediately disintegrated, 
 91 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381: Odonis […] qui ab stirpe regia existens alienus, regali tirannice abusu 
fuerit potestate…
 92 The Annales Vedastini (888, 64) clearly identify Archbishop Fulk of Reims as the leader of this 
group. Referring to the coronation of Wido, they state that a few Burgundian nobles chose him as 
king. Since some relatives of Wido lived near Langres, it can be assumed that the annals refer to 
them, not only in this context, but also later, when they report that, on his return to Italy, Wido 
was accompanied by those who decided to follow him. See also Hlawitschka, Die Widonen, 24 
with n. 12. Whether Fulk’s later allies Count Baldwin II of Flanders and his cousin Abbot Rodulf 
already formed part of the group at this point must remain open.
 93 Fulk and Wido were related by blood: Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 376. Fulk assured the pope quod 
non illum tantum diligeret pro consanguinitatis necessitudine, qua illi devinctus habebatur, verum 
multo magis, quia huius pape venerator et amator existeret. See also Schneider, Erzbischof, 7–21 
and  Hlawitschka, Kaiser, 193 with n. 31. How they were actually related cannot be established.
 94 On the decision to abandon Wido, see Schneider, Erzbischof, 45.
 95 Annales Vedastini 888, 65.
 96 Annales Vedastini 888, 65. The way the annals describe the situation leaves no doubt that Fulk 
and his allies were amongst those who now submitted to Odo’s rule: Odo vero rex Francos, qui 
suo nolebant se subdi dominationi, partim blanditiis, partim terroribus sibi sociari festinabat. 
 97 On their parentage see Favre, Famille, 160.
 98 Annales Vedastini 888, 65. Fulk was also accompanied by the bishops Dodilo of Cambrai, 
 Honoratus of Beauvais and Heitilo of Noyon, as well as Archbishop John of Rouen (chased out 
of his bishopric by the Vikings). They all figure in a charter of Archbishop Liutpert of Mainz for 
Abbot Bovo of Corvey issued probably during the council of Mainz in June 888 (MGH Conc. V, 
N° 26, 267).
 99 Schneider, Erzbischof, 49−50, has argued convincingly that the negotiations started at Worms 
and continued during the assembly of Frankfurt. Odo’s victory occurred on the 24th June. Ar-
nulf stayed at Frankfurt until at least 3rd July (DA 34), so that the news of the battle would have 
reached him there before he made his final decision.
100 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 380−381: Commemorans, quod decedente Karolo imperatore, huius Arnulfi 
avunculo, in ipsius Arnulfi servitium fuerit profectus, cupiens eius suscipere dominium et guberna­
tionem, sed ipse rex eum sine ullo consilio vel consolatione dimiserit.
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leaving him no other option but to submit to Odo for a second time.101 The “pri-
macy of the royal blood” the archbishop used as an argument five years later102 thus 
appears not to have played a role in the succession crisis of 888; Fulk first opted for 
his own relative, Wido of Spoleto, and then turned to Arnulf of Carinthia.
Fulk, of course, was aware of this hole in his argument when he wrote his  letter. 
In his defence he claimed that in 888 Charles had been too young in body and 
wisdom to govern the realm and that the Viking threat made it too dangerous to 
choose him as king.103 Yet Boso’s son Louis had succeeded his father in 887 at an 
even younger age and so too would Arnulf ’s own son Louis only a few years later. 
While the Viking threat might be more credible, the question arises whether, given 
his young age in 888 as well as in 893, it would have been Charles who commanded 
the army and not his advisers around Fulk. His half-brother Carloman, for exam-
ple, remained dependent on the groups around Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin even 
after he had been given the arms of manhood104 and in the years following his own 
coronation the sources emphasise the role of those “who were with Charles.”105 The 
archbishop’s arguments are thus revealed as mere afterthoughts, excuses to Arnulf 
for his own behaviour five years earlier.
This, however, does not answer the question why Fulk and his allies turned 
to Wido of Spoleto and Arnulf instead of elevating Charles. The cause may have 
been partly practical: Charles simply might not have been available, since he was 
with Ramnulf II of Poitiers.106 Yet other reasons probably carried more weight. In 
contrast to 893, Fulk’s party seems to have been rather weak in 888. Apart from 
the suffragan bishops of Reims, Fulk was supported by only Baldwin II of Flanders 
and Baldwin’s cousin Abbot Rodulf.107 He still lacked the support a man as power-
ful as Count Heribert I could provide,108 as well as connections outside Francia.109 
Fulk’s party was therefore limited to candidates who could not only serve as rally-
ing points for other discontented magnates, but who also brought with them their 
101 Annales Vedastini 888, 65−66. Arnulf seems to have subsequently influenced Odo to accept Fulk 
and the rest of his allies back into his fidelity. In Autumn Odo was crowned at Reims. Annales 
Vedastini 888, 67.
102 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 382: …propterque rectum congruumque regii generis principatum…
103 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381: Et idem Arnulfus regimen huius regni suscipere noluit, hic Karolus 
adhuc admodum corpore simul et scientia parvulus existebat nec regni gubernaculis idoneus erat et 
instante immanissima Nordmannorum persecutione periculosum erat tunc eum eligere.
104 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 402−403.
105 For example Annales Vedastini 894, 74: Cumque hi qui cum Karolo erant viderent se non habere 
unde ei resistere… noctu civitatem egressi cum suo rege ad Arnulfi regis auxilium cum suo rege se 
 contulerunt. And 895, 76: At hi qui cum Karolo erant conferunt se ad Zuendebolchum eique partem 
regni  consentiunt, uti veniat et iuvet Karolo suo consobrino. Offergeld, Reges pueri, 453−459.
106 So Offergeld, Reges pueri, 415.
107 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 380−381.
108 No source indicates whether Heribert I formed part of this alliance in 888. Even if he did, he was 
not as powerful as he would be in 893, since it was only in 888/889 that he started to accumulate 
honores. On this process, see Werner, Untersuchungen V and Schwager, Graf, 26−28.
109 For a detailed analysis of the alliance of 893, see below.
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own connections, like Wido of Spoleto, or had a power base sufficient to fight Odo, 
like Arnulf. Since Charles could provide neither of them, he was disqualified as a 
candidate.
I.1.5 Carolingian blood matters
We can now return to our initial question: why did Odo’s supporters in 893 deny 
Louis the Stammerer’s paternity instead of attacking Charles where he was more 
vulnerable, the problem of the legitimacy of his birth, as Boso had done in 879? 
Four times Charles had been passed over in the royal succession until he finally 
became king. In the first three cases, the political circumstances—the rivalry be-
tween the factions of Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin and the Viking threat—could 
be made out as the main reasons. Charles fell victim to his late birth when the 
political decisions concerning the succession of his father had already been taken. 
Once marginalised, he simply did not possess enough political support to have his 
claim enforced. Whether this was due to the problem of the validity of Adelaide’s 
marriage to Louis the Stammerer has to remain an open question, although the 
political realities appear to have carried enough weight on their own for him to be 
cast aside time after time.
Be that as it may, the death of Charles the Fat in 888 changed the field dramati-
cally. With Odo, a man now reached for the crown who drew his legitimation not 
from his blood, but from his victories against the Northmen.110 Does this mean 
that by the end of the 9th century Carolingian legitimacy had lost its importance? 
The emperor’s death had created a vacuum due to a lack of heirs and there be-
ing no agreed-upon succession, while Boso’s example from 879 had already dem-
onstrated that the Carolingian monopoly on kingship was not set in stone. Odo, 
making use of his prestige, won by defending the realm against the Northmen, 
now went down the same path and attempted to fill the vacuum. This new legiti-
mation by victory allowed him to declare his claim while his political connections 
and his resources enabled him to enforce it. Yet, the immediate challenges also re-
veal the limits of his support and the fragility of his position. These challenges also 
show how weak the power of Carolingian legitimacy had become at that point, for 
Fulk and his allies decided against supporting Charles—who was now passed over 
for a fourth time—and instead opted first for Wido and then for Arnulf.
It would be wrong, however, to underestimate the force of Carolingian tradi-
tions. They remained an essential part of royal behaviour and representation: the 
carefully phrased language of Odo’s diplomas and promissio sets him in line with 
his Carolingian predecessors and attempts to negate the different nature of his 
110 On the importance of the prestige won from warfare for Carolingian kingship, see Scharff, Gott, 
265−276.
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kingship, thus trying to create the impression of uninterrupted continuity.111 He 
had himself crowned at Compiègne,112 the palace that had become so important 
under Charles the Bald that it was called Carlopolis by later writers.113 His prom-
issio114 was based on those of Louis the Stammerer and Carloman II,115 assuring 
the audience that in fact nothing had changed. Immediately after his coronation 
he took possession of the Carolingian insignia stored at Saint-Denis.116 In short, 
Odo did his best to appear no different from his predecessors. He used the force 
still inherent in the Carolingian tradition to strengthen his rule. Having no Caro-
lingian blood to legitimise himself, he at least wanted to appear as a Carolingian 
since Carolingian traditions offered a legitimation more durable and reliable than 
that based on victory, which depended on the fortunes and misfortunes of the 
battlefield. How strong the Carolingian argument still was can also be deduced 
from Fulk’s letter to Arnulf.117 The archbishop certainly did not crown Charles out 
of deeply held principles of Carolingian legitimism—we will return to his motives 
later—yet his use of the Carolingian card in opposition to Odo’s “strangeness” 
shows how much weight Charles’  blood still carried in political discourse.118
This was Charles the Simple’s opportunity. Having been passed over in the royal 
succession four times and lacking political support he could not have expected to 
leave his political backwater soon. Now, however, Odo’s lack of Carolingian blood 
and the absence of other male Carolingians—apart from the also questionable 
Arnulf and Louis of Provence, Boso’s son with the Carolingian princess Ermen-
gard—improved his position considerably. Because of his claim, Charles was the 
ideal candidate, not for a normal succession, but for any opposition challenging 
the Robertian’s rule. His blood made him an ideal rallying point for all those dis-
contented with the Robertian. This was why Odo’s supporters did not use the issue 
of the legitimacy of Charles’  birth against him but brought forward doubts about 
Louis the Stammerer’s paternity. In doing so, they attacked Charles where he had 
his advantage over Odo: his Carolingian blood that, even considering his possibly 
questionable legitimacy, made him superior to his opponent. Because Carolin-
gian traditions remained strong, simply questioning Charles’  legitimacy did not 
111 Schneidmüller, Tradition, 109. On the continuities in form see Mersiowsky, Urkunde, 214−223. 
See also Airlie, Élites, on the takeover of Carolingian practices by important nobles.
112 Annales Vedastini 888, 64.
113 Koziol, Politics, 541−544.
114 Recueil Eudes, 209−211.
115 Favre, Eudes, 91−92.
116 Schneidmüller, Tradition, 110−116. Schneidmüller furthermore refers to similarities of legends 
and symbols on seals and coins as well as the links to his predecessors created by Odo’s  diplomas. 
 Schneidmüller, Tradition, 120 summarises: “Odo war es gelungen, karolingische Tradition für 
seine Zwecke zu adaptieren. Verschiedene äußere Zeichen der Königsherrschaft sind beredte 
Zeugnisse für die robertinischen Bemühungen, Herrschaft in ihrer Kontinuität zu begreifen. 
Odos Herrschaftspraxis und Herrschaftsverständnis kommen in vielem einer völligen Imitation 
karolingischer Vorbilder gleich.” 
117 See also Airlie, Élites, 428−429.
118 On the limits of Carolingian legitimacy as a political concept, see Airlie, Nearly Men, 30.
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suffice. Charles’  Carolingian blood had to be denied entirely, since it was the pillar 
on which his claim rested.
I.2 Close supporters and distant allies
Even relatively recently, the members of the alliance elevating Charles to the 
throne have been described as lacking constancy and principles, driven mainly 
by self-interest.119 Yet the war which ensued between the Carolingian’s support-
ers and Odo lasted more than four years and, in the end, Charles not only kept 
his crown, however small his realm may have been, but it was also agreed that he 
would succeed the Robertian upon the latter’s death. If this network was indeed 
so fragile, why had the conflict lasted so long and ended with such a positive result 
for Charles? It would appear that the motives of the alliance’s members in oppos-
ing Odo and supporting Charles were strong enough to create a certain level of 
group cohesion, a cohesion that proved sufficient to withstand even great pressure 
from the Robertian. However, scholars rarely produce their arguments out of thin 
air. What, then, are the reasons for the image of the alliance as unprincipled and 
inconstant?
I.2.1 Archbishop Fulk of Reims
The best starting point for an analysis of this network is one of its principal agents, 
the oft-mentioned Archbishop Fulk of Reims, who we saw acting against Odo in 
888. Fulk first appears in the sources accompanying Charles the Bald to Rome 
in 875. Two years later he became abbot of Saint-Bertin and was among those 
to whom the emperor entrusted his realm and his son Louis in the capitulary of 
 Quierzy.120 He seems to have spent the following years at the royal court121, yet his ac-
tual influence is hard to determine since he neither figures in royal diplomas nor is 
mentioned by the narrative sources. After Hincmar’s death he became archbishop 
of Reims, which seems to indicate closeness with the dominating factions around 
Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin.122 Despite his new position, his influence at court 
remains hard to trace. Soon after his ordination, he wrote a letter recommending 
King Carloman to Pope Marinus I.123 In summer 884, he visited Charles the Fat 
119 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 425: “Die folgenden Jahre sollten zeigen, daß die Großen sich ihre 
 Unterstützung von Fall zu Fall neu abringen ließen; eine verläßliche oder gar gesinnungsfeste 
Gefolgschaft hat Karl nie besessen.” Similar Schneider, Erzbischof, 112.
120 Schneider, Erzbischof, 22−23.
121 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 4, 379.
122 Schneider, Erzbischof, 25−27.
123 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 1, 363−364.
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in Metz to ask for the restoration of possessions in Thuringia,124 which indicates 
that he had connections outside the realm, but again does not shed light on his 
actual influence in the politics of the West Frankish court. Once the emperor had 
become ruler in the West as well, Fulk sent him a letter asking for his help in the 
defence of Paris against the Northmen,125 yet, as before, this letter says more of 
Fulk’s ambition to gain a preeminent position than his actual influence.126 Instead, 
Charles’  reign saw the rise of Odo, who favoured the church of his relative, Arch-
bishop Walter of Sens. Fulk’s opposition to Odo might thus be seen in the context 
of the struggle between the sees of Reims and Sens for the primacy of the Gallic 
church.127 Yet this solution seems too narrow, as it fails to consider the archbishop’s 
political ambitions, demonstrated by his invitation to Wido of Spoleto to take the 
crown after the death of Charles the Fat before turning to Arnulf of Carinthia. 
Fulk, as archbishop of Reims, seems to have claimed a central position in West 
Frankish politics that had been denied to him during the reigns of Carloman II 
and Charles the Fat. Odo’s power, on the other hand, was firmly rooted in his 
Neustrian possessions and honores, while the position at his side was occupied 
for now by Count Theoderic of Vermandois.128 Under the rule of the Robertian, 
Fulk could not hope to gain the influence on royal affairs which Odo himself had 
wielded under Charles the Fat. It was a lack of proximity to the new king which 
frustrated his political ambitions and provoked his resistance.
Aware of the archbishop’s ambitions, Odo followed a policy of appeasement 
and integration, trying to deal with the root cause of the resistance initially shown 
by Fulk and the nobles around him. Count Baldwin II had already submitted to 
Odo before the Robertian met with Arnulf.129 After the meeting, in a well-enacted 
ceremony, Odo was crowned for a second time at Reims,130 probably by Fulk 
himself,131 who also received a diploma for his church.132 Odo then moved on to 
spend Christmas at Saint-Vaast, one of the abbeys of Abbot Rodulf, one of Fulk’s 
allies when he had turned to Arnulf. In 890, the abbot also received a diploma 
through the intercession of Odo’s wife, Theodrada.133 Another diploma went to 
124 DChF 106, 30th June 884.
125 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 380.
126 See also Schneider, Erzbischof, 38.
127 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 412. On the subject of the primate of the Gallic Church see Schramm, 
König, 113−114. During his lifetime, Hincmar had unsuccessfully fought for the primate of Reims.
128 Theoderic is mentioned as Odo’s most important supporter by the Annales Vedastini (888, 64). 
Soon after, he appears as Odo’s emissary to Arnulf. Annales Vedastini 888, 65. On him see Wer-
ner, Untersuchungen V, 89−91.
129 Annales Vedastini 888, 66.
130 Guillot, Étapes, 215−216.
131 Schneider, Erzbischof, 58−59.
132 DOdo 31, probably dating to 891/892. See Schneider, Erzbischof, 94, n. 92. At some point during 
his reign, Odo also made a grant to the Church of Reims for the celebration of his anniversary 
(DOdo 47).
133 DOdo 20.
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Bishop Dido of Laon,134 a suffragan of the church of Reims. Dido, as well as Hono-
ratus of Beauvais and Riculf of Soissons, accompanied Fulk to a large assembly at 
Verberie in 892.135 Whether Count Heribert I, who was to become one of Charles’ 
most important allies,136 had supported Odo or had joined the ranks of Fulk’s allies 
cannot be answered, but just after Christmas 889, he appeared in one of the kings 
diplomas as “one of our great men.”137 Odo’s reign certainly does mark Heribert’s 
ascent: from 888 onwards he became count of Meaux, the Vexin, the Mézerais and 
Soissons, while his brother Pippin acquired the county of Beauvais.138 Odo’s net-
work in the Francia is dealt with in the next chapter, so for the moment we shall 
simply note that, among those the Robertian tried to integrate into his rule, we can 
find at least two—Fulk and Heribert—who were to become the leading members 
of the revolt against him.
For the next few years however, nothing indicates that the two were funda-
mentally opposed to Odo. Heribert, who was close to the king at the end of 889, 
unfortunately disappears from the sources. Fulk, on the other hand, remains much 
more visible. After his final submission to the king, he mostly appears to have 
cooperated with Odo. The Visio Karoli,139 probably written at Reims, endorses the 
right of Louis of Provence to the imperial crown and may be a sign that Fulk tried 
to promote Louis as a candidate for the West Frankish throne, which would indi-
cate his continuing ambition to claim a central role in the realm’s politics. With 
that said, the question is still not resolved satisfactorily.140 More important for the 
political situation in the realm was the struggle for the episcopal see of Langres. 
After the death of Bishop Isaac, the clergy and people of Langres had chosen the 
deacon Teutbald and asked Pope Stephen V to consecrate him, against the will of 
the metropolitan Aurelian of Lyon, who should have been the one to consecrate 
the new bishop.141 Stephen refused the demand, as he did not want to interfere 
with the archbishop’s rights, and instead advised Aurelian to consecrate Teutbald, 
unless he happened to have any personal objections to him. If that were to be 
134 DOdo 29. Whether Dido had opposed Odo with his metropolitan is not clear, as he does not 
 appear to have accompanied Fulk to meet Arnulf. Later on he can be found close to the king 
when he refused to absolve the captured Walker of Laon (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 392−393). Even 
after the rebellion of 893, Dido stayed loyal to Odo, defending Laon against Charles and Zwenti-
bold in 895. Annales Vedastini 895, 76.
135 DOdo 30. In addition to these bishops, the archbishops Walter of Sens and Wido of Rouen were 
also present. Of the suffragans present, Honoratus of Beauvais would stay loyal to Odo even after 
Fulk’s revolt, trying to excommunicate count Aledramnus (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 394).
136 See below.
137 DOdo 16 (30th December 889), 76: …proceribus nostris Hubaldo et Heriberto…
138 Werner, Untersuchungen V, 92−100.
139 Visio Karoli, 458.
140 See Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 100−106, in favour of this reading. Following him and providing 
an assessment of the chances of the project is Schneider, Erzbischof, 69−72. Critical is Pokorny, 
 Brieffragment, 617. MacLean, Kingship, 166 also follows Hlawitschka’s arguments. See also 
 Dutton, Politics, 233−251, who dates the Visio to 888.
141 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 1, 367−368.
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the case, by papal order no other bishop might be appointed in the meantime. 
Furthermore, Stephen sent Bishop Oirannus of Senigallia as his legate to mediate 
between the two parties.142 On Oirannus’ arrival at Lyon, Aurelian sent him on to 
Langres with the promise to proceed there himself as soon as possible, which he 
then failed to do. When his refusal to follow the pope’s commands became ap-
parent, the clergy and people of Langres sent another letter to Rome, once more 
asking Stephen to consecrate Teutbald. The pope, still unwilling to interfere with 
Aurelian’s rights, now sent a letter to the archbishop to enquire about his rea-
sons for refusing Teutbald.143 Once again Aurelian did not respond; instead, he, 
together with his suffragans and Archbishop Bernuin of Vienne, now consecrated 
the cleric Argrim as bishop.144 Only then did the pope send instructions—this time 
to Fulk—to consecrate Teutbald,145 in turn prompting Odo to send an embassy to 
Rome. Fulk, for his part, informed Stephen that he would not act before the return 
of the embassy.146 Early in 891, Teutbald was finally consecrated and installed as 
bishop of Langres. Eduard Hlawitschka has interpreted Fulk’s role in the affair as 
that of a leading actor who tried to install his protégé, Teutbald, in Langres, acting 
against Odo’s candidate, Argrim, and finally successfully depriving the king of 
an important foothold in northern Burgundy.147 However, as Rudolf Pokorny has 
shown, neither Fulk’s purported backing of Teutbald nor Odo’s for Argrim can be 
supported by evidence.148 Whether and how the archbishop of Reims finally acted 
is indeed unclear; from his only appearance, it seems that he did indeed cooperate 
with the king.
The picture is clearer in a number of other cases in which Fulk seems to have 
supported Odo’s policies. In 892, the king participated in a synod concerning a 
dispute between the abbess Hildegard and a certain Hermingard.149 Likewise, the 
archbishop and his suffragans Dido of Laon, Honoratus of Beauvais and Riculf of 
Soissons were present at a royal assembly at Verberie, where they sat in judgement 
over the case of the monk Aginus with the archbishops, Walter of Sens and Wido 
of Rouen.150 Finally, Fulk sided with the king against Baldwin  II of Flanders in 
the conflict over the abbeys of Saint-Vaast and Saint-Bertin: after taking counsel 
from four of his suffragans, Fulk ordered Bishop Dodilo of Cambrai to dissuade 
the count from continuing with his course of action and threatened his followers 
142 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 1, 368.
143 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 1, 368.
144 The consecration of Argrim is noted in a letter of Pope John  IX to the clergy and people of 
Langres (Gallia Christiana IV, cols. 540, JL 3520) and a letter of Pope Benedict IV also to the 
clergy and people of Langres (Gallia Christiana IV, cols. 540, JL 3528) and, without mentioning 
Argrim’s name, Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 1, 368. See also Schneider, Erzbischof, 85, n. 59.
145 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 1, 368.
146 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 1, 369.
147 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 99−106.
148 Pokorny, Brieffragment, 613−620.
149 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 389 and 390. Of Hildegard and Hermingard nothing further is known.
150 DOdo 30.
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with anathema if he did not give in.151 When Dodilo failed to obey, Fulk held a 
synod to deal with the matter and wrote directly to Baldwin, threatening him with 
excommunication.152 Until late in the year, Fulk seems to have supported Odo’s 
rule—and even profited from it. When the monks of Saint-Bertin, having refused 
Baldwin as their new abbot, received Odo’s permission to make their own choice, 
they elected Fulk as abbot.153
However, it is worthwhile to note another dispute, also related to the death 
of Abbot Rodulf. Rodulf had not only held the abbeys of Saint-Vaast and Saint-
Bertin, but also Cysoing and the relics of Saint Calixtus. Before his death, Rodulf 
had placed both under the protection of the church of Reims. Yet, once Rodulf 
died, his sister’s husband, Hucbald, one of Odo’s closest allies in Francia,154 took 
the abbey under his control. Fulk wrote to the pope to ask him for advice on the 
matter, to demand a confirmation of the donation and to threaten all opponents 
with excommunication.155 In his answer, reported by Flodoard, Pope Formosus 
did indeed confirm Cysoing as the possession of the church of Reims; however, 
there is no mention of any threats of excommunication.156 This may indicate that 
Hucbald had given up his claim on the abbey by the time of Formosus’ reply. 
However, relations between the archbishop and the count remained tense even 
after the affair was resolved. When Fulk instructed Dodilo of Cambrai to fetch Ca-
lixtus’ relics from Arras and transfer them to Saint-Quentin, Dodilo chose to seize 
the relics, making Fulk fear that he would hand them over to Hucbald.157 Both 
abbey and relics finally ended up in the possession of the archbishop, as Flodoard 
states,158 but whether this happened under Odo or under Charles remains open. 
It is nevertheless worth noting that Fulk, just before he decided to revolt against 
Odo, was in conflict with one of the king’s main supporters in Francia. In general 
151 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 391.
152 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 7, 396−397.
153 Folcwin, Gesta Abbatum S. Bertini Sithensium, c. 98, 624. Before becoming archbishop of Reims, 
Fulk had previously been abbot of Saint-Bertin.
154 Hucbald was married to Heilwich, daughter of Eberhard of Friuli and sister to Abbot Rodulf. On 
him see Grierson, Maison, 257 and Le Jan, Famille, 50 and 443. Odo and Hucbald were already 
in contact before 888. Bischof, Anecdota, N° V, 131−132. In this letter, the widow of the lay abbot 
of Saint-Symphorien of Orléans complains that Odo and Hucbald had interfered with her rights 
and possessions. The letter also names Hucbald as count of Senlis, against the older literature 
wrongly depicting him as count of the Ostrevent (Grierson, Origine, 111). Hucbald appears in 
DDOdo 16 (proceres noster), 38 (in omnibus fidelis noster … comes) and 48 (a deperditum). His 
nephew Heriveus appears as notary in Odo’s diplomas from DOdo 36 (894, May 2) onwards.
155 Flodoard, HRE IV, c.  1, 371. Sot, Historien, dates Fulk’s letter to Formosus to winter 891/892. 
Since it makes reference to events taking place after the death of Abbot Rodulf (5th January 892, 
Annales Vedastini 892, 70), the letter was probably composed in January or February 892. 
156 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 2, 373. The letter was composed after Easter 892 (23rd April), as it makes 
reference to the coronation of Lambert of Spoleto.
157 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 392. Sot, Historien, followed by the editors of the MGH-edition (391, 
n. 34), dates this letter to 893. Since the letter refers to the death of Abbot Rodulf and Fulk states 
that he planned to re-transfer the relics to Cysoing once peace was restored, the second half of 
892 seems equally likely.
158 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 8, 399.
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however, Fulk cooperated with Odo in cases such as the succession of Langres and 
supported him against Baldwin II; while the Visio Karoli, despite all the problems 
of interpreting it, might be read as a sign of his continuing ambitions.
Yet does this mean that Fulk wholeheartedly supported Odo’s rule? As he in-
dicates in his letter, it was not until late 892 that he was approached by a group of 
discontented nobles for advice.159 The origins of this newest conspiracy against 
Odo seem indeed to have been quite recent, at least as concerns the archbishop.160 
However, this passage also shows that Fulk was perceived as someone who would 
not betray such discontent—which would indicate that he was not part of Odo’s 
most inner circle—and, in addition, that he was thought likely to support this new 
opposition. The archbishop, despite his cooperation with Odo, was apparently 
known for having had a negative attitude towards the king. At the same time how-
ever, the king himself seems to have continued to be oblivious to this, as he, on the 
advice of that very same group, decided to leave Francia and march to Aquitaine 
just before they openly rebelled against him.161 Fulk figured as a rallying point for 
the opposition and his cooperation with Odo was therefore probably motivated 
less by actual conviction than by necessity in the face of political realities. As the 
year 888 had proven, opposition against Odo needed stronger support than he 
could mobilise on his own. This, of course, does not mean that Fulk only bided his 
time, waiting for an opportunity to rebel. Cooperation could also be beneficial, as 
him becoming abbot of Saint-Bertin for a second time shows.162 Under different 
circumstances, cooperation might have given the archbishop the political influ-
ence he aspired to.
I.2.2 The network elevating Charles
This leads us to the network that was now formed to elevate and support Charles. 
According to Regino of Prüm, most of the Francian nobles renounced Odo to 
follow the new king,163 yet this statement should be read with great care. Several 
bishops from the archdiocese of Reims remained loyal to the Robertian and a 
number of counts from the area did not side with Fulk either, most prominently 
Odo’s old ally Count Hucbald of Senlis.164 Within the group, the archbishop oc-
cupied the most prominent role. We have already seen him become a rallying 
159 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 380.
160 Schneider, Erzbischof, 104.
161 Annales Vedastini 892, 72−73.
162 See above. Apart from Saint-Bertin, Fulk also received the abbey of Avenay from Odo. Flodoard, 
HRE IV, c. 8, 399.
163 Regino, Chronicon 892, 140: Odone rege in Aquitania commorante Francorum principes ex per­
maxima parte ab eo deficiunt, et agentibus Folcone archiepiscopo, Heriberto et Pippino comitibus 
in Remorum civitate Carolus filius Ludowici ex Adalheide regina, ut supra meminimus, natus in 
regnum elevatur.
164 On the bishops see below. Hucbald figures in DOdo 38 (13th January 894−12th January 895).
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point for those discontented with Odo’s reign. After the rebellion began, he did 
his best to further Charles’  cause by using his contacts with popes and kings.165 
Fulk’s central position is also reflected by the Annales Vedastini, which repeatedly 
mention him as one of the leaders, being close to Charles166 and acting as legate to 
Arnulf.167 After Fulk, Count Heribert occupied a key position. Having risen under 
Odo and now holding several counties, he was mentioned by Fulk as one of those 
who approached him before the rebellion.168 Regino of Prüm names him as one of 
the leaders of the rebellion, next to his brother Pippin and Archbishop Fulk169 and 
later he appears as a military leader170 and chief negotiator.171 His defection to Odo 
in 896 seems to have hit Charles especially hard. Relations between him and the 
count appear to have deteriorated so much that, a year later, Heribert was the only 
noble who had left Charles’  side who the sources mention to be formally recon-
ciled with the Carolingian.172
Unmentioned by the narrative sources yet at the same time prominent in both 
of Charles’  surviving diplomas from the years of the rebellion is another key ac-
tor: his mother Adelaide. That Carolingian queens could possess political influ-
ence is well known yet hard to assess in individual cases.173 In Adelaide’s case, 
she intervened remarkably often in Charles’  diplomas—thirteen times174 in the 31 
charters that have survived as originals or copies−until her death in 901.175 Only 
three times is she named queen (regina), but all of the diplomas name her as “our 
mother” (genitrix nostra), with epithets varying from “venerable” ( venerabilis) 
to “dearest” (carissima) and “most beloved” (dilectissima) and even “sweetest” 
(perdulcissima).176 Her importance thus does not seem to have stemmed from 
165 Correspondence concerning Charles with Pope Formosus: indicating Charles’ coronation: 
 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 2, 374. Asking for the pope’s mediation with Arnulf, Odo and Lambert of 
Spoleto: HRE IV, c. 3, 875, and HRE IV, c. 3, 376. To Arnulf the aforementioned letter dating to 
893 and another in 894, assuring him of their good intentions: Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 383. To 
Wido asking him to protect Charles: Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 383−384.
166 Annales Vedastini 893, 73: Post pascha Domini Fulcho archiepiscopus et Heribertus comes assu­
mentes Karolum regem cum omni exercitu disponunt [ire] contra Odonem regem…Annales Vedas-
tini 893, 74: Karolus vero cum Fulcone Remis repedavit. 
167 Annales Vedastini 895, 75−76.
168 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381.
169 Regino, Chronicon 892, 140−141.
170 Annales Vedastini 893, 73.
171 Annales Vedastini 895, 77.
172 Annales Vedastini 896, 77 and 897, 79.
173 See Hartmann, Königin, 162−167.
174 DDChS 5, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 22, 23, 27, 32, 35, 39 and 41.
175 Adelaide died on 18th November, in all probability 901, since DChS 41, 9th November 901 marks 
her last appearance in the sources. Hlawitschka, Ahnen II, 238.
176 DChS 5, 6: karissimae et venerabilis genitricis nostre Adeleydis; DChS 7, 10: venerabilis et  carissimae 
genitricis nostrae Adelheidis; DChS 10, 16: dilectissimae genetricis nostrae Adelais; DChS 11, 18: 
venerabilis genetrix nostra Adelheidis regina; DChS 14, 25: predulcissime genitricis nostre Adeleid­
is; DChS 15, 27: perdulcissimae genitricis notrae Adeleidis; DChS 22, 43: venerabilis genetrix nostra 
Adheleydis  regina; DChS 23, 46: venerabilis genetricis nostre Adheleidis; DChS 27, 57: venerabili 
genitrice  nostra Adheleide; DChS 32, 68: dulcissime genitricis nostre Adelheidis regine; DChS 35, 
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her position as queen. The special character of her appearances will be addressed 
again at a later point.177 For the moment, it suffices to note that all of the nobles 
she intervened with had connections to the court independent from her, as in the 
cases of Fulk,178 his suffragan bishops Honoratus of Beauvais and Rudolf of Laon179 
and the counts Ecfrid180 and Erkanger.181 While she was certainly important, it does 
not automatically follow that her importance was based on her own political con-
nections. Rather, it seems that, based on her role as his mother, she was Charles’ 
closest advisor during these years, and that the diplomas reflect her influence on 
the young king.
As we have seen, Fulk and Heribert were both integrated into Odo’s rule. Al-
though not part of Odo’s innermost circle, they were nevertheless in contact with 
the king. Another instigator of the rebellion was part of this inner circle, the man 
who led the group approaching the archbishop of Reims: Anskeric, the bishop of 
Paris, the king’s archchancellor in succession to the rebellious abbot Ebolus of 
Saint-Denis.182 Little is known about Anskeric. His brother was Count Tetbert of 
Meaux and he may have had relatives in the Langrois.183 A marriage alliance with 
Pippin, father of Count Heribert I of Vermandois, has also been suggested, which 
would explain the connection between the bishop and the count.184 In addition, a 
later source, the Carmen de pontificibus romanis, indicates that he was related to 
Charles the Simple.185 Politically, Anskeric seems initially to have been in competi-
tion with Gauzlin for the office of bishop of Paris, failing to secure it on the death 
of Angelwinus. He nonetheless appeared at the court of Charles the Fat in 885 as 
episcopus vocatus.186 Charles’  support allowed him to succeed to the episcopal see 
upon the death of Gauzlin.187 His proximity to the emperor and his position in 
Paris are both emphasised by the fact that, when the Vikings arrived at the city in 
887 to demand the tribute promised to them in return for lifting the siege the year 
before, it was Anskeric who went to Charles,188 before negotiating their passage to 
75: dulcissima genitrix nostra Adeleidis; DChS  39, 83: dulcissima genitrix nostra Adeleydis; 
DChS 41, 90: dilectissima genitrice nostra Adeleide.
177 See chapter III.2.2.
178 DChS 5.
179 DChS 10, 8th February 898.
180 DChS 35, 31st October 900.
181 DChS 39, 21st August 901.
182 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381. The last diploma with Ebolus as archchancellor is DOdo 28 (25th July 
891), followed by DOdo 30 (30th September 892), which features Anskeric in the same position. 
In DOdo 33 (28th May 893) Adalgar, bishop of Autun, has succeeded Anskeric.
183 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXVIII.
184 Werner, Untersuchungen V, 95–102.
185 Mansi, Concilia  XVIII, col. 110. Formosus to Anskeric of Paris: Sacrilegos quosdam sacrati 
 culminis atros carptores, summi capitis clarissima membra attemerare ausos, anathematis ense 
recisos  notificans, monet hunc nodos dignae addere multae sceptrigeri quoque cognati pro culmine 
certet. See also Favre, Eudes, 151, n. 4.
186 DChF 116.
187 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXVI–XXVII.
188 Annales Vedastini 887, 63.
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Burgundy.189 Once Odo had become king, Anskeric joined his operations against 
the Vikings with his own troops.190 He appears shortly afterwards as abbot of Saint-
Germain of Auxerre,191 intervened for Bishop Argrim of Langres before the king192 
and finally became archchancellor in 892.193 Thus the bishop’s political importance 
can hardly be overestimated, an importance he also possessed within Charles’  in-
ner circle after the rebellion had begun. He now became the Carolingian’s new 
archchancellor, the same role he had held at Odo’s court.194 However, Charles’ 
only other diploma surviving from the years of the rebellion, dating to the sum-
mer of 896, names neither him nor any other as archchancellor,195 indicating that 
he had left Charles’  side. When this happened, however, is not clear. It may have 
occurred at the very time that Heribert and Fulk defected from the Carolingian. In 
any case, this appears not to have had any lasting consequences for their relation-
ship. After Fulk’s death, Anskeric immediately resumed his old office.196
Taking the office as an indicator of importance, we can also add another count 
to the men close to the Carolingian. A certain Elduin appears as count of the pal-
ace in a private charter of Richard the Justiciar in 896.197 His presence there can 
be explained by the negotiations taking place between Charles and Richard, with 
Elduin acting as the former’s legate. This would also emphasise his importance at 
Charles’  court at that moment, furthered by the circumstance that Heribert, Fulk 
and others had submitted to Odo earlier during that year.
Other counts also participated in important negotiations. Treating with Odo in 
895, Heribert was accompanied by Erkanger and Ecfrid.198 Little is known about 
either of them. Ecfrid was one of those who first approached Fulk in late 892199 and 
189 Abbo, Bella II, 96, v. 411−415. Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXVII, suggests that the Northmen were 
prohibited from using the Marne, as Anskeric’s brother Teutbert was count of Meaux.
190 Abbo, Bella II, 102, v. 485−488.
191 DOdo 12.
192 DOdo 15.
193 DOdo 30, 30th September 892. See also Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXV–XXIX.
194 DChS 5, 26th September 894, 7.
195 DChS 7, 25th July 896, preserved as original.
196 DChS 30, 23rd June 900.
197 21st December 896. Cartulaire Montiéramey, 18, N°  12. The charter (XII calendas januarii, 
anno IIII regnante Karolo, Francorum rege) can either be dated to 896 or 901. In 901, however, 
William the Pious had become Charles’ count of the palace (Recueil Cluny I, 83−84, N° 74, 29th 
November 901, is signed by William as principis et comiti palatio), making the later dating im-
possible. That Elduin was Charles’ count of the palace and not Odo’s can be deduced from the 
dating, which names the former as king. It seems possible that this Elduin is identical with Count 
Hilduin who, towards the end of Carloman II’s reign, received a part of the royal fisc in Tournai 
(DCmII 86). On this Hilduin as count in the Noyonnais see Vercauteren, Étude, 244−245.
198 Annales Vedastini 895, 77.
199 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381. Favre, Eudes, 184, Schneider, Erzbischof, 107 and Offergeld, Reges 
pueri, 842 see in him the count of Artois; Eckel, Charles, 11, identifies him as count of Arras. 
 Vanderkindere, Formations I, 46, is more careful; he also considers the position of Abbot Rodulf, 
and argues that he was not the count of, but a count in the Artois, e.g. of the Ostrevant or Douai. 
Lauer, Recueil Charles III, 74, n. 2, identifies him as count of the Hièmois and lay abbot of Saint-
Évroult, without giving any further reasons.
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is also attested in the sources in connection with Baldwin II’s rebellion after the 
death of the abbot Rodulf. At the time, the monks of Saint-Vaast first sent him to 
ask after the king’s will, only then to choose Baldwin as abbot on the advice of a 
certain Everbert.200 That Fulk chose to mention him in his letter nonetheless indi-
cates that Ecfrid was of some political importance. Erkanger, generally identified 
as count of Boulogne, had served as Gauzlin’s legate in 886 when he went to seek 
Duke Henry’s help against the Northmen.201 Like Heribert, he left Charles’  side 
in 896.202 Heribert’s brother, the already mentioned Pippin, also belonged to this 
circle of men carrying some political weight while probably not belonging to the 
group of central decision makers.
Also interesting is the case of yet another count, Aledramnus. He was sent to 
Arnulf by Fulk before Charles’  coronation, only to be excommunicated by Bishop 
Honoratus of Beauvais soon after.203 The choice of Aledramnus as emissary to 
 Arnulf was by no means coincidental. Since the last decade of Charles the Bald’s 
reign, the count had been a leading member of the Frankish nobility, appearing 
prominently in diplomas of Charles the Bald, Louis the Stammerer and Charles 
the Fat.204 During Charles the Fat’s reign, he and his brother, Count Theoderic—
himself a very important ally of Odo—led the advance guard during the emper-
or’s march on Paris.205 Moreover, Aledramnus was related not only to Charles the 
Simple,206 but also to Odo, whose wife Theodrada was Aledramnus’ daughter.207 
The count thus was a political heavyweight, well connected in the highest circles. 
Choosing him as emissary to Arnulf sent a powerful message to the realm: Ale-
dramnus’ support tied the reign of the young Charles to the reigns of his  father 
and grandfather and demonstrated that even Odo’s closest supporters—even 
members of his own family—rallied around the young Carolingian.
The mention of the Lotharingian Count Reginar Longneck at Charles’  side in 
895 is difficult to assess. In his fight with Odo, Charles and his supporters had 
concluded an alliance with the Lotharingian king, Zwentibold. Having united 
their forces, they now besieged Laon, where, as the Annales Vedastini report, 
“Reginar Longneck, count, marchio, accepting bad advice, left Charles and went 
to Zwentibold.”208 This phrasing indicates that he, although a Lotharingian noble, 
200 Annales Vedastini 892, 70.
201 Annales Vedastini 886, 59.
202 Annales Vedastini 896, 77.
203 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 383 and c. 6, 394.
204 DChB  356 (293: dilectus nobis, illustris comitis et ministerialis nostri) and DChB  347 (273: 
 dilectissimus nobis ministerialis, dilectus comes et ministerialis noster), DLS  28 (84: carissimus 
nobis comes and  dilectus propinquus noster comes) and DChF 120 (190: dilectus nobis comes).
205 Abbo, Bella II, 90, v. 328−329.
206 As becomes clear of DLS 28. Lot, Notes, 150, supposed that Aledramnus was related to Louis’ wife 
Adelaide, Le Jan, Famille, 256, n. 230 sees a direct tie to Louis.
207 Favre, Eudes, 202−203 and Le Jan, Famille, 237. Settipani, Préhistoire, 404−405 notes Theodra-
da’s origin as unknown.
208 Annales Vedastini 895, 76: Zuendebolchus vero rex et Karolus cum exercitu veniunt Laudunumque 
obsidione cingunt. Balduinus vero comes et Hrodulfus frater eius necnon et Ragnerus non bono 
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had previously supported Charles. Reginar appears to have held possessions in 
the Western kingdom209 and had married Charles’  sister Ermentrude around 888, 
the latter probably dying around 892, after the birth of her daughter Cunigunde.210 
Whether he had joined Charles at the beginning of the rebellion or only later can-
not be established. It seems plausible that, due to his connections to both Charles 
and Zwentibold, he had established the link between the two, yet, lacking further 
evidence, this is mere speculation. Since, during the rebellion, he is not mentioned 
before nor after this incident, it appears best to assume that his importance within 
the network supporting Charles was limited to a shorter period around the con-
clusion of the alliance with Zwentibold.
Less problematic, but certainly of more peripheral importance within the net-
work, were other men: Gauzfrid’s sons, nephews of Gauzlin and relations of the 
Ramnulfids in Aquitaine,211 belonged to the initial group approaching Fulk;212 the 
otherwise unknown Count Adalung was killed accompanying the archbishop to 
a meeting with Arnulf.213 From the archdiocese of Reims the bishops Heitilo of 
Noyon, Herilandus of Thérouanne and, soon afterwards, Mancio of Chalons214 
joined the ranks, along with Bishop Teutbald of Langres in northern Burgundy.215 
The example of the archdiocese of Reims, however, also demonstrates the limits 
of this new network. A number of suffragans did not agree with the policy of their 
consilio accepto Karolum reliquerunt et se ad Zuendebolchum contulerunt. For Baldwin and his 
brother see below.
209 An assumption that can be traced back through the literature at least to Stein, Geschichte, 199, 
but has never been actually proven. It seems likely however, since Regino of Prüm reports that 
when Zwentibold banned Reginar from the kingdom, he took all his honoribus, hereditatibus, 
quas in suo regno habebat (Chronicon 898, 145), indicating that he also held others outside his 
realm.  Situating them in the West would explain why Reginar turned to Charles on more than 
one  occassion. See also Parisot, Royaume, 542 and Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 175. Barth, Her-
zog, 32, claims that Reginar held property south-east of Orléans. How he comes to this conclu-
sion unfortunately  remains unclear.
210 Renn, Grafenhaus, 10−12 and Hlawitschka, Ahnen II, 235. Reginar’s son Gislebert stemmed from 
a second marriage with Albrada. On the old claim that Reginar was a descendent of Lothar I 
( Werner, Nachkommen, p, 412 and Settipani, Préhistoire  I, 264) see Hlawitschka, Ahnen  II, 
231−236. According to him, there is no evidence that Reginar did indeed stem from the marriage 
between his father Count Gislebert and Lothar’s daughter. He furthermore argues that neither 
the royal diplomas of Louis the Child or Charles the Simple make mention of a kinship with 
Reginar, nor do Reginar’s own charters.
211 Le Jan, Famille, 445, table N° 61.
212 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381.
213 Annales Vedastini 895, 75−76; Regino, Chronicon 895, 143.
214 Schneider, Erzbischof, 108. Unfortunately Schneider does not give any sources for this statement. 
Herilandus of Thérouanne was Fulk’s favourite for the empty episcopal siege of Châlons-en-
Champagne (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 377−378) before he ordinated Mancio (Flodoard, HRE IV, 
c. 3, 377). Heitilo of Noyon seems to have been Fulk’s confidant in the case of the transfer of the 
relics of Saint Calixt (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 391−392) and received a diploma from Charles in 
898 (DChS 2), both of which may indicate that he also supported Fulk and thereby Charles after 
893. Schneider also adds Riculf of Soissons to the list, which could not be confirmed.
215 Teutbald had sent a legate to Charles’ coronation. Afterwards, Fulk asked him to enquire about 
the position of Richard of Burgundy and of the Aquitanian nobles. Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 395.
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metropolitan: Dido of Laon as well as Honoratus of Beauvais stayed loyal to the 
king216 as, possibly, did Otgar of Amiens.217
We have so far described different layers of the network forming to rebel against 
Odo and elevating Charles to his father’s throne. The innermost core consisted of 
Charles’  mother Adelaide, Archbishop Fulk of Reims, Bishop Anskeric of Paris 
and Count Heribert of Vermandois. In the next layer were men like Heribert’s 
brother Pippin, Count Aledramnus, the Count of the Palace Elduin, Count Er-
kanger, Count Ecfrid and possibly also Reginar Longneck if he indeed belonged 
to Charles’  supporters. Undoubtedly to the outer rim belonged those primarily in 
contact with the men from the inner core or those whose base lay a greater dis-
tance from Francia: Count Adalung, Fulk’s suffragan bishops Heitilo, Herilandus 
and Mancio, Bishop Teutbald and the sons of Gauzfrid. In the Annales Vedastini 
this group is most often referred to as “those who were with Charles,”218 indicating, 
as Thilo Offergeld has shown, their influence on the actions of the king. Whenever 
political decisions had to be made, the annals emphasise their role as a group 
and only mention Charles when they indicate simple geographical movement.219 
“Those who were with Charles” are thus opposed to the fideles who were accompa-
nying and counselling Odo. The Robertian made his own policies; Charles seems 
to have been a boy−king dominated by those around him.
I.2.3 The motives behind the rebellion
What was it that brought these nobles together?220 Adelaide, we may reasonably 
presume, wanted to further her son. Fulk had received at least two abbeys since 
216 See above, chapters I.2.1, n. 134 and I.2.2, n. 203. Whether Dodilo of Cambrai also stayed loyal 
to Odo as Schneider, Erzbischof, 108, claims, is doubtful. Many of Fulk’s letters accuse Dodilo 
of opposition to the archbishop, yet none does so in the context of the rebellion against Odo. 
 Furthermore, as Cambrai was part of the kingdom of Lotharingia, Dodilo was not even a subject 
of Odo, but of Arnulf and later on of Zwentibold.
217 No source mentions Otgar as Odo’s supporter. In 900, however, he appears as a witness in one 
of Odo’s brother Robert’s private charters (Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 42), issued at a moment 
when the marchio was at conflict with Charles. See chapter III.2.2.1.
218 Hi qui cum Karolo erant, for example Annales Vedastini 894, 74. For further references see 
 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 454.
219 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 454−455.
220 Scholars have made different attempts to explain their opposition, especially concerning  Archbishop 
Fulk. Eckel, Charles, 9, portrayed Fulk as a defender of Carolingian legitimacy. Favre, Eudes, saw 
a claim of the church of Reims on the abbey of Saint-Martin of Tours as a reason for the archbish-
op’s opposition (6), as well as his desire to unite all of the archdiocese’s suffragans under the rule 
of one king, Arnulf (101−102). Offergeld, Reges pueri, 411−412, emphasises the rivalry between the 
church of Reims and the church of Sens. Schneider, Erzbischof, 54−55, does not see any plausible 
reason for the archbishop’s opposition. It was suggested by Schneider, Erzbischof, 109−110, and 
emphasised by Schneidmüller, Tradition, 123, that the party supporting Charles was to a great ex-
tent dominated by members of the Carolingian family. In particular, they singled out the counts 
Heribert and Pippin, direct descendants of Bernard of Italy, as well as Bishop Teutbald of Langres. 
Within the group which we have distinguished as Charles’ core supporters, this does not appear to 
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Odo had become king, Saint-Bertin and Avenay, yet, as we have argued, had not 
made it into the king’s inner circle. In Fulk’s case, it is indeed most likely that his 
political ambitions were the root of his opposition to Odo. A new king could cer-
tainly offer more than Odo would ever be able to, be it in honores or, more impor-
tantly, influence on royal decision making. From the beginning, Odo’s rule had 
not been based on general consent, but rather on his Neustrian possessions and 
connections, as well as some support from the likes of Theoderic of Vermandois 
and Archbishop Walter of Sens, who thereby increased their influence over the 
king.221 Only after his victory against the Normans and his recognition by Arnulf 
was Odo able to impose his rule over the whole of the realm. That Odo did his best 
to integrate former opponents, such as Fulk, shows that he was well aware of their 
importance for the stability of his realm. However, they would never have been 
able to assume a position equal to that of the king’s first supporters. Charles, on 
the other hand, was just a boy on the brink of manhood and so far without any 
significant support. Backing him would have meant that Fulk and Heribert would 
be able to exert that very same influence that was denied to them under Odo.222
Yet, this focus on the assumed political ambitions falls short when it comes 
to explaining the motives of other members of the network. Anskeric and Count 
Heribert, for example, were powerful men in key positions and close to Odo, the 
former only recently having been promoted to archchancellor and the latter rapidly 
becoming one of the leading magnates in Francia. Others, like Heribert’s brother 
Pippin, undoubtedly joined because of their personal connections to those in the 
inner core, while in the case of men like the counts Aledramnus and Ecfrid we 
simply do not know enough to make a proper judgement. There is Fulk’s letter 
to Arnulf to take into consideration however. At two points Fulk makes remarks 
concerning Odo’s behaviour. First, Anskeric, so Fulk claims, came to him asking 
for his advice concerning “insupportable” commands from the king. And second, 
that those who had approached him also asked him for advice about what to do 
concerning the “evil” Odo wanted to do to the sons of Gauzfrid.223 These remarks 
may of course only have been pretexts, yet it is worthwhile pursuing this thought 
further.
be an overly large proportion. The image only changes if we add, as Schneider and  Schneidmüller 
do, Baldwin II of Flanders and his brother Rodulf, Reginar Longneck and the descendants of 
Ramnulf II of Poitiers to the group’s allies. However, we will later show that these men cannot be 
so added. Following Offergeld, Reges pueri, 425, we might in addition add that most of the nobles 
of the region were in fact related to the Carolingians, so that the (supposed) high concentration 
of them in the group can hardly be surprising.
221 Guillot, Etapes, 210.
222 In this tenor Kienast, Vasallität, 467−468 and Offergeld, Reges pueri, 425.
223 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381: Preterea, quod audierat huic regi suggestum, quia contra fidelitatem 
ipsius et propter privatum hoc egerit commodum, infert, quod Asclericus ipse, qui hec iactitasse 
videbatur, antequam de re huiuscemodi aliquid idem archiepiscopus agere conaretur, venerit ad se 
presentibus Heriberto et Ecfrido comitibus et consilium simulque auxilium quesierit, quid agere de­
beret de iussionibus Odonis, qui res importabiles ei precipiebat. Ex parte quoque filiorum Gosfridi 
consilium petierit de malo, quod eis Odo facere conabatur…
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During 892, the year leading up to the rebellion of Fulk and his allies, two 
conflicts broke out in different parts of the realm. In the Francia, on the death of 
Abbot Rodulf, Baldwin II of Flanders claimed his cousin’s abbeys of Saint-Vaast 
and Saint-Bertin for himself.224 In the following months, not only did the monks 
of the former declare for the count, but Odo’s own relative, Walker, whom he 
had entrusted with the castle of Laon, did so as well. Castle and city both fell 
soon enough and Walker was condemned to death by judgement of the nobles 
who were present. Odo refused to pardon him. In addition, and probably at the 
instigation of the king, Bishop Dido of Laon also withheld spiritual support from 
Walker during his last hours.225 The conflict with Baldwin continued  nevertheless. 
Even deeper rifts in Odo’s political order were caused by the succession of 
Ramnulf  II at Poitiers.226 Ramnulf had an illegitimate son, Ebalus Manzer, who 
was well connected at court: his uncle, Ebolus, abbot of Saint-Denis,227 served as 
Odo’s archchancellor, a fact which probably helped secure Odo’s recognition of 
his succession.228 In early 892, however, Odo decided to grant Poitiers to Count 
Altmar,229 thus provoking the revolt of Abbot Ebolus and his brother Gauzbert, 
who took up their nephew’s claim. Soon after, he revoked his earlier decision and 
installed his own brother Robert instead of Altmar at Poitiers, in turn leading to 
a revolt of the latter. By this point, the group of nobles surrounding Fulk of Reims 
had crowned the young Charles king, meaning that the rebellion would hence-
forth demand Odo’s entire attention.
These different conflicts which broke out against Odo, in Francia as well as 
with Count Baldwin in Flanders and the Ramnulfids in Aquitaine, may have been 
to a great part independent of each other, but they may also have been a conse-
quence of deeper problems with Odo’s rule. The source of his legitimacy as ruler 
of the whole realm had been his ability to protect it against the Northmen. Yet, 
by 892, the symbolic capital of the victories of the siege of Paris and the battle of 
Montfauçon had been used up by his inability to more than temporarily contain 
the Vikings or divert their incursions by paying them off.230 Furthermore, the con-
flict between Baldwin and Odo reveals a strong mistrust231 of the count towards 
the king. Baldwin refused Odo’s initial proposal to come to terms peacefully while 
224 Annales Vedastini 892, 71. On this conflict, see also chapter VI.2 and Lößlein, Ressources.
225 Annales Vedastini 892, 72; Regino, Chronicon 892, 139–140; Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 392.
226 For a detailed study of the conflict, see chapter VI.2.
227 Ramnulf and Ebolus were brothers. Regino, Chronicon 892, 140: Post haec in Aquitaniam 
 proficiscitur contra Ramnulfum et fratrem eius Gozbertum et Ebulonem abbatem de sancto Di­
onisio et alios  nonnullos… Annales Vedastini 892, 73: At ubi fines attigit Aquitaniae, Ebulus, 
eius  adventum praesciens, in fugam versus interfectus est iuxta quoddam castellum lapide; frater 
quoque eius  Gozbertus post haec obsessus atque in brevi vitam finivit.
228 On Abbot Ebolus see Bautier, Recueil Eudes, Introduction, XXI–XXV.
229 Altmar supported Odo even before he became king. He appears as the first witness in a charter 
Odo issued for Saint-Martin in 887 (DOdo 55).
230 Annales Vedastini 889−891, 67−70. See also Favre, Eudes, 120−138 and Sassier, Hugues, 59 and 
chapter IV.2.
231 On the importance of trust, see chapter VI.
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later on, in 895, the king’s determination to rebuild trust in him becomes visible 
when he returned Saint-Vaast to the count without concluding a peace treaty.232 
This mistrust was probably rooted in Odo’s actions as king. The conflict around 
the succession at Poitiers shows Odo acting against the interests of those close to 
him.233 In addition, also the king’s decisions in the case of his own relative, Walker, 
whom he had entrusted with the castle of Laon but who had made peace with 
Baldwin, can be noted. Walker was sentenced to death, but then, according to the 
Annales Vedastini, the king did not pardon him.234 That the annals make note of 
this event reflects that, in this case, Odo did not act according to common expec-
tations, but rather violated them. In this context, we can also safely assume that 
the denial of absolution to Walker by Bishop Dido of Laon was the king’s doing 
as well.
Against this background, Anskeric’s claim that the king had ordered him to do 
intolerable things, as reported in Fulk’s letter to Arnulf, makes sense. Whether this 
had actually happened or not did not matter, nor did the actual content of these 
orders. Odo’s own actions appear to have already created an atmosphere in which 
such accusations could easily be believed, as there were enough other examples 
of his intolerable behaviour to give them credibility. By the end of 892, Odo had 
not only lost his legitimacy as victor against the Normans, but may also have been 
deeply mistrusted by many important nobles. Next to the political ambitions of 
Fulk and some of his allies, this possible crisis of trust in the king may well serve 
as an answer to why so many nobles from Francia chose to oppose Odo.
I.2.4 The cohesion of the network
A brief account of the ups and downs of the rebellion will allow us to draw some 
conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the alliance which had formed 
around Charles. After Fulk and his allies had elevated Charles to the throne, they 
mobilised an army to march against Odo. The following encounter ended with-
out any blood being shed after all parties withdrew. In autumn Odo managed to 
surprise Charles’  group and force them out of the realm. Yet, in another surpris-
ing march, the allies returned to Francia in September and an armistice was con-
cluded until Easter 894.235 The end of the armistice saw both sides gathering their 
forces, with Odo besieging Charles at Reims. Leaving the city garrisoned, Fulk and 
232 For a detailed study of the conflict, see chapter VI.2, were we further elaborate on these thoughts.
233 See chapter VI.2.
234 Annales Vedastini 892, 72: Nam antea Walkerus eius consobrinus castrum Ludunensium, quod a 
rege perceperat, per tirannidem obtinuit, sed rex castellum obsedit ipsamque civitatem mox cepit. Et 
post paucos dies diiudicatus, sed rex non sibi praevidit, capite eum iussit truncari; contrary to the 
annals Regino (Chronicon 892, 139−140) reports that Walker was executed because he had drawn 
his sword against the king in a public assembly.
235 Annales Vedastini 893, 73−74.
54 I. Becoming king: The questions of legitimacy and support
his allies took the young Carolingian and moved to meet Arnulf, who acknowl-
edged him as king and sent Lotharingian troops to support him. Encountering 
Odo, however, the Lotharingians refrained from fighting him and returned home, 
forcing Charles to seek refuge with Richard the Justiciar in Burgundy, where he 
was pursued by Odo, although without success. Deprived of their supplies in Fran-
cia and now in conflict with Richard, Charles’  allies then went to devastating the 
region.236
In 895, events took a new turn, as Arnulf succeeded in installing his son Zwen-
tibold as king in Lotharingia. In return for the promise of a part of the Western 
realm, Zwentibold agreed to an alliance with Charles and joined forces with him 
to besiege Laon, forcing Odo to withdraw behind the Seine. The alliance between 
Charles and Zwentibold, however, soon became fragile and those who were with 
Charles sent to Odo to open negations: Charles should be granted a part of the 
realm, they themselves should receive the king’s peace. Odo’s subsequent return 
to Francia forced Zwentibold back to Lotharingia. The negotiations between Odo 
and Charles’  supporters continued until Easter 896,237 while Odo remained in con-
trol of almost the whole of Francia apart from Reims, leaving Charles’  party short 
of supplies to get through the winter. Charles’  allies now withdrew to the Moselle 
and warred against Baldwin of Flanders and his brother Rodulf. In 896, the nego-
tiations finally came to an end and Odo was willing to agree to the terms proposed 
the year before, leaving Charles the part of the realm held by his supporters at 
that time. The decisive assembly, however, was disrupted by Count Rodulf, leading 
Heribert and Erkanger to abandon Charles and go over to Odo, soon, although 
reluctantly, followed by Fulk. Charles sought refuge in Lotharingia once more and 
aimed to create an alliance with a group of Northmen led by Hundeus when his 
remaining supporters reopened negotiations with Odo. This time, they succeeded: 
peace was restored, Charles was granted a part of the realm and “promised more”; 
in the context of the developments soon to come, this was undoubtedly the right 
to succeed Odo.238
Several observations can be drawn from this account: a) After the initial suc-
cess of Charles’  party, Odo’s military superiority soon became evident. He man-
aged to drive his opponents out of Francia and brought their strongholds under 
his control, thus depriving them of their bases of supply. b) Their own weakness 
evident, Charles’  supporters sought out potential allies from the beginning—here 
we have seen Arnulf, Richard, Zwentibold and Hundeus’ Northmen. We will turn 
236 Annales Vedastini 894–895, 74−75.
237 Annales Vedastini 895, 75−77.
238 Annales Vedastini 897, 78−79: … Verum post haec hi qui cum Karolo erant, videntes suam pau­
citatem et nullum tutum habere locum refugii, iterum ad Odonem regem dirigunt, quatinus ad 
memoriam reduceret, quod senior eorum filius esset sui quondam senioris, et partem aliquam ei 
ex paterno regno concederet. At vero rex cum consilio suorum respondit se illi velle misereri, si sibi 
liceret; et intercurrentibus nuntiis venit Karolus ad eum; quem ille benigne suscepit, deditque ei 
tantum e regno, quantum sibi visum fuit, promisitque maiora et remisit eum ad locum suum…
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to them and others in detail further below. c) Several of these allies soon turned 
into enemies. d) Despite his superiority on the battlefield, Odo appears to have 
had a fundamental interest in re-establishing peace with Charles and his allies. e) 
Negotiations appear to have been complicated, starting in 895 and taking most of 
that and the following year. The initial proposition from Charles’  allies appears to 
have been the basis for the final agreement: a partition of the realm and the re-
entering of those who had supported him into Odo’s peace. f) Only one moment 
occurred when defections actually took place: after the failure of the negotiations 
in 896, when almost all of Francia had been lost to Odo and no more potential 
allies were on the horizon.
Given all this, the cohesion of the group around Charles appears remarkable. 
Only after three and a half years of war, after having lost their bases and without 
the prospect of other potential alliance partners, and at the same time embroiled 
in conflict with Baldwin and his brother, did members of the network go over to 
Odo. Despite the constant setbacks, Fulk and Charles’  other supporters demon-
strated a notable ability to seek out allies against Odo. While their own strength 
evidently would not suffice to prevail against the Robertian, in alliance with Zwen-
tibold they succeeded in forcing Odo out of Francia. Even by itself, this sufficed 
to pose a constant threat to Odo and to divert him from other duties, such as de-
fending the realm against the Northmen, as the Annales Vedastini remark.239 Thus 
Odo was as interested in coming to terms with the rebels as they were—the only 
question remaining was what price would have to be paid.
I.2.5 Allies sought within the realm
Charles’  network of supporters was certainly stronger than that which had tried 
to elevate Wido of Spoleto and then Arnulf back in 888, yet it still was not in a 
position to guarantee success in imposing a new king. Other possible allies had 
to be sought out, within and beyond of the realm. The most obvious course was 
to look to those already in conflict with Odo—the Ramnulfids and Baldwin II of 
Flanders. In its entry describing late 892, the Annales Vedastini mention “others” 
who joined up with the prospective rebels around Fulk to convince Odo to leave 
Francia.240 The Ramnulfides have often been linked to the rebellion241 and it might 
indeed be that they are the “others” here, yet, as no other source indicates a con-
239 Annales Vedastini 896, 78: Ac per idem tempus iterum Nortmanni cum duce Hundeo nomine 
et quinque barchis iterum Sequanam ingressi; et dum rex ad alia intendit, magnum sibi et regno 
malum accrescere fecit.
240 Annales Vedastini 892, 72: Franci vero, qui dudum Odoni regi infesti fuerant, sociatis sibi aliis, ut 
possent compleri quae volebant, suaserunt regi, ut relicta Francia hiemandi gratia peteret Aqui­
taniam, ut Francia, quae tot annis afflicta erat, aliquatenus recuperare posset; et quia Ramnulfus 
obierat, et quia Ebulus et Gotbertus ab illo disciverant, eos aut sibi resociaret aut de regno suo pel­
leret aut vita privaret.
241 Schneider, Erzbischof, 110 and Schneidmüller, Tradition, 123.
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nection between the two groups, this must remain mere speculation. In any case, 
the Ramnulfid leaders Ebolus and his brother Gauzbert died soon after,242 thus 
ending the possibility of further cooperation.
Baldwin, on the other hand, had already been allied with Fulk in the succession 
of 888, when they and Abbot Rodulf, the count’s cousin,243 had approached Arnulf 
to take the West Frankish crown.244 After the death of Rodulf in 892, Baldwin, 
against Odo’s will, claimed his cousin’s abbeys, Saint-Vaast and Saint-Bertin, for 
himself.245 Fulk quickly became involved in the ensuing conflict. He and his suffra-
gans threatened all those who communicated with the count with anathema246 and 
sent another letter to Baldwin himself in which they reproached him for his mis-
demeanours and asked him to repent, threatening him with excommunication if 
he did not comply.247 However, although Baldwin still offered resistance to Odo at 
the end of 892, in another letter composed at a synod at Reims the bishops seemed 
to be much more obliging. The count was informed that he had indeed been ex-
communicated for his deeds, but that this excommunication had been suspended 
for the time being, due to possible advantages for state and church.248 The conclu-
sion that Fulk wanted to spare Baldwin in order to leave open the possibility for 
him to join the ranks of the conspiracy against Odo comes to mind249 and indeed 
the count and his brother are found at Charles’  side in 895.250 Yet nothing indicates 
when they had actually allied themselves with the group around the Carolingian. 
The siege of Laon, however, certainly saw the end of their cooperation. Baldwin 
and his brother Rodulf went over to Zwentibold and fought Odo on their own 
when Charles’  allies started negotiations with the Robertian.251 Over the winter of 
895/896, when Charles and Odo had agreed upon an armistice, fighting ensued 
between Charles and Baldwin,252 indicating that the rift between the two groups 
had become serious.
In 896 Rodulf also appeared at an assembly which concluded long lasting ne-
gotiations between Charles’  supporters and Odo. Odo had finally agreed to leave 
242 Annales Vedastini 892, 73.
243 On their parentage see Favre, Famille, 160.
244 Annales Vedastini 888, 65.
245 Annales Vedastini 892, 70−71.
246 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 391.
247 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 7, 396−397.
248 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 7, 397: Item ad eundem cum coepiscopis suis scribens ex synodo Remis habi­
ta dominice incarnationis anno DCCCXCII. […] Unde communi decreto episcoporum iudicatum 
fuerat eum auctoritatis canonice anathemate feriendum, sed quoniam et ecclesie et publicis regni 
utilitatibus videbatur accommodus, censura suspenditur adhuc animadversionis ecclesiastice rec­
ogitandique sibi et emendandi spatium reservatur et obsecratur per misericordiam dei, ut ab hac 
praesumptione animum revocet nec amplius iram dei contra se provocet, ne illi quodammodo gla­
dium praebeat, et cetera.
249 Schneider, Erzbischof, 104 and Schröder, Synoden, 119.
250 Annales Vedastini 895, 76. When exactly they joined Charles’ side cannot be established from the 
sources. 
251 Annales Vedastini 895, 76.
252 Annales Vedastini 896, 77.
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Charles the part of the realm his followers had owned before the war, when Rodulf 
disrupted the assembly and caused the whole agreement to fail.253 The question 
arises: why did the intervention of Rodulf, who belonged neither to Charles’  side 
nor Odo’s, have such dire consequences? The only possible explanation is that the 
negotiations sought not only a solution for the conflict between Odo and Charles, 
but a general peace including Baldwin and his brother. This meant that an ar-
rangement satisfying all three parties had to be found. When Rodulf derailed the 
negotiations, we can conclude that a decision was close to being made that would 
have been to his disadvantage. It seems safe to assume that, during their conflict 
with Charles’  supporters, Baldwin and Rodulf had taken over honores belonging 
to or claimed by Charles’  followers. This was definitely true for honores belonging 
to Odo’s allies in the region: Saint-Quentin, now occupied by Rodulf, had been in 
the possession of the son of Count Theoderic, one of Odo’s most loyal followers. A 
general peace would have meant that some or all of these honores would have had 
to be returned to their original owners—something that Rodulf would not agree 
to. The problem was solved over the following winter when Baldwin’s brother was 
killed in battle with Heribert.254 In 897, the different parties, including Baldwin, 
came to agreements similar to those of the year before and peace was finally re-
stored. However, the underlying conflicts, Baldwin’s desire to extend his influence 
in the North and his enmity with Heribert continued.255
When trying to determine Baldwin’s and his brother’s position concerning 
Charles, the central point is not their timing for joining the Carolingian’s side, but 
that they had already been in conflict with Odo before the start of the rebellion. 
Their behaviour during these years does not point towards a fundamental oppo-
sition to Odo per se, but their aim to extend their influence in the north-east of 
Francia. The contentious point between Baldwin and Odo was the abbey of Saint-
Vaast, which Baldwin had claimed for himself after his cousin Rodulf ’s death.256 
Furthermore, Rodulf had used the confusion in Francia to acquire Saint-Quentin, 
something that Odo could not tolerate either, since the abbey had been in the 
hands of the son of one of his closest supporters. Both Baldwin and Rodulf appear 
as independent actors in the political arena of Francia, their support for Charles 
253 Annales Vedastini 896, 77: Odo rex placitum cum suis fidelibus habuit, volens partem regni, quam 
eius fideles tenuerant, Karolo concedere. Sed Rodulfus comes omne illud placitum disrupit; unde 
Heribertus et Herkengerus, omnibus iam perditis, contulerunt se ad regem Odonem, paucique rel­
icti sunt cum Karolo. Did Rodulf participate in the assembly or disrupt the proceedings from the 
outside? The former seems to be the case: if the negotiations had only been interrupted by an 
attack by Baldwin’s brother, then why were they not renewed shortly after, especially since Odo 
seems to have been close to agreeing to terms acceptable to Charles’ supporters? Instead, many 
of them now changed sides, which leads us to conclude that they had lost all hope that, after the 
failure caused by Rodulf, a solution could be found.
254 Annales Vedastini 896, 78.
255 Annales Vedastini 897, 78−79. In 898, Baldwin, due to Heribert’s presence at Charles’ side, only 
sent a legate to the Carolingian’s coronation (Annales Vedastini 898, 79). In 899 Baldwin attacked 
Péronne against Charles’ explicit will (Annales Vedastini 899, 81).
256 For this conflict, see chapter VI.2.
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not aimed at disposing Odo but at increasing the pressure on the king to come to 
terms with them.
The character of Baldwin’s support for Charles brings us to another group of 
nobles whose position has been the object of scholarly discussion ever since the 
publication of an article by Jean-Pierre Brunterc’h.257 Following Charles’  corona-
tion, the Annales Vedastini report that:
After Easter Archbishop Fulk and Count Heribert took King Charles and set 
out with all the army they could muster against King Odo. Richard, William 
and Altmar came against them with a considerable army. Against whom King 
Odo did not hesitate to come. And he sent [messengers] to those who were 
with Charles, ordering that by his guarantee they should make amends for 
whatever wrong they had done them and remember the oaths they had sworn 
to him.258
Until Brunterc’h’s article, it had been assumed that Richard (the Justiciar), 
 William (the Pious) and Altmar (of Poitiers) came to support Charles and oppose 
Odo,259 a reading that would be supported by the circumstance that both  William 
and Altmar had been involved in the conflict ensuing around the succession of 
Ramnulf II at Poitiers in 892.260 However, Brunterc’h argues that, in fact, the three 
magnates were allies of the king, having joined him in April or May 893 at the 
latest.261 He translates this passage of the annals as “À l’encontre de ces derniers 
(= Richard-Guillaume-Adémar), le roi Eudes vint sans tarder et dépêcha ses 
représentants à ceux qui étaient avec Charles, leur enjoignant de réparer par son 
gage tout ce qu’ils avaient commis contre eux (= Richard-Guillaume-Adémar) 
et de se souvenir du serment qu’ils lui avaient prêté.” Odo, therefore, assumes 
the role of a mediator, offering his guarantee to Richard, William and Altmar 
for deeds done by Fulk and his allies.262 Brunterc’h further links the three mag-
nates’   alliance with Odo to a number of measures taken by the king: Richard was 
given the abbey of Saint-Germain of Auxerre, most probably in 893 or 894,263 
while  William received the abbey of Saint-Julien of Brioude by March 894 at the 
257 Brunterc’h, Naissance.
258 Annales Vedastini 893, 73−74: Post Pascha Domini Fulcho archiepiscopus et Heribertus comes 
 assumentes Karolum regem cum omni exercitu disponunt [ire] contra Odonem regem, veneruntque 
contra eos Richardus, Willelmus et Hadamarus, habueruntque exercitum copiosum. Contra quos 
rex Odo venire non distulit. Misitque ad eos qui cum Karolo erant mandans ut quicquid in eis 
deliquissent per suum eis vadium emendarent et memores essent sacramenti quae sibi iuraverant.
259 For example Eckel, Charles, 11, Chaume, Origines, 376, Kienast, Vasallität, 471. This reading was 
supported by Altmar and William being in conflict with Odo during 892. See below.
260 See chapter VI.2.
261 Brunterc’h, Naissance, 81.
262 Brunterc’h, Naissance, 107, n. 121.
263 Sassier, Recherches, 7.
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latest.264 Finally, Bishop Adalgarius of Autun became Odo’s new archchancellor 
before 28th May 893.265
While this reading of the events has subsequently been accepted by scholars,266 
Steven Robbie has recently brought up a new argument, challenging Brunterc’h’s 
view that Adalgarius had been a close supporter of Richard.267 According to him, 
in light of their previous behaviour, both were “more likely at loggerheads tha[n] 
natural collaborators.”268 He proposes an alternative reading: Richard, William and 
Altmar indeed came up in support of Charles and Odo successfully made haste 
to dissuade them.269 Robbie’s analysis can be used as a starting point for further 
thoughts: while Brunterc’h’s reading does agree with the syntax, he may be overly 
precise with his translation—the Annales Vedastini are known to contain grievous 
grammatical errors.270 It is hard to imagine what wrongs Fulk’s party had done to 
the three magnates that would require compensation and royal mediation; at the 
same time William and Altmar (and possibly Richard as well) were in conflict with 
Odo himself.271 In addition, why should the annalist emphasise that Odo did not 
hesitate to march against them, when he already had the support of these powerful 
men? Finally, while it is certain that Saint-Germain of Auxerre and Saint-Julien of 
Brioude came under the control of Richard and William respectively, these acqui-
sitions cannot be dated precisely enough to determine whether Odo had already 
granted them before Easter 893. That these grants were related to these events is 
indeed possible; however, another explanation seems more plausible, especially 
considering that over the next few years neither William nor Altmar appear again 
in the struggle between Charles and Odo, while Richard subsequently behaved 
like “a loose cannon,” as Steven Robbie put it.272 Richard, William and Altmar were 
not Odo’s allies at that particular moment, but nothing indicates that they sup-
ported Charles. In fact, Fulk asked Bishop Teutbald of Langres to inquire into the 
attitude of Richard and the Aquitanians.273 If they had been allied, this would not 
have been necessary. It seems therefore most likely that they marched up north 
with an army as a third party, one that would offer itself to the highest bidder. Odo 
264 Cartulaire Brioude, N° 182, 194−195. For the date see Brunterc’h, Naissance, 104−105.
265 DOdo 33.
266 Guillot and Sassier, Pouvoirs I, 162−165 and Koziol, Politics, 228.
267 Brunterc’h, Naissance, 82.
268 Robbie, Emergence, 46.
269 Robbie, Emergence, 46.
270 Rau, Quellen II, 6.
271 See above. Indeed, it seems much more likely that Odo sent his envoys to Fulk and his allies de-
manding them to compensate him for their wrongdoings towards him and asking for guaranties 
against further misbehaviour. 
272 Robbie, Emergence, 47.
273 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 395.
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then won the race by granting these magnates important abbeys, buying not their 
support, but their neutrality.274
Neither William, Altmar nor Richard can therefore be linked to Charles and 
his supporters at the beginning of the rebellion. At least two of them, William and 
Altmar, had already been in conflict with Odo and none of them appears to have 
fundamentally opposed his rule. Like Baldwin and his brother Rodulf, they used 
the chaos in Francia to enforce their claims. Faced with the rebellion of Fulk and 
his allies, Odo needed to pacify this conflict; it did not challenge his rule as such, 
but prevented him from concentrating his forces in Francia. While Altmar soon 
returned to Odo’s side, the image is less clear for William.275 A charter from Saint-
Julien of Brioude dates to “the fifth year of the reign of King Charles,”276 corre-
sponding to 897 and therefore the year of the final agreement between Charles and 
Odo.277 Unfortunately, the charter, while naming William as lay abbot, does not 
indicate whether he was present at that moment or had had a hand in the proceed-
ings in any other way. We might therefore suggest, although with great care, that in 
897 William was in contact with Charles and thus increased the pressure on Odo.
Richard, despite the agreement with Odo, became repeatedly involved in the 
conflict. In 894, Charles and his allies were forced to leave Francia and seek shelter 
with Richard in Burgundy. Odo followed them, but failed to secure a victory in 
battle. It was undoubtedly during this campaign that he stayed at Flavigny, issu-
ing a diploma for the abbey of Montiéramey.278 This was not only an attempt to 
prevent Charles’  supporters from establishing a new base in northern Burgundy, 
where Adelaide’s family had connections.279 It also affirmed Odo’s control of the 
Troyes region, where Montiéramey, as well as the donated goods, were located. 
Furthermore, the intervention of Count Hucbald in the diploma was a symbol of 
Odo’s own ties to and control over Francia, the heartland of Charles’  supporters. 
Finally, his stay at Flavigny might also be taken as a gesture against Richard, who, 
after the death of Bishop Adalgarius of Autun, Odo’s archchancellor, had installed 
274 This conclusion is also supported by a charter issued by Abbess Ava, sister of William, in which 
the villa of Cluny is exchanged for an allod in Einville. Its date reads anno primo certantibus 
duobus regibus de regno Odono vidilicet et Karolo (Originaux Cluny, N° 2, 26−29). The charter 
was issued on 9th November 893 (the certantibus—fighting, struggling—argues against a date 
of 897, which has also been put forward: the two kings are unlikely to have been fighting after 
the settlement of 897)—several months after William and the others are supposed to have allied 
themselves with Odo. Yet, at that moment, the count recognised both the Robertian and the 
Carolingian as kings. Since this charter was issued before William’s first charter for Saint-Julien 
of Brioude (see chapter I.2.5, n. 264), we might even suggest that the settlement with Odo had not 
been fully implemented by November 893, leading to the discontent of the count.
275 See also chapter VI.2.
276 Grand Cartulaire, N° CCCXXXVII, 96: anno V regnante Karolo rege.
277 Kienast, Vasallität, 466, n. 1654, taking in conseridation the terms of office of Provost Eldefredus 
and Deacon Bernardus, both named in the charter.
278 DOdo 38. On the date see also the comment of Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 160−161.
279 Werner, Nachkommen, 432. Adelheid’s brother Wulfard had been abbot of Flavigny. See also 
above.
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Walo, brother of his right hand man Manasses, in this see, although the commu-
nity had elected Aquinus, the provost of Flavigny.280
Whether Charles’  party had originally intended to move as far south as 
 Richard’s lands remains an open question, but, without a doubt, Odo’s campaign 
did not leave them much of a choice. Even if Richard actually agreed to an alli-
ance with Charles’  party, it did not hold for long. By the end of 894, Manasses had 
attacked Bishop Teutbald of Langres, who had opposed the installation of Walo 
at Autun, and blinded him.281 Since Teutbald had been close to Fulk both sides 
entered into conflict.282 Odo, at this point if not earlier, had changed his strategy 
from trying to overwhelm his opponents by force to depriving them of their bases 
of supply, taking their possessions in Francia.283 The situation of Charles’  sup-
porters turned desperate. Without supplies from Richard they were now forced to 
live off the land, leading to a wave of violence and devastation, emphasised by all 
contemporary witnesses.284
This did not mean the end of contact between Charles and Richard. In the 
winter of 895/6, a meeting in southern Lotharingia took place at Remiremont.285 
Emperor Lambert and King Rudolf signed next to Charles, yet also present were 
Manasses and Rampo. Manasses was the right hand man of Richard the Justiciar 
and Rampo was involved in the blinding of Bishop Teutbald of Langres. In this 
affair, Fulk had not only tried to protect his relative Rampo, but had also done his 
best to delay the excommunication of Richard and Manasses demanded by the 
pope.286 Whether Charles gained any actual support during this time is not appar-
ent from the sources, but he remained in contact with Richard. In late 896,  Richard 
and Charles were still negotiating, as is signalled by the presence of the count of 
280 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 134. Futhermore, it is possible that at the time Troyes was already 
in the hands of Richard, thus strengthening this assumption. The first indication that the count 
was in control of the city, however, only stems from December 896, when he dispensed justice 
in favour of abbot Berthard of Montiéramey at the placitum of Courtenois (21st December 896; 
Cartulaire Montiéramey, N°  12, 18). See also Crété-Protin, Église, 307−308, who misdates the 
event to January.
281 Annales Vedastini 894, 75. See also Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 134−135.
282 Pope Formosus, upon being confronted with Richard’s crimes not only against Teutbald, but 
also against archbishop Walter of Sens, excommunicated Richard, Manasses and Rampo and 
 demanded the bishops do the same (Flodoard, HRE  IV, c.  3, 377). Fulk did not question the 
 decision to excommunicate the first two, but defended the innocence of his relative Rampo (Flo-
doard, HRE IV, c. 3, 376−377).
283 Annales Vedastini 895, 75.
284 Annales Vedastini 895, 75: Burgundiam acriter depopulati sunt. Regino, Chronicon 893, 141: Et sic 
alternatem ex utraque parte multi pereunt, ingens malicia, innumerabiles rapinae et assiduae predae 
fiunt. Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 53, 455−456: Tempore, quo inter reges Odonem et Karolum graves ageban­
tur Francorum in regno discordie, per hanc accasionem licito rapine et depredations fiebant, confusum 
erat fasque nefas, nusquam Deu aut humanarum timor legume, sed vi et potential universa constabant.
285 Liber Memorialis Remiremont, 21, fol. 11v. Karolus rex iuuenis, Lanbertus imperator, Rodulfus rex, 
Rampo, Vuitbertus, Rotrudis, Adeldrudis, Siifridus, Gotdofridus, Manases, Eldigarius ep., Folco ep., 
Uuilerius, Lehutaldus. For the dating and identifications, see Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 147−152. 
On the motivation of Rudolf, king of Upper Burgundy, see Demotz, Bourgogne, 96−97.
286 See chapter I.2.5, n. 282.
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the palace Elduin at Richard’s court.287 Since the charter is dated by Charles’  reign, 
we can conclude that Richard did not favour Odo at that moment.288 Once peace 
in Francia was restored, Richard also re-entered the king’s favour. A diploma dat-
ing to October 897 shows him at Odo’s court, honouring him as “Richard, our 
illustrious and beloved count.”289
To summarise, we should note that, inside the realm, two leading nobles ap-
pear to have allied themselves with Charles’  supporters: Baldwin of Flanders, to-
gether with his brother Rodulf; and Richard the Justiciar. Neither alliance lasted 
for long and at least for some time the rebels ended up in open conflict with both 
parties. This points towards the general character of these coalitions. They came 
into being because both sides hoped to profit from each other in their individual 
struggles against Odo. That they proved to be only short lived and were super-
seded by hostilities was the result of the fundamental differences in the nature of 
their opposition to the king. Neither Baldwin nor Richard aimed at replacing Odo 
with another king. Both fought to extend their influence. In the end, under which 
king they would achieve this did not matter. This freed their own policies from 
the restrictions the members of the network’ suffered from. They could change 
sides whenever they deemed it profitable. Fulk and the others had to remain with 
Charles or abandon everything they fought for.
I.2.6 Allies sought outside the realm
Those who were with Charles not only sought allies from within the realm, they 
also looked for supporters from outside. Such support could come from the kings 
of Eastern Francia, Lotharingia (once it had become independent under Zwen-
tibold), Italy, Upper Burgundy, Provence and the pope. By the end of 896, Fulk 
had turned to almost all of them, and in some cases more than once. The first 
choice was Arnulf, whose superiority had already been acknowledged by Odo in 
888. Fulk’s letter to him was not only meant to soothe Arnulf ’s anger over the 
coronation and to prevent him from intervening in Western Francia. It was also 
aimed at winning his trust and getting him to renounce his support for Odo while 
recognising Charles, and, finally, obtaining material support. That this also meant 
accepting Arnulf ’s superiority did not really matter at that moment, as long as 
287 Cartulaire Montiéramey, N° 12, 18 (21st December 896).
288 One could add to this a charter from Saint-Julien of Brioude (Grand Cartulaire, N° CCCXXXVII, 
96), where William the Pious was lay abbot and which dates anno V regnante Karolo rege (cor-
responding with 897 taking in conseridation the terms of office of Provost Eldefred and Deacon 
Bernard, both named in the charter; Kienast, Vasallität, 466, n. 1654). The charter names William 
as lay abbot, but does not otherwise indicate whether he was present at that moment or had had a 
hand in the proceedings in any other manner. We may therefore assume, although only with great 
care, that also William was in contact with Charles or putting pressure on Odo at that moment.
289 DOdo 42 (21st October 897, Nanteuil-le-Haudouin), 180: Richardus, illustris dilectusque nobis 
comes. Richard asked for goods in Atuyer to be granted to a certain Gislebert.
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Arnulf confirmed Charles as the legitimate king and thus demonstrated that his 
claim was just. In 893, Fulk’s efforts to win Arnulf for Charles’  cause proved futile, 
yet a year later the king finally changed his position and agreed to meet Charles 
at an assembly at Worms.290 Fulk and his allies brought rich gifts and Charles was 
benignly received. The Carolingian made a promissio of which nothing further is 
known, whereupon Arnulf granted him the kingdom of his father and even pro-
vided military assistance.291
Arnulf ’s motivation to change his course so completely has been the subject 
of ample discussion.292 Most convincing so far is the pragmatic view of Arnulf ’s 
situation offered by Thilo Offergeld. According to his argument, Odo’s position 
had been strengthened by his recent successes against Charles. In contrast, the lat-
ter would have been, as his promissio shows, open to a more complete submission 
under Arnulf ’s supremacy. Furthermore, it would have been in Arnulf ’s interest 
to keep the conflict between the two rivals going, not least to secure the Lotharin-
gian frontier. To shift his support to the weaker party would therefore have been 
a reasonable decision.293 However, a few additions can be made to this reading. 
Odo’s position should not be overestimated. He had succeeded in appeasing Aqui-
taine and prevented Richard the Justiciar from joining his enemies’ ranks, but he 
had failed in crushing the rebellion in Francia, as well as in solving the ongoing 
conflict with Baldwin II of Flanders. The peace talks at Reims might have brought 
these conflicts to an end, which would have left Odo his full strength to pursue 
whatever other goals he might have had at that moment. This outcome had the 
potential to pose a threat to Arnulf himself, who had only recently returned from 
Italy without achieving anything decisive. Even worse, on his march back home 
he had also failed to suppress King Rudolf of Upper Burgundy and almost led his 
army into disaster while crossing the Alps.294 How weak his position actually was 
at that moment is revealed by his subsequent failure to gain the consent of the 
Lotharingian nobles to the installation of his son Zwentibold as their king at a 
290 Nothing is known of any preliminary talks between Charles’ allies and Arnulf. Nevertheless it 
seems likely that talks of this sort took place before the actual meeting (Schneider, Erzbischof, 
134). 
291 Annales Vedastini 894, 74; Regino, Chronicon 893, 141. The promissio is only mentioned by 
 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 383.
292 On this subject, see Offergeld, Reges pueri, 433−435. One interesting aspect to note: as 
 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 129, remarks, the Annales Vedastini and the Annales Fuldenses (Ratis-
bon  continuation, 125) stress the kinship between Arnulf and Charles, as does Fulk’s letter to 
Arnulf. Based on this fact, Hlawitschka argues that this issue played a crucial role in Arnulf ’s 
decision to support Charles, a reading that has been criticised by Schneider, Erzbischof, 137 and 
Offergeld, Reges pueri, 433−434. The emphasis of the annals on their kinship should not be read 
as a reflection of Arnulf ’s actual reasoning, but as a reflection of the official argumentation pre-
sented at Worms to justify the king’s decision.
293 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 435.
294 Annales Fuldenses (Ratisbon continuation) 894, 124. Regino’s report about the campaign 
(Chronicon 894, 142) is much more positive. Arnulf ’s campaign in Rudolf ’s Burgundy does not 
seem to have inflicted grave destruction on the region. See Demotz, Bourgogne, 95−96.
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meeting at Worms.295 Fulk’s offer, that Arnulf acknowledge and support Charles in 
return for Charles’  acceptance of his supremacy, would not only have prolonged 
the conflict in the West and secured the Lotharingian border from any possible 
threats, but would also have served to demonstrate Arnulf ’s superiority to his own 
nobles, thereby strengthening his rule after a series of failures. Turning to Charles, 
therefore, was a pragmatic course of action not chiefly because of Odo’s strength, 
but because of Arnulf ’s own problems.
The military support provided by Arnulf appears to have been composed of the 
levies of some Lotharingian bishops and counts from the Meuse area.296 Once this 
host encountered Odo, however, the Lotharingians decided to keep their amici-
tia with the Robertian and refused to confront him.297 The leading members of 
Charles’  party seem to have been well aware of this problem and did their best to 
keep the Lotharingians on Charles’  side. A diploma of Charles issued at Attigny,298 
an important royal palace on the Aisne, is a sign of their endeavours. At the re-
quest of Charles’  mother Adelaide and Archbishop Fulk, Charles restored parts of 
the fisc of Arches in Porcien to Bishop Franco of Liège. It has long been assumed 
that this was done because Franco had been part of the Lotharingian forces which 
supported Charles,299 but the actual reasons run deeper. In fact, as a diploma of 
Charles the Fat shows,300 Franco had been close to Odo’s brother Robert. This new 
diploma, therefore, was issued to demonstrate to those other Lotharingians who 
had ties with the Robertians, that at least Franco would not leave Charles’  side in 
the upcoming confrontation. Furthermore, it was a sign that the kind of fidelity 
shown by the bishop would be rewarded not only materially, but also with honour, 
as demonstrated by the intervention of Adelaide.301 As we have seen, this did not 
prove entirely successful. Confronted with Odo’s army, the Lotharingians refused 
to fight for Charles. However, they did not abandon Charles right away either. 
From the account of the Annales Vedastini, it seems that they treated with Odo. 
Before they left to return home, they secured Odo’s departure as well, thus depriv-
ing him of the opportunity to crush the rebellion at that moment.
Arnulf ’s next intervention in West Frankish affairs took place in the following 
year, when he responded to the devastation in Burgundy caused by the war by 
295 Regino, Chronicon 894, 142. The Annales Fuldenses do not note this event.
296 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 435.
297 Annales Vedastini 894, 74−75; Regino, Chronicon 893, 141.
298 DChS 5, 26th September 894.
299 E.g. Kienast, Vasallität, 474.
300 DChF 105, dated to 884. In this diploma, Franco and Robert both ask the Emperor to grant a 
manse to Robert’s fidelis Sanctio. The identification of this count with Odo’s brother has been 
made by Wollasch, Gerard, 63, unfortunately without giving any further arguments. However, 
later on the only interventions made by Robert in Lotharingia during the reign of Charles the 
Simple are both connected to the church of Liège (DDChS 65 and 81), so that an earlier relation 
between Robert and the church—as demonstrated by DChF 105—seems very likely. 
301 On the role of Adelaide’s interventions, see chapter III.2.2.
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inviting both Odo and Charles to meet him.302 As in the previous year, his inter-
vention may partly have been motivated by internal affairs. After his failure to in-
stall his son Zwentibold as king of Lotharingia, he now planned a second attempt. 
Having one or even both of the West Frankish kings acknowledging his superior-
ity would aid his cause and their presence at Zwentibold’s coronation would also 
help to secure his son’s new position. While Odo responded, coming with rich 
gifts, Fulk’s party decided not to accept the invitation.303 Instead, the archbishop 
sent a letter to assure Arnulf of the validity of the promissio, given by Charles 
the year before, and announced the preparation of an attack on Odo.304 In conse-
quence, Odo was received with all honours by Arnulf, returning home after the 
coronation of Zwentibold. On his way back, he encountered Fulk, who was finally 
on his way to Arnulf with further gifts. Fulk escaped but Count Adalung, who had 
accompanied him, was killed and the baggage lost.305 Why had Fulk’s party not 
responded to Arnulf ’s invitation earlier? It has been proposed that they refrained 
from doing so since the atrocities committed in Burgundy, which were the reason 
for Arnulf ’s call to Odo and Charles, had been their doing.306 This may have been 
the case, but it is also possible that after the visit to Worms the year before, it had 
not seemed likely that Charles was in danger of losing Arnulf ’s acknowledgment 
of his kingship. Only when the news spread that Odo had accepted the invitation 
and had been received amiably did it became apparent that a letter would not suf-
fice and therefore Fulk hastened to Worms to limit the damage already done.
If Odo had hoped to deprive Charles of support from the East by his pres-
ence at Worms, he failed. Zwentibold, newly installed on the Lotharingian throne, 
did not hesitate to seize the opportunity when Charles’  supporters offered him 
parts of the Western kingdom and allied himself with Charles.307 Together they 
launched an attack on Laon to which Odo was incapable of responding. His forces 
exhausted, he withdrew over the Seine, leaving the defence of Laon to Bishop Di-
do.308 Without pressure from Odo, however, the alliance between Charles’  party, 
which by this point had been reinforced by Count Baldwin and his brother Rodulf, 
and Zwentibold did not hold. The count of Flanders went over to Arnulf ’s son, 
and subsequent rumours of a plot to assassinate Charles then led to a final break. 
Zwentibold left the camp and later concluded a separate peace treaty with Odo.309 
The events at Laon, however, do not seem to have caused lasting damage to the 
302 Annales Vedastini 895, 75.
303 Annales Vedastini 895, 75; Regino, Chronicon 895, 143.
304 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 383.
305 Annales Vedastini 895, 75−76; Regino, Chronicon 895, 143.
306 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 136. For other speculations see Favre, Eudes, 173 and Eckel, Charles, 17.
307 Annales Vedastini 895, 76; Regino, Chronicon 895, 143.
308 Annales Vedastini 895, 76.
309 This can be established from Zwentibold’s restitution of the abbey of Salone to Saint-Denis in 
January 896 (DZ 7).
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relations between Charles and Zwentibold. When in 896 Charles was forced to flee 
from Western Francia, he sought refuge in Lotharingia.310
Besides Arnulf and Zwentibold, Fulk also turned to Wido of Spoleto. His rela-
tive, whom he had invited in 888 to take over the realm only to abandon him 
shortly after, had briefly been considered as an alternative candidate to Charles 
yet again.311 This option seems to have been dismissed quite quickly, probably be-
cause five years earlier Wido had proven that he was not able to bring together 
sufficient support on his own and was unlikely to be acknowledged as king by a 
majority of the leading nobles.312 Charles, on the other hand, even if he could not 
provide any resources on his own, had Carolingian blood which could serve to 
legitimise the rebellion and was more likely to serve as a rallying point for other 
nobles than Wido. Instead, Fulk wrote a new letter to Wido, congratulating him on 
having been crowned emperor (two years earlier) and asking him to protect and 
support Charles.313 Furthermore, he warned him of Arnulf preparing a campaign 
against him.314 This was undoubtedly meant as a sign of Fulk’s good will, aimed 
to make Wido ready for an alliance. Whether this endeavour was crowned with 
success we do not know, since the sources do not mention a response on Wido’s 
part. In any case, given his warning that Arnulf would soon invade Italy, it seems 
debatable whether the archbishop actually expected the emperor to intervene in 
Western Francia.315 It appears more likely that Fulk’s true purpose was to gain 
Wido’s acknowledgement of Charles and to demonstrate that Charles kingship 
was legitimate.
It is likely that, in late 895, when the negotiations with Odo entered their final 
stage, Fulk renewed his diplomatic efforts to win royal support for Charles. The 
young king met with Wido’s son, Emperor Lambert, and King Rudolf of Upper 
Burgundy at Remiremont.316 For most of the year, Lambert had been targeted by 
the archbishop as a potential ally317 and the meeting at Remiremont was undoubt-
edly the result of these endeavours. Lambert himself probably hoped to win mili-
tary support against Arnulf318 and the same was likely also true for Rudolf, who 
himself was on the defensive against Zwentibold in the north and the kingdom 
of Boso’s son Louis in the south.319 The Remiremont meeting demonstrates the 
310 Annales Vedastini 896, 78.
311 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381−382.
312 It is not clear from Fulk’s letter who brought up the idea of inviting Wido for a second time. Fulk’s 
contact with Wido appears to have ceased after 888. Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 121 with n. 31.
313 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 383−384.
314 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 384. 
315 Already Kienast, Vasallität, 473, posed the question of what Fulk actually expected to gain from 
Wido.
316 Liber Memorialis Remiremont, 21, fol. 11v. For the dating and identifications, see Hlawitschka, 
Lotharingien, 147−152.
317 See below, Fulk’s letter to Pope Formosus, in which the archbishop asked for Formosus’ help in 
gaining Lambert’s friendship for Charles.
318 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 152−155.
319 Demotz, Bourgogne, 96−97.
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range of Fulk’s connections, but at the same time it also betrays that the only allies 
Charles could find at that moment were as much in need of help as he himself was. 
As Eduard Hlawitschka remarked:
Daß die […] bedrängten Herrscher […] sich bei ihrem Treffen mitsamt 
ihrem Gefolge in das Gedenkbuch in Remiremont einschreiben ließen, kann 
nicht verwundern. Erwartete man doch von dem mit der Einschreibung 
 verbundenen Gebetsgedenken nicht nur zukünftiges Heil, sondern Gottes 
Hilfe in der Gegenwart. Und diese war ihnen bitter not.320
Pope Formosus was also deeply involved in Fulk’s endeavours to win support for 
Charles’  cause. He appears to have been the only one to quickly recognise Charles 
as king, congratulating him on his elevation, granting him the panem benedictum 
and giving him some counsel321 while at the same time trying to mediate a peaceful 
solution with Odo. Formosus proposed that both parties agree to a ceasefire, with 
Fulk travelling to Rome and the Gallic bishops working towards re-establishing 
peace.322 Fulk’s plans were different: he asked the pope to win Arnulf ’s support for 
Charles and to threaten Odo not to devastate the realm,323 without success. Arnulf 
seized the possessions of the church of Reims while Odo continued his efforts of 
suppressing the revolt.324 Fulk, nevertheless, redoubled his efforts of increasing 
diplomatic pressure on Odo after the negotiations for an agreement had begun. 
In another letter to Formosus he asked him again to write to Odo as well as all the 
nobles to urge them to keep the peace and acknowledge Charles’  hereditary right 
or at least give him a part of the realm.325 As he had done in the cases of Arnulf and 
Odo, the archbishop also tried to use Formosus as a mediator between Charles, 
Wido and, after Wido’s death, Lambert.326 At least in Lambert’s case, the pope ap-
pears to have indeed spoken for Charles and probably contributed to the realisa-
tion of the alliance. Formosus’ death, however, brought an end to Fulk’s influence 
in Rome. From the beginning, his successor Stephen VI, who exhumed Formosus 
to accuse him of perjury, reproached the archbishop for not coming to Rome and 
threatened him with the penalties of canon law if he chose not to be present at a 
synod later in 896.327
320 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 153.
321 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 374: Item huic quoque regi Karolo congruam dirigens admonitionem ei­
usque congratulans eminentie atque devotioni, quam rex idem se significaverat erga sedem apos­
tolicam gerere, qualiter ei sit in regno agendum, succincte lucideque demonstrat. Quem petierat ei 
panem benedictum pro pignere mittens et de itinere prefati presulis nostri ad sedem apostolicam 
monens. This, however, did not mean that Formosus stopped recognising Odo as king, address-
ing him as rex in other  letters. See next note.
322 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 2, 374 and Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 374. In both letters Odo is designated 
as rex.
323 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 375.
324 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 375.
325 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 376.
326 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 383−384; Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 376.
327 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 4, 378. On the circumstances, see Schneider, Erzbischof, 159−162.
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The key figure in finding support from potential allies outside the realm was, as 
we have seen, Archbishop Fulk, who used his contacts in the East and in Italy. Very 
much like the support Charles’  allies won from nobles inside the realm, these coa-
litions resulted from short term goals on both sides and were not based on long-
term common interests. Fulk was interested in gaining ideological and material 
support for the rebellion, Arnulf in demonstrating his superiority and Zwentibold 
in enlarging his realm. The contacts with Wido, Lambert and Rudolf appear not 
to have brought about any practical advantage, as their individual interests were 
too different. Lambert and Rudolf seem mostly to have been interested in joining 
forces against Arnulf instead of uniting against Odo. Pope Formosus’ role should 
be assessed in the same way. His voice for peace appears to have gone unheard, 
his letters to Odo and Arnulf concerning Charles seem to have remained without 
effect. However, all of these contacts also tell us something about how Charles’ 
coronation was perceived outside Western Francia: Arnulf, while initially reluc-
tant, nevertheless acknowledged the Carolingian as king. Pope Formosus did so 
without hesitation, yet at the same time continued to call Odo rex as well. Wido, 
Lambert and Rudolf also had no problem with Charles being one of them, a king. 
We will return to the implications of that observation in our conclusion to this 
chapter.
I.2.7 A network of different layers
The network of men rebelling against Odo consisted, as we have argued, of differ-
ent layers. In the centre were men like Archbishop Fulk of Reims, Bishop Anskeric 
of Paris and Count Heribert of Vermandois, all powerful nobles from Francia. The 
archbishop, as we have seen, appears to have been mainly driven by political ambi-
tion. The same may have been true for Heribert and the others as well, yet this has 
to remain an assumption. It is, however, remarkable that all of them appear to have 
been more or less well integrated into Odo’s rule, the bishop of Paris even serving 
as the king’s archchancellor. As an explanation, we have proposed that they were 
blocked by others already within Odo’s most inner circle from achieving their goal 
of gaining more influence at the royal court, of entering this same circle. Since 
these others had already been there before Odo became king, they were able to de-
fend their position and thus block the advance of the likes of Fulk and the others.
However, this explanation seems to be unsatisfactory in the case of those not 
belonging to the inner core of the network forming against Odo. While in some 
cases the participation of individual members can be explained by personal rela-
tions to those in the centre—for example Heribert’s brother Pippin and the suf-
fragan bishops of the diocese of Reims—in other cases their participation cannot 
be explained so easily. To assume that they were also driven by their ambitions 
would mean to fall back on thought patterns long discarded by scholarship that 
suppose that the relations between the kings and the nobles were characterised 
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only by a constant struggle for power. In addition, taking the case of Bishop An-
skeric into consideration, who was already at the centre of Odo’s court, the motive 
of political ambitions seems to fall short of explaining the entirety of the rebellion. 
Seeking a more satisfying explanation, we have argued that another common trait 
of the rebels was their distrust in Odo, which was caused by a series of ill-received 
actions on his part. Whatever it was, it was a strong glue that held these men to-
gether. Only when everything was apparently lost, when their lands had been oc-
cupied by Odo and the negotiations seemed to have failed, did the network begin 
to disintegrate.
At the beginning of this chapter, we have referred to the perception of this 
network as being highly fragile. This image is not entirely wrong. Yet it does not 
apply to the core group of rebels but to the alliances they formed with men outside 
their own network. As they were too weak on their own to overcome Odo, they 
sought out potential allies. Within the realm these were men who had already 
been in conflict with Odo or were about to challenge him. In any case, while shar-
ing a common enemy—the king—these nobles did not share a common goal with 
the rebels. They were defending their claims or trying to extend their influence, 
but they did not challenge Odo’s rule per se. The same is also true of the allies 
Fulk sought outside the realm. Whether it be Arnulf and Zwentibold or Lambert 
and Rudolf, they all were driven by factors relating to their own advantage, not 
by the goal of overthrowing Odo. It was therefore in the nature of these alliances 
of convenience to break as soon as the common goal proved to be weaker than 
 individual interests.
Consistent with this image is the fact that, at the very end of the rebellion, 
Charles and his remaining supporters made contact with yet another potential 
ally who did not fit neatly into the groups otherwise sought out within and beyond 
the realm. In 896, a group of Northmen under a leader called Hundeus had taken 
the opportunity presented by the ongoing fighting, between Rodulf and Baldwin 
on the one side and Odo and Heribert on the other, to return to Francia. Their 
strength quickly increasing, they installed themselves on the Oise and then turned 
towards the Meuse, from where they were finally driven back towards the Seine 
by the king. Charles now turned to them, baptising Hundeus at Easter. Over the 
summer, the Normans plundered the Seine region without encountering any fur-
ther resistance.328 A letter from Fulk indicates his reaction when he discovered 
that Charles had planned an alliance with the Vikings: should Charles proceed 
with the alliance, the archbishop not only threatened that he would stop support-
ing him, but he would also encourage others to do the same, and, furthermore, 
he would excommunicate the Carolingian.329 No further evidence exists that this 
328 Annales Vedastini 896 and 897, 78.
329 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 384−385. While Fulk mentions rumours about plans to forge an alliance 
between Charles and the Normans, the Annales Vedastini only report that Hundeus was brought 
to Charles to be baptised. 
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alliance was ever carried out,330 yet the plans appear to be the logical result of the 
policy Charles and his supporters had pursued during the rebellion: lacking suf-
ficient strength by themselves, they took every opportunity to ally themselves with 
others who could aid them in bolstering Charles’  claim, provide them with men 
and resources, or at least distract the forces of the Robertian.
I.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have addressed two questions: the reasons why Charles was 
passed over from his birth up until 893 and the composition and nature of the 
network that finally elevated him to his father’s throne. Charles, as we have seen, 
was born just a few months too late, when the political decisions surrounding the 
succession to Louis the Stammerer had already been taken. His birth was certainly 
noted, yet it was not relevant to the royal succession for a long time. Once in his 
political backwater, Charles remained there after the deaths of his brothers and, in 
888, when, after the death of Charles the Fat, non-Carolingian kings rose to take 
the crowns of the respective regna. Even then, Charles appears to have lacked sub-
stantial political support, as no source shows him being considered as a candidate 
by any faction.
Did the problem of his birth play a role in the decisions against his succession? 
Louis the Stammerer, forced by his father Charles the Bald, had rejected his first 
wife Ansgarde to marry Charles’  mother Adelaide and thus created a situation in 
which the legitimacy of both marriages was questionable. Indeed, as we have seen, 
Pope John refused to crown Louis’  second wife when they met at Troyes. Yet Louis 
himself, up until just before his death, did his best to ensure the equal succession 
of his sons from both marriages and the general consensus at court appears to have 
been in accordance with this policy. In fact, the only time when the legitimacy of 
Louis’  sons was questioned was in 879 when Boso had himself crowned king. He 
argued that he could do so due to the vacancy of the throne in the absence of any 
legitimate heirs, thus claiming that neither Louis’  marriage with Ansgarde nor 
that with Adelaide had been valid. However, only the year before, Boso had be-
trothed his daughter to Louis’  younger son Carloman and, therefore, to one of the 
boys he now denied the right to rule.
Charles, as discussed, does not appear to have been a viable candidate in the 
subsequent royal successions. Nevertheless, and whether or not his legitimacy was 
doubted, he remained quiet, biding his time. The moment might have come in 
888: Charles the Fat’s deposition and death had left the question of succession 
330 If we assume that Hundeus’ baptism preceeded Fulk’s letter, the archbishop’s threats may have 
been the reason why the alliance was dropped. While he was not with Charles anymore, he still 
possessed considerable political weight to either aid the Carolingian by influencing Odo and his 
allies or to hamper him by using his connections against him.
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open and Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin, who had dominated politics over the 
past  decade, were dead. This time, however, the Robertian Odo took the crown 
in  Western Francia. His claim was not uncontested. A party around Archbishop 
Fulk and Count Baldwin of Flanders invited first Wido of Spoleto and then  Arnulf 
of Carinthia to be king. Odo prevailed, but another five years later was again 
 challenged by a group around Fulk, who this time crowned Charles king.
The death of Charles the Fat, leaving the different realms without Carolingian 
heirs, created a vacuum that was used by the most powerful magnates to make 
themselves kings. Their claims were based on their resources and their political 
networks. Arnulf, additionally, could rely on his illegitimate Carolingian blood 
while Odo could also make a case because of his victories against the Northmen. 
The Carolingian dynasty might have come to an end at that moment, yet Carolin-
gian traditions and the idea of Carolingian legitimacy remained strong constitutive 
factors. In Western Francia, Odo behaved like a Carolingian king, trying to negate 
the difference in blood that separated him from his predecessors. This strength 
of the Carolingian idea was Charles the Simple’s chance. Whatever doubts there 
might have been about the legitimacy of his father’s marriages, he was of Carolin-
gian blood and, as Louis the Stammerer’s son, he had an undeniable claim to the 
crown of Western Francia. All he needed was political support to claim his throne.
That support came in the form of a strong party based mainly in Francia and 
centred on Archbishop Fulk of Reims, Bishop Anskeric of Paris, Count Heri-
bert of Vermandois and Charles’  mother, Adelaide. Several layers of other group 
members who formed the core party now elevating Charles to the throne have 
been identified. This group distinguished itself from other groups also in conflict 
with the Robertian through its cohesion and its fundamental opposition to Odo. 
It was strong enough to challenge Odo’s right to rule, yet too weak to prevail and 
thus in constant need of other allies. They found those within and beyond the 
realm, leading to a number of alliances of convenience which fell apart as soon as 
the common goal proved to be smaller than the individual interests. Some of the 
leaders of the party seem to have been motivated by political ambition, yet this 
argument appears to fall short when considering the entirety of the group now 
rebelling against Odo. We have proposed that another motive of the rebels was a 
lack of confidence in the new king, caused by a series of acts that were perceived 
as norm-breaking behaviour.
Carolingian legitimism, on the other hand, does not appear to have been a 
driving motive of the leading nobles. All of them had aligned themselves with 
Odo before the rebellion, with some even being part of his innermost circle. When 
Fulk and Baldwin had opposed Odo in 888, their choice had not been Charles but 
Fulk’s relative Wido and then Arnulf. That is not to say that Carolingian legiti-
macy did not play a role in Charles’  coronation. It did, and in fact it was the only 
reason why the party around Fulk chose Charles as their candidate. What Fulk’s 
party needed was a claimant around whom they could rally and who would attract 
other potential supporters. This was where the interests of Charles and those of 
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Fulk and his allies came together: Charles had the claim that they needed to le-
gitimise their revolt against Odo, to demonstrate to the world the justness of their 
cause. There may or may not have been doubts about the legitimacy of Charles’ 
birth, yet his Carolingian blood was undeniable and could serve as an argument 
against the Robertian Odo. Fulk’s letter to Arnulf shows how this argument was 
used. The throne was Charles’  by right of heritage, whereas Odo was nothing but a 
stranger to the royal family. How strong Charles’  claim was and how well it served 
the rebels around Fulk is also demonstrated by the behaviour of the pope and 
the other kings of the Frankish world. Pope Formosus immediately acknowledged 
Charles as king and treated him as having equal standing with Odo. Kings like 
Arnulf may have taken a bit longer to come around, but in the end the result was 
the same. They accepted Charles as one of their own, as their peer, whose right to 
the crown was undeniable.
Thus, Charles’  blood served to legitimise the rebellion of Fulk and his allies 
against Odo while giving himself the opportunity to leave the political backwater 
in which he had been stuck since his birth. How strong this claim was is also dem-
onstrated by the willingness of the pope and the other kings to acknowledge him. 
This, however, did not mean that from then on they renounced Odo’s right to be 
king. Western Francia, for the time being, had two kings who had to find a way to 
coexist. The result of the final negotiations between Odo and Charles’  supporters 
is known: Charles was given a part of the kingdom and promised even more.331 To 
grant Charles some part of the realm had been one of the two key demands of the 
rebels from as early as 895. The “promise for more” was a new addition, which is 
usually interpreted as an agreement that the Carolingian would succeed Odo as 
sole king of the realm upon the Robertian’s death,332 since Odo requested every-
body to hold Charles’  fidelity only a few months later when on his deathbed.333
Why would Odo, victorious after three and a half years of warring, agree to 
such “surprising”334 terms with the defeated Charles instead of promoting his own 
brother’s succession? The Viking threat and his own weariness to continue the 
fight, possibly related to his sickness, have been brought forward, as well as argu-
ments that Odo wanted to create a buffer zone against the aggressive Zwentibold 
331 Annales Vedastini 897, 79: Et intercurrentibus nuntiis venit Karolus ad eum; quem ille benigne 
 suscepit, deditque ei tantum e regno, quantum sibi visum fuit, promisitque maiora et remisit eum 
ad locum suum.
332 The final accord has often been read as a humiliation for Charles (Favre, Eudes, 190; Kienast, 
 Vasallität, 484; against Favre already Eckel, Charles, 25 with n.  5), due to the wording of the 
 Annales Vedastini (897, 79: At vero rex cum consilio suorum respondit se illi velle misereri, si sibi 
liceret) and the assumed reduction of the part of the realm granted to him by Odo. However, the 
expressions used by the annals to describe the actual conditions are almost the same. Further-
more, any differences in the size of the part of the realm that Charles was to receive are mere 
reconstructions by scholars based on assumptions and therefore cannot be used as a basis for 
an evaluation of the treaties. In any case, if the final treaty did include the succession agreement, 
which part of the realm Charles was now given becomes of only marginal importance.
333 Annales Vedastini 897, 79.
334 Schneidmüller, Karl III., 27 and Offergeld, Reges pueri, 444 (“astonishing”).
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or to limit Arnulf ’s influence.335 It might be added that Odo’s own position in 
Neustria was not as stable as believed. At some point during his rule there,336 a 
certain Roger had usurped Le Mans, earlier held by Count Berengar, holder of 
a second march in Neustria.337 Odo’s brother Robert had then, with the aid of 
the king’s troops, laid siege to the city and installed a certain Gauzlin as count. 
 Gauzlin, however, failed to hold Le Mans and soon Roger returned—only to be ex-
communicated by Bishop Gunter—without much success. Roger remained in Le 
Mans and the bishop spent the rest of his life without ever being able again to enter 
the city.338 Odo had not only failed to establish his candidate in his own backyard, 
but his position in Neustria was now threatened by a hostile Roger.
While Odo’s position was vulnerable, the return of the great Viking army to the 
continent in 896 threatened to undermine his own legitimacy even more. Having 
focussed his forces on dealing with Baldwin of Flanders and Charles, Odo had 
neglected the defence of the realm, as was criticised by the Annales Vedastini.339 A 
continuation of the conflict would mean risking the basis of his own legitimacy: 
his ability to protect the realm from the Northmen. Therefore, Odo needed to 
restore peace in the realm, a task he then addressed with vigour. Baldwin finally 
re-entered the peace of the king340 and Richard now appeared at Odo’s court in 
Francia, where he was honourably received.341 Charles, on the other hand, may 
335 Eckel, Charles, 27 concerning the Northmen; Favre, Eudes, 191 and Schneider, Erzbischof, 169 
for the buffer zone; Schneidmüller, Tradition, 119 with n. 85 as to Arnulf ’s influence. See also 
 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 444−445 with an overview.
336 Probably after 892, since Berengar appears together with Robert in a private charter in June 892 
(Recueil Robert et Raoul, App. I, N° 27). At the time of the usurpation, Berengar was probably 
already dead. Barton, Power, 69, n. 27. It is most commonly assumed that these events are related 
to the events in Francia and that Roger was sent to Le Mans by Charles the Simple’s party. See for 
example Kaiser, Bischofsherrschaft, 455.
337 Guillotel, Autre marche, 9−10.
338 On this “war of Le Mans” see Werner, Untersuchungen III, 280 and Barton, Power, 63−77. Barton 
argues for Berengar not being count of Le Mans, but of Rennes (69 with n. 27) and that Roger 
was sent to Le Mans by Charles the Simple. This latter view is based on Roger being married to 
Charles’ aunt Rothild and that “it is hard to believe that a mere adventurer with no patron would 
attempt to seize the county of Maine for himself ” (71). While this is certainly possible, given the 
lack of sources this has to remain mere speculation.
339 Annales Vedastini 896, 78: Ac per idem tempus iterum Nortmanni cum duce Hundeo nomine 
et quinque barchis iterum Sequanam ingressi; et dum rex ad alia intendit, magnum sibi et regno 
malum accrescere fecit. Similar also Abbo, Bella II, 110, v. 583−588:
 En iterum misero gemitu loquor affore sevos
 Allofilos. Terram vastant, populosque trucidant,
 Circumeunt urbes pedibus, regnantis et aedes,
 Ruricolas prendunt, nexant et rans mare mittunt.
 Rex audit, nec curat Odo; per verba respondit
 O, quam responsi facinus.
340 Annales Vedastini 897, 79. Rodulf, Baldwin’s brother, had been killed the year before (Annales 
Vedastini 896, 78). In contrast to 896, the negotiations now seem to have taken place indepen-
dently of each other.
341 DOdo 42 (21st October 897, Nanteuil-le-Haudouin). Richardus, illustris dilectusque nobis comes 
asked for goods in Atuyer to be granted to a certain Gislebert.
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have been beaten by late 896, yet he nonetheless remained as a rallying point for 
Odo’s enemies. Furthermore, despite having made his peace with Odo, Arch-
bishop Fulk continued to use his influence at court in support of the Carolingian 
and it seems possible that others did so as well.342 The core of Charles’  party was 
characterised by a strong cohesion and Fulk in particular had proven to be ener-
getic in his attempts to strengthen the network. Even if it was now ripped apart, 
its remnants still possessed enough political influence to exert pressure on Odo, 
whose own power had also suffered from the drain of the war.
Indeed, Odo had always been open to negotiations. In 895, when Charles’  sup-
porters sent envoys proposing terms, the Robertian “agreed most willingly”343 and 
when the talks came to an end a year later, Odo was about to grant the Carolin-
gian a part of the realm.344 Therefore, it seems that Odo did—at least from 895 
onwards—acknowledge Charles’  claim as his father’s heir and recognise him as a 
king. Another issue also appears to have been solved early on: when Fulk and his 
allies rebelled against Odo, they denied the Robertian’s own kingship. The nego-
tiations also included that the rebels were to re-enter into Odo’s fidelity, meaning 
that they no longer denied his right to rule. In addition, that Charles would be 
given a part of the realm had been agreed early on and only the details remained 
subject to negotiations.345 More important, however, was the question of Odo’s 
succession, since its solution also determined whether the partition of the realm 
would be permanent or only temporary. On Odo’s death, his brother Robert, who 
had already taken over most of Odo’s honores in 888,346 might have had a claim to 
the throne too. However, Odo himself, when he had reached for the crown, had 
been opposed by large parts of the realm. The symbolic capital of his Viking victo-
ries legitimised his new position, but in the end it had been his Neustrian honores 
which provided him with the necessary resources to impose his claim. Robert 
had no such legitimation and we should not assume that, just because Odo had 
342 Indeed, Fulk writes in his letter that he would do his best to convince others to turn away from 
Charles if he continued with his plans to ally himself with the Normans (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 
385: Sciatis enim, quia, si hoc feceritis et talibus consiliis adquieveritis, numquam me fidelem habe­
bitis, sed et, quoscumque potuero, a vestra fidelitate revocabo et cum omnibus coepiscopis meis vos 
et omnes vestros excommunicans eterno anathemate condempnabo.). Nothing indicates that those 
“others” were still with Charles. In fact, since the circle around Charles had greatly diminished, 
and Fulk himself indicates that this circle was behind the plans to forge an alliance, those “others” 
are much more likely to be found at Odo’s court than with Charles.
343 Annales Vedastini 895, 76: Hi vero qui cum Karolo erant videntes se inminui et, ut ferunt, quia 
 Zuendebolchus cum suis Karolum privari vitam cogitabant, ab ipsa obsidione legatos [ad] Odonem 
mittunt, ut partem regni, qualemcumque ei placuerit, Karolo et eis consentiat atque eos in pace 
recipiat. Quod rex libentissime annuit, indeque adunato exercitu in Franciam repedavit.
344 Annales Vedastini 896, 77.
345 For a long time scholars have tried to establish the part of the realm given to Charles. Favre,  Eudes, 
190 and Kienast, Vasallität, 482−483 argue for Laon, Schneider, Erzbischof, 167−169 for most parts 
of the archdiocese of Reims. In the end, as Eckel, Charles, 26 already stated, due to the lack of 
sources the question cannot be answered. In any case, since Charles succession in the event of 
Odo’s death had been agreed upon at the same time, the solution would only have been temporary.
346 Saint-Denis at least appears to have remained with Odo. Koziol, Charles, 374.
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 become king that he had created a new dynasty—Robert’s claim as his brother’s 
heir was thus likely to be challenged. In the end, it would have been up to the no-
bles to decide upon the issue,347 many of whom either followed their own interests 
like Richard the Justiciar and William the Pious, or supported Charles. Settling the 
question of succession in favour of Charles, whose claim was undeniable, was thus 
a pragmatic course of action, avoiding future conflicts.
When Odo died a couple of months later, this was the starting point for Charles’ 
sole reign. In the absence of other Carolingian rulers, Charles’  blood had become 
the crucial factor for his final elevation to the throne. It gave him a claim that 
was impossible to deny and thus distinguished him from other, non-Carolingian, 
candidates and claimants. In the end, it paved his way to the throne of Western 
Francia and was the basis for his recognition by his peers and the pope. Within 
the realm, the network around Archbishop Fulk and Count Heribert348 formed 
his old and future power base. This group, however, while cohesive and powerful, 
had proven too weak to be the sole pillar of his rule in times of conflict. During 
the time of the fight with Odo, the network had depended on alliances with other 
powerful nobles like Richard the Justiciar and Baldwin of Flanders. To integrate 
them under his rule would be the crucial task of the next years of Charles’  reign.
347 On 9th and early 10th century royal successions see Becher, Dynastie. Becher argues that 
 successions were not simply a question of dynastic rights, but much more of the dominating 
 influence of the nobles. The right of inheritance was used as an argument, but the final decision 
was to be made by the aristocrats (Becher, Dynastie, 198). Becher did not include the Robertians 
in his analysis; however, the situation in 892/893 ties in very well with his conclusions.
348 Odo had reconciled Heribert with Charles. Annales Vedastini 897, 79.

II.  Changes in the political landscape: From Louis the 
Stammerer to Odo
Belonging to the inner circle around the ruler meant having influence on the po-
litical decisions taken there as well as being permitted a certain amount of con-
trol over access to the king and, thus, over the political agenda. This influence 
increased if a ruler’s capacity to exert control over the political affairs of the realm 
was diminished, for example when he was too young to wield actual power or at 
moments when the old ruler had died and his succession was open to debate. The 
period of roughly 20 years after the death of Charles the Bald until Charles the 
Simple’s accession as sole king of the Western realm was one of five very different 
rulers quickly succeeding each other. Each succession implicated alterations in 
the framework determining the relations between the ruler and the nobles around 
him. The ascents of new rulers to the throne were not the only factors causing 
shifts in the political landscape however. Also, the composition of the networks of 
nobles around the rulers changed. Rivalries opened up and were bridged, nobles 
once influential died or had to leave the court while others rose.
Hence, determining the possibilities and limits of royal power necessitates the 
exploration of these networks. Who formed part of these networks and how could 
each individual’s position in these networks be described? As in the previous 
chapter, this approach reveals how the individual nobles interacted not only with 
the king, but also with each other, at times forming alliances and factions to influ-
ence the politics of the realm. These different interactions characterise two very 
different groups which should not be confused: depending on their proximity to 
the ruler; one formed layers around him which often consisted of nobles who were 
rivals with each other, the other aimed to increase influence on the ruler by allying 
itself to other nobles sharing the same interests and could stretch over the differ-
ent layers. These groups could certainly be identical and the degree of congruency 
between them was crucial for the amount of control groups of nobles could win 
over the royal politics.
Analysing networks, of course, presents a number of problems. Sources for the 
period covered in this chapter are richer than during the 25 years that were to 
follow, yet are still far from abundant and allow us only small glimpses of the 
proceedings at court. Consequently, our results will always only partially reveal 
the actual networks. The nature of one of our major sources, the royal diplomas, 
poses another problem. As our sources indicate, many more diplomas seem to 
have been issued than have actually survived to the present, a loss that increases 
the problems of our analysis. In addition, while coincidence certainly played a 
role in regard to which diplomas have been preserved (and which have not), the 
chance of survival was much better in ecclesiastical institutions.1 This leads to a 
1 Esch, Überlieferungs-Chance; Johanek, Herrscherdiplom; Merta, Laien. Koziol, Politics, 307 
argues that chance played much less of a role than has generally been assumed so far, due to 
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certain distortion of the overall image in favour of spiritual dignitaries within the 
royal networks. Furthermore, we need to consider how royal charters should be 
read. The study of royal diplomatic is a field that has seen massive change since 
the 19th century. They are no longer seen as mere remnants of day-to-day rule, a 
kind of bureaucratic paperwork, so to speak.2 Instead, their issuance is now con-
sidered as something special—to receive one was meant to have been, in the true 
meaning of the word, “a privilege.”3 Expressions were carefully selected for their 
political meaning, its layout equally carefully chosen to transmit royal dignity and 
authority, while the handing over of the physical document was embedded in a 
well thought-out public ceremony. Diplomas, therefore, not only served to secure 
legal rights, but are also reflections of royal authority in the symbolic communica-
tion between the king and his nobles.4 This becomes even more true in the late 
Carolingian period as the spatial distribution of the recipients and temporal dis-
tribution of the issuing of diplomas became more and more concentrated around 
certain regions and moments. These concentrations are by no means random and 
reflect real political developments and events.5 In this context, royal diplomas gain 
another dimension of meaning: they are instruments of politics, issued at special 
moments. They are symbols of the political relations between the king and certain 
individuals, notably the petitioners and the recipients. Geoffrey Koziol recently 
argued that these diplomas should be considered as “performatives,” a kind of me-
morial, reminders of already existing or newly forged alliances, of peace treaties, 
confirmations of honours or claims to another kingdom.6
However, overgeneralising this view comes with the danger of placing too 
much emphasis on the relations expressed by an individual diploma. While the 
intervention of an important noble for an ecclesiastical institution certainly re-
flects the importance of this noble and his relation to the king, the institution itself 
did not necessarily have a special bond connecting it to the ruler. Often, diplomas 
were also sought for more basic reasons, to have rights confirmed or possessions 
added.7 When using the evidence of the diplomas, therefore, we have to ask in 
each case what the nature of the relations between the nobles asking for them and 
the kings delivering them were. Cross-referencing diplomas with other sources 
helps to establish the importance of the individuals appearing in them and can 
the importance of diplomas, ecclesiastical institutions had a special interest in preserving them. 
 Critical Merta, Auctoritae, 300, n. 6 and Irmgard Fees in her forthcoming article.
2 Guyotjeannin, Diplomatique, 19. Good overviews of the changes are offered by Koziol, Politics, 
18−41 and Mersiowsky, Urkunde, 1−42.
3 Huschner, Kanzlei, 358−359. On the process of the deliverance of a diploma, see Mersiowsky, 
Urkunde, 647−661.
4 Keller, Herrscherurkunden; Koziol, Politics, 40−62; Mersiowsky, Urkunde, 661−666. On the in-
fluence of the king on the actual text of diplomas, see Scharer, Herrscherurkunden and Kikuchi, 
Representations.
5 Koziol Politics, 68−69.
6 Koziol, Politics, 40−62.
7 This view is emphasised, for example, by Kölzer, Diplomatik, 24.
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aid in casting some further light on these relations. Titles and epithets used to 
describe individual nobles in royal charters point towards the special importance 
of certain individuals, as in the case of the word “beloved” (dilectus) or in the use 
of the superlative.8 These words do not always have to be taken literally, as a true 
indication of personal closeness, since they may equally be used to express the 
rank a noble took within the hierarchy at court. For us, however, this distinction 
does not matter too much, since even if the nature of their influence on the king 
was different, it was visible and real.
II.1	 Old	elites:	Louis II	the	Stammerer
On the verge of leaving for his second Italian campaign, Charles the Bald held an 
assembly at Quierzy during which the famous capitulary of 877 was issued. The 
main purpose of the measures outlined in the capitulary were to constrain Charles’ 
son, Louis the Stammerer,9 who was installed as king, yet at the same time sur-
rounded with Charles’  fideles and other nobles of his choosing.10 Thus, for exam-
ple, the count of the palace, Adalard, was entrusted with the royal seal and ordered 
to remain with the prince at all times.11 Adalard, given his office, was a politically 
influential man at court, whose importance is further emphasised by him being, at 
Charles’  instigation, the prince’s new father-in-law. He was not the only one men-
tioned by the capitulary, however. A large number of nobles were commanded to 
stay close to the prince at all times, while others were to join him should he move 
to certain regions.12 Three bishops were charged with keeping Charles informed 
about the state of the realm and his son’s activities.13 Given the importance of these 
tasks, we can assume the nobles mentioned within the capitulary, like Adalard, 
represented a group possessing both considerable political importance during the 
emperor’s last years and proximity to him. Therefore, the capitulary offers us an 
insight into the circle of nobles present at Charles’  court during the last years 
of his reign and we use it extensively hereafter to point out certain continuities 
within the circles of leading nobles during the following reigns.
However, the system created to keep Louis in check appears to have been 
flawed. Some of the most important nobles, such as Hugh the Abbot, Count Boso 
of Vienne and Count Bernard of Auvergne, had not been present at the assembly 
of Quierzy.14 Hugh, figuring prominently in the emperor’s last diplomas,15 held 
 8 Brunner, Fürstentitel, 198−203.
 9 Nelson, Charles, 249.
10 Annales Bertiniani 877, 212−213.
11 MGH Capit. II, N° 281 c. 17, 359.
12 MGH Capit. II, N° 281 c. 15, 359.
13 MGH Capit. II, N° 281 c. 25, 360.
14 See Hincmar’s letter to Louis the Stammerer, Migne, PL 125, col. 986.
15 DDChB 437 and 438, 12th July 877, 478 and 481: Hugo abbas, noster fidelis atque propinquus.
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the military command against the Northmen on the Loire.16 Even more important 
was Boso,17 whose sister had become first Charles’  concubine and then his wife.18 
After Charles’  first Italian campaign, he had been made the equivalent of a vice-
king in Italy, married the daughter of Louis II19 and from that point on intervened 
frequently in imperial charters with epithets and titles emphasising his proximity 
to the emperor.20 Finally, Bernard of Auvergne was, next to Bernard of Gothia, one 
of the most powerful men in Aquitaine. Both of them had been assigned to Louis 
the Stammerer in 872, when he became king of Aquitaine.21 The capitulary which 
separated the nobles into different groups, of which one was to remain at all times 
with Louis and hence possessed significantly more influence on the affairs of the 
realm than the others, therefore might be expected to have created rifts among 
the nobles. And indeed, the new order did not hold for long. Charles, having ar-
rived in Tortona and waiting for Hugh the Abbot, Boso, Bernard of Auvergne and 
Bernard of Gothia, who Charles had ordered to follow him, received the news 
that they had joined a conspiracy against him.22 None of these men had been as-
signed to remain with Louis at all times. Consequently, Janet Nelson proposes that 
their refusal to come to Charles’  aid was meant to draw him back over the Alps 
and re-establish the status quo. According to this argument, the problem was not 
their proximity to Charles himself, but their position at Louis’  court should the 
emperor die in Italy.23
This fear was not without reason. When Charles died upon his forced return 
to the North, the first thing Louis tried to do was to create his own power base 
by handing out honores to other nobles,24 thus provoking resistance from those 
who felt cast aside by him. A letter from Hincmar to the new king reveals the 
leaders of the opposition that now assembled at Montaimé: Hugh the Abbot, 
Boso, Bernard of Auvergne and Bernard of Gothia, who were now joined by two 
of Charles’  key personnel, Abbot Gauzlin and Count Conrad of Paris.25 Gauz-
lin, abbot of Jumièges, Saint-Amand and Saint-Germain-des-Prés, had served 
as the emperor’s archchancellor since 86726 and had probably also drawn up the 
16 Annales Bertiniani 866, 132. See also Regino, Chronicon 867, 93 who tells us that Hugo abba in 
locum Ruotberti substitutus est.
17 On Boso’s position under Charles the Bald, see also chapter VI.4.
18 Annales Bertiniani 869, 167 and 870, 169.
19 Nelson, Charles, 242−243. 
20 For example DDChB 441 (1st August 877, 489: Bosone carissimo nostro), 443 (11th August 877, 
496: Bosoni carissimi ducis nostri), 444 (around 11th August 877, 498: Boso, dux et missus Italiae 
sacrique palacii nostri carissimus archiminister), 458 (end 875−877, 512: illustris atque insignis ducis 
videlicet Bosonis et dilectissimi ministerialis nostri) and 460 (876−early 877, 513: Bosonis comitis, 
ducis Italiae et sacri palatii nostri archiministri).
21 Annales Bertiniani 872, 185−186. On this, see Nelson, Charles, 231−232.
22 Annales Bertiniani 877, 216.
23 Nelson, Charles, 252.
24 Annales Bertiniani 877, 218.
25 Annales Bertiniani 877, 218 and Migne, PL 125, col. 987.
26 On his early career and importance at Charles’ court see Werner, Gauzlin, 406−411.
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capitulary of  Quierzy.27 Conrad had acted as Charles’  legate in negotiations with 
the Northmen,28 although his importance is probably best captured by the epithets 
used to describe him in a diploma issued in the wake of the battle of Andernach. 
He was “our fidelis, associated with us by family propinquity, Conrad, most noble 
count” as well as “our dearest and most familiar.”29 Interesting enough, these two 
apparently had no connection with the Italian affair. Quite the contrary, Gauzlin 
and Conrad had both belonged to the group originally intended to stay close to 
Louis. Therefore, with one stroke, the new king managed to upset not only those 
already in fear of losing their influence at court once the emperor was dead, but 
also those who were meant to stay close to him. Both groups accordingly united 
against him and forced him to give in. Louis was crowned king but had to agree to 
hand over even more honores30 and to give a promissio about his future conduct to 
the nobles.31 In the end, it was the nobles who made Louis king, not the designa-
tion by his father.32
Hincmar’s account in the Annales Bertiniani is full of references to leading no-
bles and councillors urging and advising the king. For example, according to him, 
Hugh the Abbot urged Louis to cross the Seine and come to his aid against the 
Northmen as well as against the counts Gauzfrid and Emeno.33 Soon afterwards, 
the king was reconciled with Gauzfrid at the instigation of some of his council-
lors.34 Assessing these references however is rather problematic. Hincmar’s annals 
were by no means an objective account of what had happened. The archbishop had 
a distinctive political position and phrased the annals accordingly, manipulating 
documentary evidence and omitting facts if it helped to further his case.35 Espe-
cially during his later years, he emphasised the necessity of consensus between the 
king and the nobles—no king should rule alone but be advised and counselled 
by chosen members of the nobility. The clearest evidence of his conviction is of 
course his De ordine palatii, but he expressed his thoughts also in his letters: “‘The 
27 Nelson, Charles, 248.
28 Annales Bertiniani 876, 210−211.
29 DChB 412 (4th September 876), 423: …fidelem nostrum et parentelę propinquitate conjunctum, 
Chunradum, nobilissimum comitem… and …nobis carissimo et familiarissimo… On his parentage 
with Welf, see Nelson, Charles, 246, n. 110.
30 Annales Bertiniani 877, 219.
31 Annales Bertiniani 877, 219 and MGH Capit. II, N° 283, 363−365.
32 On the relation between the king and the nobles see Schramm, König, 53−58 and Kienast, 
 Vasallität, 415−417.
33 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222: Ac, suadente Hugone abbate et markione, perrexit ultra Sequanam, 
tam pro auxilio Hugonis contra Nortmannos quam et pro eo quod filii Gozfridi castellum et honores 
filii Odonis quondam comitis inuaserunt, ac quia Imino, frater Bernardi markionis, Ebrocensem 
ciuitatem usurpans, multas depraedationes circumcirca in illis regionibus exercebat, insuper et Eiri­
cum more Nortmannico depraedari praesumpsit.
34 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222: Sed miserante Domino aliquantulum conualescens, satagentibus 
 quibusdam consiliariis suis et amicis Gozfridi, uenit ad eum isdem Gozfridus, adducens secum filios 
suos, ea conditione ut castellum et honores quos inuaserant Hludouuico regi redderent et postea per 
concessionem illius haberent.
35 Nelson, Annals, 35.
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general disposition of the realm’ must depend, not on any one man, but on ‘the 
judgement and consent of many’.”36 Hincmar’s references in the annals are there-
fore hardly surprising: they reflect the same thought pattern and were meant to 
show how kingship should work.
However, the question remains, whether the archbishop’s account represents 
the actual relations between Louis and the nobles surrounding him. For example, 
Hincmar tells us that, while treating with Pope John at Troyes, Louis ordered the 
bishops Frotar and Adalgarius to ask John to confirm his father’s diploma that 
handed the realm over to him. In turn, the pope asked for the confirmation of 
another diploma that granted Saint-Denis to the Church of Rome. According to 
Hincmar, this was a forgery produced by the very same bishops and other council-
lors of the king,37 which would indicate that the nobles around Louis were behind 
the initial request of the king in order to provide the pope with an opportunity 
to present his own charter. Equally, a visit of Louis to the pope was made at the 
instigation of some of the councillors, probably leading to the excommunication 
of Emeno.38 When Louis met with Boso after the synod, he was in the company 
of several of his most important councillors, resulting in the betrothal of his son 
Carloman to Boso’s daughter.39 Furthermore, the distribution of the honores of 
Bernard of Gothia is said to have been made with their counsel.40 In all of these 
cases, Louis is shown to have acted in close cooperation with those around him. 
As argued, this concords well with Hincmar’s own convictions of how a kingdom 
should be run and does, in all probability, reflect the reality of Louis’  court.41 There 
is, however, a second layer to this. In all of these cases Louis’  actions directly reflect 
the interests of those around him, the most obvious case being the conspiracy with 
the forged diploma, meant to deprive Gauzlin of Saint-Denis. However, should we 
take this as a sign of the influence the nobles exercised over Louis? Depriving Ber-
nard of Gothia of his honores certainly intensified the tensions between the king 
and the count and might not have been in Louis’  best interest if he was to seek a 
peaceful solution.42 Yet at the same time, distributing Bernard’s honores among 
those around him also served his purpose since it reinforced his relations with 
36 Nelson, Hincmar, 25−26. See there also for the quote. Flodoard, HRE  III, c.  26, 343: Item pro 
 sollicitudine, quam tempore Ludovici regis nuper defuncti susceperat idem Teudericus de filiis  ipsius 
regis, ne moleste acciperet, si eum commoneret causa dilectionis vigilem esse debere apud filios 
 eiusdem regis; ostendens quia non solum grandis praesumptio, sed etiam magnum periculum est, 
uni soli  generalem regni dispositionem tractare sine consultu et consensu plurimorum… In a similar 
tenor also Hincmar, De ordine palatii, c. VI−VII, 82−96.
37 Annales Bertiniani 878, 227−228.
38 Annales Bertiniani 878, 228.
39 Annales Bertiniani 878, 229. 
40 Annales Bertiniani 878, 229−230. For the conflict between Bernard of Gothia and Louis the 
 Stammerer see chapter VI.1.
41 On the cooperation between the king and the nobles, see Hannig, Consensus fidelium, 
 Schneidmüller, Konsensuale Herrschaft and Patzold, Konsens. For the late Carolingian period, see 
also MacLean, Kingship. 
42 See chapter VI.1 on Louis the Stammerer’s position.
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the same men who were to take up their arms to subdue the count.43 Similarly, the 
 betrothal between Louis’  son Carloman and Boso’s daughter tied the latter closer 
to him. Nevertheless, taking into considering the way Louis’  reign had started, 
how these nobles had enforced their will on the new king and how the king’s de-
cisions concur with their own interests, we can deduce that they still possessed a 
distinctive political leverage over him.
Who were these men exercising such influence on Louis? Hincmar’s already-
mentioned letter is a good starting point for an analysis of this inner circle. Of the 
six nobles he named as most important, three also appear in the king’s diplomas. 
Most notable is Hugh the Abbot, who requested three diplomas for his abbeys, 
and was named “glorious abbot” and “our relative”; while another three charters, 
in which he did not appear, were issued for monasteries under his control.44 Con-
sidering that he held the command along the Loire, a diploma for the cathedral 
church of Tours may also have been issued at his request,45 although due to the 
lack of further evidence this must remain a mere possibility. Boso, apart from 
the betrothal of his daughter to Louis’ son Carloman, intervenes in two charters, 
described as “our beloved dux” and “our dearest dux” respectively, for the church 
of Lyon and the abbey of Tournus under abbot Geilo.46 A lost diploma for Saint-
Martin of Autun may also have been related to him.47 Gauzlin, who served as arch-
chancellor for most of the reign,48 intervened together with Queen Adelaide in a 
royal charter for the church of Paris, while the abbey of Saint-Denis, which came 
under his control at the beginning of Louis’  reign, received another diploma.49 
Given the offices they held at court, their appearances in Hincmar’s annals and 
the epithets used to describe them in the royal diplomas, we can already tell that 
these men held important positions at court. The same was probably also true for 
Bernard of Auvergne since he was not only amongst those receiving the honores of 
Bernard of Gothia,50 but was also charged with protecting Louis’ son and succes-
sor, Louis, when the king felt his death approaching.51 Bernard of Gothia, in turn, 
43 Annales Bertiniani 879, 234.
44 At his request: DDLS  6, 11 (27: …fidelis nostri Hugonis scilicet gloriosi abbatis…) and 15 (44: 
… venerandus vir, noster quoque propinquus, Hugo, religiosus abba…). For Saint-Martin of Tours: 
DDLS 12 and 14. For Saint-Germain of Auxerre DLS 36.
45 DLS 39.
46 DDLS 20 (Lyon), 66: …dilecti ducis nostri Bosonis… and 27 (Tournus), 81: …carissimi ducis nostri 
Bosoni…
47 DLS 34. We can link the diploma to Boso assuming that at the point of its delivrance he held it. 
DChB 444, around 11th August 877 names a certain Badilo as abbot for Saint-Martin. The diploma 
is issued at Boso’s intervention, showing his earlier connection to the abbey. Soon after the abbey 
must have passed into Boso’s hands, since in 879 he exchanged it with Theoderic the Chamberlain 
(Annales Bertiniani 879, 235). Saint-Martin appears to have been one of these abbeys. See Bulliot, 
Essai, 141.
48 His last appearance is DLS 30 (8th February 879). In DLS 31 (29th March/10th April 879) Wulfard 
serves as archchancellor.
49 DDLS 8 (Saint-Denis) and 9 (church of Paris).
50 Annales Bertiniani 878, 229−230.
51 Annales Bertiniani 879, 234.
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quickly lost his honores and was eliminated from the inner circle. Finally, during 
Louis’  reign Count Conrad disappears from the sources, thus making it impos-
sible for us to draw any further conclusions.
Bernard’s loss of his honores points us towards a rift among the leading no-
bles that emerged almost immediately after Louis’ accession to the throne. When 
Hugh the Abbot called on the king to cross the Seine, he did so as a consequence of 
two conflicts:52 one with Gauzfrid, Gauzlin’s brother;53 and another with Emeno, 
the brother of Bernard of Gothia.54 Thus, in both conflicts, the rebellious nobles 
were closely related to men who had, up until then, been key figures in the politi-
cal affairs of the realm. Gauzlin was able to reconcile his brother with the king,55 
something that Emeno might also have hoped for from his own brother. Bernard, 
however, had entered into conflict with Archbishop Frotar of Bourges56 around 
the same time and both he and his brother were excommunicated at the synod of 
Troyes in 878,57 at the same moment that Bernard lost his honores.58 Soon after, he 
also became the target of a military campaign.59 Thus, Bernard had clearly been 
eliminated from the circle around the king. Gauzlin’s influence was also diminish-
ing. At Troyes he became the target of a conspiracy to deprive him of Saint-Denis,60 
followed by the loss of the office of archchancellor in early 879.61 Linking of the 
cases of Bernard and Gauzlin has been proposed since both of them belonged to 
the Rorgonid family.62 While this link by kinship should not be overinterpreted 
in regard to both of them pursuing the same goals,63 the family ties between the 
two did play an important role as a means to mediate a solution to the conflict.64 
Gauzlin himself was apparently not directly involved in either of the cases, since 
he was able to use his influence at court to mediate a favourable outcome for his 
brother. This he failed to do for Bernard, probably because at this point his posi-
tion at court had already come under pressure. In any case, two parties appear to 
have formed, struggling for influence at court: Hugh the Abbot, Boso and Bernard 
of Auvergne on the one hand, and at least Gauzlin and Count Conrad on the other.
While the group around Gauzlin remains in the shadows, the one around Hugh 
is more visible due to its presence at court and hence we can adduce a number of 
the other nobles that were part of it. Next to Hugh, its most important member 
52 For these conflicts see chapter VI.1.
53 Werner, Gauzlin, 406−409.
54 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222.
55 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222.
56 MGH Epist. VII, N° 135, 118−119.
57 Annales Bertiniani 878, 228; MGH Epist. VII, N° 142, 122.
58 Annales Bertiniani 878, 229−230.
59 Annales Bertiniani 879, 234. 
60 Annales Bertiniani 878, 228.
61 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, LXIII. 
62 Werner, Gauzlin, 406 and 417−422. 
63 Against an overinterpretation of this family connection, see MacLean, Kingship, 104.
64 On Gauzlin’s and Bernard’s connection, see chapter VI.1.
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certainly was Count Theoderic the Chamberlain, undoubtedly the Theoderic who 
was named in the capitulary of Quierzy as part of the group to remain with the 
prince. His importance at court becomes clear from a number of cases: like Ber-
nard of Auvergne, he also profited from the distribution of Bernard of Gothia’s 
honores;65 on at least one occasion he demanded a royal diploma;66 and finally, 
he belonged to those accompanying Louis’  heir while conducting the campaign 
against Bernard.67 Considering his affiliation with the group around Hugh, we 
must, nonetheless, be careful. While the sources do indeed indicate his coopera-
tion with this group in the case of Bernard of Gothia and he certainly joined forces 
with them from that moment on, his earlier importance at court may also have 
been rooted in a personal relationship with Louis himself. In other nobles’  cases, 
the connection with the dominating circle is more apparent, although their politi-
cal importance appears to have been of a more limited nature. For example, Arch-
bishop Ansegisus of Sens figured as the leader among the bishops paying homage 
to Louis the Stammerer after his coronation,68 indicating that he kept some of the 
influence he had gained during the last years of Charles the Bald, when he, Odo of 
Beauvais and Actard of Tours replaced Archbishop Hincmar of Reims at court.69 
However, his association with the group around Hugh is only noted after Louis’ 
death, when he crowned Louis III and Carloman II at Ferrières on their behalf.70 
Archbishop Frotar of Bourges, who had been the target of Bernard of Gothia, 
together with Bishop Adalgarius of Autun participated in the conspiracy against 
Gauzlin at Troyes, where the two of them handed over a precept to the pope on 
the king’s behalf.71 Adalgarius also received two diplomas for his church, one of 
them issued at the request of Count Theoderic, who by then had become count of 
Autun,72 thus not only marking his access to the king but also his connection to 
the inner circle around Hugh. The same was true for Archbishop Aurelian of Lyon, 
for whose church Boso demanded a diploma.73 Also closely connected with Boso 
was Abbot Geilo of Tournus, the future bishop of Langres, who received another 
diploma at the count’s intervention.74 Finally, we can also add Bishop Walter of 
Orléans as well as the counts Goiram and Ansgar (probably the count of Oscheret) 
to the list. Walter was yet another of the nobles who had been assigned in the 
65 Annales Bertiniani 878, 229−230.
66 DDLS 29, 23rd January 879 and possibly 33 (deperditum), both for the church of Autun.
67 Annales Bertiniani 879, 234.
68 Annales Bertiniani 877, 220.
69 Nelson, Charles, 241−242.
70 Annales Bertiniani 879, 238−239; Annales Vedastini 879, 45.
71 Annales Bertiniani 878, 227−228: Frotarius autem et Adalgarius episcopi attulerunt in conuentu 
 episcoporum papae Iohanni praeceptum per quod pater suus Hludouuico regnum tradiderat, petentes 
ex ipsius parte ut priuilegio suo ipsum preceptum confirmaret. John in turn demanded the confirma-
tion of the (forged) charter, which would have given the Church of Rome control over Saint-Denis.
72 DLS 29 (23rd January 879, Gondreville).
73 DLS 20 (12th September 878, Troyes).
74 DDLS 26 and 27.
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capitulary of Quierzy to accompany Louis when he entered the Seine region and 
was now granted another royal charter,75 thus pointing to his continuing impor-
tance. More importantly, however, he and the two counts were sent to Louis the 
Younger to negotiate on behalf of the group around Hugh after Louis the Stam-
merer’s death.76 Apart from Theoderic, all of these men appear to have been part 
of an outer layer of the dominating circle. Their influence at court remains more 
or less obscure since none of them appears in the direct vicinity of Louis. In the 
case of Ansegisus, his mention can also be explained by his importance to the 
Gallic Church77 while Frotar’s and Adalgarius’ appearances at court may as likely 
have been the result of the ecclesiastical proceedings of the synod of Troyes, as 
was probably also Aurelian’s.78 Finally, the two counts only appear after the king’s 
death.
Louis’  contacts were not limited to those belonging to the dominating groups 
of Hugh and Gauzlin. As we have already discussed in the context of Theoderic 
the Chamberlain, certain nobles also drew or might have drawn their position 
at court from a personal connection to the king. Examples of this mainly come 
from the family of Louis’  second wife, Adelaide, who can be found intervening in 
a diploma for Saint-Médard of Soissons.79 Related to her was Count Aledramnus, 
who Louis granted a rich gift of property naming him “our dearest” and “our be-
loved relative.”80 In his case, a connection with Gauzlin is also discernible which 
certainly did not hurt his position at court. Both were captured after the battle of 
Andernach81 and Aledramnus made a donation to Gauzlin’s abbey of Saint-Denis 
in 879.82 Finally, just before Louis’  death, Adelaide’s brother Wulfard became the 
new archchancellor in the succession to Gauzlin.83 While he was certainly ap-
pointed with the consent of the leading group around Hugh, his being chosen was 
undoubtedly more due to his relationship to the king: once Louis died, he appears 
to have lost the office again.84
Unrelated to the king but holding a position independent from Hugh and his 
allies were Bishop Odo of Beauvais, one of Charles the Bald’s confidants who had 
been assigned to remain close to Louis in the capitulary of Quierzy, and a certain 
75 DLS 40 (deperditum).
76 Annales Bertiniani 879, 236−237; Annales Vedastini 879, 45. 
77 On the primacy of the church of Sens (and Ansegisus), see Schramm, König, 112−114. The impor-
tance of the archbishops of Sens within the Gallic Church becomes evident from their role in the 
royal coronation, a role that was heavily opposed by the Archbishop Hincmar of Reims and his 
successors.
78 Aurelian’s presence at Troyes is indicated by his subscription of the synodal acts. MGH Conc. V, 
N° 9, 104, 135, 140.
79 DLS 30.
80 DLS 28, 84: …carissimum nobis comitem nomine Aletramnum… and …praefato dilecto propinquo 
nostro Aletramno… On him see chapter I.2.2.
81 Annales Bertiniani 876, 209. 
82 Lot, Notes, 150.
83 DLS 31, 29th March, 10th April 879. On him see also chapter I.1.2.
84 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, LXVII−LXVIII.
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Count Albuin. When he felt his death approaching, Louis entrusted the two of 
them with the royal sword, crown and the rest of the royal insignia, to be brought 
to his son Louis III, who was to be crowned and anointed. When they heard of the 
king’s death, they handed over the insignia to Count Theoderic and quickly left.85 
That Odo and Albuin did not remain with Theoderic seems to indicate that they 
kept their distance from the dominating circle. Difficult to place is Bishop Wala of 
Auxerre, one of the bishops assigned to advise Louis when entering the Seine re-
gion in the capitulary of Quierzy. At an unknown moment, the church of Auxerre 
received a diploma from the king86 which points towards a continuing connection 
between the royal court and the bishop. Yet, whether this connection was deter-
mined by the dominating groups around the king or was independent from them 
remains unclear. Once Wala had died, Wibald, a cleric who had been educated at 
the palace school of Charles the Bald, succeeded him at Louis’  instigation.87 After 
the king’s death, from one of his successors he obtained a royal charter concerning 
a private donation he made to the congregation of his church. In this diploma he 
established a prayer service for Louis commemorating his death day,88 which may 
be read as a sign of a closer connection between him and the king. In the context 
of episcopal succession, another see also needs to be considered. Early in 878, 
Bishop Willebertus of Châlons died and was succeeded by a certain Berno.89 It 
seems likely that Berno was well connected at the royal court since Hincmar asked 
him in 879 to intervene on his behalf before the kings and Hugh the Abbot90 and 
since he later received diplomas both from Carloman II and Charles the Fat.91 Had 
Berno, like other bishops of the time, previously belonged to the royal chapel? In 
877, Charles the Bald issued a diploma for the abbey of Marchiennes at the request 
of “Berno, the venerable deacon of the palace, our beloved ministerialis.”92 It seems 
at least possible that the two Bernos were identical and that Louis managed to lift 
another cleric from the palace on an episcopal see. Whether in both of these cases 
this was entirely his own choice or whether the circle around Hugh had had a hand 
in their appointments has to remain unanswered.
85 Annales Bertiniani 879, 235−236.
86 DLS 35 (deperditum).
87 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 163.
88 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 165. The date of the royal diploma is not given by the gesta. 
Wibald was invested as bishop 5th April 879 (five days before Louis the Stammerer’s death) and 
died 12th May 887 (Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 166, n. 327). This leaves Carloman II 
and Charles the Fat as possible rulers to have issued said charter. The description of the charter 
as regio precepto does not exclude the Emperor Charles, since the Gesta also note that Wibald, 
because of his death, was not able anymore to obtain another royal diploma (165: Quod multa 
cum  difficultate peregit, sed regale preceptum quod ex eo adeptus fuerat, mors inmatura possidere 
prohibuit.).
89 Willebertus died 2nd January 878. Duchèsne, Fastes III, 98.
90 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 23, 317−318. See also below.
91 DCmII 76 and DChF 150.
92 DChB 435 (11th July 877), 473: …Bernonem venerabilem diaconum palatium, dilectum ministeri­
alem nostrum…
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Finally, there is Archbishop Hincmar of Reims himself to consider. During 
Charles the Bald’s last years, he had fallen out of royal favour and, as we have seen, 
been replaced by a number of other men.93 After the emperor’s death, Hincmar 
addressed a number of letters to Louis, offering his counsel.94 When Louis’  efforts 
to create his own power base by handing out honores was resisted by the leading 
nobles, Hincmar advised him to refer himself to their leaders.95 This advice was 
less a sign of support for the rebels than a simple acknowledgement of political 
realities96 as well as possibly an attempt to gain a foothold within the group of 
dominant nobles by siding with them. The archbishop’s importance was under-
lined when he consecrated and crowned Louis king.97 He continued to send Louis 
more letters on political affairs and also played an important role at the synod of 
Troyes.98 Yet despite all this, his actual influence at court remained limited and he 
appears not to have belonged to Louis’  inner circle. All in all, he was someone who 
carried some political weight but was never in the actual centre of political deci-
sion making, although cooperating with the king and those close to him.99
So far, we have been able to identify different groups of nobles at the king’s 
court. The groups around Hugh the Abbot and, to a lesser degree, Gauzlin ap-
pear to have dominated the inner circle around the king, using their influence 
to further the interests of their associates. However, another group can also be 
 identified—although in this case this term may be misleading since there are no 
signs of an inner cohesion or even cooperation—which had independent access 
to the king and probably, at least in the case of his close relatives, like his wife 
Adelaide, also exerted some political influence. The existence of this last group 
demonstrates that the king was able to maintain a certain liberty in choosing those 
close to him and was not entirely dependent on the groups dominating the court. 
Royal contacts went even further, encompassing large parts of the realm. Shortly 
after his coronation, Bishop Arnaldus of Toul100 and soon thereafter Abbot Ans-
bald of Prüm101 received diplomas, representing royal contacts with Lotharingia. 
From Burgundy came Abbot Odo of Vézelay,102 from Aquitaine Abbess Ava of 
Sainte-Croix103 and the abbey of Solignac104 also received a royal charter. The synod 
of Troyes presented the chance for a large number of ecclesiastic dignitaries to 
 93 Nelson, Charles, 241−242.
 94 Devisse, Hincmar, 967.
 95 Annales Bertiniani 877, 218 and Migne, PL 125, col. 987.
 96 Devisse, Hincmar, 968−973.
 97 Annales Bertiniani 877, 219.
 98 Devisse, Hincmar, 975−978.
 99 Devisse, Hincmar, 978−979 and McCarthy, Hincmar, who provides a detailed study of Hincmar’s 
relations with the king.
100 DLS 4 (9th December 877).
101 DLS 7 (19th or 24th March 878).
102 DLS 5 (15th December 877).
103 DLS 13 (4th July 878).
104 DLS 38 (deperditum).
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demand confirmations and grants. Among them were not only the bishops Abbo 
of Nevers105 and Lambert of Mâcon106 from Burgundy but also Archbishop Sigebod 
of Narbonne107 and his suffragan Frodoynus of Barcelona108 from Septimania and 
the Spanish March, while other diplomas went to the church of Girona109 and the 
abbeys Notre-Dame of Arles-sur-Tech110 and San-Esteban de Banolas.111 However, 
these were contacts that can easily be explained by regular day-to-day work related 
to the administration of the realm and therefore they do not betray any larger po-
litical influence of their recipients at the royal court.
II.2	 Rival	factions:	Louis III	and	Carloman II
After the death of Louis the Stammerer, the tensions between the groups around 
Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin rose and turned into open conflict. Since both of 
Louis’  sons were under Hugh’s control, Gauzlin decided to call Louis the Younger 
into the realm. At the same time, the composition of the two groups changed. 
In the case of Gauzlin, the contact with Bernard of Gothia—if it had ever been 
strong—now appears to have ceased completely. Instead, until the division of the 
realm at Amiens, the sources emphasise Gauzlin’s cooperation with Count Con-
rad of Paris.112 By early 880, their base of support amongst the nobility appears to 
have weakened considerably.113 Meanwhile, the alliance around Hugh also began 
to crumble in the wake of the succession crisis. Early on the group still held to-
gether: Hugh mediated an exchange of honores between Boso and Theoderic,114 
while Hincmar also mentions the three of them acting together in the face of Louis 
the Younger’s intervention.115 However, Boso broke away from them soon after, 
having himself crowned king at Mantaille on the 15th October 879, and taking 
with him a number of nobles belonging to the wider circle. Boso’s electio is signed, 
among others, by Archbishop Aurelian of Lyon, Bishop Adalgarius of Autun und 
Abbot Geilo,116 two of whom we have already identified earlier as having a close 
105 DLS 18.
106 DLS 19.
107 DLS 22.
108 DLS 17.
109 DLS 21.
110 DLS 16.
111 DLS 23.
112 Annales Bertiniani 879, 235−236, and again in 880, 240; Annales Vedastini 879, 44 and 880, 46.
113 Annales Bertiniani 880, 240: Hludouuicus rex Germaniae una cum uxore sua ab Aquis in istas 
partes iter arripuit et usque ad Duziacum uenit, ubi Gozlenus et Chuonradus obuiam illi uenerunt, 
quam plurimis iam de illorum complicibus ab illorum societate retractis.
114 Annales Bertiniani 879, 235.
115 Annales Bertiniani 879, 236−237.
116 MGH Capit. II, N° 284, 369.
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connection with him. Adalgarius acted as archchancellor for Boso,117 Geilo was 
granted a diploma shortly after118 and also became bishop of Langres in early 880.119 
Furthermore, Bernard of Auvergne’s position in relation to Boso is uncertain. In a 
charter issued by Boso “after the death of the most glorious King Louis,” Bernard 
appears as one of the witnesses,120 but soon after he joined the fight against Boso.121 
In the light of this, it is very possible that the final settlement of Ribemont and 
the partition of Amiens was necessitated not only by the intervention of Louis the 
Younger, but also by the diminishing support both sides received from the nobil-
ity. Louis III, from then on with Gauzlin, was to rule over Francia and Neustria; 
Carloman, remaining with Hugh, received Burgundy and Aquitaine.122
The actual influence each of these groups had on the kings, before and after the 
partition, is hard to assess. Once crowned, both Hincmar and the Annales Vedas-
tini emphasise the independent actions of both Louis and Carloman.123 Yet once we 
turn from the narrative sources towards Hincmar’s letters, the image changes, as 
Thilo Offergeld has shown.124 Just after the death of Louis the Stammerer, in a letter 
to Count Theoderic the Chamberlain, the archbishop argued for a broader basis 
to support the regency of the late king’s sons.125 Moreover, two other letters reveal 
his idea of involving Charles the Fat in their tutelage. The first letter, addressed to 
Charles, describes Louis and Carloman as “orphan boys without a father” in need 
of a “mature, prudent and rational guardian.”126 The second letter, prefacing the 
first, was addressed to Hugh the Abbot, trying to win his support for the plan.127 
Hincmar, of course, aimed at regaining his lost influence at court and may there-
fore have exaggerated the young kings’ dependence. Yet, the way he passes over 
them in these letters, disregards them as underage boys completely dependent on 
those around them, as children who still needed to be educated, seems neverthe-
less to reflect the common opinion. Otherwise his arguments would hardly have 
117 Poupardin, Recueil Provence, IX. According to Poupardin, Aurelian also became archchancellor 
for a short period. The diploma naming him as such (DProv 17), however, has been revealed to be 
a forgery by Bautier, Recueil Eudes, CXLIV–CXLVI.
118 DProv 19 (8th December 879, for Saint-Philibert and Geilo).
119 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, 108.
120 DProv 16 (25th July 879), 31: … post obitum Hludovici gloriosissimi regis… On the identification of 
Bernard, see Zielinski, Regesten III,4, N° 2741, 122. Bernard was related to Boso’s wife Ermengard.
121 Annales Bertiniani 880, 243.
122 Annales Bertiniani 880, 241.
123 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 382−383.
124 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 383−392.
125 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 26, 343. See also Offergeld, Reges pueri, 384.
126 Migne, PL 125, c. 1, cols. 989−990: … et istos juvenes, reges nostros, propinquos vestros, et pupil­
los sine patre loco filiorum teneatis, et eis regnum ab antecessoribus illorum successione dimissum 
per suggestionem primorum regni hujus disponatis, et qui de primoribus cuique illorum conveni­
ent ordinetis. And c. 2, col. 991: Istis juvenibus fidelibus filiis vestris, regibus nostris, maturos ac 
prudentes atque sobrios bajulos singulis constituite, qui oderint avaritiam, et eos verbo et exemplo 
justitiam diligere doceant…
127 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 24, 327.
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been convincing. Thus, the letters are a strong indicator that, at least in 879/880,128 
Louis and Carloman were entirely in the hands of those nobles around them.
Hincmar’s own weak position at court put him in a difficult position. He 
had crowned Louis the Stammerer only two years earlier, yet in 879 it was the 
Archbishop of Sens who had consecrated Louis and Carloman at Ferrières. As 
Hincmar’s letters to Theoderic and Hugh show, he did his best to influence royal 
politics, yet whether his efforts actually produced any result seems doubtful.129 The 
conflict surrounding the episcopal see at Noyon provides us with further insight. 
After the death of Bishop Raginelm, Hincmar, aiming at limiting royal influence 
to the confirmation of the final candidate, requested a free canonical election.130 
Hincmar did not appear at court in person, but, apart from writing to the kings131 
and Hugh the Abbot,132 he also repeatedly asked Bishop Berno of Châlons to in-
tervene on his behalf.133 In the end, Hincmar had his way and Heitilo was elected 
according to the canons, as the archbishop had pressed for.134 It is interesting to 
note that the archbishop did not himself address the kings or Hugh the Abbot, 
but had one of his suffragan bishops mediate for him. Both letters sent to Berno 
indicate that the bishop was present at the royal court at the time. Furthermore, we 
can assume that Hincmar’s choice in using Berno was not only because the bishop 
happened to be present at court, but because the archbishop considered him as a 
suitable intermediary. Following this thought, it seems plausible that Berno had 
certain connections at court that would allow him to better influence the deci-
sion makers in Hincmar’s interest than Hincmar himself would have been able 
to at that time. If, as we have proposed above, Berno had been a member of the 
royal chapel before his appointment as bishop of Châlons, this would serve as 
an explanation as to why this was the case. In any case, his connections to the 
 leading members of the court appear to have been better than the archbishop’s, 
who  therefore chose to involve him in the matter of the see of Noyon.
Louis III
Sources for Louis III’s short reign are rare since hardly any diplomas have survived 
to the present day. When Louis moved south to suppress Boso’s revolt, Gauzlin 
was charged with the command against the newly returned Vikings in Francia;135 
he also became the king’s new archchancellor.136 His importance as one of the 
leading magnates thus remained unbroken. Of Count Conrad nothing further is 
128 On the dating of the letters see, Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 234−235, n. 34 and Offergeld, Reges 
pueri, 385−386.
129 On the adoption plans see chapter I.1.3.
130 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 24, 326−327.
131 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 19, 260−261.
132 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 24, 326−327.
133 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 23, 317−318.
134 Devisse, Hincmar, 984−985. For a detailed study see Ehrenforth, Hinkmar.
135 Annales Vedastini 880, 47.
136 DLIII 43.
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known up until his death towards the end of Louis’  reign.137 Either his position 
remained unchanged or he was replaced by a new face, another Count Theoderic, 
Theoderic of Vermandois.138 Theoderic was the brother of the well-connected 
Count Aledramnus who we have identified as an important figure in the court of 
Louis the Stammerer. He may have owed Aledramnus his entrance into the circle 
dominating the court. Since he would not have been able to achieve such success 
at court had he opposed Gauzlin, he must have started to cooperate with him at a 
very early stage. It was probably also through his own and Aledramnus’ influence, 
in connection with Gauzlin’s, that the Robertian Odo, son of Robert the Strong 
and maybe already Aledramnus’ son-in-law, was appointed count of Paris follow-
ing Count Conrad’s death.139 In the context of the quarrel between Louis III and 
Hincmar concerning the succession of Bishop Odo at Beauvais, the archbishop 
named Theoderic as one of the king’s most important councillors, which indicates 
his ascent had occurred already before Conrad’s death.140 Finally, in 882, when 
nobles from Lotharingia offered Louis the realm, the king turned down their offer 
but sent Theoderic with an army to aid them against the Northmen.141 Thus, the 
leading nobles at Louis’  court appear to have been Gauzlin, Theoderic and pos-
sibly Conrad until his death.
At first, Hincmar appears to have cooperated with Louis and this group of no-
bles, but relations began to deteriorate, as is demonstrated by the conflict over the 
succession of the deceased Odo of Beauvais. At Hincmar’s request, Louis granted 
the people and clergy of Beauvais the right to elect their bishop; later, again in ac-
cordance with the archbishop, he refused their candidate. At that point, Hincmar’s 
and Louis’  positions clashed. While the king insisted on his right to name the 
 candidate—he opted for Audacher, notary in the royal chancellery142—the arch-
bishop did his best to institute a new solution.143 He wanted to install a council 
of five bishops, chosen by himself, to decide upon the new bishop. Hincmar sup-
ported a certain Roger while Audacher was excommunicated. In the end, the con-
flict was only ended by Hincmar’s and Roger’s deaths.144 The archbishop certainly 
137 22nd March 882. Chaume, Origines, 310 and Dümmler, Geschichte III, 133.
138 To be distinguished from Theoderic the Chamberlain, as Werner, Untersuchungen V, 102 with 
n. 59 and Gauzlin, 208 with n. 150a, has shown.
139 Werner, Gauzlin, 451, for Gauzlin. We add Theoderic and Aledramnus since the former later 
 belonged to Odo’s firmest supporters while Odo married the latter’s daughter, Theodrada. Favre, 
Eudes, 202−203 and Le Jan, Famille, 237. Settipani, Préhistoire, 404−405 notes Theodrada’s ori-
gin as unknown. Favre, Eudes, 15 suggests the early 880s as date for the marriage.
140 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, 116. On the letter, the position of Hugh the 
 Abbot (definitely not at Louis’ court since DCmII 54 (4th June 881) shows him at Pouilly-sur-
Loire) and the identification of Theoderic, see Werner, Gauzlin, 206−208.
141 Annales Bertiniani 882, 245−246. On this, see also MacLean, Response, 30−38.
142 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, LXXII–LXXIII. Audacher had already been 
active under Charles the Bald, for whom he also served as legate to the pope (Annales Bertiniani 
877, 215). On him, see also Tessier, Recueil Charles le Chauve III, Introduction, 85−87.
143 Schmitz, Hinkmar, 467 and 478.
144 Devisse, Hincmar, 985−989. See also Schmitz, Hinkmar and Guyotjeannin, Episcopus, 13.
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did not take his exclusion from an influential position at court well, and appears 
to have had a private feud with Gauzlin.145 This explains why one of Louis’ greatest 
successes, his victory against the Northmen at Saucourt, almost appears as a defeat 
in Hincmar’s annals.146
There is only one more noble left to mention in Louis’ network: Welf, abbot 
of Saint-Riquier, who received a diploma probably during the preparations for 
the campaign leading up to Saucourt.147 Welf, “venerable abbot and our dearest 
kinsman”, also held Sainte-Colombe and had been assigned in the capitulary of 
Quierzy to constantly remain with Louis the Stammerer. He thus belonged to the 
important nobles of the realm—and he was Count Conrad’s brother.148 He was 
related to Louis through Welf ’s and Hugh’s aunt, the Empress Judith, second wife 
of Louis the Pious and mother of Charles the Bald. His presence in the diploma 
is therefore unsurprising. He was not only related to the king, but also, and more 
importantly, to one of the nobles dominating the royal inner circle. His influence, 
however, did not last long. Like his brother, he died before Louis, in his case 13th 
November 881.149
Carloman II
Much better documented than the reign of Louis  III is that of his brother, 
 Carloman II. Carloman’s years as ruler of the southern division of the realm saw 
the continuation of the alliance around Hugh the Abbot and Theoderic the Cham-
berlain. Hugh’s dominant role becomes clear from the Annales Vedastini, which 
names him as the mediator of the treaty of Ribemont.150 Two of Carloman’s royal 
diplomas saw him intervening, as “our dearest venerable abbot”, for the church of 
Narbonne and simply as “venerable abbot” for the king’s chaplain Arveus, while 
in a third he served as ambasciator for the abbey of Saint-Florent.151 Theoderic ap-
pears in the same role in a diploma for the church of Autun152 and was probably 
also behind a diploma for Saint-Martin of Autun.153 The wider circle of their sup-
porters also remains visible: Archbishop Frotar of Bourges intervened on behalf of 
145 Werner, Gauzlin, esp. 447−450.
146 Annales Bertiniani 881, 244: Hludouuuicus […] reuersus est in partem regni sui contra Nortman­
nos. Qui uastantes omnia in suo itinere, Corbeiae monasterium et Ambianis ciuitatem aliaque 
sancta loca occupauerunt. De quibus non modicam partem occisis ceterisque fugatis, et ipse Hlu­
douuicus una cum suis retrorsum, nemine persequente, fugam arripuit, diuino manifestante iudicio 
quia quod a Nortmannis fuerat actum non humana sed diuina uirtute patratum extiterit. See also 
Werner, Gauzlin, 437.
147 DLIII 43 (30th December 880, Compiègne), 112: ...Guelfo, venerabilis abbas et consanguineus nos­
ter carissimus….
148 Poupardin, Royaume, 355−356.
149 Poupardin, Royaume, 356 with n. 3.
150 Annales Vedastini 880, 46.
151 DDCmII 54 (138: … karissimi nostri venerabilis abbatis Hugonis…), 55 (144: Hugo venerabilis 
abba hoc ambassavit) and 61 (162: …Hugonis venerabilis abbatis).
152 DCmII 49.
153 DCmII 83 (deperditum).
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the abbey of Beaulieu154 and properties in Berry and the Nivernais were restored to 
Bishop Walter of Orléans.155 Two other figures joined the royal circle: one was Ab-
bot Wulfard of Flavigny, Adelaide’s brother, who again became archchancellor.156 
He intervened alone for the fidelis Rainardus157 and together with Hugh the Abbot 
for the chaplain Arveus in another.158 While the first diploma seems to indicate a 
close connection to Carloman, his return to the office of archchancellor was cer-
tainly more due to an alliance he concluded with Hugh and his circle,159 as seems 
to be indicated by their joint intervention. This last diploma also figures the other 
remaining important noble: Wido, “our beloved count”160, who completed the list 
of those intervening for the chaplain. This Wido may have been either the brother 
of Count Ansgar of Oscheret, who we have already met as an associate of Hugh; 
or another Wido from Burgundy who later appears to have been close to Richard 
the Justiciar. The first Wido followed his brother and Wido of Spoleto to Italy in 
888, where he died in battle.161 The second accompanied Richard at the assembly 
of Varennes162 and also witnessed two of his private charters.163 Either way, the epi-
thets of the diploma and his intervention with Hugh and Wulfard indicate Wido’s 
political importance and his link to the circle around Hugh.
Apart from these remarks, the rich corpus of diplomas preserved from Carlo-
man’s reign allows us to make some further observations. As during his father’s 
reign, Carloman was sought out by a number of ecclesiastical dignitaries from 
Septimania and the Spanish march. Archbishop Sigebod of Narbonne and Bishop 
Theotarius of Girona again received charters for their churches,164 as did the ab-
bey of Notre-Dame of Arles-sur-Tech.165 In addition, Saint-Polycarpe and Sainte-
Cécile were now granted diplomas.166 Similarly, Bishop Abbo of Nevers and Abbot 
Odo of Vézelay again appeared at the royal court:167 along with Archbishop Fro-
tar’s intervention, further examples of the king’s contacts in Aquitaine. Also inter-
esting are a number of appearances closely connected to the advancement of the 
campaign against Boso: Bernard of Auvergne, Boso’s brother Richard and bishops 
Adalgarius of Autun, Geilo of Langres and Ratbert of Valence, all of whom had 
154 DCmII 62.
155 DCmII 53.
156 See chapter I.1.2.
157 DCmII 59. 
158 DCmII 61.
159 Wulfard’s return to court was certainly also related to the campaigns against Boso since his abbey, 
Flavigny, was a valuable asset in this fight. Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, 
LXVIII.
160 DCmII 61, 162: ...Widonis dilecti nobis comitis…
161 Gesta Berengarii Imperatoris, 22−23.
162 DProv 28 and Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 95.
163 Chronicon S. Benigni Divionensis, 113 and Cartulaire Montiéramey, N° 12, 18.
164 DDCmII 54 (Narbonne), 58 and 93bis.
165 DCmII 60.
166 DDCmII 52 (Saint-Polycarpe) and 57 (Sainte-Cécile).
167 DDCmII 50 (Nevers) and 51 (Vézelay).
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supported Boso when he took the crown.168 Bernard received the county of Mâcon 
the moment it was taken from Boso,169 thus indicating that, if he had indeed sup-
ported Boso, he now had switched to the Carolingian alliance that had formed 
against the usurper. His affiliation with the group around Hugh is less clear, al-
though his son Norbert became Carloman’s new notary.170 Over the following year, 
charters from Saint-Julien of Brioude, which, although he never was its abbot, ap-
pears to have been under his control,171 were dated after Charles the Fat instead of 
Carloman.172 Richard and Adalgarius acted together in a diploma for the church 
of Autun, Carloman’s first preserved charter, dating to 30th November 880.173 In 
the same diploma, Theoderic the Chamberlain served as ambasciator, thus linking 
together the three most important men of the area. Richard, addressed as count 
of Autun, was now either granted the county or at least recognised as its count, 
Adalgarius was its bishop and Theoderic held important abbeys in the area.174 Next 
in line was Ratbert of Valence, who joined Carloman’s court between November 
880 and July 881,175 followed by Geilo of Langres.176 Thus, Boso’s own network is re-
vealed to have been extremely fragile, with key figures such as his own brother and 
his archchancellors deserting him as soon as the united power of the Carolingian 
kings became apparent. However, not all of those who were now reaccepted into 
Carloman’s peace remained close to the king. In particular, Richard’s position is 
far from clear. As Hincmar reports, the new count of Autun brought Boso’s wife 
and daughter to Autun after Vienne had fallen,177 yet nothing indicates explicitly 
that it was he who captured the city.178 Moreover, that he brought his brother’s 
family to Autun is not a sure indication that he supported Carloman wholeheart-
edly. He may also have done so to keep them out of the reach of the royal court 
after Boso’s death.179 Be that as it may, for the next few years Richard disappears 
from our sources, indicating that he did not play an important part in the affairs 
of the realm. However, his appearance in the royal diplomas, like those of the 
other nobles from Burgundy originally supporting Boso, marks the reintegration 
168 See above. Richard appears in Boso’s last charter before his coronation (DProv 16).
169 Annales Bertiniani 880, 243.
170 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, LXXIII–LXXV.
171 Lauranson-Rosaz, Auvergne, 54−55.
172 Cartulaire Brioude N°s 197 and 260, 208 and 270: Anno primo quod (domnus) Karolus sumpsit 
 Imperium. MacLean, Kingship, 69. Brioude continued to date after Charles the Fat even after the 
emperor’s death. Auzias, Aquitaine, 418 and 541−548.
173 DCmII 49, 124: …Rikardi comitis Augustidunensis…
174 Annales Bertiniani 879, 235.
175 DCmII 85, confirming donations made by Boso to Ratbert’s foundation Charlieu (DProv 22).
176 DDCmII 56 (18th July 881) and 63 (8th August 882).
177 Annales Bertiniani 882, 247: Dum autem in eodem procinctu degeret, mense septembrio nuntia­
tum est illi certo nuntio quia, capta Vienna, uxorem Bosonis et filiam eius Richardus, frater ipsius 
Bosonis, ad comitatum suum Augustudunsensem adductam habebat.
178 For example Offergeld, Reges pueri, 379 and Robbie, Emergence, 30, who assume that it was 
 Richard who finally captured Vienne from Boso’s men.
179 After September 882, nothing indicates any further political actions from Boso. Bautier, Origines, 
61−67. 
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of Boso’s old powerbase into Carloman’s rule. At least in the Autunois, Theoderic 
the Chamberlain played a key role in these proceedings and served as a direct link 
to the dominant group around Hugh the Abbot.
The realm reunited
Once Louis III had died, Carloman also took over the Northern kingdom at the 
invitation of the nobles from Francia.180 Hincmar’s use of the expression “great 
men of the realm” (primores regni) in this context points towards a unified action 
of the leading magnates, which leaves us to conclude that Gauzlin, as well as Theo-
deric of Vermandois, were involved in the issue. In fact, Gauzlin does appear in 
the petition of the bishops to Carloman made at Quierzy181 where the young king 
renewed the promissio he and his brother had given two years earlier. Undoubt-
edly, both groups had made an arrangement to set aside their rivalry and embark 
on a course of cooperation. However, Hincmar also tells us that Carloman, after 
an initial campaign against the Northmen, was not able to muster sufficient forces 
to fight them due to the absence of Hugh the Abbot and the withdrawal of several 
powerful nobles of Francia from the new king.182 Shortly after Carloman had been 
called to the North, the old frictions appear to have surfaced again. This does not 
mean however that the new king found himself completely isolated in Francia. 
Hincmar himself, for example, was among those who continued to support Car-
loman.183 This is hardly surprising: as soon as Louis died, the archbishop had once 
again renewed his efforts to gain influence at court, composing the famous De 
ordine palatii for Carloman.184 However, his death shortly afterwards deprived him 
of any possible profit.
This period, marked by the absence of nobles from Francia from Carloman’s 
court, lasted for over a year. Efforts were certainly made to overcome this situ-
ation, as the succession of Fulk, abbot of Saint-Bertin and member of the royal 
court since the times of Charles the Bald,185 to Hincmar at Reims demonstrates. 
Being well connected both at court and among the Frankish nobility, he might 
have been installed as a mediator between the king and the withdrawn nobles. 
Yet, the integration of the North only succeeded after Gauzlin had been made 
180 Annales Bertiniani 882, 246−247: Primores autem regni expeditum nuntium miserunt ad 
 Karlomannum, mandantes ut, relictis qui Viennam obsiderent et seditioni Bosonis resisterent, ipse 
quantotius ad eos uenire festinaret, quoniam hostiliter ipsi praeparati erant in occursum Nortman­
norum… Ipsi autem parati erant illum recipere et se illi commendare; sicut et fecerunt.
181 MGH Capit. II, N° 285, 370.
182 Annales Bertiniani 882, 249.
183 Annales Bertiniani 882, 250.
184 Devisse, Hincmar, 989, Gross and Schieffer, Hinkmar, 10. The original title of the work appears 
indeed to have been Admonitio Hincmari Remorum archiepiscopi ad episcopos et ad regem Karlo­
mannum per capitula.
185 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 4, 379, tells us that Fulk had been trained at the aula palatii. Fulk’s earlier 
importance is also reflected by his appearance in the capitulary of Quierzy, where he was named 
among those who were to remain close to Louis the Stammerer. See MGH Capit. II, N° 281 c. 17, 
359 and above.
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archchancellor around August 883, an office that had remained vacant since the 
death of Wulfard almost two years earlier.186 His appointment certainly helped to 
ease tensions and create links to other nobles, thus providing the court with an 
influential lever. The final agreement seems to have been reached at the assembly 
of Ver about half a year later. Carloman’s capitulary,187 a renewal of the one he 
had issued in February 883,188 placed the king in line with his predecessors and 
emphasised his claim to rule over the entire realm.189 In the wake of the assembly, 
he issued a diploma at Compiègne, the most important Carolingian palace of the 
Western realm, at the request of three of the North’s leading nobles, Bishop Berno 
of Châlons, Bishop Angelwinus of Paris and Count Theoderic of Vermandois,190 
demonstrating the newly won support of Francia for the king. That Hugh’s party 
now agreed on allowing other nobles into the circle around the king was undoubt-
edly also due to the threat posed by the Northmen. Before the assembly of Ver, the 
leading nobles had already gathered at Compiègne, where they decided to open 
negotiations with the Vikings. According to the Annales Vedastini, they finally set-
tled on a tribute of 12.000 pounds of silver, a sum to be collected from the entire 
realm.191 Participation in the decision making at court was undoubtedly the price 
the nobles from Francia asked for contributing their part of the tribute.
The takeover of the Northern realm does not seem to have weakened Hugh the 
Abbot’s position at court. In November 882, it was he who went to meet Charles 
the Fat at Worms to negotiate the return of parts of Lotharingia to Carloman, a 
fruitless endeavour.192 His dominance in the royal diplomas—after the unification 
of the realms Hugh intervened six times193 and received another two diplomas for 
himself194—has led to the belief that he wielded more or less absolute control over 
the royal chancellery.195 This seems to be an exaggeration, since most of these char-
ters were issued after Gauzlin had become archchancellor. However, according 
to the Annals of Sainte-Colombe of Sens, he held the monarchiam clericatus in 
186 The last diploma mentioning Wulfard as archchancellor was issued 881, September 2nd 
( DCmII 93bis). Wulfard probably died immediately afterwards, his death date known as 6th Sep-
tember (Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, LXVIII with n. 3). The office afterwards 
remained vacant, notary Norbert referring to Wulfard as post obitum… (DDCmII 62 and 63).
187 MGH Capit. II, N° 287, 371−375.
188 MGH Capit. II, N° 286, 370−371.
189 MGH Capit. II, N° 287, 371: Karlomannus gratia Dei rex omnibus venerabilibus episcopis, abbati­
bus, comitibus, iudicibus omnibusque sanctae Dei ecclesiae et nostris fidelibus. Cum ad palatium 
Vernis anno dominicae incarnationis DCCCLXXXIV, anno autem regni nostri quinto, indictione 
secunda, mense Martio convenissemus et pars fidelium nostrorum nobiscum, placuit, ut quaedam 
statuta  sacrorum canonum necnon quaedam capitula antecessorum nostrorum renovarentur…
190 DCmII 76 (13th March 884).
191 Annales Vedastini 884, 55. The beginning of the armistice at the Feast of the Purification of the 
Virgin (2nd February) indicates that the negotiations had already started before, the assembly of 
the nobles deciding upon them therefore had taken place before the assembly of Ver.
192 Annales Bertiniani 882, 249.
193 DDCmII 66, 70, 71, 72, 78 and 89.
194 DDCmII 77 and 87.
195 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, LVIII–LIX.
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palatio,196 a phrasing that more or less applies to the office of archchaplain.197 Set-
ting offices or control over the royal chancellery aside, Hugh’s importance during 
this period is probably best captured by two royal diplomas, one calling him “our 
tutor and great protector of our realm”198, the other installing a prayer service at 
Rethondes not only for Carloman’s brother Louis, but also for the “most vener-
able” and “most reverend” Abbot Hugh:199 a singular honour during Carloman’s 
reign. Thus, his role at court appears to have been more central than ever.
Despite his importance, we should not forget that other men also held influen-
tial positions at court. We have already mentioned Gauzlin’s return to the office 
of archchancellor in August 883 and can add to this a diploma for his abbey of 
Saint-Germain-des-Prés200 as well as him serving as ambasciator in another royal 
charter.201 In addition, Theoderic of Vermandois entered into very close associa-
tion with the king after the settlement with the Northern nobles. It was by no 
means a coincidence that he was among those appearing in the first diploma after 
the assembly of Ver, honoured as “our greatly beloved.”202 This was undoubtedly 
a consequence of the central role he had assumed during the reign of Louis III. 
Like Gauzlin, he also received another royal charter, in his case for his abbey of 
Morienval.203 Theoderic’s intervention for Bishop Berno of Châlons in the first 
diploma also indicates that, at least by now, Berno, who “stands out in the gov-
ernment of our realm and in very useful counsel and aid”,204 not only possessed 
some influence at Carloman’s court, but also had joined the circle of nobles origi-
nally dominating that of Louis III. The same diploma also saw the intervention of 
Bishop Angelwinus of Paris,205 another one of those assigned to remain with Louis 
196 Annales S. Columbae Senonsensis 882, 104. The annals appear to have been contemporary. 
Heine, Geschichtsquellen II, 342.
197 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 369 with n. 220. Positive on Hugh being archchaplain also Fleckenstein, 
Hofkapelle, 146 and 163. Critical Löwe, Hinkmar, 207. On the office of archchaplain at the West 
Frankish court, see Tessier, Diplomatique, 56−57 and Bautier, Chancellerie, 15−18.
198 DCmII 71, 183: ...venerabili Hugone abbate, tutore nostro ac regni nostri maximo defensore…
199 DCmII 89, 228: …venerabilissimo Hugone… and …reverentissimo abbate Hugone…
200 DCmII 93. It is possible however, that in 883 Gauzlin had already passed on Saint-Germain to his 
nephew Ebolus. See below, chapter II.3, n. 234.
201 DCmII 79.
202 DCmII 76, 198: …Teuderico comite valde dilectus nobis…
203 DCmII 90.
204 DCmII 76, 198: …qui nobis in principio regni nostri et consilio et auxilio satis proficuus et fidelis 
extitit…
205 DCmII 76. This diploma is dated by Bautier to 13th March 884 and states that Bishop Angelwinus 
of Paris (DCmII 76, 198: venerabilis scilicet Angelwinus Parisorum episcopus) appeared together 
with count Theoderic in front of Carloman to support a request of Berno, bishop of Châlons. 
However, it so far assumed that Angelwinus died 8th December 883 (Duchesne, Fastes II, 475 
with reference to Depoin, Essai, 222), refering to Angelwinus’ death day noted in the necrologies 
of Saint-Denis and Argenteuil (Molinier, Obituiare I,1, 333 and 351). The year is not given by those 
and has instead been deducted from the Translatio S. Mederici, 110, which states that Anno In­
carnationis Domini nostri J. C. DCCCLXXXIV studiosus Dei cultor Sacerdos memoratae Ecclesiae 
nomine Theodebertus adiit venerabilem Gozlinum Abbatem atque urbis Parisicae Antistitem…, 
meaning that by the time of the translation (supposedly 29th August 884) Gauzlin had already 
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the Stammerer by the capitulary of Quierzy, signalling that he had also joined the 
group around Gauzlin and Theoderic.
Nobles from the southern regions who had belonged to the group around Hugh 
remained influential. Theoderic the Chamberlain appeared again in connection with 
the church of Autun, serving as ambasciator,206 and was also granted a diploma for 
his abbey, Saint-Martin of Autun.207 The position of Archbishop Frotar of Bourges, 
who intervened together with Hugh the Abbot for the church of Marseille,208 ap-
pears to have remained unchanged. Bishop Walter of Orléans received two more 
diplomas for his own church, both of them at Hugh’s intervention.209 Count Wido 
continued to be important, being described as “our highly beloved and illustrious 
count.”210 Count Ansgar of Oscheret, who had belonged to the group around Hugh 
three years earlier when he had been part of a legation to Louis the Younger,211 now 
succeeded Angelwinus as bishop. This reading is also backed by the account of the Annales Ve­
dastini (884, 54) which read Anno Domini DCCCLXXXIIII. Per idem tempus mortuo Engelwino 
Parisiorum episcopo Gauzilinus abba subrogatur in sedem eius.
 This, however, would leave us with a dead bishop appearing before the king. Therefore, two dates 
have to be examined: that of the diploma and that of the translation. The former date reads as 
Data III idus martii, indictione II, anno II regni Karlomanni regis in Frantia (DCmII 76, 198). We 
can agree without any hesitation with Bautier’s conclusion that the second year of Carloman’s 
reign in Francia corresponds with the year 884 (his brother Louis having died on the 5 August 
882), even more so as the date also matches the year of the indiction. Alternatively, setting aside 
the indiction and the in Frantia, we could also read the date as 13th March 881, calculating from 
his first coronation at Ferrières. This, however, would mean that Carloman would have been at 
Compiègne at that moment, since the diploma was issued there. According to Hincmar however, 
at this moment Carloman was in Burgundy, fighting Boso (Annales Bertiniani 881, 243−244: 
Anno incarnationis dominicae 881 remanente Karlomanno cum suis contra Bosonis seditionem, 
Hludouuicus, frater eius, reuersus est in partem regni sui contra Nortmannos.), which also cor-
responds with Carloman’s diplomas. The date 13th March 884 therefore appears to be correct.
 The text of the Translatio on the other hand is less clear: it does give 884 as the year, but only for 
the moment at which the priest Theodebert approached Gauzlin to propose the translation of 
the relics. But in fact, between this moment and the actual translation, some time seems to have 
passed, so that the die depositionis S. Mederici, in qua praefatus sacerdos id facere disposuerat, 
could also have taken place the following year. This also leads to another problem, the die depo­
sitionis S. Mederici, which could either mean the day of Saint Merry’s death (29th August) or the 
day of the translation of the body (which according to Mabillon, Acta Sanctorum Benedicti III,1, 
14, n. c was celebrated 22nd January).
 We therefore propose to date Angelwinus’ death not to have been 8th December 883 but 884. 
If Gauzlin succeeded him within a couple of weeks, this would still have left enough time for 
Theodebert to initiate the translation, which then would have taken place in 885, either early in 
January or late in August. However, this would mean that Gauzlin was by no means appointed 
bishop of Paris by Carloman (as Werner, Gauzlin, 216 assumed) since the latter had already died 
5th or 6th December 884 (Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, 210), but succeded 
him during a period of interregnum, before Charles the Fat arrived in the realm. This solution, of 
course, assumes that the account of the Annales Vedastini is wrong.
206 DCmII 68.
207 DCmII 83.
208 DCmII 72.
209 DDCmII 70 and 71.
210 DCmII 88, 226: …illuster comes nobisque admodum dilectus…
211 Annales Bertiniani 879, 236−237.
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reappeared in two diplomas, in which he was connected to Theoderic the Cham-
berlain and Count Robert of Troyes.212 Finally, we may also add Bishop Adalgarius 
of Autun, who had rejoined Carloman after having supported Boso’s rebellion, to 
this circle, although his connection to the court probably depended on his relation-
ship with Theoderic and Ansgar, who served as ambasciatores in the royal char-
ter granted to his church.213 Despite the integration of the North, the circle around 
Hugh thus continued to be extremely present at the royal court.
Thus Carloman’s united court saw the continuing dominance of the groups 
that had formed years earlier around Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin. Yet, again, 
access to the king was not limited to the nobles belonging to these groups. The 
aforementioned Robert of Troyes appears to have had connections to Ansgar of 
Oscheret, yet his own position at court—he demanded three diplomas for the ab-
bey of Montiéramey during Carloman’s entire reign214—was probably more deter-
mined by his relation to the king himself, since he was married to Gisela, Louis 
the Stammerer’s daughter from Ansgarde and thus Louis’  and Carloman’s sister.215 
Another interesting case is that of a certain Erifons, another “illustrious fidelis” of 
the king.216 He only appeared in Carloman’s last diploma, probably issued just after 
the king had been fatally wounded. In the face of his inevitable death, Carloman 
wished to make donations to Saint-Crépin of Soissons in atonement for his sins.217 
The choice of words and Erifons’ presence at the king’s side just before his death, 
as well as his being charged with the implementation of the measures laid down 
in the diploma (he also served as ambasciator at Gauzlin’s order218), indicate that 
he, like Robert, enjoyed a more personal connection to the king than those of the 
other nobles dominating the court. The same is also possible for Abbot William of 
Croix-Saint-Ouen, who is described as “our highly beloved and illustrious fidelis 
William” when he demanded a royal charter for his abbey.219 Nothing further is 
known about this abbot; however, as the way he is described shows, he appears 
to have been held in some esteem by the king, either because of his political im-
portance, or his personal relationship with him. In two other cases, those of the 
212 DDCmII 68 (as ambasciator with Theoderic) and 81 (Robert).
213 DCmII 68.
214 DDCmII 65, 80 and 81. None of these diplomas are datable, therefore making it impossible to 
determine at what point Robert had entered the court.
215 On him, see Saint-Phalle, Comtes, 157−158. He is often addressed as count of the palace by schol-
ars. This seems to stem from him being described as minister palatinus et abbas Beati Lupi in a 
private charter issued by himself for the abbey of Montiéramey (Giry, Études, 129, N° 14). Wheth-
er this really indicates that he served as count of the palace remains unclear. See also Saint-Phalle, 
Comtes, 157 with n. 26.
216 DCmII 79, 212: …illuster fidelis noster…
217 See also the commentary of Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, 210−212.
218 DCmII 79, 213: Erifonnus, jubente Gauslino, hoc ambasciavit.
219 Baudot, Abbaye, 19−21 (16th August 884, Verberie), here 19: …illuster fidelis noster Guillelmus, 
admodum nobis dilectus… Baudot identified the abbot as William the Pious, Bernard of Au-
vergne’s son (Baudot, Abbaye, 10), albeit without giving any reasons. However, it seems unlikely 
that Bernard’s son should have held an abbey in the north-east of Neustria.
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counts Hilduin220 and Alardus,221 due to the loss of the diplomas that recorded 
their appearances at court, statements about their relation to the king or their con-
nections to the dominating circle cannot be made at all.
However, while the likes of Robert and Erifons appear to have been close to 
Carloman, their political influence must have been limited. They had connections 
to the circle around Hugh and Gauzlin, but either only to second-rank nobles, as 
in the case of Robert’s connection to Ansgar of Oscheret, or in a subordinate role, 
like Erifons to Gauzlin. The leading members of the circle, on the other hand, 
distinguish themselves by their frequent interventions for churches, abbeys and 
individuals, in some cases for those which were close to the regions where they 
themselves held important honores, such as Hugh’s interventions for the church of 
Orléans,222 while in others there was no connection at all. Institutions far from the 
royal court, like Saint-Sauveur of Alfa or the church of Marseille, now sought out 
the inner circle to gain access to the king.223
These latter institutions point us to a last observation concerning Carloman’s 
reign over the united realm. While he remained within Francia from September 
882 onwards, his connections with the regions south of the Loire remained intact. 
We have already shown the presence of nobles from Burgundy at his court. To 
these we can add a number of appearances from Aquitaine and Septimania. Arch-
bishop Frotar of Bourges was certainly the most important of the king’s contacts 
in Aquitaine, but Carloman was also sought by representatives of the abbey of Soli-
gnac224 and the abbess Adalgard of Sainte-Croix of Poitiers.225 In Septimania next 
to Saint-Sauveur of Alfa also Archbishop Sigebod of Narbonne, who had been 
present at court in 881, was in contact with the king, sending a legate to demand 
a further diploma for his Church.226 Contacts with the south of the realm are thus 
shown to have remained intact.
II.3 New faces on the rise: Charles the Fat
After Carloman’s sudden death early in December 884, the West Frankish nobles 
sent for Emperor Charles the Fat to take over the realm.227 Up until his deposi-
tion by East Frankish nobles four years later, Charles had visited the West only 
twice. His initial voyage to receive the homage of the Western nobles brought him 
220 DCmII 86 (deperditum).
221 DCmII 91 (deperditum).
222 DDCmII 70 and 71.
223 DDCmII 66 (Saint-Sauveur, intervention by Hugh the Abbot) and 72 (Marseille, intervention by 
Hugh and Fortar of Bourges).
224 DCmII 69.
225 DCmII 74.
226 DCmII 73.
227 See chapter I.1.3.
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from Italy via Lotharingia to Ponthion.228 In 886, he undertook a campaign to 
relieve Paris from a Viking siege, an endeavour that ended in him negotiating the 
payment of tribute and allowing the Northmen access to Burgundy.229 However, 
contacts with the West Frankish elite were not limited to these periods. On various 
occasions, he was sought out by individual nobles while absent from the realm,230 
visits that signal special relations between them and the emperor.
According to the Annales Vedastini, the decision to call Charles into Francia 
was made by the Franks, who sent Theoderic of Vermandois to the emperor.231 Of 
course, the wording of the annals does not have to be taken literally and there may 
indeed have been nobles who opposed the choice. However, since there are no 
further reports of any such opposition, the leading men seem to have backed the 
call, a supposition evident from the fact that in Theoderic they chose one of their 
own as leader of the delegation. During the interregnum, both Hugh the Abbot 
and Gauzlin continued to exercise considerable influence: Hugh sent envoys to 
the Northmen now returning to the realm,232 while Gauzlin secured the vacant see 
of Paris for himself233 and installed his nephew Ebolus as abbot of Saint-Germain-
des-Prés.234 Given the unity shown by the Frankish nobles, both appear to have 
favoured the emperor as Carloman’s successor. In the case of Gauzlin, it is also 
worth pointing out the connections he had made after his capture in the battle of 
Andernach to nobles from the East Frankish kingdom235 and which he already had 
used after the death of Louis the Stammerer. That he did indeed exert his influence 
on Charles’  behalf may also be indicated by the speech Abbo attributed to him in 
his famous poem, praising the emperor’s qualities.236
228 DDChF 115 (Pavia) – 116−118 (Granges) – 119, 120 (Gondreville) – 121 (Toul) – 122 (Ponthion) 
– 123−126 (Etrepy). See also Annales Vedastini 885, 56.
229 DDChF 137 (Metz) – 138 (Attigny) – 139 (Servais) – 140,141 (Quierzy) – 142−149 (Paris) – 152 
(Schlettstadt). On the campaign see Annales Vedastini 886, 61–63 and Abbo, Bella II, v. 163–342, 
78−90.
230 DDChF 129 (for the church of Langres), 152−155 (church of Langres), 160−163 (Saint-Martin of 
Tours, Saint-Philibert of Tournus, Saint-Médard of Soissons). 
231 Annales Vedastini 884, 56: Franci capiunt consilium et Theodericum comitem Italiae dirigunt ad 
imperatorem Karolum, uti veniat in Franciam. At this point Theoderic the Chamberlain had al-
most certainly already died. Chaume, Origines, 309 with n. 3.
232 Regino, Chronicon 884, 122.
233 See chapter II.2, n. 205.
234 Annales S. Germani Parisiensis 881, 167. The chronology of the annals, however, is problematic. 
For example Robert of Neustria’s abbacy is noted only for 915, while DChS 45, 25th April 903, 
indicates that he had become its abbot at least twelve years earlier. See also Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 
XXII. It seems generally assumed that Gauzlin passed Saint-Germain-des-Prés to his nephew 
Ebolus when he became bishop of Paris. Waquet, Abbon, 21, n. 3.
235 Annales Bertiniani 879, 235−236.
236 Abbo, Bella I, v. 48−52, 18:
 Urbs mandata fuit Karolo nobis basileo,
 Imperio cujus regitur totus prope kosmus
 Post Dominum, regem dominatoremque potentum,
 Excidium per eam regnum non quod paciatur,
 Sed quod salvetur per eam sedeatque serenum.
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While the part these men took in the decision to call the emperor seems to 
be clear, assessing their influence at Charles’  court poses considerable problems. 
Hugh the Abbot appears only once in the sources before his death when his ab-
sence from the emperor’s first campaign against the Northmen due to an illness 
is noted.237 Whether this illness was indeed the real issue or just a pretext to cover 
a loss of influence must remain an open question. Posthumously, however, he 
is mentioned several times. The Annales Fuldenses describe Hugh and Gauzlin 
both as “abbots and leading commanders of Gaul, on whom the Gauls had placed 
all their hopes against the Northmen,” whose whose deaths had encouranged 
the enemy and led to the new attack.238 However, this note clearly confuses the 
 chronology—Hugh and Gauzlin only died at the time of the siege of Paris—and 
reads more like a laudatio on both their lives rather than on their actual political 
importance during the year preceding their deaths. Similarly, Hugh’s posthumous 
appearances in Charles the Fat’s diplomas239 may do him honour, but only reflect 
the memory of a man who had shaped West Frankish politics for a long time and 
are, moreover, linked to abbeys that had been under his control for a long time. 
However, there is one event that possibly casts some light on Hugh’s position at the 
imperial court: when the second campaign against the Northmen was organised, 
raising levies in Neustria and Burgundy, regions where Hugh had been most in-
fluential, the command went to Ragenold, the dux of Maine (dux Cinomannicus), 
instead of Hugh.240 This may of course have been due to his already mentioned ill-
ness, although it seems just as likely that Hugh’s influence was finally on the wane.
In the case of Gauzlin, who Simon MacLean considers one of the key figures in 
what he labelled the “North Frankish circle”,241 we encounter the same problem-
atic situation. His prominent role in the defence of Paris against the Northmen 
is well attested by the Annales Vedastini and Abbo’s Bella Parisicae Urbis, yet is 
easily explained by his leading role as bishop of the city and does not necessitate 
any proximity to Charles.242 More promising is a phrasing in the Translatio S. Me-
derici, stating that Gauzlin could not take part in the translation because he was 
occupied with various duties in service of the realm,243 although this may relate to 
237 Annales Vedastini 885, 56.
238 Annales Fuldenses (Mainz continuation) 886, 104: Interea Hugo et Gozilin, abbates et duces prae­
cipui Galliae regionis, in quibus omnis spes Gallorum contra Nordmannos posita erat, defuncti 
sunt. Unde Normanni audaciores effecti et de sua munitione egressi omnique regione potiti vena­
tiones et varios ludos nullo prohibente exercebant.
239 DDChF 143 (Saint-Aignan), 145 (Saint-Germain of Auxerre), 161 (Saint-Martin of Tours).
240 Annales Vedastini 885, 57.
241 MacLean, Kingship, 102−105.
242 MacLean’s final argument in favour of Gauzlin considers that Charles’ diploma for Saint-Maur 
of Fossés (DChF 149) was related to Gauzlin, the abbey having been founded by Gauzlin’s father 
Rorico and also held the latter’s grave. This seems to be a confusion between Saint-Maur and the 
closely related abbey of Glanfeuil, which indeed was founded by Rorico. On the two abbeys, see 
Koziol Politics, 156−161 and 481.
243 Translatio S. Mederici, 111: …saepe dictus Episcopus variis regni utilitatibus occupatus adesse min­
ime potuit.
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his  participation in the campaigns against the Northmen in 885. His influence in 
Francia best becomes visible in the letters he sent to Count Erkanger, asking him 
to fetch help from the emperor.244 Yet, while this episode certainly underlines his 
good relations with leading members of the Frankish nobility, it does not allow us 
to draw any conclusions on his standing with the emperor. Did Gauzlin use an in-
tercessor because he feared a direct approach would not yield the intended results?
Finally, Theoderic and his brother Aledramnus appear as military leaders in the 
context of the siege of Paris. Aledramnus took over command of the fortress built 
at Pontoise but was soon forced to withdraw to Beauvais.245 In Abbo’s poem, both 
he and Theoderic are named as leading a force of 600 men to a victory against the 
Northmen in the course of the siege, most likely the same force that had been sent 
by the emperor to the aid of Paris.246 At least in the second case, it seems clear that 
they had received their orders from the emperor. Aledramnus can also be seen at 
the emperor’s court, the only one among the nobles mentioned so far who came 
to meet Charles on his first journey to the West, intervening together with a cer-
tain Bishop Warnulf in favour of the church of Chalon-sur-Saône as “our beloved 
count” at Gondreville.247 Warnulf ’s see is unknown,248 although his description 
as “our most beloved bishop” indicates his importance for Charles. Aledramnus’ 
connection to Warnulf further emphasises his own role in the emperor’s network 
in the Western realm. So far, the two brothers emerge as the only Westerners who 
appear to have been close to the emperor.
In contrast, to most of those who had formed the dominant circle at Carlo-
man’s later court, Bernard of Auvergne, who had been an important ally to them 
although never visible for a long period at the royal court, appears to have quickly 
entered into the circle around the emperor and received a very honourable wel-
come. He intervened on behalf of the church of Lyon together with the emperor’s 
closest advisor, Bishop Liutward of Vercelli. He is described as “most illustrious 
marchio,” a very rare title that further underlines his importance.249 The diploma 
also seems to acknowledge Bernard’s control over Lyon,250 appearing to be an-
other concession made by the emperor to tie the most powerful man in Aquitaine 
to him and likely the result of their long established contact if the charters from 
Saint-Julien of Brioude can indeed be interpreted in this way.
244 Annales Vedastini 886, 59.
245 Annales Vedastini 885, 57−58. The report of the annals led to the belief that Aledramnus was 
count of the Vexin, where Pontoise is situated (Kalckstein, Geschichte, 472), or of Beauvais 
(Favre, Eudes, 19). Lot, Notes, 150, considers him as count of Laon, due to DLS 28, in which he 
was given property in the Laonnais. MacLean, Kingship, 106 names him as count over all three.
246 Abbo, Bella II, v. 315−329, 88−90.
 MacLean, Kingship, 106.
247 DChF 120, 190: …dilectus nobis comes…
248 DChF 120, 190: … dilectissimus nobis presul… See, for example, Depreux, Prosopography, 100, 
n. 9.
249 DChF 123 (20th June 885, Etrepy), 196: …illustrissimus marchio…
250 Auzias, Aquitaine, 419−420 and Kienast, Herzogstitel, 165−166 with n. 10, 1.
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Among those seeking out the emperor, we can also find two others who be-
longed to the circle dominating Carloman’s court. In the aftermath of the siege 
of Paris, both Bishop Berno of Châlons and Count Ansgar of Oscheret requested 
diplomas.251 Ansgar’s appearance points towards a wider circle of nobles in Upper 
Burgundy on which Charles now relied. He intervened together with Count Milo 
of Langres for the provost of the church of Langres, the see of Bishop Geilo. The 
latter was the single largest recipient of the emperor’s diplomas within the West 
Frankish kingdom,252 a key figure in the emperor’s control over Upper Burgun-
dy.253 It is not only the number of royal charters, however, that characterises the 
importance of see and bishop for Charles. Geilo was one of the first to meet the 
emperor, intervening on behalf of Saint-Bénigne and Saint-Etienne of Dijon,254 
both of which indicate his influence in the region. His requests were also sup-
ported by Liutward of Vercelli255 and even Charles’  wife, the empress Richgard.256 
Finally, Geilo was one of the few who did not wait for the emperor to come to the 
West, but sought him out on two occasions when he was in the East.257 The relation 
between Geilo, Milo and Ansgar, as demonstrated by the intervention of the latter 
two for the provost of Langres, appears to have been a close one. After the em-
peror’s death, all three of them belonged to the supporters of Wido of Spoleto.258
Contact with nobles from Upper Burgundy was not limited to these three, 
however. Robert of Troyes, whose contact with Ansgar we mentioned above, had 
died in the defence of Paris but was succeeded by his nephew Adelelm,259 who con-
tinued to support the besieged Parisians.260 Considering Robert’s close relations 
with the abbey of Montiéramey, it does not seem too far-fetched to assume that it 
was at Adelelm’s request that Charles now issued another diploma for the mon-
astery.261 Two more royal charters were petitioned for by a certain Count Rudolf 
and his son Pippin.262 In both diplomas, property in northern Burgundy, Bar and 
251 DDChF 150 (Berno) and 155 (Ansgar).
252 DDChF 117 (Saint-Bénigne of Dijon) and 118 (church of Dijon), 129, 147, 152, 153 and 154 (church 
of Langres); 162 went to Saint-Philibert of Tournus, but was requested by Bishop Geilo for his for-
mer abbey. On Geilo, see also Bautier, Diplômes, 216–230. Bautier’s depiction of Geilo as a man 
without personal morals (Bautier, Diplômes, 216 and 223) has been critisised as anachronistic by 
MacLean, Kingship, 110−111, who points out that Geilo’s rise under several different masters was 
indeed rather common at that time.
253 MacLean, Kingship, 114.
254 DDChF 117 and 118 (20th May 885, Granges).
255 DDChF 129 and 153.
256 DChF 154.
257 DDChF 129 (at Lorsch) and 162 (at Kirchen).
258 Geilo crowned Wido at Langres (Annales Vedastini 888, 64). Milo and Ansgar followed Wido 
back to Italy. Favre, Eudes, 85.
259 Abbo, Bella I, v. 438−455, 48−50.
260 Abbo, Bella II, v. 209−216, 80−82.
261 DChF 141 (deperditum).
262 DDChF  116 and 137. MacLean, Kingship, 109 identifies this Rudolf as marchio of Upper Bur-
gundy. This seems to be unfounded since Rudolf is not known to have had a son named Pippin 
(see Demotz, Bourgogne, 36).
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the Lassois, was given to fideles, which points towards them being local counts. Fi-
nally, Bishop Agelmar of Chalon-sur-Saône263 and the new abbot of Saint-Martin 
of Autun, Gregory, belonged to those in contact with the king.264
Two groups can be distinguished among the nobles mentioned so far. The old 
core, which had formed the inner circle around Carloman and his predecessors, 
was still intact and cooperated with the emperor. However, at the same time their 
influence at Charles’  court is impossible to determine. Of its members, only Ale-
dramnus appears in the emperor’s diplomas while the connections of Hugh, Gau-
zlin and Theoderic with Charles remain in the dark. All of them were strongly 
involved in West Frankish affairs, most notably in the fight against the Northmen. 
Yet, at the same time, their influence in royal politics appears to have diminished, 
probably caused in large part by Charles’  absence from the realm, depriving them 
of the opportunity to influence the decision-making process at court. On the other 
hand, for Bernard of Auvergne, always more an associate than a constant member 
of the old circle, not much appears to have changed. His position had increas-
ingly become more distant from court, and apparently mainly focused on affairs in 
Aquitaine. Here, he acted for the emperor as a local power broker, channelling the 
royal will into the region south of the Loire via his own connections.265
At the same time, we can note the rise of other nobles, such as Geilo of Langres, 
who now became a key figure in securing Upper Burgundy for the emperor. Geilo, 
like Ansgar of Oscheret, had already been in contact with the dominating circle, 
yet now his position appears to have been much more central and, most of all, 
independent of them. And there were other men who rose through the emperor’s 
protection. The most interesting example is Ragenold, according to the Annales 
Vedastini the dux of Maine.266 When he was killed, the newly assembled army 
made up of contingents from Neustria and Burgundy dispersed, indicating that he 
had been its leader. That the death of the commander led to the end of the entire 
campaign was not extraordinary.267 In 866, Robert the Strong’s death in combina-
tion with Ramnulf ’s injury lead to the dispersal of their force268 and similarly in 
887 Duke Henry’s death in battle was followed by his army returning home.269 
All of these nobles appear to have held key positions at the head of their respec-
tive armies in which they could not easily be replaced. In the case of Ragenold 
however, the question arises as to how he had become the leader of such an army. 
No sources indicate that he belonged to the circle of nobles dominant at court. It 
has been suggested that he might have been a relative of Gauzlin,270 yet how close 
263 DChF 119.
264 DChF 122.
265 See also MacLean, Kingship, 69−70.
266 Annales Vedastini 885, 57.
267 See also Leyser, Warfare, 39−40.
268 Annales Bertiniani 866, 130−131.
269 Regino, Chronicon 887, 126.
270 Werner, Adelsfamilien, 142 and Werner, Gauzlin, 457−459.
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this relationship was remains unclear. The only thing we know for certain about 
him is that he was in conflict with Bishop Lambert of Le Mans, who excommuni-
cated him during 883−885 due to him having appropriated Church income.271 He 
was certainly a powerful noble based in Neustria, possibly the leader of a march 
against the Bretons and Northmen.272 Although our sources do not mention any 
influence of the emperor in the assembling of the army, it seems very unlikely that 
he was not involved at least in the appointment of its commander. As the annals of 
Saint-Vaast report, the army consisted of forces of “all who were in Neustria and 
Burgundy,”273 pointing to a large-scale operation. Given that Hugh the Abbot, who 
held honores in both regions, appears to have been passed over as commander, it 
seems likely a central authority—the emperor—was behind its organisation. Rage-
nold thus would have been Charles’  choice, undoubtedly based on his position, 
experience and, if indeed correct, his relation to Gauzlin. But most of all, it was 
also a choice to appoint someone new to a key position in the defence of the realm.
Ragenold was not the only new noble Charles appointed—or had to appoint—
following the deaths of Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin. Anskeric, who now became 
bishop of Paris, is another example. He was the brother of Count Tetbert of Meaux 
and appears to have competed with Gauzlin for the see of Paris upon Angelwinus’ 
death.274 He was also one of the first to meet with Charles upon his initial visit to 
the West, intervening with Count Rudolf and his son Pippin on behalf of a fidelis 
from Upper Burgundy,275 thus establishing contact at a very early moment. Hence, 
Anskeric appears to have recommended himself to Charles at a very early point, 
while his nomination also shows the interest of the emperor in installing trusted 
men in key positions in the realm. The connection between the two also became 
apparent in 887, when Anskeric met Charles to take over the tribute due to the 
Northmen.276
However, the most important man promoted by the emperor was without a 
doubt Odo, son of Robert the Strong. Olivier Guillot, in an article dedicated to 
the Robertian’s early career, claimed that, after the siege of Paris, Odo was exercis-
ing royal prerogatives such as distributing honores in the Western realm despite 
Charles still ruling.277 This, however, was convincingly refused by Simon MacLean, 
who in turn argues for a close cooperation between the count and the emperor 
instead of a political rivalry for power,278 a view we also follow. Odo had suc-
ceeded Conrad as count of Paris some years earlier but remained invisible during 
271 Actus pontificum Cenomannis, 339−340.
272 Guillotel, Marche, 12.
273 Annales Vedastini 885, 57: Inter haec omnes qui morabantur Neustria atque Burgundia adunantur 
et collecto exercitu adveniunt quasi debellaturi Nortmannos.
274 See chapter I.2.2.
275 DChF 116. See also chapter II.3, n. 262.
276 Annales Vedastini 887, 63.
277 Guillot, Étapes, 203−206 and Formes, 61−62.
278 MacLean, Kingship, 49−55.
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that time. He appears to have been politically close to Gauzlin279 and they acted 
together in the defence of Paris, as becomes clear from Abbo’s poem.280 Besides 
Gauzlin, he also enjoyed the support of Theoderic and Aledramnus since he mar-
ried the latter’s daughter Theodrada, probably during the early 880s.281 His role 
became of central importance only after the bishop’s death, when he took over 
responsibility for the city.282 Contact with Charles may have been established even 
before the emperor took over the West, since Odo’s brother Robert appears to 
have held a countship at Namur283 and had intervened in one of Charles’  diplomas 
two years earlier.284 Robert’s importance at court becomes even clearer from the 
phrasing used to describe him in the charter, “our most loyal noble man count 
Robert”, the use of a superlative generally being reserved for special cases.285 After 
the siege of Paris was lifted, Charles granted Odo the honores of his father Robert 
the Strong,286 namely the counties along the Loire together with the abbeys Saint-
Martin of Tours and Saint-Aignan. A number of diplomas issued on this occasion, 
confirming an exchange for Saint-Aignan and confirming the property and im-
munity of the church of Tours,287 further document Odo’s newly won importance. 
His key position in the emperor’s West Frankish affairs is underlined by a diploma 
for Saint-Martin issued at his request at Kirchen in June 887.288 It was a confirma-
tion of a charter from Odo two months earlier, in which he returned property 
to the monks.289 However, the parts copied by the royal chancellery contain the 
prayer services for himself and his father Robert the Strong,290 an almost unique 
concession in the emperor’s diplomas.291 The choice to appoint Odo—apart from 
279 Favre, Eudes, 13; Werner, Gauzlin, 451, MacLean, Kingship, 108.
280 Abbo, Bella I, v. 40−46, 16−18.
281 See chapter I.2.2. The date of the marriage is suggested by Favre, Eudes, 15.
282 As shown for example the desperation of the inhabitants during the time of Odo’s absence from 
the city. Annales Vedastini 886, 60−61: Odo vero, videns affligi populum, clam exiit de civitate, a 
principibus regni requirens auxilium et, ut imperatori innotescerent velocius perituram civitatem, 
nisi auxilium ei daretur. Dehinc regressus ipsam civitatem de eius absentia nimis repperit merentem.
283 MacLean, Kingship, 108. See also chapter III.2.1.
284 DChF 105 (May/June 884), 169: ...vir nobilis Rotbertus comes fidelissimus noster…
285 On the use of epithets, see Brunner, Fürstentitel.
286 Annales Vedastini 886, 62; Regino, Chronicon 887, 126.
287 DDChF 143 (27th October 886) and 146 (29th October 886). MacLean, Kingship, 109 assumes 
that both diplomas were issued before Odo was installed in his father’s honores. However, both 
date to late October 886, most certainly at the same moment or after the installation of Odo in 
Neustria. DChF 139 (22nd August 886) for Saint-Martin of Tours, which is further viewed by 
MacLean as showing that Odo was already in a close relationship with the emperor before, only 
indicates that he had given the abbey some property at some point earlier (224: ...Noviento, quam 
Odo integerrie ad peculiare fratribus contulit.). The circumstance that the charter was demanded 
by a group of monks and not Odo or their abbot points towards the conclusion that the succes-
sion of Hugh the Abbot was still unresolved. The same accounts for DChF 145, in which monks 
of Saint-Germain of Auxerre likewise requested the confirmation of their properties and rights.
288 DChF 160 (16th June 887).
289 DOdo 55 (April 887).
290 DChF 160, 206.
291 MacLean, Kingship, 53. Bishop Liutward is the only other case. DChF 92.
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his brother’s connection to the imperial court—is not surprising. When Charles 
the Bald had installed Odo’s father in the region, he had also settled some of Rob-
ert’s supporters there.292 As Karl Ferdinand Werner has shown, these same men 
were still in place when Odo took over and supported him.293 Charles’  diploma for 
Saint-Martin of Tours, issued after Hugh the Abbot’s death, tells us that Odo had 
given property to the monks294 and his intervention with Bishop Adalard of Tours 
for the latter’s church295 indicates that the two, at least after Odo’s appointment, 
were close as well. Hence, Odo appears to have been well connected in the area 
and was therefore an ideal choice for the vacant position along the Loire. In ad-
dition to the bishopric of Paris, Charles thus secured another key position in the 
Western realm for himself.
Charles tried to use all opportunities presented to him to set up men of his 
choice in central positions and to tie them to him. In the case of the see of Auxerre, 
the emperor tried to install his candidate Teutbert, yet failed when Bishop Walter 
of Orléans intervened.296 Instead, Herfrid, one of Walter’s relatives,297 was elected. 
The Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium do not know of Teutbert, but report that 
Herfrid was the royal candidate.298 Of course the Gesta are not an entirely reli-
able source.299 Nevertheless, it would seem possible that, encountering Walter’s 
resistance, Charles altered his decision and settled for a candidate who was also 
agreeable to the bishop of Orléans. In this case, it seems likely that the emperor’s 
lost diploma for the church of Auxerre was issued at Herfrid’s request300 and that, 
like Anskeric, Herfrid would then have been one of the emperor’s men. Concern-
ing the appointment of bishops, it has also been suggested that the elevation of 
Walter’s nephew, another Walter, to the see of Sens was also initiated by Charles.301 
Finally, at Paris, Charles seems to have favoured Abbot Ebolus of Saint-Germain-
des-Prés, Gauzlin’s nephew, for whose abbey he issued a diploma.302 It also appears 
that, upon Gauzlin’s death, Ebolus was given control over the deceased’s other ab-
beys, namely Saint-Denis and Jumièges,303 indicating that Charles tried to tie the 
abbot even closer to him. In addition to these men, the emperor also strengthened 
his relations with other nobles. The fight against the Northmen had left a number 
292 Annales Bertiniani 866, 126: Karolus Rotberto comiti abbatiam Sancti Martini ab Engilwino ab­
latam donat et eius consilio honores qui ultra Sequanam erant per illius complices dividit.
293 Werner, Untersuchungen IV.
294 DChF 139. See chapter II.3, n. 287.
295 DChF 146.
296 Bischoff, Anecdota, N° IV, 129−130. Letter of Walter of Orléans to the clergy of Auxerre, recom-
mending them not to vote for Teutbert.
297 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 169.
298 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 169−171.
299 See Janin, Heiric.
300 Kehr, Kanzlei, 33. The deperditum is mentioned by DChS 42.
301 MacLean, Kingship, 116.
302 As becomes clear of DChS 45.
303 Werner, Gauzlin, 461; Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXIII. On Ebolus see also the studies of Poupardin, 
Note and Levillain, Abbé. On his relations, see Oexle, Bischof.
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of counties vacant and thus provided Charles with various honores to distribute 
among men of his choice, which he did before returning to the East,304 although 
unfortunately nothing further is known about these measures.
In addition to these more intense contacts, we can also make out a number of 
other nobles and institutions seeking out Charles. Archbishop Fulk of Reims had 
already communicated with the emperor in 883, when he asked him to intervene 
on his behalf with the pope to be given the pallium and a confirmation of the 
privileges of his Church.305 A year later, he successfully requested the restoration 
of goods in Thuringia and Lotharingia to the abbey of Saint-Remy of Reims when 
the emperor was visiting the western regions of his realm.306 Once Charles had 
taken over Francia Occidentalis, however, Fulk does not appear to have belonged 
to those enjoying imperial favour. Flodoard only records one letter from this time, 
probably dating to between February and July 886 due to its references to the siege 
of Paris. In this, he urged Charles to protect the realm and painted a picture of the 
consequence of the loss of the city in the darkest colours.307 According to Gerhard 
Schneider, this was a sign of his interest in the wider affairs of the realm and his 
claim for the primacy of the church of Reims.308 While this letter may indeed have 
contributed to the emperor’s intervention, it is more likely that the pleas from 
Gauzlin and Odo carried more weight.
Apart from Fulk, Charles was also sought out by other churches and abbeys 
throughout the realm. From Septimania came Bishop Theotarius of Girona to re-
ceive a confirmation of the properties and rights of his church.309 Charles restored 
property alienated from the Aquitainian abbey of Saint-Agricol and Saint-Vital.310 
In Burgundy, he did the same for the canons of Saint-Vincent of Mâcon at the 
request of their bishop, Letard.311 Another bishop from Burgundy, Emmensus of 
Nevers, received a confirmation for his new foundation at Cusset,312 as did Abbot 
Bonifatius of Sainte-Seine for his own abbey.313 Finally, in the North, Saint-Maur 
of Fossés314 and Saint-Médard of Soissons315 were granted diplomas. This last case 
304 Annales Vedastini 886, 62.
305 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 380. In particular, the confirmation of the privileges appears to have been 
a central problem. Schneider, Erzbischof, 33−34.
306 DChF 106 (30th June 884, Metz).
307 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 380: Memoratque civitatem Parisiorum, quam caput asserit et introitum 
regnorum Neustrie atque Burgundie, barbarica cingi obsidione citoque capiendam, nisi dei subven­
tum fuerit clementia. Que si capta fuerit, totius dispendium regni se perpessuros, tamque periculose 
hec iam mala grassari, ut a predicta urbe Remos usque nichil tutum remanserit; nulla nisi perver­
sorum christianorum barbarisque consentientium secura sit habitatio, quorum multi christianam 
deserentes religionem paganorum se societati coniunxerant ac tuitioni subdiderant.
308 Schneider, Erzbischof, 38.
309 DChF 148.
310 Kehr, Urkunden Karls III., XVI, referring to DOdo 49.
311 DChF 151.
312 DChF 138.
313 DChF 140.
314 DChF 149.
315 DChF 163.
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appears to have been more of a personal matter, the emperor donating a villa to 
the abbey for the sake his soul as well as those of his ancestors and predecessors.316 
The abbey was also the burial place of Duke Henry, one of his closest advisors and 
his most important commander, who had been killed the year before,317 which 
may also have been a reason for the emperor’s choice to grant the diploma. This is 
a rather limited number of contacts, yet considering that Charles only visited the 
West on two occasions and for very short periods of time, these diplomas never-
theless demonstrate that the emperor, like his predecessors, was in contact with all 
parts of the realm.
II.4	 Resistance,	integration	and	rebellion:	Odo
The death of Charles the Fat had left a vacuum at the centre of West Frankish 
politics. For the first time since the death of Louis the Stammerer, nobles formed 
rival factions, each trying to establish their own candidate on the throne. Odo’s 
main supporter is identified by the Annales Vedastini as Count Theoderic of 
Vermandois,318 which is hardly surprising considering their relationship. Theo-
deric also served Odo shortly afterwards as an ambassador to Arnolf,319 his last 
appearance in the sources. By 895, he was dead and his honores had been passed 
on to his son.320 Odo’s brother Robert was also a key figure in these events; Odo 
appears to have passed on the majority of his honores to Robert upon becoming 
king. No contemporary source actually mentions this procedure, but the Annales 
Sancti Germani Parisiensis note that, in 888, Robert became count of Paris,321 he 
furthermore appears as abbot of Saint-Martin of Tours around that time322 and 
finally is addressed as “our senior” by Viscount Garnegaud of Blois.323 Moreover, 
the other viscounts of the Robertian counties along the Loire, Hucbert, Hardrad 
and Hatto were now in close contact with the king’s brother, as a number of pri-
vate charters from Angers and Tours show.324 The honores having been passed 
on, Odo nevertheless maintained contact with the Neustrian bishops. Raino of An-
gers received two diplomas,325 the church of Orléans, where his notary  Throannus 
316 DChF 163, 265: …quod ob remedium animae nostrae ac progenitorum nostrorum regum scilicet 
praedecessorum nostrorum…
317 Regino, Chronicon 887, 126. Regino’s date is off by one year.
318 Annales Vedastini 888, 64: Verum, ut diximus, Franci divisi, aliqui Widonem, qui partibus Ful­
chonis archiepiscopi favebant, alii Odonem, inter quos Theodericus comes eminebat, in regno stat­
uere contendebant.
319 Annales Vedastini 888, 65.
320 By 895, Saint-Quentin was in the hands of his son (Annales Vedastini 895, 77). Theoderic’s con-
trol of Saint-Quentin is documented by the Sermo in tumulatione SS Quintini, 272.
321 Annales S. Germani Parisiensis 888, 167.
322 DOdo 19.
323 Favre, Eudes, 96, n. 5 and pièces justificatives VI, 244: …senioris nostri domini Rotberti comitum…
324 Cartulaire Angers, N° XV, 37−39; Favre, Eudes, Preuves IV and DRoI 37.
325 DOdo 17 and 39.
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became bishop after Walter’s death,326 received another327 while a judgement fa-
voured the archbishop of Tours.328 Robert’s power was further increased when 
Odo installed him as count of Poitiers in around 892329 and although he does not 
appear in any of the datable diplomas before 893330 nor in the major narrative 
sources, he was certainly one of the pillars his brother’s rule rested on.
Among the others supporting Odo in those early days was an old acquaint-
ance of his, Count Hucbald of Senlis. The two of them are named by a widow 
complaining to the archbishop of Sens that they had interfered with her rights and 
possessions.331 Hucbald’s central role also becomes evident from three of Odo’s 
diplomas, in which he intervened for various important abbeys, namely Saint-
Hilaire of Poitiers, Montiéramey and Saint-Maur of Fossés.332 In these, his prox-
imity to the king is further underlined by expressions such as “our procer” and 
“our fidelis in all affairs.” Also close to Odo at this time was his kinsman333 Count 
Altmar, who before 888 had signed one of Odo’s charters for the church of Paris 
next to him and Robert334 and who now also witnessed one of Robert’s private 
charters.335 A few years later, after the death of Ramnulf II of Poitiers, Odo installed 
him as count of Poitiers336 as part of an attempt to tighten his grasp on northern 
Aquitaine. Altmar rebelled soon after when Odo withdrew the county from him 
to hand it over to his brother Robert. He took Poitiers by force337 and allied him-
self with William the Pious and Richard the Justiciar.338 Odo and Altmar appear 
to have come to an agreement soon afterwards, since Altmar appears alongside 
Robert as marchio in a diploma handing over the abbey of Saint-Hilaire of Poi-
tiers to Bishop Egfred.339 According to Eduard Favre, this Altmar was the same 
who held the abbey Saint-Médard of Soissons in 900.340 His identification however 
seems to be partially based on a forgery indicating that, in 893, Odo had donated 
property to the abbey.341 The Altmar in control of Saint-Médard of Soissons is gen-
erally thought to have held Arras, where he took over Saint-Vaast in 899,342 while 
326 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXXVI.
327 DOdo 30Bis.
328 DOdo 19.
329 Abbo, Bella II, v. 545−546, 106.
330 DOdo 25 (16th June 891) is a forgery, probably based on an authentic diploma. See Bautier’s com-
mentary, 114−117.
331 Bischof, Anecdota, N° V, 131–132.
332 DDOdo 16 (76: …proceribus nostris, Hubaldo et Heriberto…), 38 (161: ...in omnibus fidelis noster, 
Hucbaldus comes…) and 48.
333 Abbo, Bella II, v. 535−541, 106. See also Settipani, Préhistoire, 404, n. 24.
334 Cartulaire Paris, N° 52, 70−71.
335 DOdo 55 (April 887).
336 Ademar, Chronicon III, c. 21, 141. See also Kienast, Vasallität, 462.
337 Abbo, Bella II, v. 544−547, 106−108.
338 Annales Vedastini 893, 73–74. See chapter I.2.4.
339 DOdo 50 (15th October 893−3rd January 898).
340 Favre, Eudes, 15−16, based on Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 10, 402.
341 DOdo 52.
342 Annales Vedastini 899, 81.
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the Altmar close to Odo appears to have been mainly active south of the Loire.343 
While we therefore have to refuse Favre’s identification, Altmar, nevertheless, like 
Robert and Hucbert, belonged to a group close to the new king whose members 
owed their influence to their earlier connections to him.
Other allies came from the circle of men elevated by Charles into central po-
sitions. The new archbishop of Sens, Walter, carried out his first coronation at 
Compiègne344 and became royal archchancellor in 894.345 Whether two other men, 
Bishop Anskeric of Paris and Abbot Ebolus of Saint-Denis, belonged to Odo’s very 
first allies remains unknown. From June 889 onwards, however, they belonged 
to the group of his most important supporters. Anskeric, “our most beloved”, a 
phrase that emphasises his proximity to the king, received two diplomas for his 
abbey Saint-Germain of Auxerre.346 Thus, his presence at Odo’s side not only 
meant that Paris was tied even closer to the king, but also that he had a foothold 
in Burgundy, where local nobles and bishops had originally opted for Wido of 
Spoleto. Anskeric’s Burgundian connections were probably also the reason for his 
intervention on behalf of Bishop Argrim of Langres, whose appearance at Odo’s 
court in December 889 marked an important victory for Odo. Argrim’s predeces-
sor Geilo was one of those who had opposed the Robertian: it was he who had 
crowned Wido king and therefore Argim’s support for Odo meant that the king 
had obtained the support of Langres.347 Furthermore, Anskeric was the brother of 
Count Tetbert of Meaux and thus strengthened Odo’s relations with the nobles of 
Francia even more. It may have also been due to his influence that, after Tetbert’s 
death, the county passed to Heribert I, who was probably related to the brothers.348 
Finally, Anskeric’s proximity to the king is emphasised by his serving as ambascia-
tor in a diploma for the church of Narbonne349 and becoming archchancellor in 
892 in succession to Abbot Ebolus.350
Ebolus appears as archchancellor in Odo’s first preserved diplomas, dating 
to 13th June 889.351 Next to Gauzlin and Odo, Ebolus had been one of the leaders 
of the defence of Paris, particularly after Gauzlin’s death and in times of Odo’s 
absence from the city.352 Ebolus’  role in Odo’s bid for the throne is difficult to 
ascertain. His brother Ramnulf II of Poitiers certainly did not side with Odo and 
only submitted early in 889;353 it is even possible that he himself had aspirations 
343 See chapter I.2.3 and, for example, Vita Sancti Geraldi Auriliacensis I, c. 35, 182. 
344 Annales Vedastini 888, 64.
345 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXXIV.
346 DDOdo 11 and 12 (10th and 11th July 889). Only DOdo 12 names Anskeric, 62: …Anscherici, ven­
erabilis episcopi reverendique eorumdem monachorum abbatis, nobis valde dilectissimi…
347 Annales Vedastini 888, 64.
348 Werner, Untersuchungen V.
349 DOdo 24.
350 DOdo 30.
351 DDOdo 2 and 3.
352 Abbo, Bella II, v. 163−167, 78.
353 Annales Vedastini 889, 67.
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for the crown.354 When Odo went to Aquitaine to meet with Ramnulf, he took 
only a few men with him. The meeting between the two was undoubtedly pre-
ceded by negotiations in which Ebolus, due to his connections to both parties, 
must have played a key role. Whether he had already become Odo’s archchan-
cellor must remain unclear, yet his appointment ensured that the king had a di-
rect link to the most important man in Aquitaine. After the death of Archbishop 
Frotar of Bourges, Ebolus was also given control over Saint-Hilaire of Poitiers, 
further strengthening Odo’s connection to the most important family in Aqui-
taine. By the end of 889, his petition in favour of the abbey was supported by the 
intervention of the counts Hucbald and Heribert,355 thus publicly placing him at 
the core of the king’s network of close associates.
We have already mentioned Heribert’s close association with the king and can 
thus refrain from going into any further detail.356 By furthering Heribert, Odo in-
creased his grasp on Francia even more. Control over this region was decisive since 
it not only held the rich remnants of the Carolingian fisc, but also the palaces and 
abbeys closely tied to the memory of their family, most notably Charles the Bald’s 
Compiègne, which Odo chose as the place for his coronation. But Francia was also 
the region where the resistance against Odo had been most fierce: Archbishop 
Fulk had led the party in favour of Wido and shortly afterwards allied himself with 
Abbot Rodulf of Saint-Vaast and Saint-Bertin and his cousin Baldwin II of Flan-
ders.357 This party started to dissolve only after Odo’s victory over the Vikings at 
Montfauçon and his acknowledgement by Arnulf, when Baldwin submitted him-
self to the king.358 Fulk and Rodulf followed soon after. Odo’s second coronation 
at Reims indicates at least the archbishop’s consent, even if not his participation in 
the ceremony.359 Fulk later received two diplomas for his church360 while his overall 
behaviour towards the king, as argued, shows general cooperation.361 Rodulf was 
soon integrated into Odo’s reign. His request for a confirmation of the monk’s 
mensa was supported by Queen Theodrada, her only appearance in the royal diplo-
mas.362 The moment of the charter’s deliverance may have been motivated by the 
Northmen’s return to the Seine-Oise region in 890,363 necessitating the abbot’s co-
operation with the king. Securing Francia was probably also the  motivation behind 
354 Annales Fuldenses (Ratisbon continuation) 888, 116: …deinceps Ramnolfus se regem haberi sta­
tuit. See also chapter I.1.4.
355 DOdo 16 (14th December 889). The identification of the Ebolus in the diploma with Ebolus of 
Saint-Denis is disputed. We follow Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXIII and 74−75. Different on this 
matter Favre, Eudes, 33, n. 10.
356 See chapter I.2.1.
357 Annales Vedastini 888, 64−65.
358 Annales Vedastini 888, 66.
359 Schneider, Erzbischof, 60–62 and Guillot, Étapes, 215−216.
360 DDOdo 31 and 47.
361 See chapter I.2.1.
362 DOdo 20 (21st May 890).
363 Annales Vedastini 890, 68.
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the appointment of Odo’s relative, Walker, as commander of the castle of Laon,364 
as was a diploma for Bishop Dido of the same city, guaranteeing the security of the 
immunity of the Church’s buildings and houses from intrusion by royal agents.365 
By placing men closely associated with him in central positions, as well as by ap-
peasing former opponents, Odo thus secured Francia for himself.
Burgundy and Aquitaine
Burgundy, as mentioned, was, besides Francia, the region where Odo’s rival for 
the crown, Wido of Spoleto, had found most of his support. Geilo of Langres 
crowned him, the counts Milo and Ansgar followed him back to Italy. Winning 
the acknowledgement of the Burgundian nobles and forging links with its most 
important representatives were therefore vital when it came to securing Odo’s rule 
over the realm. By June 889, the first steps had been taken. At Odo’s first major 
assembly at Orléans, the king issued a large number of diplomas for recipients 
from Burgundy, Aquitaine and Septimania, marking his acknowledgement as king 
over the entire realm. Among those coming from Burgundy were Abbot Odo of 
Vézelay,366 who had already requested diplomas from Louis the Stammerer and 
Carloman II, and Abbot Biltgerius, who now received a royal charter for his abbey 
of Saint-Philibert of Tournus.367 Even after Geilo had become bishop of Langres, 
he had preserved strong links with his former abbey, as his intervention on its 
behalf in front of Charles the Fat demonstrates.368 Biltgerius’ presence at Odo’s 
court therefore, like that of Geilo’s successor Argrim half a year later,369 is a sign 
that the core region of Wido’s support had now chosen to submit to Odo. A final 
key figure in the area was Bishop Adalgarius of Autun, who, not unlike Odo of 
Vézelay, we have already seen at the courts of Louis the Stammerer and Carlo-
man II. While under Carloman his role in firmly establishing royal control over 
the region was undoubtedly important, especially during the efforts to suppress 
Boso’s revolt (like many others, Adalgarius had originally been one of Boso’s sup-
porters), and at Odo’s court he seems to have risen quickly to an even more central 
role. Property was restored to his church370 and in 893 he replaced the rebellious 
Anskeric as royal archchancellor,371 thus providing the king with a direct link to 
the Burgundian nobility. Considering the endeavours of Richard the Justiciar, who 
around the same time had formed an alliance with two of Odo’s enemies, William 
the Pious of Aquitaine and Altmar of Poitiers,372 this measure was surely meant to 
provide Odo with a finger on the pulse of events in Burgundy.
364 Annales Vedastini 892, 72. 
365 DOdo 29.
366 DOdo 10.
367 DOdo 13 (16th July 889).
368 DChF 162.
369 DOdo 15 (14th December 889).
370 DOdo 21.
371 DOdo 33 (28th May 893).
372 See chapter I.2.5.
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In the case of Aquitaine, we have already noted the importance of Odo’s rela-
tive, Count Altmar, as well as that of Abbot Ebolus, the royal archchancellor and 
brother of Ramnulf II of Poitiers, who, according to Ademar of Chabannes, from 
then on entertained close relations with the king and probably also introduced 
Count Gerald of Aurillac, one of his close supporters, to the royal court.373 After 
the king had come to an agreement with Ramnulf, abbots Theoderic of Solignac 
and Gerulf of Beaulieu appeared at the royal court to ask for diplomas.374 Again, 
like Odo of Vézelay, both had been regular visitors to the royal court, acknowledg-
ing the rule of Louis the Stammerer and Carloman II, thus demonstrating that 
Odo had now been accepted as their successor. However, more importantly, both 
cases also demonstrate that Odo could now also rely on the approval and support 
of another political heavyweight in the area, Archbishop Frotar of Bourges. In the 
case of Solignac he acted as ambasciator, while we have already seen him closely 
associated with Beaulieu in the time of Carloman II.375 Further support appears 
to have come from a certain Count Hugh, to whom Odo gave the honores of the 
rebellious William the Pious in 892.376 In Aquitaine, as in Burgundy, we can there-
fore observe the king’s attempts to establish links allowing him to remain in touch 
with the local nobility. These could be via important local nobles whom he tied 
to himself by giving them offices and honores, or men from the circle already sur-
rounding him, who he now tried to install in key positions in the region.
Finally, at the assembly at Orléans in July 889 we can make out a large number 
of contacts in Septimania and the Spanish March, most notably Bishop Ermemi-
rus of Girona377 and Count Sunyer of Ampurias,378 representatives of one of the 
most influential families in the coastal Pyrenees,379 both of whom were interven-
ing together on behalf of the abbey Saint-Polycarpe. The latter was not the only 
monastery in the South receiving a diploma on that occasion. In the case of Saint-
Paul of Fontclara,380 Odo pulled out all the stops to demonstrate to the realm that 
he was willing to act like a king. With the consent of his closest fideles,381 as the 
charter makes special note of, the king granted the abbey the complete scope of 
royal attention: confirmation of its property, protection, immunity, the liberty to 
choose its abbot and some parts of the fisc in the area. In turn, he asked for a regu-
lar prayer service to be held for him, his family and the realm, thus not only taking 
care of his eternal soul, but at the same time ensuring that his rule was remem-
bered in the South. Contact with the far South remained strong after this, with 
regulars such as Archbishop Theodard of Narbonne and Ememirus’ successor at 
373 Ademar, Chronicon III, c. 21, 141.
374 DDOdo 2 and 4.
375 DCmII 62.
376 Abbo, Bella II, v. 548–553, 108. On him, see Lot, Orson, 579−583.
377 DDOdo 5 and 7.
378 DOdo 7.
379 D’Abadal, Comtes, 249. On his family, see Lewis, Development, 109−110.
380 DOdo 6.
381 DOdo 6, 32: …simul cum procerum nostrorum fidelium consensu…
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Girona, Servus Dei, petitioning on behalf of their churches at the royal court382 as 
well as other new appearances such as the abbots Sunifred of La Grasse, Aduvirus 
of Notre-Dame of Amer and Tenericus of Saint-Martin of Mont-Redon.383
Only very few of these men coming from so far away to seek out the king are 
likely to have wielded considerable influence at the royal court. Yet their presence 
is a good indicator that the nobles of the entire realm co-operated with the king. 
This image is also confirmed by the synod of Meung-sur-Loire and the assembly of 
Verberie in the early 890s. The synod saw the presence of no less than five archbish-
ops and nine bishops, representing Neustria, Francia, Burgundy, Aquitaine and 
Septimania.384 The assembly appears to have been smaller: the original sentence 
against a monk from Montiéramey, which was confirmed in a later diploma,385 had 
been pronounced by the archbishops of Reims, Sens and Rouen as well as three 
bishops from Francia,386 two of whom, Dido of Laon and Honoratus of Beauvais, 
later remained loyal to Odo. At the same time, the synod of Meung, marking the 
acceptance Odo enjoyed in the entire realm like no other event, also appears as a 
turning point. From 890 onwards, the overall number of diplomas issued by Odo 
dropped. This, of course is hardly surprising since after this point the initial visits 
from nobles to acknowledge the new king and to receive confirmations and grants 
had taken place and diplomatic activity came down to a more normal level. How-
ever, it is worth noting that after 892 visits from the distant regions of the realm, as 
far as the evidence allows us to surmise, ceased entirely. The conflicts breaking out 
in 892 and the coronation of Charles the Simple early in 893 appear to have deeply 
affected the stability of Odo’s reign. Nobles and ecclesiastical institutions seem to 
have laid low, waiting for events to unfold.
The later years
The same years also saw a massive change in Robert’s role at court. During the 
first years of Odo’s reign he certainly occupied a key role in his brother’s poli-
cies. However, after 892, deep ruptures appeared in the circle of supporters the 
king had constructed to support his reign. Theoderic had probably already died 
and Aledramnus, Altmar, Ebolus, Anskeric and Heribert were in open rebellion, 
 leaving only Count Hucbald, whose description as “our fidelis in all affairs”387 
was undoubtedly not chosen by chance but reflected the contemporary prob-
lems of Odo’s reign. The king renewed his efforts to increase his base of support, 
 nominating Adalgarius of Autun as his archchancellor, but had to resort back to 
382 DDOdo 24 (Narbonne), 27 and 28 (Girona).
383 DDOdo 17 (La Grasse), 23 (Notre-Dame) and 32 (Saint-Martin).
384 DDOdo 26. Present were the archbishops of Sens, Bourges, Tours and Narbonne. In terms of 
bishops we can note those of Albi, Autun, Béziers, Chartres, Clermont, Girona, Nevers, Orléans 
and Carcassone. Archbishop Adaldus (of Sens, 927–932) appears to have signed at a later point. 
Schröder, Synoden, 106.
385 DOdo 30.
386 The bishops of Laon, Beauvais and Soissons.
387 DOdo 38 (894), 161: …in omnibus fidelis noster…
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Archbishop Walter of Sens when the former was poisoned. Walter certainly car-
ried some political weight, but he did not offer the same connections that Ebolus 
and Adalgarius had possessed. The weight of influence within Odo’s innermost 
circle therefore shifted massively in favour of Robert, who, in May 893, appeared 
for the first time in one of Odo’s diplomas as “our beloved brother and illustrious 
count and marchio,” intervening on behalf of the abbey of Cormery.388 In half the 
diplomas issued from 893 onwards, Robert either intervened or acted as petition-
er.389 When, in Neustria, Roger usurped Le Mans, it was Robert who led the army 
to liberate the city and installed a new count.390 Apart from in Neustria, Robert 
also acted on the king’s behalf in Francia, where he played a key role in the king’s 
dealings with Count Baldwin concerning the matter of the abbey of Saint-Vaast.391 
As the Annales Vedastini report, Robert acted as mediator between his brother 
and the count: in 895 he accompanied Baldwin’s emissaries on their return to the 
king and received the keys to the abbey when Odo ordered his men to evacuate 
it.392 This indicates that he enjoyed the trust not only of his brother, but also of the 
count. And indeed, when Baldwin finally submitted to Odo, it was again Rob-
ert who had convinced him to do so.393 It may be that even earlier he had medi-
ated between the opposing parties of a conflict, this time between his brother and 
Charles’  allies. When, in 894, Odo had made his camp in front of Reims and nego-
tiations were being carried out, it was not he who gave hostages to Charles’  party, 
but Robert,394 thus acting as a guarantor of Odo’s good will and behaviour. During 
the second half of Odo’s reign, Robert had become his brother’s right hand.
Other contacts of Odo during the same period were—as far as we can tell—
mostly motivated by the political events unfolding at the same time. Altmar was 
reintegrated by Odo’s acknowledgment of his position in the north of Aquitaine, 
as demonstrated by his intervention together with Robert on behalf of the bishop 
of Poitiers.395 William the Pious, involved in the conflict around the succession of 
Ramnulf ’s son Ebalus Manzer at Poitiers, appears to have been neutralised by the 
grant of Saint-Julien of Brioude.396 The diploma issued at the request of the bishop 
of Clermont for the church of Saint-Agricol and Saint-Vital397 was probably also 
meant to strengthen the ties with the count of Auvergne. Another royal charter 
issued in July 894 at the request of Bishop Franco of Nevers398 may be read as an 
388 DOdo 33 (28th May 893), 146: …dilectus noster frater atque illustris comes et marchio... DOdo 50 
(15th October 893−3rd March 898) also ascribes him the title.
389 DDOdo 33, 34, 40, 41 and 50.
390 Actus Pontificum Cenomannis, 343. See also chapter I.3.
391 On the role of mediators in conflicts, see Althoff, Colloquium, 176−180.
392 Annales Vedastini 895, 77.
393 Annales Vedastini 897, 79.
394 Annales Vedastini 894, 74.
395 DOdo 50.
396 Cartulaire Brioude, N° 182, 194−195. For the date see Brunterc’h, Naissance, 104−105.
397 DOdo 49.
398 DOdo 37 (11th July 894).
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attempt to gain a foothold in the border region between Aquitaine and Burgundy, 
a contact which could be used to observe the ongoings of both William and Rich-
ard the Justiciar.
Richard the Justiciar, despite belonging to one of the most noble families of 
the realm, the Bosonids,399 brother to Richilde, Charles the Bald’s second wife,400 
and Boso, the emperor’s closest supporter,401 had originally only inherited a few 
possessions in northern Burgundy. However, his birth had brought him close to 
the centres of decision making, knowing the most important people and in turn 
being known by them.402 A first step was his support for the Carolingian cause 
against his brother Boso, for which he was rewarded with the county of Autun 
and probably also the abbey of Saint-Symphorien, over which he appears as ab-
bot in a private charter some years later.403 In 887/888, he further improved his 
political connections by marrying Adelaide, sister of the most powerful man in 
Upper Burgundy, Rudolf, 404 soon to be king of the same region. Up until 893, his 
focus appears indeed to have been on his new brother-in-law’s regnum as well as 
Provence, where his nephew Louis now occupied the throne.405 A judicium held 
at Varennes, judging that the monks of Gigny were to be restored possessions 
they had originally received from King Rudolf, but which had been subsequently 
alienated by a vassal of the queen, shows Richard in the company of Louis’  mother 
Ermengard.406 It seems likely that on this occasion Richard mediated between the 
interests of his brother-in-law, Rudolf, and his sister-in-law, Ermengard.407 Rela-
tions with the latter appear to have been equally good: in her son’s Louis’ corona-
tion charter from Valence, Richard appears as the boy’s guardian.408
Around the same time, Richard seems to have started to construct a network 
of support stretching over northern Burgundy. A number of charters and entries 
show him in the company of local nobles: a donation made by him, probably at a 
local assembly, to the abbey of Saint-Bénigne of Dijon409 was witnessed by Bishop 
Teutbald of Langres, the counts Girbald, Wido and Radulf as well as by Viscount 
399 On the family, see Bouchard, Blood, 74−97.
400 Annales Bertiniani 870, 169. On Richilde, see Hyam, Ermentrude and Richildis, 153−168 and 
Hartmann, Königin, 119−121.
401 On Boso, see among others Airly, Nearly Men and Bautier, Origines.
402 Robbie, Emergence, 29.
403 Recueil Saint-Symphorien N° 3, 13−14, dating to October 885−887. Whether Richard had joined 
the army of Charles the Fat to relieve Paris cannot be determined from the sources.
404 Bouchard, Bosonids, 415.
405 Robbie, Emergence, 36. He (37−38) also assumes that Richard supported the coronation of Wido 
of Spoleto in 888. However, the sources do not mention him and the supporters of Wido in 
Burgundy are much more likely to be identified with his relatives who then followed him to Italy 
(Annales Vedastini 888, 65 and Pokorny, Brieffragment, 620).
406 DProv 28. See Robbie, Emergence, 41, who reads this judgement as “placatory towards Rudolf.”
407 Demotz, Bourgogne, 98.
408 MGH Capit. II, N° 289, 377.
409 Chronicon S. Benigni Divionensis, 113.
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Madelgaud of Oscheret.410 Count Wido also accompanied Richard at Varennes, to-
gether with Count Ragenar, Richard’s nephew and brother of his most important 
supporter, Manasses.411 The latter can also be found together with his wife in an en-
try dating to 890 in the Liber Memorialis of Remiremeont, along with King Louis 
and his mother Ermengard, Richard and his wife Adelaide, as well as William the 
Pious of Aquitaine.412 By early 893, Richard had become the most powerful noble 
in Burgundy, a fact that can be deduced from Flodoard referring to him as princeps 
of Burgundy.413 Up until this point, however, leaving Teutbald aside, Richard’s sup-
port consisted only of laymen—the bishops of the region seem to have preferred 
Odo, who they joined at the synod of Meung-sur-Loire.414
Richard’s big opportunity arose when the party around Fulk rebelled against 
Odo and crowned Charles king. His political connections first paid off just after 
the rebellion when Richard, William and Altmar joined their forces to see what 
could be won from the contesters.415 That they acted together at this moment can 
hardly be surprising. As we have seen, William and Richard already appeared to-
gether in the entry from Remiremont three years earlier. Fulk’s letter to Teutbald, 
asking the bishop to inquire about their intentions,416 points to them forming a un-
ion during the early 890s. The subsequent agreement with Odo brought Richard 
the possession of Saint-Germain of Auxerre.417 This, however, did not put an end 
to his ambitions: in the wake of events in Francia, he now turned to more violent 
means to expand his influence in Burgundy.
The first victim of his new endeavours was Bishop Adalgarius of Autun, Odo’s 
archchancellor and a key royal supporter in the region, who was poisoned and 
replaced by Manasses’  brother Walo, thus ensuring Richard’s control of this see as 
well as the abbey of Flavigny, previously held by Adalgarius.418 Soon after, Teutbald 
of Langres was attacked and blinded by Manasses himself, acting on behalf of 
410 Robbie, Emergence, 38. In the conflict over the episcopal see of Langres, Teutbald seems to have 
been the choice of the locals (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 1, 367−368).
411 DProv  28. On the identification of the Burgundian nobles at Varennes, see Hlawitschka, Lo-
tharingien, 95−96 and Hlawitschka, Textkritisches, 256–257. Robbie, Emergence, 39−40, argues 
against Hlawitschka’s reading. Manasses and Ragenar appear to have been Richard’s nephews 
from an unknown sister. See Hlawitschka, Lotharinigien, 242, n. 4 and Bouchard, Blood, 192–193.
412 Liber Memorialis Remiremont, 4, fol. 3v. and Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 243−9. Manasses later 
also appears in another entry together with his other brother Rampo and Charles the Simple. 
Liber Memorialis Remiremont, 21, fol. 11v. See also Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 147−152.
413 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 395: Rogat etiam sibi remandari de Richardo Burgundionum principe et de 
Aquitanis, quod eum contigerit scire, et cetera.
414 MGH Conc. V, N° 33, 289−292. Present were the bishops Adalgar of Autun, Herfrid of Auxerre 
and Archbishop Walter of Sens. At the same time, the only connection between Odo and Richard 
is DOdo 25, which, according to Bautier (Recueil Eudes, 114−117), is either a forgery or a com-
plete re-edition of later times.
415 See chapter I.2.5.
416 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 395.
417 Sassier, Recherches, 7.
418 MGH Conc. V, N° 38, 314−318 and Series abbatum Flaviniacensium, 502. On the role of Walo, see 
Bouchard, Cartulary, 78.
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Richard, because he had obstructed Walo’s installation as bishop.419 Teutbald died 
soon after, upon which Argrim, who seems to have acknowledged Richard’s dom-
inance, returned to the see.420 Finally, Odo’s cousin Archbishop Walter of Sens was 
imprisoned for nine months by Richard and Manasses, only being released upon 
the king’s intervention and the provision of hostages by the people of Sens.421 It 
is probably at this time that Richard also gained control of the abbey of Sainte-
Colombe of Sens422 and became count of Auxerre423 and Troyes.424 By the end of 
Odo’s reign in 897, Richard had become one of the major players in West Frank-
ish politics, a player who needed to be integrated into the king’s rule if, after the 
years of conflict with Baldwin of Flanders and the alliance around Fulk supporting 
Charles, Odo wanted to restore a stable peace. Odo’s last dated diploma from 21st 
October 897425 indicates that indeed a solution had been found. Richard not only 
obtained a rich grant of fiscal property for one of his fideles, but was also depicted 
as “our beloved and illustrious count”, a combination of epithets that otherwise 
was only used for Robert.426
II.5 Conclusion: Continuities and changes
Thus, the two decades following the death of Charles the Bald were marked 
by continuities and changes in the networks around the successive rulers. The 
reigns of Louis the Stammerer and his sons Louis  III and Carloman  II were 
shaped by a circle of very dominant nobles. The origins of this circle date back 
to the last years of Charles the Bald and formed when Louis attempted to create 
his own bases of support by handing out honores to nobles of his own choice. 
The key actors in this circle are the well-known Hugh the Abbot, Gauzlin, Boso 
of Vienne, Theoderic the Chamberlain, Bernard of Auvergne, Bernard of Go-
thia and Conrad of Paris. Soon, however, this circle began to fall apart due to 
rivalries for influence at court and control of Louis’  sons; the rebellion of Boso 
weakened it further. Moreover, from 879 onwards, Bernard of Auvergne appears 
to have taken a more individual course, more detached from the royal court, 
where he was hardly present. This movement was halted, to some extent, by the 
419 Annales Vedastini 894, 75; Flodoard, HRE IV, 377. See also Pokorny, Brieffragment, 612−613.
420 Duchèsne, Fastes  II, 190−191. Argrim later appears together with Richard and Manasses at 
Charles’ court (DChS 55).
421 Chronicon S. Petri Vivi Senonensis 896, 96; Annales S. Columbae Senonensis 895, 104.
422 Based on the assumption of an existing sincere charter as the basis for the forgery of DOdo 25. 
On memories for Richard at Sens, see Robbie, 20−27.
423 Sassier, Recherches, 7 and 9−10. Later on, Manasses’ other brother Ragenar became viscount of 
Auxerre.
424 Saint-Phalle, Comtes, 155. According to him, Richard took control of Troyes just before his attack 
on Sens. See also Crété-Protin, Église, 307−308.
425 DOdo 42, 180: …illustris dilectusque nobis comes…
426 DOdo 33, 146: …Robertus, dilectus noster frater atque illustris comes et marchio…
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reconciliation of Hugh and Gauzlin after Louis III’s death, a time that also saw 
the addition of Theoderic of Vermandois to the group. Nevertheless, by the time 
of Charles the Fat, the group had narrowed down to only three members, Hugh 
the Abbot, Gauzlin and Theoderic.
Indeed, by the middle of the 880s, the death or breaking away of almost all of 
its members—by 888 only Theoderic was still alive—led to a radical change in 
the political landscape. Even before the deaths of Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin, 
Charles the Fat had shown his will to pursue a novel course by the appointment 
of Ragenold of Maine as commander of the army against the Northmen, a noble 
apparently not belonging to the previously existing inner circle at court. After the 
siege of Paris, Charles used the opportunity created by their and other important 
nobles’  deaths to create his own new network of support by installing men of his 
choice in central positions and tying others to him by handing over honores. These 
were typically not new comers, but had started their ascent, like Geilo of Langres 
and Odo, under Charles’  predecessors. He selected them because they represented 
the ideal choices to create the maximum effect with the least effort: they were 
already tied into the local politics and possessed their own networks and connec-
tions that the emperor could now use as conduits of his royal power without creat-
ing discontent or larger frictions among the West Frankish nobility.
After Charles’  death, Odo’s own claim was opposed by two different groups 
allying themselves against him. On the one hand, we find nobles from Francia 
who had been present at the emperor’s court, although without playing any politi-
cally significant role, notably the new archbishop of Reims, Fulk, Abbot Rodulf of 
Saint-Vaast and Saint-Bertin, as well as the latter’s cousin Count Baldwin of Flan-
ders. The other group consisted of a network of nobles from Burgundy, centred 
on Bishop Geilo, one of the key figures in the late Charles’  network. On the other 
hand, Odo’s own basis of support was an alliance consisting of the last remnants of 
the old group around Hugh and Gauzlin like Theoderic of Vermandois, those in-
stalled and furthered by the emperor in the Paris region as well as relatives and old 
acquaintances from Neustria and Francia. This drifting apart of nobles formerly 
belonging to the inner circle of a ruler’s predecessor is at first sight reminiscent 
of the rivalries breaking out during the reign of Louis the Stammerer. However, 
there appears to have been a crucial difference. Hugh and Gauzlin had known 
each other for a long time at Charles the Bald’s court and learned to cooperate 
with each other. When their position was threatened by Louis the Stammerer, they 
quickly joined with others to form an alliance enforcing their interests. The groups 
opting for Odo and Wido of Spoleto consisted of key actors within Charles the 
Fat’s network of support and therefore were a parallel to the rivalry between Hugh 
and Gauzlin. However, while the emperor’s court was certainly a centre for politi-
cal decisions, due to Charles absence from the Western realm it never became a 
rallying point for the West Frankish nobles. Thus, contacts between nobles from 
the different regions were much more based on a personal level and were certainly 
not as intense as before. The inner cohesion of the circle around Charles the Bald 
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was hence weakened. In addition, the question of succession, open due to the lack 
of a “natural heir,”427 meant there was no common candidate whose favour the 
nobles could seek, thus depriving them of another rallying point.
Odo himself did his best to integrate those nobles originally opposing him into 
his rule. By allowing certain nobles into his inner circle, he used them as a means 
to connect with other members of their families—his first archchancellor, Abbot 
Ebolus, for example, was the brother of Ramnulf II of Poitiers—or to gain access 
to their local networks—as in the case of his third archchancellor Adalgarius of 
Autun. However, by the crisis years of 892/3 at the latest, weight within this circle 
was shifting considerably. After the rebellion of several of its key members, the 
position of Odo’s brother Robert became extremely dominant. Access to the king 
without Robert appears to have been hardly possible—or desired.
Those nobles with less political influence at court than the main actors we have 
treated so far are also interesting. Under Louis the Stammerer and his sons, this 
group consisted mainly of nobles cooperating with the circle around Hugh and 
Gauzlin, most of all Archbishop Frotar of Bourges, the bishops Walter of Orléans 
and Adalgarius of Autun as well as Count Ansgar of Oscheret. However, next to 
them, especially under Louis the Stammerer, we are also able to identify a number 
of nobles whose connection with the inner circle is less apparent. Count Aledram-
nus and Abbot Wulfard of Flavigny were related to the royal family, Bishop Berno 
of Châlons was probably a former member of the royal chancellery. These cases 
demonstrate that, at least on this level, the king also possessed certain liberties to 
shape the circle surrounding him. In particular, kinship opened the door for those 
who also had other connections, as is shown by the case of Count Robert of Troyes 
under Carloman II. This, of course, does not mean that these men formed a coun-
ter-weight against the influence of the key actors. Berno of Châlons, for example, 
seems to have been well connected to them and Wulfard later allied himself with 
them to enter their midst. In many of these cases, to whom they actually owed 
their influence at court is uncertain. If Count Wido, who rose under Carloman II, 
was indeed Count Ansgar’s brother, he would have had a direct link to the group 
around Hugh and might have owed his influence to them as much as to the king.
This group of secondary nobles was more in flux than that of the dominating 
circle. Wido and Robert of Troyes, for example, disappeared again with Carloman, 
as did Count Rudolf with his son Pippin under Charles the Fat. However, there 
is also some consistency within this group: notably, Frotar of Bourges, Aledram-
nus, Ansgar, Berno and also Bishop Geilo of Langres appear time and again— 
undoubtedly because their links to the court depended not only on the king, but 
also on their associations with the group around Hugh and Gauzlin. After the 
death of these two, however, this group also fell apart. Count Ansgar, for example, 
427 Regino, Chronicon 888, 129: Post cuius mortem regna, que eius ditioni paruerant, veluti legitimo 
destituta herede, in partes a sua compage resolvuntur et iam non naturalem dominum prestolantur, 
sed unumquodque de suis visceribus regem sibi creari disponit.
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supported Wido of Spoleto and followed him to Italy where he became marchio 
of Ivrea. Count Wido, to give another example, if it was indeed the same Wido, 
associated himself with Richard the Justiciar soon after.
Finally, continuities and changes can also be found at the lowest level of con-
tact, that is to say, visits of nobles and representatives of ecclesiastical institutions 
whose main interest appears to have been obtaining royal diplomas confirming 
their rights and possessions or to receive donations. Institutions belonging to this 
group include abbeys such as Solignac, Beaulieu, Vézelay and Saint-Maur of Fos-
sés. All of these institutions seem to have had an especially strong bond to the 
royal centre and to the unity of the realm.428 This was undoubtedly also true for 
the visitors from Septimania and the Spanish March, who, due to their location on 
the border region with Muslim Spain, seem to have tried to found their identity on 
tying themselves to a larger political and historical entity, that is to say, the West 
Frankish realm.429 In the individual cases, however, very profound reasons may 
also have been behind their motivation to travel the huge distances to the royal 
court. Often local disputes about landed property and rights arose around new 
foundations in the area430 while the local nobility also tried to gain control over the 
episcopal sees. For example, in the case of Odo’s early diplomas for Septimania, 
the presence of Count Sunifred and Bishop Ermemirus of Girona was the result of 
a conflict between the count and Archbishop Theodard of Narbonne, triggering in 
turn the appearance of the archbishop and his own candidate, Servus Dei.431 The 
Septimanians thus sought the king because they needed a monarch to defend their 
own interests against their rivals.432
While contacts with Septimania were strong, those with Aquitaine appear 
rather limited, focusing only on a small number of bishoprics and abbeys. This 
concurs with the evidence we have from the earlier 9th century. Aquitaine, de-
spite Charlemagne’s efforts to tie it more closely to the crown by installing new 
counts, bishops and abbots, had a strong tradition of independence, undoubtedly 
furthered by the practice of Carolingian kings of making it a sub-kingdom for 
their sons. Diplomas for Aquitanian recipients are thus rather scarce and the con-
tact between the king and the local nobles was ever more attenuated.433 This points 
us towards another case, however. Burgundy, in contrast to Aquitaine, was among 
the regions of the West Frankish realm with the closest ties to the royal centre. Its 
nobles were some of the most influential at court and both churches and abbeys 
frequently received royal diplomas. The reign of Odo, however, marks a distinc-
428 Koziol, Politics, 92−93.
429 Remensnyder, Remembering.
430 Jarrett, Power.
431 Schröder, Synoden, 122−123, 128−138 and 186−189; Bautier, Dissidence and Recueil Eudes, 21–27; 
Koziol, Politics, 93−94.
432 Koziol, Politics, 497.
433 Kienast, Wirkungsbereich and Lauranson-Rosaz, Roi, 414−416. See also Levillain, Recueil Pep-
pin I et Peppin II, Introduction; Collins, Pippin I; Lauranson-Rosaz, Auvergne, 40−58; Martindale, 
Charles; Martindale, Kingdom; Nelson, Charles, 231−232; Gournay, Rouergue, 42−61.
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tive change in these relations. The support Wido of Spoleto enjoyed in the area is 
a sign of the opposition of the local nobility to Odo. The king did his best to open 
channels of communication by bringing nobles with regional connections, such as 
Anskeric and Adalgarius, into his inner circle. Here, however, the Robertian had 
to compete with other men who tried to tie the local nobility to themselves. Wido 
of Spoleto, of course, was the first; yet more significant was Richard the Justiciar, 
who built up his own network of support around 890 and started to expand his 
influence by violent means in 893, thus installing himself as an intermediate layer 
between himself and the royal centre, a development that we will further explore 
in the following chapter.

III. Networks of royal power: Charles the Simple
After his “restoration” as king (as his diplomas put it1), Charles was confronted 
with the effects of the struggle for the crown. According to the Annales Vedastini, 
Odo, when he felt his death approaching, called upon the nobles of the realm to 
serve Charles loyally.2 Odo’s efforts to ease the transition of the crown from him-
self to the young Carolingian indicate that he was far from certain about how his 
newly established order would hold up against the shifts within the noble hierarchy 
brought about by Charles’ succession. Odo’s reign had been marked by the rivalry 
of the nobles who had supported his own coronation with the group around Arch-
bishop Fulk. While Odo attempted to integrate these men into his rule after their 
rebellion, Charles’ succession opened another window of opportunity for them to 
renew their rivalry and increase their influence in royal politics in West Francia. 
Even more, over the past years, Richard the Justiciar had risen in Burgundy, equal-
ling William the Pious in Aquitaine in power. Their integration into the rule would 
be another difficult task for Charles. This leads to the first of the questions to be 
addressed in this chapter. How did Richard’s new position affect Charles’ rule in 
Burgundy? Or, more precisely, how did it affect Charles’ contacts to the nobles 
of the region and his own movements? In a wider context looking for answers to 
these questions means to analyse Charles’ itinerary as well as his diplomatic activ-
ity in terms of temporal and spatial distribution. The second set of questions deals 
with the problem of how Charles managed to integrate both his old supporters and 
Robert (as well as Richard and William) into his rule. Or to put it another way, this 
means addressing both Charles’ own understanding of kingship and the impor-
tance he attributed to his Carolingian heritage as well as his ability to manipulate 
the noble networks around him. His rule lasting 25 years already indicates a re-
markable capacity to deal with these problems and his ability to adapt to changes 
brought about by the deaths of key figures within the network, the necessity of in-
tegrating new nobles such as after the acquisition of Lotharingia or by shifts under 
the surface caused by changes of the relations between  individual nobles.
III.1 General overview
A total of 120 diplomas are preserved from Charles the Simple’s reign, 27 as origi-
nals, 81 in copies and another 13 as deperdita.3 These numbers, although at first 
1 From 8th February 898 (DChS 10) onwards, almost all of Charles’ diplomas date not only after his 
regnal years (anno … regnante), but also of those of his reinstatement to power (redintegrante). See 
also Wolfram, Herrschertitel, 71−72.
2 Annales Vedastini 897, 79: Qui dum languor per dies singulos incresceret, onmibus rogare coepit, ut 
Karolo servarent fidem.
3 For an overview of Charles the Simple’s diplomas (and changes compared to Lauer’s edition), see 
Lößlein, Urkunden.
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glance impressive, are of course problematic in several ways. First, they repre-
sent only a fraction of those which were issued originally.4 Furthermore, quite a 
number of these diplomas lack dating formulae, making it impossible to allocate 
them to a specific moment or place. In other cases, the charters have been interpo-
lated or even rewritten, meaning that they have to be read with even greater care 
than usual. Also, this ostensibly impressive number of diplomas appears much 
less so when averaged over the entire reign. Out of the 120, 116 can be attributed 
to the years 898−922, averaging 4.6 diplomas per year. In comparison, 36 diplo-
mas5 of Louis the Stammerer are preserved, averaging 24 diplomas per year, 44 
of  Carloman II6, resulting in an average of 7.8 and finally 50 in total of Odo or 5 
 diplomas per year. Louis’  reign, of course, is exceptional due to its shortness, but 
the reigns of Carloman and Odo show that the average number of diplomas per 
year diminished over the last two decades of the 9th century.7 However, the aver-
age is perhaps as misleading as the overall total number of diplomas since neither 
number reflects the fact that there were concentrations of diplomas at certain mo-
ments or periods of time. As can be seen in the chart, there are high concentrations 
of diplomas during Charles’  reign, most notable during the first three years of his 
rule, from the end of 911 to 912, from 917 to 919 and finally during 921 and 922. 
4 See chapter II, introductory remarks.
5 We omit DDLS 1, 2, 3 and 24 from our count, since the first two were issued under the reign of 
Charles the Bald, the third is actually Louis’ promissio and the fourth the treaty of Fouron. 
6 Omitting DDCmII 64, 67 and 75, Carloman’s renewed promissio and two capitularies while adding 
a diploma unknown to the editor. See Baudot, Abbaye.
7 This trend was continued under Charles’ successors. Kienast, Wirkungsbereich, 546−547 and 552.
Figure 1: Number of diplomas per year issued by Charles, CC BY 4.0.
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Most of these concentrations seem, at first glance, to be linked to certain events: 
to Charles’  accession to the throne in 898, to the acquisition of Lotharingia in late 
911 and to the conflicts with Count Gislebert and the rebellions of the nobles from 
the West from 919 to 922. However, at second glance, these links are less clear. For 
example, during the first two years only five diplomas were issued for beneficiaries 
in Francia8 while thirteen went to Septimania and the Spanish March.9 Only in 
900 can a significant rise in recipients from the North be noted10. We will return to 
this observation later; for the moment, it is worth keeping in mind that, like Odo 
ten years earlier,11 interest in Charles as king was actually rather limited during the 
first year of his reign and that contacts with nobles in Francia only intensified after 
two years had already passed.12 At the end of his reign, Charles’  diplomatic activity 
was already visibly rising in 917 and 918 although the conflict with Gislebert only 
started in 919. A closer look at the beneficiaries in these cases reveals the issue: 
out of the thirteen diplomas issued during these years, six are closely linked to the 
passing of Queen Frederuna, confirming her donations or establishing memo-
rial services for her and Charles.13 Frederuna is also the cause for a sudden spike 
of diplomatic activity in 907, the year of their marriage, with two royal charters 
 being closely linked to the event.14 Again, we will return to these diplomas at a 
later point.
Periods of low diplomatic activity can be distinguished from these high con-
centrations, especially the years from 902 until the end of 911 (with the exception 
of 907) and from 913 to 916. By comparing these two periods, we can mark a rise 
in the average number of diplomas issued per year. For the first period this gives us 
an average of 2,15 for the second of 3.3,16 an increase that can be attributed to the ac-
quisition of Lotharingia which provided Charles with a greater base of support for 
his own network and increased the demand for royal charters. And, indeed, six of 
the diplomas issued during these years went to Lotharingian recipients while the 
rest went to those from the Western realm, thus giving a new average for the latter 
of 1.8 diplomas per year. While the acquisition of the regnum Hlotharii therefore 
 8 DDChS 2, 10, 11, 16 and 18.
 9 DDChS 6, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and D’Abadal, Catalunya II,2 375−377. D’Abadal 
dates the deperdita identified by him to 898/899 or after 911. The years 898/899 appear to be most 
probable, likely as part of the diplomas issued at Tours-sur-Marne.
10 Compared to three in both 898 and 899 (DDChS 2, 10, 11, 16, 18 and 21, the last one going to 
Aqui taine), we can now note at least eight diplomas for the North (DDChS 28−35, possibly also 
DChS 8, issued after 900). 
11 Odo’s earliest datable diploma only dates to 13th June 889, so about 18 months after he had taken 
the crown. 
12 Charter reception as a sign of acceptance of the royal sovereignty has been suggested by Mersi-
owsky, Reappraisal.
13 DDChS 87, 90, 91, 93, 95 and 96.
14 DDChS 56 and 57.
15 From 902 to the end of 911 (without 907), 18 diplomas have been preserved. This does not include 
DDChS 67 and 68, which were issued in December 911 and mark the acquisiton of Lotharingia.
16 From 913 to 916 thirteen diplomas were issued.
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had an impact on the overall activity, relations with the West apparently suffered 
only very little.
III.1.1 Charles’ itinerary
The same problem of having a very limited number of diplomas in comparison 
to the length of the reign also makes it impossible for us to establish a proper 
royal itinerary.17 Due to the lack of narrative sources for most of Charles’  rule, 
there are necessarily large gaps in our knowledge about the whereabouts of the 
king at certain moments. This problem is increased by the fact that a number of 
diplomas, as already mentioned, cannot be dated properly or lack a mention of 
the place of their issuance; furthermore, there are also those cases where the name 
of the place given in the diploma could not be attributed to a modern location. 
While a study of the details of Charles’  itinerary therefore becomes impossible, 
we can, nevertheless, take a look at the general picture. As before, it is worthwhile 
distinguishing between the periods before and after the acquisition of Lotharingia. 
From Charles’  diplomas, we can see that he remained almost exclusively within 
the region between Seine, Loire and Lotharingia. There were, however, some ex-
ceptions: a visit to Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire brought Charles to the southern borders 
of Robert’s power base in Neustria18 and two others to Troyes and to Melay close 
to Richard’s in Burgundy.19 Within Francia, the most important palace is Com-
piègne, where we can make note of no less than nine stays.20 This is hardly surpris-
ing since Compiègne had become the most symbolically loaded royal centre in the 
Western realm, expanded by Charles the Bald and furnished with a chapel shaped 
after the one Charlemagne had constructed at Aachen.21 Next to Compiègne, the 
palaces of Verbery, Ponthion, Attigny and Corbeny as well as the castrum of Laon 
appear on Charles itinerary.22
17 On these problems, see also Brühl, Fodrum, I, 220−222 and 231; Bautier, Itinéraires, 99–100. 
 McKitterick, Charlemagne, 188–197, has questioned the possibility of reconstructing the royal itiner-
ary from diplomas. Based on a new evaluation of the dates and places given by Charlemagne’s 
diplomas and by comparing them to those indicated by the narrative sources, she claimed that in 
some cases the Carolingian could not have been present in person when his diplomas were issued. 
This conclusion would have far reaching consequences for the research on the royal chancery and 
on royal itineraries. However, McKitterick’s analysis has been rejected by Kölzer, System, who 
demonstrated, by newly scrutinising her evidence, that Charlemagne could indeed always have 
been present when his diplomas were delivered.
18 DDChS 34–35.
19 DDChS 38 and 47.
20 DDChS 11, 31, 42, 45, 49, 50, 55, 61 and 60. 
21 On the importance of Compiègne, see Schneidmüller, Tradition, 101–105; Airlie, Palace and Koziol, 
Politics, 541−548.
22 In total nine stays. DDChS 30 and 32−33 (Verbery), 29 and 48 (Ponthion), 56 (Attigny), 53 (Cor-
beny) as well as 51, 54 and 60 (Laon). On the dominance of palaces within Charles’ itinerary, see 
also Brühl, Fodrum, I, 48−53.
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Charles can also be seen to have stayed in other important places, particularly 
Saint-Denis, Reims and Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire23 while the remaining stays were 
in different villae.
After the acquisition of Lotharingia the situation in the West remains un-
changed. Charles’  activities again appear to have been limited almost exclusively 
to Francia itself, apart from one exception in 914, when he issued three diplomas 
23 DDChS 10 (Saint-Denis), 18 (Reims) and 34−35 (Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire).
Figure 2: Charles’ itinerary based on places of issuance of royal diplomas (898–end of 911). 
(© Fabien Cerbelaud)
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near Le Mans.24 What is new is the extension of his activities east of the Meuse, 
where they cover most of his new realm. This second half of Charles reign saw a 
diminishing role of Compiègne in favour of other palaces, especially Attigny and 
Herstal.25 Within Lotharingia, Charles also made use of a number of other pal-
aces, for example Thionville and Gondreville, but also—and more important in 
symbolic terms—Aachen and Nimwegen.26 Both in the West and in Lotharingia, 
a number of cities and important monasteries were visited as well, Laon and Metz 
most of all, but also Soissons, Reims, Noyon, Toul and Saint-Denis27.
Charles’  frequent stays at the old Carolingian palaces tie in well with the 
 practices of his predecessors. Compiègne, of course, had been dominant since the 
times of Charles the Bald. Louis the Stammerer and Odo were both crowned and 
anointed there,28 Louis  III celebrated Easter and Christmas at the palace twice 
during his short reign,29 Carloman II made it his sedes regni once he took over the 
North30 and all four of them issued various diplomas there.31 Next to  Compiègne, 
numerous other palaces were also in use,32 amongst them Quierzy,33 Gondreville34 
and Verbery.35 The differences from Charles’  reign, however, can easily be tracked 
by studying the global picture of his predecessors’  diplomas. Louis the Stammerer 
started his short reign at Compiègne and in Francia, then moved via Paris to 
Tours from where he joined the pope at Troyes before finally directing himself to 
24 DDChS 77−79. The first two of these diplomas, DDChS 77 and 78 (19th June 914), were issued in 
villa Ruio. Lauer proposes that this might have been a mistake made when the copies of the origi-
nal diploma were produced, meaning that in fact the diploma did not read Ruio but Rivo which 
he identified with Rupt in the departement Haute-Marne (Recueil Charles III, 172, n. 1 and 174, 
n. 1). The third diploma (21st June 914), was issued in a villa Collega, identified by Lauer as Collège, 
departement Sarthe, commune de Sablé (Recueil Charles III, 176 and 321). Unfortunately, Lauer 
did not reveal his reasons for this identification. My own efforts to confirm the identity of the 
villa Collega with Collège (Sarthe) with the help of the various Dictionnaires Géographiques have 
revealed the existence of quite a number of places called Collège in the entire North of modern 
France, yet none show any connection to a villa Collega (nor the existence of a villa Ruio). Given 
that all three diplomas were issued within three days, the villa Ruio and the villa Collega must have 
been in close vicinity to each other (on average, the king and his entourage travelled 20–35 km a 
day, Reinke, Reisegeschwindigkeit), which would render the identification of Rupt as villa Ruio/
Rivo impossible if we put faith in Lauer’s identification of Collège (Sarthe). Doing so would mean 
that in June 914 Charles left Francia for a journey to the very west of his realm.
25 We can note five stays at Attigny (DDChS 76, 86, 89, 93 and 110), four at Herstal (DDChS 84, 85, 
100−101 and 106) and four at Compiègne (DDChS 80, 92, 108−109 and 122). 
26 DDChS  74, 83 and 103 (Thionville), 82 (Gondreville), 90−91 and 127 (Aachen) as well as 87 
(Nimwegen).
27 DDChS 95, 98 and 111 (Laon), 69, 73 and 81 (Metz), 99 and 105 (Soissons), 87−88 (Reims), 112 
(Noyon), 70 (Toul) as well as 97 (Saint-Denis).
28 Annales Bertiniani 877, 220; Annales Vedastini 888, 64.
29 Annales Bertiniani 880, 242 and 882, 245; Annales Vedastini 880, 49.
30 Bautier, Itinéraires, 103−104.
31 DDLS 3−5 and 31, DLIII 43, DDCmII 66−67, 72−73 and 76, DOdo 14.
32 For a detailed study, see Bautier, Itinéraires. 
33 E.g. DCmII 64.
34 DLS 29.
35 Baudot, Abbaye; DCmII 78, DOdo 20.
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 Lotharingia and back to Francia.36 Carloman II spent the first half of his reign in 
Burgundy and the Aquitanian borders, campaigning against the rebellious Boso. 
Once his brother died and he had joined the nobles in the North, he stayed in 
Francia to fight the Northmen.37 Odo’s diplomas reveal him remaining mostly 
36 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, XXIV–XXXI.
37 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, L−LVI. Only three diplomas were issued by 
Louis III (and only one, DLIII 43, of them mentions date and place), rendering the reconstruction 
of his itinerary based on his diplomas impossible.
Figure 3: Charles’ itinerary based on places of issuance of royal diplomas (end of 911–923). 
(© Fabien Cerbelaud)
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within his Neustrian possessions, at Orléans,38 Tours,39 Paris40 and Chartres41 as 
well as in villae along the Loire.42 As becomes clear from these brief summaries, 
certain shifts took place between the death of Charles the Bald and the time of 
Charles the Simple. While Louis the Stammerer still travelled over large parts of 
the realm, Francia, Neustria and Burgundy, Neustria became excluded under his 
son Carloman II. Odo, of course, is an anomaly in this process. Due to his own 
power base being in Neustria, under him, Francia became less visited than be-
fore. Burgundy saw fewer and fewer royal visits after Carloman had moved to 
the North. Odo himself only came to the region in pursuit of Charles43 while the 
latter, once he became the sole king of the Western realm, did not travel further 
south than Troyes and Melay. The regions south of the Loire hardly saw any visits 
at all, leaving aside Odo’s military campaigns in 889 and 892.44 From the death of 
Charles the Bald onwards, the royal movements were therefore more and more 
limited to Francia and only the acquisition of Lotharingia brought a change to this 
picture.
III.1.2 Contacts with distant regions
The limitation of the royal movements to a certain region, however, does not au-
tomatically point towards a loss of contact with the nobles from other parts of the 
realm. As we have seen in the previous chapter, contacts with nobles from the vari-
ous regions remained on a constant level up until the second half of Odo’s reign, 
when contacts with Burgundy in particular, which up until that point had been 
very strong, started to cease. At first glance, this process did not continue under 
Charles, with a number of diplomas going to Saint-Martin of Autun, Saint-Ger-
main of Auxerre, Saint-Clément of Auxerre, Saint-Bénigne of Dijon, the churches 
of Autun, Auxerre and Langres as well as to Richard’s right-hand man Manasses 
during the first half of his reign45 while after the acquisition of Lotharingia other 
diplomas went to Richard’s son Hugh the Black46 and to Saint-Philibert of Tour-
nus.47 At second glance, however, this image changes: with one or possibly two 
38 DDOdo 1−9, 17, 23−24 and 41.
39 DDOdo 19 and 39.
40 DDOdo 10−13, 34, 35 and 36.
41 DOdo 16.
42 Meung-sur-Loire, DDOdo 22 and 27−28; Cosne-sur-Loire, DOdo 30. See also, Bautier, Recueil 
Eudes, CLIV−CLVII and Bautier, Itinéraires, 105.
43 Annales Vedastini 894, 75; DOdo 38.
44 Kienast, Wirkungsbereich, 531−539.
45 DDChS  32 and 59 (Saint-Martin of Autun), 38 (Saint-Germain of Auxerre), 3 (Saint-Clement 
of Auxerre), 8 (Saint-Bénigne of Dijon), 33 (Autun), 31 and 42 (Auxerre), 55 (Langres) and 43 
(Manasses).
46 DChS 79.
47 DChS 82.
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exceptions,48 all the diplomas going to Burgundy were issued at the request of 
Richard himself or for members of his family. From the mid-890s onwards, Rich-
ard hence acted as an intermediary between the king and the local Burgundian no-
bility, taking over control of the access to the royal court. This process can be best 
studied using the Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium. Bishop Herfrid of Auxerre, 
who appears three times in Charles’  diplomas and is indeed the only noble to re-
quest royal diplomas for a Burgundian institution without Richard’s intervention, 
had been installed by Charles the Fat.49 In 910, his successor Geran, belonging to a 
family based in Soissons, was the choice of Richard and his partisans,50 even if they 
still sought Charles’  approval. Geran was followed by men originating not only 
from the area, but also coming from Richard’s own abbeys, Sainte-Colombe and 
Saint-Germain of Auxerre. In their cases, the Gesta make no more mention of the 
king, while the marchio’s role is increasingly emphasised.51 But Richard’s growing 
power in the area was not only reflected in how bishops were chosen. Both Herfrid 
and Geran did their best to regain control over estranged possessions. Whereas 
the former did so by requesting diplomas from the king and bulls from the pope 
without any mention of Richard,52 the latter only acted on the explicit permission 
of the magnate when he went to see Charles.53
Contacts with Neustria had, as far as we can tell, been rather limited since the 
death of Charles the Bald, the main recipients being the Saint-Martin of Tours,54 
Saint-Aignan of Orléans55 and the respective cathedral churches of both Tours56 
and Orléans.57 This practice also continued under Charles the Simple, with one 
important change. As Richard channelled contact with nobles from Burgundy, in 
Neustria contact between the king and local elites appears to have been controlled 
by Robert. This was certainly not entirely new, since Hugh the Abbot had inter-
vened frequently in the royal diplomas of Louis the Stammerer and Carloman II 
48 DChS 42. Possibly also DChS 3, which is only mentioned by the Gesta Pontificum Autissiodoren­
sium I, 173, as being issued per deprecationem Hermenberti. If Richard was indeed not involved in 
this second case, it would tie in well with DChS 42, which was also issued solely at the request of 
Bishop Herfrid.
49 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 169−171.
50 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 185. The election of Geran was pressed forward by Ragenar, 
viscount of Auxerre and Manasses’ brother.
51 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 201−205 and 209. According to the Gesta, Geran’s succes-
sor Betto had become abbot of Sainte-Colombe of Auxerre with Richard’s consent before becom-
ing bishop at the marchio ’s intervention. He was succeeded by Gualdricus, a member of a noble 
family from Auxerre, who had been monk at Saint-Germain of Auxerre. The Gesta note that he 
uoluntate atque licentia precellentissimi domni Richardi principis ab uniuerso clero et populo futurus 
appetitur et adclamatur episcopus.
52 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 173. See also DChS 3.
53 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 199−201. 
54 DDLS 12, 14 and 15; DCmII 87, DDChF 139, 160 and 161; DDOdo 9 and 41.
55 DChF 143.
56 DLS 39 and DChF 146.
57 DLS 40; DDCmII 53, 70 and 71; DOdo 30BIS.
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on behalf of ecclesiastical institutions along the Loire.58 The diplomas of Charles 
the Fat for these abbeys and churches were all intervened for by Odo, although the 
emperor’s charter for the church of Tours was also petitioned by its archbishop, 
Adalard.59 The next step in this development then becomes evident under Charles 
the Simple, with direct contact between the king and the local elites ceasing 
completely. There are, of course, numerous charters for Saint-Martin and Saint-
Aignan, yet all of them were issued at the request of Robert, the only possible ex-
ception being one diploma for Saint-Serge of Angers under Abbot Raino, which is 
only preserved as deperditum, neither mentioning Robert nor Raino.60 The same 
applies for Charles’  only known diploma for a cathedral church along the Loire, 
Saint-Maurice of Tours, which mentions Robert but not the archbishop—again, 
bear in mind that the diploma is lost and only referred to in a diploma issued by 
Louis VII in 1157 or 1158.61 The marchio, on the other hand, as becomes evident 
from his private charters, maintained close relations with the local bishops from 
Orléans, Nantes, Angers and, most of all, Tours.62 Close contact with Robert in-
stead of the king, however, was not was not only held by the local bishops, but 
also by the viscounts of the Robertian counties along the Loire: Atto, Guarnegaud, 
Fulk, Rainald and later Theobald frequently appear witnessing Robert’s charters.63 
Neustria, or at least the counties and bishoprics along the Loire, seem to have been 
entirely under Robert’s control. Yet, there is one important exception: a diploma 
for Saint-Évroult in today’s western Normandy figures Count Hugh of Maine.64 
Given the earlier conflict between Odo and Robert on the one side and Roger, 
Hugh’s father, on the other,65 this is hardly surprising. We will return to this di-
ploma later on, for now however, it is worth noting that, during the early years of 
Charles’  reign, not all of Neustria was under Robert’s direct control. After 911, this 
image changes. Next to bishops and viscounts, counts from the region begin to 
58 DLS 15 (for Saint-Martin of Tours), DDCmII 87 (for Saint-Martin), 70 and 71 (for the church of 
Orléans). 
59 DDChF 139, 160 and 161 (Saint-Martin of Tours), 143 (Saint-Aignan of Orléans) and 146 (church of 
Tours).
60 DDChS 46, 49, 98 and 101 for Saint-Martin of Tours (DChS 63 for Saint-Martin is a forgery, see 
Noizet, Pratique, 100−110). DDChS 77 and 78 for Saint-Aignan of Orléans. DChS 4 for Saint-Serge 
of Angers is a deperditum—only the confirmation of a donation made by a certain Adalberge by 
Charles is noted.
61 DChS 9. Lauer, Recueil Charles III, 13.
62 DDRoI  40 (Ebernus of Tours), 42 (Ebernus of Tours, Raino of Angers, Fulcher of Nantes and 
Berno of Orléans), 43 (Ebernus of Tours), 47 (Ebernus of Tours, Anselm of Orléans and Isaias of 
Nantes) and charter from 31st March 914, Werner, Untersuchungen I, 286−289 (Anselm of Orlé-
ans). On the very problematic DRoI 47, see Leveque, Actes, Dufour’s comment and Guyotjeannin, 
Notice, 680–686, the last two arguing in favour of the charter’s sincerity.
63 DDRoI 41 (Atto, Guarnegaud and Fulk), 42 (Atto, Guarnegaud, Fulk and Rainald), 47 (Fulk), 48A 
(Fulk and Tetbald) and charter from 31st March 914, Werner, Untersuchungen I, 286−289 (Fulk).
64 DChS 35.
65 See chapter I.3.
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appear in Robert’s charters, among them Hugh of Maine,66 indicating that Robert 
had found even broader support by then. Hence, Neustrian cooperation with the 
king increasingly depended solely on a good understanding with the powerful 
marchio of the Loire counties.
Contacts with Aquitaine, as we have already seen, had always been limited 
and now became even more so with all of the earlier reliable contacts ceasing 
completely. The Archbishop of Bourges cannot be found at Charles’  court,67 nor 
did the abbeys of Solignac, Beaulieu or Poitiers receive any royal charters. Two 
of Charles’  diplomas indicate the presence of Aquitaine’s most powerful noble, 
 William the Pious, the son of Bernard of Auvergne, at court.68 The first one went to 
Count Gerald of Aurillac’s newly founded abbey in the same town, with William 
serving as ambasciator.69 Probably around the same time, according to the Vita 
Geraldi, William had, without success, tried to persuade Gerald to abandon royal 
service and to commend himself to him instead.70 This episode apparently did not 
affect relations between the two since Gerald continued to support William on 
various occasions.71 The other diploma sees William acting together with Robert 
of Neustria, restoring estranged property in the Limousin to the latter’s abbey of 
Saint-Denis,72 thus casting some light on the connection between two of the most 
powerful nobles of the realm but not providing us with any further insight into 
relations between Charles and the Aquitainian elite. Interesting in this context, 
however, is a lost diploma for the abbey of Conques, which supposedly confirmed 
the abbey’s property at the request of its abbot Rodulf.73 Abbot Rodulf also appears 
in the Vita Geraldi as being connected with Gerald, acting as his intermediary in a 
conflict with Count Raymond.74 Furthermore, another diploma was issued in 919 
at the request of Count Seguin of Nevers.75 Seguin’s predecessor, Rather, seems to 
have wavered between William the Pious and Richard the Justiciar76 while Seguin 
himself can be seen in contact with William’s nephew and successor, William the 
66 DDRoI 47 (Gauzlin, Heriveus and Gauzbert; Gauzlin and Gauzbert may have been sons of the 
Rorgonide Gausfred, Dhondt, Études, 318 and 322), 48A (Herbert and Gauzlin) and charter from 
31st March 914, Werner, Untersuchungen I, 286−289 (Hugh of Maine).
67 He did, however, have contact with Robert. Charter from 31st March 914, Werner, Untersuchungen 
I, 286−289, witnessed by Archbishop Geruntius of Bourges.
68 A third, often meant to figure William the Pious (e.g. Stieldorf, Marken, 214), DChS 102, is a for-
gery. See the Lößlein, Diplôme.
69 DChS 21.
70 Vita Sancti Geraldi Auriliacensis I, c. 32, 180.
71 Vita Sancti Geraldi Auriliacensis I, c. 32, 180 and I, c. 33, 180.
72 DChS 50.
73 DChS 44.
74 Vita Sancti Geraldi Auriliacensis II, c. 28, 234.
75 DChS 99 (30th September 919). The diploma grants property belonging to the count to a certain 
fidelis, Eptino, and his wife.
76 Chaume, Origines, 367, n. 3 and 402, n. 1. This is disputed by Charrier, Histoire, 56, who believes 
Nevers to have been under the control of William the Pious up until 918, when he was succeeded 
by Seguin, although he does not cite any sources.
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Younger: together they witnessed a charter for Cluny.77 Charles’  contacts with 
Aquitaine therefore appear to have been dominated by a circle mostly in close 
contact with the Williamides. There is one notable exception however. A diploma 
dating to 90978 figures one of William’s opponents at court—Raymond, at that 
point still count of Nîmes and Albi, but later succeeding his father as count of 
Toulouse.79 The Tolosan family was one of the Williamide’s major opponents in 
southern Aquitaine, gaining supremacy over Septimania after William the Pious’ 
death.80 Hence contacts with Aquitaine were, as before, tenuous and as far as the 
few diplomas we have tell us, limited to two factions, the circle around William the 
Pious and the Tolosan counts.
Septimania itself, apparently the target of these two factions, constitutes a com-
plete contrast to Aquitaine, having, despite its distance from the royal court, one 
of the highest densities in diplomas over the two halves of Charles’  reign. Septima-
nian elites had, as we have seen, a very particular interest in obtaining royal char-
ters. The number of diplomas issued for nobles from the region is therefore hardly 
surprising, yet worth a couple of further thoughts. As in the preceding reigns, 
we find the churches of Narbonne81 and Girona82 among the recipients. Besides 
these institutions, a number of abbeys from the region also appeared repeatedly 
before the kings: Saint-Polycarpe, for example, received charters from Carloman 
and Odo;83 Notre-Dame of La Grasse and Santa-Maria of Amer from Odo and 
Charles the Simple;84 while San-Esteban of Bagnolas was granted diplomas from 
Louis the Stammerer and Charles.85 For others, their contact with the king appears 
to have dated back much further. Caunes, represented by its abbot Hilderic, and 
Saint-Chinian under Abbot Bera had last seen royal charters under Charles the 
Bald;86 Elne under Emperor Lothar.87
77 Recueil Cluny I, N° 275, 270−271. The charter does not indicate when it was issued. Since it con-
tains the phrase pro remedio scilicet animę Wilgelmi senioris nostri defuncti, necnon et pro salute 
ipsius nepotis comitis seniorisque nostri domni Wilgelmi… it was issued after the death of William 
the Pious but during the lifetime of William the Younger, hence between 6th July 918 and 12th De-
cember 926. While Bruel proposes the year 926, Chaume dates the charter to around 920. Neither, 
however, give any further reasons.
78 DChS 61.
79 Lot, Fidèles, 116−120. See also Débax, Stratégies, 137.
80 Lewis, Development, 182−186; Dunbabin, France, 59−60; Caille, Vicomtes, 50–51.
81 DDChS 14, 23, 24 and 119. It is also worth pointing out a letter from Archbishop Agio of Narbonne 
to the bishops Agambert and Elefons, in which, having heard of their journey to the royal court, 
he asks them to obtain a diploma from the king on his behalf (HGL V, N° 47, col. 145). Elefons also 
appears in DChS 102, a forgery (see Lößlein, Diplôme), while Agambert also signs the proceedings 
of the synod of Attilian in 902 (Schröder, Synoden, N° 19, 160). The sees of both of these bishops 
are unknown.
82 DDChS 19 and 120.
83 DCmII 52 and DOdo 7.
84 DOdo 18 and DDChS 20 and 60 for La Grasse and DOdo 23 and DChS 116 for Santa-Maria of 
Amer.
85 DLS 23 and DChS 85.
86 DDChB 44 (Saint-Chinian) and 456 (Caunes).
87 DDChS 15 and 26.
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The large number of diplomas issued for recipients from Septimania can be ex-
plained in part by the interests of the local elites demanding them. Saint-Polycarpe 
and San-Esteban of Bagnoles, for example, were in a long-term conflict over some 
property originally given to the latter, but claimed by the former.88 In the case of 
San-Juan-de-las-Abadesas, Abbess Emma seems to have feared that after the death 
of her father Wifred, who had founded the abbey, her brother Sunyer might try to 
estrange its property. Charles’  diploma was only one of several measures she took 
to protect her abbey’s property.89 However, while these local interests certainly can 
serve to explain the individual diplomas, they fall short when it comes to explain-
ing certain other anomalies. With some exceptions,90 all of these diplomas were 
issued in 898, 899 and 922. The ones from 898 reflect Septimanian elites paying 
homage to the new king and obtaining royal charters in return, similar to what 
happened during the reigns of Louis the Stammerer, Carloman II and Odo. In the 
first diploma in June 898, a certain Theodosius received parts of the fisc, comital 
rights and immunity in parts of the counties of Narbonne, Roussillon and Bésa-
lu.91 In November, two more diplomas were issued, this time for the churches of 
Narbonne and Elne, with a confirmation of goods in the former case and generous 
grants in the latter.92 Both churches were represented by envoys, as the respective 
(arch-)bishops had not appeared in person.
In both 899 and 922, however, the diplomas for the distant South were issued 
over a short period of time, about a fortnight in the first case and a week in the sec-
ond.93 Even more remarkable is that, on both occasions, the charters were given in 
the same place, a villa which had originally belonged to the royal fisc but had been 
given to the church of Tours by Louis the Stammerer,94 situated south of Reims, 
the modern Tours-sur-Marne. The second occasion, in particular, raises ques-
tions. From 919 onwards, Flodoard’s annals give us a detailed account of events in 
Western Francia, allowing us to track the king’s movements through his realms. In 
June 922, Charles’  reign was in crisis. The king was fighting both Count Gislebert 
and the Western nobles who had rebelled against him. Both sides gathered their 
forces on the Marne and were encamped some distance from each other. Flodoard 
then notes that Charles attacked Reims at Pentecost,95 in 922 corresponding to 
the 9th of June. In the midst of a military campaign that would prove decisive for 
his reign, the king then decided to issue a remarkable number of diplomas at the 
88 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 34−36.
89 Jarrett, Power. On the family, see also D’Abadal, Comtes; Lewis, Development, 109−110 and 143−152 
and Vones-Liebenstein, Katalonien, 491−501.
90 DDChS 60 (La Grasse, dating to 908) and 85 (Bagnoles, dating to 916).
91 DChS 13.
92 DDChS 14 and 15. On the interpolations of DChS 14, see Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 106−111 and Chas-
tang, Lire, Chapter II. After removing the interpolated parts, only the confirmation of a donation 
made by Louis the Stammerer remains.
93 DDChS 19−27 (29th May−14th June 899) and 115–120 (31st May−7th June 922).
94 Barbier, Palatium, 546. DLS 39.
95 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9.
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very place where he had already done so for recipients from the same area 23 years 
earlier. Why would he do such a thing?
By studying the diplomas issued on both occasions more closely, some further 
issues attract attention, especially concerning the diplomas for the churches of 
Elne and Narbonne. The two diplomas for Elne96 and three of those issued for Nar-
bonne97 seem to form a particular group, which in the case of Narbonne also in-
cludes diplomas from Carloman II and Odo.98 With the exception of Odo’s charter, 
all the others appear to have been heavily interpolated when they were transcribed 
into the cartulary of the church of Narbonne during the archiepiscopacies of Wi-
fred of Cerdagne (1019−1079) and Berengar of Narbonne (1156−1162), rendering 
them highly suspicious.99 All five of these diplomas, however, share a common 
phrasing, complaining about “the poverty of [the archbishop’s] bishopric, since 
both his own see and nearly all the churches of his diocese are ruined, to the point 
that he can never restore them by himself.”100 While this may indeed have been the 
case when Carloman II used the formula for the first time,101 by the late 890s, this 
period of impoverishment had ended long ago. As the Vita Sancti Theodardi notes, 
the archbishop requesting the charter from Carloman had managed to rebuild the 
cathedral only a few years later, with the construction work probably beginning 
in 885 or 886.102 At least in the case of Narbonne, by Charles the Simple’s time, 
the formula was most probably unfounded. The use of the formula therefore must 
 96 DDChS 15 and 26.
 97 DDChS 14, 23 and 119.
 98 DCmII 54 and DOdo 24.
 99 See Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 106–110, criticised by Tessier, Recueil Louis II, 131. The cartulary has 
been studied extensively by Chastang, Lire, who confirmed and refined Bautier’s position (Chas-
tang, Lire, 239−267). Setting aside the interpolations, Charles’ diplomas appear to have been 
mere confirmations of Carloman’s. Against this reading, Koziol, Politics, 494−495, pointing out 
that the identical framing formulae of the diplomas is not ground for suspicion. Since the for-
mula in question (see next note) is also to be found in two other diplomas for the church of Elne, 
issued at the same time but not part of the same cartulary, we can indeed accept these formulae to 
be genuine, while otherwise following Bautier and Chastang, leaving us to assume that the actual 
charters issued by Charles did no more than confirm Carloman’s.
100 Translation from Koziol, Politics, 495. The phrasing in the diplomas vary slightly from each 
other: DChS 14, 25: …innotuit nobis per quosdam sui fideles quemadmodum sua sedes et pene 
omnes ecclesie ejusdem civitatis ruine jam proxime existebant, ita ut per ipsum nullatenus possent 
restaurari… DChS 15, 27: …innotuit nobis per quendam suum fidelem quemadmodum sua sedes 
et pene omnes ecclesię ejusdem sedis ruinę tam proximę existebant, ita ut per ipsum nullatenus pos­
sent restaurari… DChS 23, 46: …innotuit nobis de paupertate sui episcopatus et quemadmodum 
sua sedes et pene omnes ęcclesie ejusdem civitatis ruine jam proxime existebant, ita ut per ipsum 
nullatenus possent restaurari… DChS 26, 55: …innotuit nobis de paupertate sui episcopatus et 
quemadmodum sua sedes et pene omnes ecclesie ejusdem loci ruine jam proxime existebant, ita 
ut per ipsum nullatenus possent restaurari… DChS 119, 280: …innotuit nobis de paupertate ejus­
dem episcopatus et quemadmodum ipsa sedes et pene omnes ecclesiae ejusdem civitatis ruinae jam 
proximae existebant, ita ut per ipsum nullatenus possent restaurari…
101 DCmII 54, 138: …innotuit nobis de paupertate sui episcopatus et quemadmodum sua sedes et pene 
omnes aecclesiae ejusdem civitatis ruinae jam proximae existebant, ita ut per ipsum nullatenus 
possent restaurari…
102 Vita Sancti Theodardi, 152 E. Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 108.
 III.1 General overview 141
have had another reason, which is most likely to be found not on the part of the 
bishops, but on that of Charles. In these diplomas, Charles could portray himself 
as the restorer and protector of the Church, as true king of the realm. This read-
ing is further emphasised by the grants made in the various diplomas. The first 
charter for Elne grants, next to some properties, half of various incomes, among 
them the market and the salines—rights that were also confirmed to the church 
of Narbonne. The second diploma, issued one year later, was even more generous, 
granting the cathedral of Elne all the churches of the Roussillon and the Conflent, 
in addition to a number of other properties. In 899, Charles reinforced the immu-
nity of ecclesiastical servants in the church province of Narbonne, prohibiting any 
officials from forcing them to attend lay courts and from levying taxes from their 
possessions.103 One of the most interesting phrasings, however, can be found in a 
diploma issued in 922 for the church of Girona, donating to the church “the little 
belonging to our royal power” because of the fidelity shown by its bishop, Guigo.104 
The message was clear: remain loyal to the crown and you will be rewarded with 
whatever is left. Given Charles’  current situation, that was clearly a message aimed 
at those who so far had remained with him.
Perhaps this is the solution to the question of why Charles would issue such a 
number of diplomas for distant recipients at such a crucial point of his campaign 
against the rebel nobles. He did this to reinforce his links with his followers, to 
demonstrate to them that he was the true king, willing to act in favour of those 
who supported him, protecting the church and handing out generous rewards. 
Also present at Tours-sur-Marne were monks from Saint-Thierry of Reims,105 
who could have relayed this to Charles opponents, thus ensuring that the message 
also reached those who might be willing to return to their rightful king. Both the 
place and the target of the demonstration were partly due to the contingencies 
of the situation. Tours-sur-Marne was close by; Bishop Guigo, who interceded 
for every single one of the 922 diplomas,106 had belonged to Charles’  chapel be-
fore becoming bishop of Girona.107 But the place, time and recipients mirror the 
circumstances of 899 closely enough for it to be likely that there was more to the 
issuance of these diplomas. In 922, Charles used the opportunity offered to him by 
circumstance to reenact the assembly that had taken place in 899, to remind the 
realm of the beginnings of his reign.
If it is likely that Charles’  initiative was behind the issuance of the 922 diplomas, 
it seems probable that the same is also true for the 899 assembly. Why, for example, 
103 DChS 24. 
104 DChS 120, 285: Supra quae praefato episcopo Wigoni suaeque eclesiae […] pro remedio animae 
nostrae ac genitorum nostrorum, ob nimiam etiam fidelitatem quam illum erga nos cernimus 
habere, largimur perpauca nostrae regali jure competentia potestati…
105 DChS 115, 31st May 922.
106 DDChS 116−120, with the exception of DChS 119 for the church of Narbonne, all name the re-
cipients as Guigo’s fideles. Two deperdita, identified by D’Abadal for the abbey of Saint-Quirze, 
D’Abadal, Catalunya II,2 384 and 472−473, probably also belonged to these diplomas.
107 HGL V, col. 124−125. Schröder, Synoden, 178−179; Magnou-Nortier, Société, 322−333.
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would Archbishop Arnust of Narbonne travel to see the king—from whom he had 
already obtained a confirmation of his possessions and rights half a year earlier 
by means of an envoy—to obtain another diploma guaranteeing the immunity of 
the clergymen of his church province from a king who was unlikely to enforce his 
order in such a distant province?108 We have already shown that, in 899, Charles 
used his diplomas to portray himself as the one true king. It, therefore, seems most 
likely, that Arnust did not seek out the king to demand further confirmation of his 
rights, but that Charles invited him and other local elites to join him at court. This 
would have provided Charles with the opportunity for a political mise-en-scène al-
lowing him to demonstrate his royalty to the realm. Of course, many of the other 
diplomas—like the one for San-Juan-de-las-Abadesas—were undoubtedly issued 
because the petitioners had a viable interest in obtaining a royal charter. But at 
Tours-sur-Marne, they seem to have only provided a framework for the king’s 
own message. He used the assembly of Tours-sur-Marne to strengthen his rule by 
demonstrating his willingness to act like a king.
III.1.3 Using diplomas to demonstrate Carolingian legitimacy?
The case of the Tours-sur-Marne diplomas leads us to another aspect of how 
 diplomas were used to strengthen Charles’  rule. Since the influential work of 
Bernd Schneidmüller on the power of Carolingian tradition,109 it has become the 
scholarly consensus that Charles was strongly attached to his family’s past and 
especially to the memory of his grandfather, Charles the Bald.110 Indeed, there are 
many indications that Charles did use his Carolingian descent to strengthen his 
rule by emphasising his legitimacy. Most notable are the changes to the dating 
clauses of his diplomas after the acquisition of Lotharingia, which refer to the 
event as “attaining [his] larger inheritance” (largiore vero hereditate indepta).111 De-
scribing the new realm as his inheritance was, of course, a statement that was only 
loosely based on the political realities. Lotharingia had fallen to Charles because 
its leading nobles preferred his rule to that of Conrad I112 and not because of some 
108 See also Koziol, Politics, 494.
109 Schneidmüller, Tradition.
110 Last see Koziol, Politics, 544−548.
111 The change in the dating clause sets in with DDChS 67 and 68, both dating to 20th December 
911, the first diplomas Charles issued for Lotharingian recipients, Bishop Stephen of Cambrai and 
the canons of his Church. From this moment on, the phrase is only omitted in DDChS 112 (20th 
September 921, church of Châlons) and 122 (29th July 923, Saint-Corneille). In both cases the 
second addition to the dating line, the redintegrante, is also left out. On the practice of indicat-
ing the acquisition of new realms or other important events in the dating clauses, see Wolfram, 
Herrschertitel, 115. On the changes in Charles’ dating clauses, see also Koziol, Politics, 421−483.
112 See below, chapter IV.4.
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special Lotharingian attachment to the Carolingian dynasty.113 Nevertheless, this 
clearly shows that Charles used his heritage to his political advantage by stress-
ing his Carolingian descent and the claims he derived from it. Moreover, in the 
narratio of his diplomas, Charles hardly ever fails to point out the dynastic links 
tying him to his ancestors. Direct links are thus established with Charlemagne, 
his grandfather’s grandfather (atavus), Louis the Pious, his great-grandfather 
( proavus), Charles the Bald, his grandfather (avus), Louis the Stammerer his “be-
getter” (genitor), Louis III and Carloman II his brothers (fratres).114 Usually, such 
mentions are connected to the confirmation of earlier diplomas or services for the 
afterlife of his ancestors. However, there is a special case when Charles artificially 
inserted a mention of his ancestors and his relation to them into one of his diplo-
mas. A charter dating to 917, issued for Saint-Corneille at Compiègne, introduces 
his ancestors Pippin, Charlemagne and Charles the Bald in the sanction clause, 
referring to sanctions laid down by them under similar circumstances.115  Making 
such references was, from a purely practical point of view, quite pointless. As 
Geoffrey Koziol has argued, its only purpose was to demonstrate Charles’  descent 
and place him in a line with his ancestors.116
Yet, to what extent Charles really emphasised his Carolingian heritage is much 
less clear than has been generally assumed by scholars.117 Describing predecessors 
as ancestors—which, after all, they were—was a common practice among Caro-
lingian kings and was equally used by Charles’  brother, Carloman II,118 and his 
father, Louis the Stammerer.119 Charles’  supposed close connection to Charles the 
Bald, which seems to be based mainly on the large number of his grandfather’s ap-
pearances in Charles’  diplomas—26 out of 120—also crumbles when placed under 
scrutiny.120 This is certainly a significant ratio and it is far greater than for other 
113 Parisot, Royaume, 574−578, argued in favour of such an attachment. Against this position, see 
Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 198, n. 48 and 202.
114 An early example is DChS 2, dating to 898, 2−3: ...quia veniens vir venerabilis Heidilo […], obtu­
lit obtutibus nostris auctoritates atavi nostri Karoli et proavi Chludovici, necnon et avi nostri item 
Karoli imperatoris… Louis the Stammerer and Charles’ halfbrothers are, for example, mentioned in 
DChS 82, 183: …ob amorem Dei […], necnon et elemosinam avi nostri imperatoris Karoli seu et Lu­
dowici regis, piissimi genitoris nostri, sive fratrum nostrorum, videlicet Ludowici atque Karlomanni… 
115 DChS 91, 209: Quod si quis hanc auctoritatem nostram adversari et nostrae uxoris Friderunae con­
tradictionem refragari conatus fuerit, legem quam statuit Pippinus rex, noster atavus in monasterio 
Promia, seu Lauduni in puellarum loco, atque noster abavus Karolus imperator augustus in Aquisgra­
ni palatio, necnon et gloriosus similiter imperator Karolus, noster avus, in eodem videlicet Compendi­
ensi coenobio, coactus exsolvat atque usque in adventum Domini damnatus, positus sub maledictione 
Judae fiat et quod vindicare sibi voluerit minime habeat. See also Schneidmüller, Tradition, 128−129.
116 Koziol, Politics, 547.
117 Schneidmüller, Tradition and Koziol, Politics.
118 For example DDCmII 51, 128 and 74, 193.
119 Among others, DLS 7, 18 and 20, 66.
120 Schneidmüller, Tradition, Anhang, 207−209 counts 33 confirmations of Charles the Bald’s diplo-
mas. We count 26, excluding the forgeries DDChS 37 and 107 as well as the rewritten DDChS 46 
and 101. Three more, DDChS 25, 27 and 83, are confirmations of Charles the Bald’s diplomas, yet 
fail to mention him. The number may of course be higher, given that among the 120 diplomas we 
note 13 deperdita.
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kings mentioned in the corpus. For example, Louis the Stammerer, the second 
most cited ruler is mentioned fourteen times.121 Yet, given that only 36 diplomas of 
Louis are known, compared to about 460 from Charles the Bald, Charles the Sim-
ple’s connection to his father seems to have been much more important than the 
one to his grandfather.122 It is helpful to compare these numbers to the practice of 
other kings. For example Charles’  half-brother Carloman names Charles the Bald 
nine123 and Louis the Stammerer seven times124 in 44  diplomas while Louis the 
Stammerer in turn quotes Charles the Bald fifteen times.125 The ratio of mentions 
to the total number of diplomas known indeed seems to indicate that Charles’ 
own practice of mentioning Charles the Bald (and his own father) was not more 
developed than that of his predecessors.126 This conclusion ties in well with an-
other finding. While Charles’  and his grandfather’s diplomas went, in large parts, 
to the same ecclesiastical institutions, there are numerous cases where the for-
mer fails to mention the latter, most notably in the five diplomas issued for Saint-
Denis.127 Confirming the acts of past rulers—among them Charles the Bald—and 
installing prayer services for them was certainly important for Charles. However, 
his practice was not substantially different from his predecessors.
While the observations we have made so far apply to Charles’  entire reign, 
there were some significant changes in his diplomas following the acquisition of 
Lotharingia. Most prominent is the change of his intitulation to rex Francorum, 
vir illustris,128 a phrasing derived from diplomas issued by Pippin, Charlemagne 
and Carloman.129 When trying to interpret this change in regard to Charles’  use 
of Carolingian tradition to strengthen his rule, however, we should take into con-
sideration at which audience the diplomas were directed. From the little that is 
known about how diplomas were issued and used, it seems that they were meant 
121 DDChS 12, 14, 19, 20, 23, 32, 33, 42, 60, 75, 82, 85, 119 and 120. Not included are the highly prob-
lematic DDChS 46 and 101.
122 Koziol, Politics, 498, explains this with Charles’ endeavour to rehabilitate his father.
123 DDCmII 51, 52, 62, 66, 68, 73, 77, 82 and 87.
124 DDCmII 51, 54, 66, 68, 74 and 87.
125 In 36 diplomas. DDLS 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 27, 30 and 39.
126 Odo, to name another example, mentions Charles the Bald ten times in 50 diplomas (DDOdo 1, 
9, 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 30, 32 and 41). Louis the Stammerer, on the other hand, is only mentioned twice 
(DDodo 11 and 41).
127 DDChS 10, 47, 50, 66 and 89. Other examples are the diplomas for Saint-Remy (DDChS 87 and 
88), Saint-Germain of Auxerre (DChS 38) and Saint-Bénigne of Dijon (DChS 8) as well as some 
of diplomas for Saint-Martin of Tours (DDChS 49 and 98), Saint-Amand (DDChS 54 and 110) 
and Saint-Martin of Autun (DChS 59). Similarly, none of the diplomas issued for the church of 
Châlons (DDChS 29 and 112) mention Charles the Bald and only one out of two for the Churches 
of Autun (DChS 31) and Paris (DChS 57) do. Most of these diplomas are confirmations of recent 
restitutions or grants. However, as the example of DChS 91(see above) shows, if Charles wanted 
to insert his grandfather or others of his ancestors in his diplomas, he found a way to do so.
128 The change sets in with his first Lotharingian diplomas, DDChS 67 and 68. 
129 Wolfram, Herrschertitel, 116−118. Charlemagne’s diplomas use rex Francorum, vir inluster as in-
titulatio from 769 until 774, Carloman’s from 769 until 772. Wolfram was apparently not aware 
of its use by Pippin.
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to be presented and probably read aloud to a larger community.130 Yet, who, apart 
from some specialists familiar with early Carolingian diplomas and, what is more, 
with diplomas from such a short period of time, would have recognised the allu-
sion made to his illustrious ancestors? Charles dropped the vir illustris after only 
a few months, shortening his new intitulatio to rex Francorum,131 which seems to 
indicate that if he had indeed tried to use the memory of these earlier Carolingians 
to strengthen his legitimacy, he had soon recognised the futility of this means of 
doing so.
The new seal and monogram used by the king in 913 pose another problem in 
this regard. Both imitate those of Charlemagne,132 and as visual signs may have 
been recognised by a wider audience, which may have been able to compare 
Charles’  diplomas with his ancestor’s. Hence they may have served the purpose 
of demonstrating the link between Charles himself and Charlemagne.133 However, 
both are isolated cases taken from one single diploma,134 a diploma that appears to 
have been written not in Charles’  chancellery, but in that of Archbishop Ratbod of 
Trier by a scribe called Theodulf.135 This would also explain why this diploma re-
sembles the Lotharingian tradition so much.136 Considering that Ratbod had kept 
his distance to the king up until that point,137 this diploma was probably meant as 
a symbol of the archbishop’s entrance into the king’s favour. As it was drawn up in 
Ratbod’s chancellery, we may even question whether the seal and monogram were 
developed at Charles’  own court. Likely, they had been presented to the king by 
the archbishop, to honour him by letting him appear as his ancestor.
While Charles’  diplomatic practice does not indicate that he set out to 
strengthen his rule by putting special emphasis on his Carolingian heritage, he 
certainly possessed a highly developed sense of legitimacy. The most revealing 
source, in this regard, is a part of Witger’s Genealogia Arnulfi comitis.138 The first 
part, entirely separate to the second part which is dedicated to the family of Ar-
nulf I of Flanders, covers the descendants of the Frankish emperors and kings and 
130 On the role of diplomas in public encounters with the king, see Bedos-Rezak, Ritual; Keller, 
Herrschersiegel; Beyer, Urkundenübergabe; Worm, Beobachtungen; Worm, Strategien; Koziol, 
Pardon, chapter 9; Koziol, Politics, 33−37.
131 Only DChS 67, 68, 69, 125, 71 and 72 use the rex Francorum, vir illustris. The vir illustris was 
dropped after 12th April 912, with the exception of Charles’ circular to the bishops of his realm 
(MGH Conc. VI, N° 2).
132 Lauer, Recueil Charles III, LXXVIII–LXXIX for the monogram and XLVII–XLVIII for the seal.
133 As interpreted by Wolfram, Herrschertitel, 117, Schneidmüller, Tradition, 133.
134 DChS 74.
135 Schieffer, Kanzlei, 139−140, Bautier, Chancellerie, 21, n. 1 and Patzold, Episcopus, 88. Theodulf 
probably also wrote DDLCh 58 and 68.
136 Wolfram, Herrschertitel, 120.
137 DChS 74 is the first diploma for the church of Trier. On Ratbod’s distance to Charles up until 913, 
see below.
138 Witger, Genealogia. On this genealogy, see Koziol, Charles; Freise, Genealogia; Oexle, Karolinger, 
263, n. 61; Génicot, Princes, 220−221, Schneidmüller, Tradition, 85–88. Witger’s origin is un-
known. In regard to his genealogy, scholars see him either as canon of Saint-Corneille of Com-
piègne or, in this regard, especially Freise, having a Flamish connection to Arnulf ’s court.
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was “dictated by King Charles, restorer of Compiègne after two fires.”139 As Geof-
frey Koziol convincingly argues, Witger used an already existing genealogy when 
he produced his own draft and only made some further additions for Charles’ 
own successors, meaning that the core part was indeed dictated by the king to the 
canons of Saint-Corneille.140 The genealogy traces the Carolingian family from its 
origins, giving the same content as others of its kind. It is only when it reaches 
Charles Martel that the record changes, becoming more detailed than the mere ge-
nuit-enumerations of the first five generations. Charlemagne’s entry, for example, 
reads “Emperor Charles fathered Charles, Louis and Pippin, Rotrude and Berta on 
queen Hildegard, Drogo and Hugh and Rothaid on a concubine.”141 The entry be-
trays three features of the genealogy: a deep knowledge about the family, the inclu-
sion of daughters in the account and, most importantly, the distinction between 
children born by queens and those born by concubines.142 This detail is found in 
the entries for Louis the Pious,143 Charles the Bald144 and Louis the Stammerer145—
hence, for the lineage holding the West Frankish realm. The other lineages are 
traced to their respective ends (as marked by the death of the last crowned ruler146) 
but are significantly less comprehensive—daughters and illegitimate offspring are 
omitted here.147 Two of these entries are nevertheless remarkable: “King Carloman 
fathered King Arnulf ”148 and “King Arnulf fathered Louis on Queen Oda, Zwen-
tibold, however, on a concubine.”149 The first entry fails to mention the illegitimate 
birth of Arnulf which is hinted at only by the fact that his mother is left out. The 
second entry, on the other hand, is the only one outside the West Frankish line that 
mentions offspring by a concubine—undoubtedly because Zwentibold was, next 
to his father, the only illegitimate son to be crowned. And while Arnulf ’s entry 
is also the only one to attribute a title to an offspring (i.e. Carloman begat “King” 
Arnulf), both only mention Arnulf as king, not as emperor.
139 Witger, Genealogia, 302: Hic incipit genealogia nobilissimorum Francorum ymperatorum et regum 
dictata a Karolo rege Conpendiensis loci restauratore post bina incendia.
140 Koziol, Charles, 172−179. 
141 Witger, Genealogia, 302: Karolus ymperator genuit Karolum, Hludovicum et Pipinum, Rotrudim 
et Bertam ex Hildegardi regina, Drogonem et Hugonem et Rothaidim ex concubina.
142 See also Koziol, Charles, 173−175.
143 Witger, Genealogia, 303: Hludovicus ymperator genuit Hlotharium, Pipinum et Hludovicum Ro­
trudim et Hildegardim ex Yrmingardi regina, Karolum et Gislam ex Iudith ymperatrice.
144 Witger, Genealogia, 303: Karolus imperator genuit ex Hyrmentrudi regina quattuor filios et toti­
dem filias, id est Hludovicum, Karolum, Karlomannum et Hlotharium, Iudith quoque et Hildegar­
dim, Hirmintrudim et Gislam.
145 Witger, Genealogia, 303: Hludovicus rex genuit Hludovicus et Karlomannum et Hildegardim ex 
Ansgardi vocata regina, Karolum quoquo postumum et Irmintrudim ex Adelheidi regina.
146 The only exception is the line of Pippin I of Aquitaine which is not continued and thus omits 
Pippin II.
147 For example, the entry for Louis the German, Witger, Genealogia, 303: Hludovicus rex genuit 
Karlomannum, Hludovicum et Karolum ex Emma regina.
148 Witger, Genealogia, 303: Karlomannus rex genuit Arnulfum regem.
149 Witger, Genealogia, 303: Arnulfus rex genuit Hlodovicum ex Oda regina, Sendeboldum vero ex 
concubina.
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The genealogy includes a striking entry, dedicated to Charles’  own father: 
“King Louis fathered Louis and Carloman and Hildegard on the so-called queen 
Ansgarde, and also, posthumously, Charles and Ermentrude on Queen Adelaide.”150 
Both cases, the treatment of Arnulf and the slight against his half-brothers, reveals 
an even more finely tuned sense of legitimacy than the distinction between the 
offspring of queens and concubines already indicated. Arnulf, despite being born 
of a concubine, is depicted as a legitimate ruler by simply omitting the circum-
stances of his birth from the genealogy, yet, at the same time, degraded by denying 
him the title of emperor. The legitimacy of Charles’  brothers, on the other hand, 
is questioned by the remark on Louis the Stammerer’s marriage problem151 while 
at the same time it portrays Charles as their father’s true heir because he was born 
from the legitimate queen.
As argued above, Charles did not emphasise his Carolingian heritage to 
 underline his claim to the throne and his practice of confirming his ancestors’ 
diplomas did not differ from his predecessors. His complicated relations with 
his brothers, however, seems to be reflected in his diplomas. Carloman II is only 
mentioned four times,152 Louis  III only appears once. While in the latter’s case 
this is not surprising—Louis appears to have issued only a very small number of 
diplomas—the former’s case is different. There is a distinctive overlap in institu-
tions that were granted charters from both kings153 yet Charles only confirmed 
three of Carloman’s diplomas.154 On far more occasions, he clearly excluded him 
from confirmations of previous charters, such as those issued by his father and 
grandfather.155 Selective citation was certainly not a practice unique to Charles and 
certainly not one he limited to his brothers’  diplomas.156 Yet in these cases, there 
seems to be a particular underlying animosity that even surfaces in the dedication 
Charles made in another diploma, denying them their rank: “for the salvation of 
our grandfather Emperor Charles and King Louis, our most pious father, and our 
 brothers, namely Louis and Carloman.”157 Charles acknowledged his brothers, yet 
150 See chapter III.1.3, n. 145. Interestingly, the genealogy omits Charles’ third sister, Gisela, who had 
been married to Count Robert of Troyes and died before 12th December 884. She is mentionned 
in DCmII 80 as Gislae sororis nostrae. See Settipani, Préhistoire, 317 with n. 861 and 862.
151 See chapter I.1.1.
152 DDChS 23, 82, 105 and 119. DChS 101 does also mention him, yet, as already indicated, is too 
problematic to use in this context.
153 Churches of Narbonne (DCmII 73, DDChS 14, 23, 24 and 119), Girona (DCmII 58 and 93bis, 
DDChS 19 and 120), Autun (DCmII 49 and 68, DChS 33) and Châlons (DCmII 76, DDChS 29 
and 112), Saint-Martin of Autun (DCmII  83, DDChS  32 and 59), Saint-Germain of Auxerre 
(DCmII 77, DChS 38), Saint-Martin of Tours (DCmII 87, DDChS 46, 49, 98 and 101), Saint-
Germain-des-Prés (DCmII 93, DDChS 45, 92 and 94), Morienval (DCmII 90, DChS 105), Saint-
Maur of Fossés (DCmII 92, DChS 108), Saint-Crépin of Soissons (DCmII 79, DChS 12).
154 DDChS 23, 105 and 119.
155 DDChS 12, 19, 32, 33, 45 and 120. See also Koziol, Charles, 178 with n. 70.
156 Koziol, Charles, 178 with n. 70.
157 DChS 82, 183: …ob amorem Dei […] necnon et elemosinam avi nostri imperatoris Karoli seu et Lu­
dovico regis, piissimi genitoris nostri, sive fratrum nostrorum, videlicet Ludowici atque Karlomannni…
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their having  become kings while he had been cast aside left its traces. They were 
family; their royalty, however, was another matter.
Other recent rulers were neglected in Charles’  diplomas.158 Charles the Fat, 
for example, is only mentioned three times,159 despite Charles issuing a large 
 number of diplomas for the same institutions as the emperor.160 However, once 
again, Charles’  practice does not differ much from his predecessors’. Odo men-
tions Charles the Fat three, possibly four times161 in 50  diplomas, Arnulf and 
Zwentibold in their charters for Lotharingian recipients not at all, Louis the 
Child only once.162 Like the emperor, diplomas from these last three rulers were 
hardly ever confirmed by Charles: twice in the cases of Arnulf and Zwentibold, 
once for Louis the Child,163 although again there are a large number of institu-
tions that received diplomas from several of them.164 However, given that only 
21 of Charles’  diplomas for Lotharingian recipients are preserved, these num-
bers may be rather expected than exceptional and hardly differ from the prac-
tice under Zwentibold and Louis the Child.165 Odo’s appearances in Charles’ 
diplomas—three confirmations166 and one memorial service167—are different to 
158 See also Koziol, Politics, 498, according to whom Charles’ choices were motivated by his legiti-
mistic convictions.
159 DDChS 45, 55 and 114 as well as the higly problematic DChS 101.
160 Saint-Martin of Tours (DDChF 139, 160 and 161; DDChS 46, 49, 98 and 101), Saint-Martin of 
Autun (DChF 122; DDChS 39 and 59), Saint-Germain of Auxerre (DChF 145; DChS 38), Saint-
Médard of Soissons (DChF  163; DDChS  16, 52 and 58), Saint-Aignan of Orléans (DChF  143; 
DDChS 77 and 78), Saint-Maur of Fossés (DChF 149; DChS 108), Prüm (DChF 100; DDChS 84 
and 104), Saint-Maximin of Trier (DChF 133; DChS 69), Andlau (DChF 96; DChS 125), Tour-
nus (DChF  162; DChS  82), Saint-Bénigne of Dijon (DChF  117; DChS  29) and the Churches 
of Trier (DChF 102; DDChS 74, 81 and 100), Langres (DDChF 129, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155 and 
155a; DChS  55), Tours (DChF  146; DChS  9), Girona (DChF  148; DDChS  19 and 120), Liège 
(DDChF 104 and 105; DDChS 5 and 65), Toul (DDChF 121 and 124; DDChS 70, 71 and 114) and 
Châlons-en-Champagne (DChF 150; DDChS 48 and 112). On the habit of issuing diplomas for 
the same institutions as their predecessors, see Koziol, Politics, Chapter 3, 97−118.
161 DDOdo 11, 16, 49 and probably also 20.
162 DLCh 49.
163 DDChS 68 (Zwentibold), 69 (Arnulf), 73 (Louis the Child) and 84 (Arnulf and Zwentibold). 
DDChS 100 and 103 do mention Arnulf and Zwentibold in the context of judicia.
164 Churches of Trier (DDA 39, 53, 113, 114 and 124; DDZ 4, 18, 20, 21 and 27; DDLCh 2, 17 and 
59; DDChS 74, 81 and 100), Toul (DDA 93, 112 and 128; DLCh 7; DDChS 70, 71 and 114), Liège 
(DA 64; DZ 24; DDLCh 55 and 57; DDChS 5 and 65) and Cambrai (DDA 108? and 127; DZ 23, 
DDChS 67, 68, 128 and 106) and the abbeys Prüm (DDA 29 and 92; DDZ 2 and 25; DDChS 84 
and 104), Saint-Maximin of Trier (DA 10; DDZ 13 and 14; DChS 69), Echternach (DZ 5; DLCh 53; 
DChS 76), Andlau (DLCh 68; DChS 125) and Saint-Mihiel (DDZ 3 and 8; DDLCh 36 and 62; 
DDChS 11, 73 and 83). 
165 Zwentibold’s 28 preserved diplomas mention Arnulf three, possibly four times (DDZ 2, 14 and 
24; the passage in DZ  4 concerning Arnulf appears to have been interpolated). In Louis the 
Child’s 16 diplomas, Arnulf figures four (DDLCh 2, 7, 49 and 57) and Zwentibold three times 
(DDLCh 57, 62 and 70).
166 DDChS 60, 75 and 105. We exclude the higly problematic DChS 101 from this list.
167 DChS 49.
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the cases above, even if not at first glance. Geoffrey Koziol argued that Charles 
did not consider Odo a legitimate king.168 This conclusion is based on Charles’ 
practice of marking his predecessors as his relatives,169 hence naturally exclud-
ing Odo. However, these expressions can also be found in earlier diplomas170 
and tie in well with other expressions common in Louis the Stammerer’s and 
Carloman II’s diplomas concerning their royal descent, as we have shown above. 
The language of Charles’  diplomas certainly does not reflect the new situation 
with a non-Carolingian predecessor, yet to expect that Charles would drop this 
phrasing only to include Odo into the line seems to be expecting too much. In 
this context, it is also worth pointing out that the dating clauses of a number of 
Charles’  early diplomas add “in succession to Odo” (in successione Odonis) to 
the normal dating,171 demonstrating that he did indeed acknowledge Odo as his 
legitimate predecessor.172 The low number of Odo’s appearances certainly shows 
that he was not one of Charles’  favourite kings, yet he certainly did not fall vic-
tim to a damnatio memoriae.173 Nevertheless, mentions of Odo may indeed have 
carried a specific weight, given that his brother was one of the most powerful 
men of the realm and one of the key players at the royal court. We must therefore 
take mentions of Odo into consideration when moving on to discuss relations 
between Charles and the marchio.
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The beginning of Charles’ reign as sole king is marked as a “renewal”— 
redintegratio—of his rule, attributed to the divine will by the official language of 
his diplomas.174 For the author of the Annales Vedastini, his installation on the 
throne was no less consequential. Since the realm had been his father’s, it was 
168 Koziol, Politics, 500−501.
169 For example DDChS  24, 49 (Nos vero priscorum regum, scilicet parentum nostrorum, morem 
sequentes…), 35, 75 (…morem praedecessorum, parentum scilicet nostrorum regum, imitari 
 videmur…) and 43, 93 (…predecessorum regum nostrorum siquidem parentum morem et actus 
imitantes…).
170 For example DDLS 24, 76 (…morem parentum regum videlicet et imperatorum praedecessorum 
 nostrorum sequentes…), 28, 84 (…morem parentum regum videlicet et imperatorum praedeces­
sorum  nostrorum sequentes.) and DChF 144, 231 (…morem parentum regum videlicet praedeces­
sorum  nostrorum sequentes…).
171 DDChS 13−14, 19−20 and 22−26.
172 See also Falkowski, Contra legem, 228.
173 Likewise, not all of the mentions of Odo can be attributed to Robert’s intervention. DChS 60, 
confirming one his diplomas, was issued for the abbey of La Grasse, far from Robert’s power base 
and without his intervention.
174 Wolfram, Herrschertitel, 115. The formulae seem to be borrowed from Louis the Pious’ diplomas 
issued after 834.
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just that it should now be his.175 However, the annals also note that his accession 
was acclaimed by an assembly of Franks; hence, despite his claim, Charles still 
needed the general consent of the nobles.176 Odo, already on his deathbed, had 
tried to ensure this consent by asking the nobles to serve Charles loyally,177 prob-
ably in accordance with the treaty concluded between him and Charles earlier 
in 897. However, as a run-through of who was present at Charles’ coronation 
shows, Odo’s death-bed appeal to the nobles did not have the desired effect. 
Archbishop Fulk was present at the coronation, since the ceremony took place 
at Reims. Count Heribert I’s presence is indicated by the Annales Vedastini—he 
was the reason why Baldwin of Flanders proclaimed his loyalty to the new re-
gime through envoys, rather than coming in person.178 Others, however, were 
missing: Odo’s own brother Robert, Richard the Jusiticiar and William the Pi-
ous. Robert’s absence was probably due to the Northmen, who, after a settlement 
with Odo, had spent the winter along the Loire179 and were now devastating the 
bordering regions before returning to their ships. After they were gone, Robert 
met the king and was received honourably. Richard and William, on the other 
hand, appear to have waited for Robert to act. Only when he had acknowledged 
Charles as king, did they come to court,180 indicating that they did not take it for 
granted that Robert would agree to Charles’ being the new king. This is certainly 
surprising since Robert, given his importance for Odo’s rule, undoubtedly had 
played a major role in the negotiations of 897. However, as would appear from 
Richard’s and William’s hesitance, they seem to have harboured certain doubts 
towards the actual implementation of the treaty. Hence, the episode points us 
the initial problem of Charles’ reign: to find a way to integrate his old opponents 
who had been key figures of Odo’s rule and the other powerful magnates of the 
realm who had abstained from supporting him during the previous years and to 
mediate between their interests and those of his old supporters who still formed 
the core of his network.
175 Annales Vedastini 898, 79: Franci vero rege mortuo die ... Remis conveniunt Karolumque in sede 
paterna restituunt. This concurs with their account of Charles’ first coronation in 893, 73: Mittunt 
itaque et Karolum regis Hludowici filium, adhuc puerulum, ad dictum placitum venire fecerunt 
et die supra dicto Remis adunati eum in paterno solio benedictum in regem collocant, omnesque 
coniurant adversus Odonem regem.
176 On Carolingian successions, see Tellenbach, Grundlagen; Kasten, Königssöhne and Becher, 
 Dynastie.
177 Annales Vedastini 897, 79.
178 Annales Vedastini 898, 79.
179 Annales Vedastini 897, 79. Against this reading Koziol, Charles, 375−376, who argues that the 
coronation took place in January when the Northmen were still at peace. The account of the An­
nales Vedastini (see next note) is not entirely clear on this subject. While the Northmen started 
devastating Neustria and Aquitaine before returning to their ships in spring, it is left unclear 
whether they had already started to do so in January.
180 Annales Vedastini 898, 79: Nortmanni vero verno tempore rediere ad naves, vastatam Aquita­
niae partem atque Neustriam, insuper plurima eversa castra, interfectis habitatoribus. Post haec 
Rothbertus comes, frater regis Odoni, venit ad regem; quem rex honorifice suscepit, eiusque fidelis 
effectus rediit ad sua. Similiter fecit et Richardus, [insuper et Willelmus].
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III.2.1 Close associates and allies
III.2.1.1	 The	first	years
The first years of Charles’  reign were marked by a peculiar situation. As indicated 
by the Annales Vedastini, Robert and Richard were present at the royal court and 
took part in discussing and planning of affairs of the realm; they were present, for 
instance, in 900 to organise a campaign against the Northmen.181 During these 
first years, however, neither of them appeared in royal diplomas; although after-
wards, first Richard and then Robert become dominant. Instead, diplomas issued 
during these years tended to be issued to those who had supported Charles dur-
ing the fight against Odo. Archbishop Fulk and Heribert  I occupied prominent 
positions within the inner circle around the king. The archbishop resumed his 
service as archchancellor182 and intervened before Charles on behalf of the monks 
of Saint-Amand.183 The count, on the other hand, received a diploma for his abbey 
Saint-Crépin of Soissons, which emphasises his position as one of the king’s most 
important advisors by naming him “our beloved count and abbot”,184 and he took 
part in the council preparing the Viking campaign of 900.185 His influence, as well 
as Fulk’s, was also visible one year earlier, when he and the archbishop successfully 
spoke against Baldwin of Flanders, who, soon after he had been forced to give up 
Saint-Vaast, approached the king to recover his lost lands.186
But also others of Charles’  old supporters remained present at court. Bishop 
Anskeric of Paris appears to have played an important role, becoming Fulk’s suc-
cessor as archchancellor after the latter’s murder in 900187 and acting as Charles’ 
ambassador on two occasions. In 899, he represented the king at a meeting at 
St Goar with Zwentibold and a legation sent by Arnulf.188 A year later, when the 
conflict between Charles and Robert had broken out, he negotiated with the latter 
at Tours.189 Furthermore, the bishop was granted two diplomas for his church.190 
The first of these is worth a closer look. It was issued in 907, shortly after Charles’ 
marriage to Frederuna,191 who herself intervened on behalf of Anskeric. Frederuna 
was not the only petitioner, though: besides her, the diploma also makes note of 
Abbess Gisela of Nivelles, daughter of Lothar II and Charles’  cousin, Robert of 
Neustria, the countess Adelaide—either Robert’s daughter and spouse of Herib-
181 Annales Vedastini 900, 82.
182 DChS 10, 8th February 898. Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XVI.
183 DChS 18.
184 DChS 12, 20: …dilectus nobis comes et abbas…
185 Annales Vedastini 898, 79.
186 Annales Vedastini 899, 81−82.
187 DChS 30, 23rd June 900. Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XVI−XVII. On the importance of the arch-
chancellor, see Depreux, Prosopographie, 30.
188 Regino, Chronicon 899, 146−147.
189 See below, chapter III.2.1.2.
190 DDChS 57 and 62.
191 The marriage is made note of in DChS 56, 19th April 907, 122.
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ert II of Vermandois192 or the wife of Richard the Justiciar193—the counts Altmar 
and Erkanger as well as another Robert to who we will turn later on. The presence 
of Charles’  relative and some of the most important nobles of the realm—Robert, 
of course, but also Adelaide, representative of either Heribert II or Richard as well 
as Altmar and Erkanger, both of whom were among Charles’  closer supporters—
places a special emphasis on the occasion. The small assembly portrayed by this 
diploma is nothing less than a portrait of the elite of the realm: the most impor-
tant people at court, enriched with the presence of another member of the royal 
family and with Anskeric as the diploma’s recipient in an especially honourable 
position. But the charter also provides us with further insight into the continu-
ing influence of Charles’  earliest supporters, to whom not only the bishop, but 
also Count Erkanger had belonged. This was Erkanger’s second appearance in 
Charles’  diplomas. In 901, he had intervened on behalf of a certain royal fidelis 
named Tedricus,194 in a diploma that demonstrates well how the old associates 
formed links with those desiring access to the king.
Another example of the continuing influence of this circle and its involvement 
in important political decisions and the construction of links to other nobles is 
another diploma issued at the request of Count Hugh of Maine and Count Ecfrid, 
another of Charles’  early supporters.195 It was issued at a liturgically propitious 
time: delivered on the eve of All Saints Day, it indicates that Charles, Hugh and 
Ecfrid celebrated one of the most important Christian holidays together at the 
abbey of Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire—as already noted, this was far outside the region 
the king usually visited—and at a liminal point between Francia and Maine, on 
the border of Robert’s counties. Indeed, the diploma was issued after Robert had 
left the royal court in anger196 and marks Charles’  efforts to find allies against the 
powerful marchio.197 Hugh of Maine was the son of Rothild, sister of Louis the 
Stammerer and abbess of Chelles, and Roger of Maine, who had taken Le Mans 
and thwarted Odo’s and Robert’s efforts to install their own man, Gauzlin, in the 
192 Werner, Nachkommen, 458. Werner argues for a marriage between Heribert II and a daughter 
of Robert of Neustria. He identifies this daughter with the countess Adelaide based on a) the 
circumstance that the abbey of Rebais, which is given to the church of Paris in the diploma, was 
situated in Meaux, one of Heribert’s counties; Adelaide would then represent her husband in the 
charter b) her position in the diploma after Robert but preceding the other counts c) the name 
Adelaide appearing in Heribert’s family in the next generation. On the question of this mar-
riage, see also Settipani, Préhistoire, 225 with n. 242 and 408 with n. 44. Against this identifica-
tion Bouchard, Patterns, 16−17, n. 27, who argues that Adelaide would not have been Robert’s 
daughter, but his wife since it was common practice a) for spouses to sign as witnesses next to 
each other and b) to indicate daughters as such. However, neither Robert nor Adelaide figure as 
witnesses in the charter, they are mentioned as petitioners in the narratio. See also Hlawitschka, 
Ahnen II, 383–384 with further literature on this case.
193 Lauer, Recueil Charles III, 123, n. 5, without giving any reasons.
194 DChS 39, 21st August 901.
195 DChS 35, 31st October 900.
196 Annales Vedastini 900, 82.
197 See below. 
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city.198 Thus, Hugh was Charles’  cousin, and in fact the diploma describes him as 
the king’s “beloved kinsman,”199 but, more importantly, he was Robert’s enemy.
Others belonging to the old circle around Charles also continued to be present 
at court. Count Aledramnus intervened together with Bishop Mancio for the lat-
ter’s church of Châlons200 and Bishop Heitilo of Noyon requested two diplomas 
for his church.201 Besides Charles’  old friends, however, also other nobles were 
heard at the royal court. Count Altmar, who we have already seen among the no-
bles figuring in the diploma of 907, was probably also behind the king’s charter 
for his abbey of Saint-Médard of Soissons.202 Furthermore, some of the nobles who 
had originally supported Odo were now integrated into Charles’  rule. The bishops 
Honoratus of Beauvais and Rudolf of Laon203 were among the first to intervene in 
a royal diploma, in their case on behalf of the monks of Saint-Denis, for a grant of 
immunity within their new fortification.204 This was another diploma of distinc-
tive political importance: the abbey, held by Odo after the death of his chancellor 
Ebolus,205 appears not to have been passed on to his brother Robert.206 Odo had 
made Saint Dionysius his patron207 and was even buried in the abbey. Already 
in 896, Charles had tried to link himself to the saint when he issued a diploma 
for the abbey of Salonnes, where relics of Dionysos were held,208 an abbey that 
only half a year earlier had been restored by Zwentibold to Saint-Denis.209 In his 
new diploma, Charles now renewed the connection by claiming the saint as his 
own special patron210 and indirectly declaring his own overlordship over the abbey 
where not only Odo was entombed, but more importantly also his brothers Louis 
and Carloman and, most importantly of all, Charles the Bald.211 Issued at the abbey 
itself, this diploma was meant as a political symbol, demonstrating that the king 
198 On this “war of Le Mans” see Werner, Untersuchungen III, 280−282 and chapter I.3.
199 DChS 35, 75: …dilectus comes Hugo consanguineus…
200 DChS 29.
201 DDChS 2 and 40.
202 DChS 16, a deperditum dating to 899. Flodoard (HRE IV, c. 10, 402) reports that Altmar held 
Saint-Médard which he exchanged with Archbishop Fulk for Saint-Vaast after the latter abbey 
had been taken from Baldwin of Flanders. We assume that Charles issued the diploma before the 
exchange had taken place.
203 Rudolf had become bishop of Laon at a moment when Odo controlled the city (Flodoard, HRE 
IV, c. 5, 384 and c. 7, 398).
204 DChS 10, 8th February 898.
205 Favre, Eudes, 151, n. 1.
206 Also Koziol, Charles, 374. 
207 DOdo 34. Over the 9th century, Dionysos had become the most important patron of the West 
Frankish kings. Große, Saint-Denis, 228. On the importance of Saint-Denis and its connection to 
Charles the Bald, see Koziol, Politics, 443. On the conflict between Charles and Robert for Saint-
Denis, see Koziol, Charles, 374−379.
208 DChS 7.
209 DZ 7, 896 January 22. On Salonnes and Saint-Denis, see also Parisse, In Media Francia.
210 DChS 10 (8th February 898), 16: …peculiaris patroni nostri domni Dionysii…
211 On the development of Saint-Denis as a royal necropolis, see Leistenschneider, Königsgrablege, 
especially 20−21 for the Caroligian period. On Charles the Bald and Saint-Denis, see Nelson, 
Mort, 61–64.
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was seizing control of one of the central places associated with kingship and that 
he now had also gained the support of former opponents. While this is Honoratus’ 
only appearance in Charles’  diplomas, Rudolf intervened again in 905, together 
with a Count Odilard, on behalf of the royal notary, Ernustus,212 thus marking his 
continuing influence.
III.2.1.2 Shifting balances
The end of this first period, during which the group of Charles’  old supporters 
dominated the circle around the king, ended with the murder of Archbishop Fulk 
on 17th June 900. Almost immediately afterwards, Charles’  first diploma for Rich-
ard the Justiciar was issued,213 followed by Robert leaving the court.214 The close 
sequence of these events seems to indicate that they were connected to each other. 
The best way to address this question is to remember Robert’s position at court 
during Odo’s last years, as analysed in the previous chapter. In 888, Robert had 
taken over most of his brother’s honores, most importantly the counties and ab-
beys along the Loire as well as Paris and the appertaining military command. Dur-
ing the fight against Charles, he had become the most important noble at Odo’s 
court, acting as leader of his armies and negotiating on his behalf. This certainly 
influenced the way he interpreted his own position within the hierarchy of the 
nobles and at the royal court. He developed a strong confidence in his abilities and 
wisdom, a certain “sageness” that had to be acknowledged and used by the ruler.215
Charles’  succession, however, meant that the political balance in the realm 
shifted. Integrating powerful nobles into his rule did not necessarily conflict with 
Charles’  own perception of kingship. The language of a number of his diplomas 
underlines his willingness to take counsel into consideration and take his deci-
sions in accordance with those surrounding him.216 However, the position that 
Robert desired was already taken by the nobles who had supported Charles’ 
claim to the throne from the beginning, the group around Archbishop Fulk and 
 Heribert I of Vermandois. Their presence appears to have made an integration of 
Robert on the basis of the latter’s aspirations impossible. Fulk and Heribert would 
undoubtedly not have accepted what, in their eyes, must have been a presumption. 
212 DChS 51.
213 DChS 32, 26th June 900.
214 The account of the Annales Vedastini (900, 81−82) indicates the temporal proximity of both 
events, placing Robert leaving the court immediately after Fulk’s murder and Heriveus’ election. 
215 Koziol, Robert, 250−251, from Robert’s only royal diploma, issued in 923 (DRoI 1). “Sageness” 251.
216 Up until the end of 911: DDChS 10, 16 (cum fidelium nostrorum consensu, venerabilium videli­
cet episcoporum), 41, 90 (suggerentibus quoque una cum dilectissima genitrice nostra Adeleide et 
regni nostri primoribus, tam episcopis quam comitbus, ceterisque fidelibus), 49, 108 (cum consilio 
regni nostri utriusque [ordinis] principum), 53, 115 (a nostris, tam episcopis quam laicis, fidelibus 
responsa accepimus), 56, 121−122 (fideliumque nostrorum benigne consulta suscipimus) and 57, 
124 (Prefatorum igitur principum cognoscentes consilia esse salubria, eorum acquievimus benigne 
postulationibus atque communi consensu fidelium).
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Their revolt against Odo had, in part, been motivated by their desire to enter the 
innermost part of the circle around the king and they had been willing to fight for 
four devastating years to achieve their aim. At this point, giving up this position 
and, of all people, for their old opponent, would simply not have been possible. 
Robert had access to the court and certainly played a major role in the decisions 
made there, as the Annales Vedastini indicate,217 but he was denied the position he 
had occupied under Odo.
The murder of Fulk, however, meant that a power vacuum was created in 
the inner circle and that a new balance of power needed to be found. Charles’ 
choice, however, did not fall on Robert but on Richard, for whom now a so-far 
unparalleled sequence of diplomas was issued at the palaces of Verberie218 and 
Compiègne.219 In these diplomas Richard was described as “illustrious count and 
our beloved marchio”220 and “illustrious count and marchio,”221 culminating in the 
third description as “our beloved and dearest Richard, venerable count.”222 At this 
point, Robert was probably still present at court. As the Annales Vedastini report, 
it was Richard’s most important confidant, Manasses, who made some negative 
comments about Robert to the king. Robert himself was not present at that mo-
ment and only later learnt about these words, taking them as reason to leave.223 We 
can read this scene as a sign that Richard’s influence had already eclipsed that of 
Robert at court. That Manasses dared to insult him was clearly a sign for Robert 
that, for the time being, his was a lost cause. Instead of him, Richard now domi-
nated at court, and he and the king celebrated Christmas together at Reims.224
We should, however, not solely reduce this second period to one of rivalry 
between Robert and Richard. Particularly in 900 and 901, Charles did his best 
to increase the circle around him by concluding new alliances to keep Robert in 
check. We have already mentioned Charles’  visit to Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire, where 
he met with Hugh of Maine. His cousin was not the only new royal ally, however. 
Just before Charles issued his first diploma for Richard, he confirmed a grant for 
217 Annales Vedastini 900, 81−82.
218 DDChS 32 (26th June 900) and 33 (30th June 900).
219 DChS 31 (after the 30th June 900). Jacques de Font-Réaulx, Diplômes, 42, disagrees with Lau-
ers’ dating and corrects it to after 15th July but fails to give any arguments. Lauer’s datation is 
based on the date of Fulk’s murder, 17th June, and that the diploma is signed by his successor as 
archchancellor, Bishop Anskeric of Paris. I would add something else to the analysis: Heriveus, 
who was ordained by a synod as the new Archbishop of Reims on 6th July (Schmitz, Heriveus, 
62 with n. 17), is already replaced as notary by Herluin. Since Heriveus certainly did not leave 
the chancellery immediately upon Fulk’s death, and indeed still served as notary in DDChS 30, 
32 and 33 (24th, 26th and 30th June), the diploma was definitely issued after 30th June. See also 
Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXIX, n. 2.
220 DChS 32, 68: …illustris comitis et dilecti markionis nostri…
221 DChS 33, 70: …comes illustris et marchio… On the interpolations in this diploma, see also Bau-
tier, Recueil Eudes, CLII, n. 1.
222 DChS 31, 65−66: …dilectus et carissimus nostri Richardus, venerabilis comitis… 
223 Annales Vedastini 900, 82.
224 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 12, 405.
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the church of Saint-Christophe at Paris made by Viscount Grimoard,225 indicating 
that he had won one further supporter in Paris, possibly from one of Robert’s own 
men. In November 901, he confirmed the rights and possessions of Corbie at the 
request of Count Ermenfrid of Amiens,226 brother of its abbot Franco, who had 
emphasised his independence from Odo by not only displaying his own mon-
ogram on the coins minted at the abbey, but also by omitting the name of the 
king.227 This diploma leads us to a private charter Robert issued in September 900 
for Saint-Martin of Tours228 after he had already left the royal court. Among a 
large number of other bishops and nobles, this charter was witnessed by Bishop 
Otgar of Amiens, who “confirmed” (roboravit) it as episcophilax229—two expres-
sions which set him apart in the list of the witnesses. Did Otgar belong to Robert’s 
supporters? While this conclusion comes to mind, we should also point out the 
presence of Charles’  archchancellor Anskeric among those signing the charter, in-
dicating that he tried to mediate between the king and the marchio.230 Otgar might 
thus also have belonged to the royal embassy sent to Robert. If Otgar was Robert’s 
ally, Charles’  diploma for Ermenfrid was not only a symbol of his alliance with 
the count, but also a sign that he had now taken control of the Amienois and was 
ready to confront Robert’s ally in this area. But even if this was not the case, the 
diploma, nevertheless, remains exceptional for the early years. It was the first time 
that Charles referred to a larger group of nobles in a diploma, the “first men of our 
realm, bishops as well as counts and other fideles”231, who (alongside his mother 
Adelaide) had advised him. This points to a larger assembly at that moment, an 
assembly that allowed Charles to display his own power and to act as a king by 
confirming the diplomas of his predecessors: he mentions his grandfather Charles 
the Bald, Clothar III and his mother, St. Bathilde,232 founder of Corbie, as well as 
bishops and popes.233 The assembly at Fresnoy was a demonstration of Charles’ 
kingship, going back to his grandfather and the Merovingians, displaying him as 
a king who protected the church and listened to his councillors. It was a moment 
from which he could draw confidence.
In addition to Grimoard and Ermenfrid, we now also find Baldwin of Flanders 
at Charles’  side. Soon after Odo’s death, Baldwin had made a new attempt to in-
crease his influence in the north-east of the realm by attacking Péronne. Charles 
225 DChS 30, 23rd June 900. Grimoard is otherwise not known. His grant to Saint-Christophe seems 
to indicate that he was viscount of Paris.
226 DChS 41.
227 Kaiser, Bischofsherrschaft, 601. On the coins, see Doubliez, Monnayage, 283−310, esp. 293.
228 DRoI 42, 13th September 900, Tours. 
229 DRoI 42, 164: Otgerius episcophilax roboravi. On the use of Greek words in charters from the 
region see Jarousseau, Évêques, 374. See also McNair, Development, 57.
230 Anskeric had already previously served as Charles ambassador at the meeting of St Goar with 
Zwentibold and a legation of Arnulf in early 899 (Regino, Chronicon 899, 149−147).
231 DChS 41, 90: ...regni nostri primoribus, tam episcopis quam comitibus, ceterisque fidelibus…
232 On her, see Hartmann, Königin, 82−85.
233 On the bishops and popes, see Lauer, Recueil Charles III, 87 with n. 2−7.
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managed to subdue the count once again and seized Saint-Vaast from him, pre-
senting it to Archbishop Fulk, who exchanged it with Count Altmar.234 When Bald-
win’s subsequent efforts to regain his lost honores were thwarted by the archbishop 
and Count Heribert, his men murdered Fulk.235 Unfortunately, the account of the 
Annales Vedastini ends shortly after, so we only have Flodoard’s report of a synod 
under Fulk’s successor, Archbishop Heriveus, during which Baldwin’s men were 
excommunicated for their deed.236 Baldwin, however, was not only spared this 
punishment, but received a diploma shortly after confirming his new foundation 
at Bergues-Saint-Winnoc;237 he was also given control over Saint-Bertin,238 which 
had been one of his targets in 892 but then had been passed to Archbishop Fulk by 
Odo.239 The disparity between the actions taken against the murderers and those 
taken against their overlord can be explained by Charles’  political situation at that 
very moment: the outbreak of the conflict with Robert. The king could not risk an 
open conflict with Baldwin like the year before—on the contrary, he needed all the 
allies he could possibly muster to keep the marchio of Neustria in check.
III.2.1.3 A new balance
The second period of Charles’  rule, marked by Richard’s dominance and Rob-
ert’s absence from court, lasted until 902/903, when the latter returned while the 
former disappeared from the royal diplomas. Due to the lack of narrative sources, 
the reasons for this change are almost impossible to assess however a hypothesis 
can be brought forward based on Charles’  diplomas. As we have argued, over the 
past decade Richard had obtained a position in Burgundy that had allowed him to 
establish himself as an intermediary between the local nobles and the king.240 The 
diplomas Charles issued for Burgundian recipients during the first years of his rule 
seem to indicate that the king acknowledged this state of affairs. While Burgundi-
ans did receive diplomas from him, they only did so at Richard’s plea. There is one 
exception, however. In March 902, Charles confirmed the restitution of estranged 
property at Mailly to the church of Auxerre at the request of its bishop Herfrid.241 
Is this diploma, which does not mention Richard in any way, a sign that Charles 
intended to revoke the status quo and re-establish direct contact between himself 
and the Burgundian nobility, thus threatening Richard’s control over the region?
234 Annales Vedastini 899, 81. See also chapter III, n. 202.
235 Annales Vedastini 900, 81−82; Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 10, 402.
236 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 10, 403.
237 DChS 28.
238 Folcuin, Gesta Abbatum S. Bertini Sithensium, c. 98, 625.
239 Folcuin, Gesta Abbatum S. Bertini Sithensium, c.  98, 624. Fulk, before becoming archbishop 
of Reims, had already once been abbot of Saint-Bertin and also acted on behalf of the monks 
before Odo when they refused Baldwin. See also chapter VI.2, Schneider, Erzbischof, 22–25 and 
Lößlein, Ressources. 
240 See chapters II.4 and III.1.2.
241 DChS 42, 14th March 902.
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The diploma for Herfrid was followed by a last one for Richard, delivered four 
months later in July and granting property to his right-hand man Manasses.242 In 
contrast to the earlier diplomas issued at the marchio ’s request, it does not use 
the exceptional honorifics such as “beloved” and “dearest”243 but simply addresses 
him as “illustrious count.”244 While this change may indicate that relations be-
tween Charles and Richard had come under strain, there is also a hint that this 
diploma may have been intended to signal quite the opposite. It was delivered 
at Rueil, a villa that had been granted to the abbey of Saint-Denis by Charles 
the Bald Charles in 875.245 This grant had been made in exchange for a prayer 
service that included the emperor, his second wife Richilde246 and, for the first 
time, Richilde’s and Richard’s brother Boso, underlining the proximity between 
the latter and Charles the Simple’s grandfather.247 Had Rueil been chosen to tie 
Charles the Simple’s relation with Richard to the memory the earlier diploma 
represented? If we follow these interpretations, in early 902 Charles would have 
made an attempt to strengthen his own contacts with the Burgundian nobility 
and thus to weaken Richard’s control over the region. This would have led to a 
deterioration of the relations between him and the marchio and, in turn, to efforts 
to mend these.
Be it as it may, with the diploma issued at Rueil Charles’ rule started to transi-
tion into its third phase. From April 903 onwards, not Richard, but Robert became 
“our highly beloved count,”248 the most important noble of the realm, who cele-
brated important Christian holidays with the king—probably Easter and definitely 
Pentecost, according to the dates on which the respective diplomas were issued—
and the one who was received by Charles at the city of Charles the Bald, Com-
piègne.249 Just like Richard before, Robert was now a dominating presence in royal 
diplomas, receiving four more250 between 904 and 911 while also making a promi-
nent appearance in the diploma of 907.251 How important Robert had become for 
Charles is best demonstrated by the first of these diplomas. Issued for Saint-Martin 
of Tours, it instituted a memorial service not only for Charles himself, but also for 
242 DChS 43, 25th July 902.
243 See chapter III.2.1.2.
244 DChS 43, 93: …per deprecationem illustris comitis Richardi… While this is not too far off the ear-
lier DChS 33, 70 in which Richard is described as comes illustris et marchio, DChS 43 also drops 
the marchio title.
245 DChB 379.
246 On Richilde see Hyam, Ermentrude and Richildis. 
247 On Charles the Bald and Boso and this diploma in particular see Airlie, Nearly Men, 33−34.
248 DChS 45, 25th April 903, 96: …comes nobis admodum dilectus... DChS 46, 98 names Robert vir 
specialius, amabilis and carissimus, yet cannot, due to its highly problematic nature, be used for 
our analysis. DChS 47, 6th May 903 repeats the expressions used in DChS 45.
249 DDChS 45 and 46.
250 DDChS 49, 50, 54 and 66.
251 DChS 57. See above.
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Robert and his brother, the lord and king, Odo.252 Another  diploma again reflects 
the strength of Robert’s new position within the hierarchy of the nobility. Issued 
for Saint-Denis, it shows William the Pious and Robert acting together.253 Robert, 
despite being named second in the diploma, is clearly the dominating of the two. 
While William is described as “reverend count” (comes venerandus), Robert is ad-
dressed as “count and marchio” (comes et marchisus), thus underlining his supe-
riority in rank—an impression that is further strengthened by William restoring 
property to Robert’s abbey of Saint-Denis. Hence the diploma marks the acknowl-
edgement of Robert’s position by one of the most powerful men of the realm.
Robert’s dominance, however, does not mean that the old circle around the 
king had lost all of its influence. While those we labelled as Charles’  allies against 
Robert before 903 only made single appearances in the royal diplomas, some of 
his older associates remained notable also in the period after 903. The most ob-
vious example is of course the diploma from 907, in which Anskeric, Erkanger 
and Altmar appear alongside Robert.254 Furthermore, Rudolf of Laon continued 
to be present at court, intervening together with a Count Odilard for Charles’ 
notary Ernustus.255 Two more diplomas for Saint-Médard of Soissons256 were un-
doubtedly issued at the request of Heribert II of Vermandois, who succeeded his 
father between 900 and 906.257 Finally, contact with the church of Paris survived 
the death of Anskeric. His successor Theodulf was given a diploma in which he 
himself was addressed as “our beloved and venerable bishop,”258 emphasising his 
importance to the king. This was not his only appearance in Charles’  diplomas. In 
918, the king confirmed, along with other property, a donation made by the bishop 
to Saint-Marcel of Paris.259
Even more important was Fulk’s successor at Reims, the new Archbishop 
Heriveus. Heriveus was the nephew of one of Odo’s closest supporters, Count 
Hucbald of Senlis.260 It was probably due to this relationship that Heriveus became 
Odo’s notary in 894.261 Once Odo died, like Honoratus of Beauvais and Rudolf of 
Laon, Heriveus joined Charles’ side and became the new king’s notary under arch-
chancellor Fulk.262 Not even three weeks after the murder of Fulk, Heriveus was 
elected as his successor by a number of bishops from the archdiocese of Reims: 
252 DChS  49, 108: …in eleemosinam nostri et domni Odonis, quondam regis, germani sui nostro­
rumque etiam aliorum praedecessorum… …servitium…ipsa die in memoriam nostri et Odonis 
regis atque Rotberti praedecessorumque eorum…celebrent…
253 DChS 50, 110−111.
254 DChS 57.
255 DChS 51.
256 DChS 52, 906 and 58, 11th June 907. Saint-Médard probably passed into Heribert I’s hands im-
mediately after Fulk’s death. 
257 Schwager, Graf, 31 with n. 138.
258 DChS 64, 145: … dilectus noster ac venerabilis Theodulfus […] episcopus…
259 DChS 97.
260 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 11, 403.
261 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXXIX.
262 DChS 10, 8th February 898. Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XIX. 
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Riculf of Soissons, Dodilo of Cambrai, Otgar of Amiens, Mancio of Châlons, Rudolf 
of Laon and Otfrid of Senlis.263 The only source indicating that Charles had a hand 
in Heriveus’ election as archbishop is Richer, who reports that he succeeded Fulk 
by “royal grant.”264 Richer’s report, however, is based on  Flodoard, who does not 
mention any involvement of the king in the affair while Fulk had done his best to 
secure the free episcopal election.265 Nevertheless, Heriveus appears to have been 
Charles’ choice. That he had belonged to the royal chancellery even after Odo’s 
death certainly indicates that the king trusted him. But more importantly, Heriveus’ 
first official act as bishop was clearly geared towards Charles’ political interests. The 
same synod that elected him archbishop also decided on the fate of Fulk’s mur-
derers, excommunicating them while leaving their master, Baldwin of Flanders, 
unharmed266—a turn of events that perfectly fit in with Charles’ own efforts to gain 
Baldwin as a supporter in the ensuing conflict with Robert.
Heriveus’ election also reveals how well he was connected within the ecclesias-
tic elite of Francia. Six out of nine suffragans voted for him in his election267 while 
the anathem against Baldwin’s supporters, issued on the same occasion, was also 
signed by the others, as well as by Archbishop Wido of Rouen and Bishop Angel-
rannus of Meaux.268 The same bishops, or in some cases their successors, were also 
present at the council of Trosly in 909.269 Apart from Trosly, Heriveus also appears 
to have organised a number of provincial synods, during which they discussed 
not only spiritual matters, but also the state of the realm.270 While these latter were 
probably only attended by the suffragan bishops of the church of Reims, Heriveus 
also kept in contact with important men outside the borders of his province. When 
Wido of Rouen needed advice in the conversion of the Northmen, he turned to 
Heriveus.271 In 902, the archbishop of Reims met with Archbishop Hatto of Mainz, 
one of the leading nobles in the regency for Louis the Child,272 to confer not only 
over ecclesiastical affairs but also over those of use for the realm.273 Moreover, the 
archbishop also appears to have been very well connected in the West Frankish 
elite outside the church. Given his past in Odo’s chancellery, it may well have been 
263 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 11, 403−404.
264 Richer, Historiae, I, c. 19, 56: Sepulto vero domno Fulcone metropolitano, Heriueus vir spectabilis et 
palatinus, episcoporum consensu, et Remensium conibentia in pontificatu regis donatione succedit.
265 See also Schmitz, Heriveus, 63.
266 The excommuncation sentence has been preserved, MGH Conc. V, N° 47, 456−458.
267 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 11, 403−404.
268 MGH Conc. V, N° 47, 456−457.
269 MGH Conc. V, N° 58, 497−562, 562. 
270 Flodoard, HRE IV, c.  14, 407: Conventus denique synodales sepe cum coepiscopis sue dioceseos 
habuit, in quibus de pace et religione sancte dei ecclesie statuque regni Francorum salubriter com­
petenterque tractavit. On this passage, see also Schröder, Synoden, N° 18, 157−160.
271 Guillot, Étapes.
272 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 538−542.
273 Mainzer Urkundenbuch, N°  176, 109−110: …quaesituri pariter de ecclesiasticę documentis 
disciplinę regnique utilitatibus. The meeting took place 16th September 902 at Herrici monasterio, 
probably a place in Lotharingia. See Schmitz, Heriveus, 66 with n. 34 and 35.
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his connections to the Robertians that helped bringing Robert back to Charles’ 
court. His influence within and without the Church is also visible in 920, when, 
as Flodoard reports, the Frankish counts abandoned Charles.274 The circumstance 
that only the counts protested against the king’s relation to his intimate Hagano 
seems to point to Heriveus’ control over the bishops of his diocese. Some of them, 
like Abbo of Soissons and Bovo of Châlons, were close to Charles and certainly did 
not need to be convinced to remain loyal,275 in other cases however it was probably 
due to the archbishop that the bishops stood with the king. On the other hand, his 
connections to the secular nobles become apparent when Flodoard ascribes the 
settlement found between Charles and the counts to his mediation.276
Thus, Heriveus appears to have been a key figure of Charles’ reign, well con-
nected within and beyond his province and deeply involved in the politics of the 
realm. It is therefore hardly surprising that Charles’ choice fell on him to succeed 
Anskeric as archchancellor after his death in 911.277 Heriveus held the office up 
until 919 when he was replaced by Archbishop Roger of Trier,278 a development 
that seems to have left their relation unaffected, as can be seen from the events 
in 920 as well as from Heriveus’ support for Charles in the succession of Bishop 
Stephen at Liège.279 While there may have been tensions between him and the king 
in 922,280 the proposed evidence for this is ambiguous. Immediately preceding the 
breakout of the hostilities, there were negotiations between Heriveus’ fideles and 
the rebels.281 Whether this indicates cooperation between Heriveus and the rebels 
is not clear, however, and it seems at least possible that the intention of the meeting 
was to win the archbishop as mediator in the ensuing conflict. Soon after, however, 
Reims did become a holdfast for Charles’ enemies. When hostilities broke out, 
Charles devastated the possessions of the church of Reims along the Meuse. Just 
before Pentecost, inhabitants of the city stole horses from Charles’ army, leading 
to a futile assault on Reims. Soon after, Robert was crowned king at Saint-Remy.282 
Flodoard does not directly connect Heriveus to these events. He only mentions the 
archbishop’s death immediately after the coronation, making it appear as a divine 
sign against the justness of Robert’s cause and thus indicating that Heriveus at least 
274 Flodoard, Annales 920, 2.
275 On these men, see below.
276 Flodoard, Annales 920, 2: Heriveus autem, Remorum archiepiscopus, accipiens regem cum omnes 
eum desseruissent, duxit eum ad hospitia sua, in villam quae dicitur Carcarisia. In crastinum vero, 
venerunt in Crusniacum, Remensis episcopii villam, ibique manserunt donec Remis venirent. Sicque 
deduxit eum per septem fere menses, usque quo illi suos principes eumque suo restitueret regno.
277 Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XVII–XVIII.
278 The last diploma featuring Heriveus as archchancellor dates to 27th June 919 (DChS  101). 
 Occasionally Roger acted as archchancellor before this (DDChS 84, 19th January 916 and 93, 28th 
April 918). See also Schieffer, Kanzlei, 145, who gives DChS 102 (a forgery) as the last  diploma 
with Heriveus.
279 Schmitz, Heriveus, 84. See also below and Zimmermann, Streit.
280 As proposed by Schmitz, Heriveus, 79.
281 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7−8.
282 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8−10.
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tolerated the proceedings.283 However, Heriveus appears to have been sick for quite 
some time before his death284 and may have lost control over affairs at Reims.285 
In this context, we should also note the fates of Heriveus’ brother and nephew: 
shortly after the election of the archbishop’s successor Seulf, they were accused of 
having broken their oaths, imprisoned by Heribert II and Robert and deprived of 
their property.286 While the nature of their betrayal remains obscure, it seems pos-
sible that they had opted for Charles instead of Robert, which may in turn point 
towards Heriveus’ own convictions. In any case, it seems that there was a strong 
opposition against Charles within the city and the cathedral,287 an opposition over 
which Heriveus, already on his deathbed, would have had only limited influence.
Robert’s integration into Charles’  rule in 903 did not mean that the king from 
then on solely depended on him, but that a balance had been found between him, 
the circle of Charles’  old supporters and the other nobles who had joined this circle 
after 898. This new-found stability even allowed for the reintegration of  Richard 
into the royal court without threatening Robert’s position. In 907,  Richard re-
quested a diploma for Otbert, the provost of Langres, appearing at the royal court 
together with his right-hand man Manasses and Bishop Argrim of Langres.288 
Given the date of the diploma, 4th April 907, Charles and Richard seem to have 
celebrated Easter together at Compiègne, indicating the importance Charles still 
attributed to Richard and that their relationship had probably not suffered. A year 
later, Richard received another diploma, this time for Saint-Martin of Autun as 
“count and illustrious marchio.”289 By 907/908, therefore, Charles had successfully 
created a finely balanced network of support that included all of the factions that 
had previously struggled for influence at the royal court.
III.2.1.4 Lotharingia
In late 911, Charles acquired a new regnum, Lotharingia. Before focussing on his 
network of support there and the impact this event had on his relations with the 
Western nobles, we first need to address some questions concerning the nature 
of this regnum, its borders and how they affected the composition of the Lothar-
ingian nobility. From south to north, Lotharingia’s290 western border ran along 
the Saone, making an eastward turn around Chalon-sur-Saone rejoining the river 
283 Jacobsen, Flodoard, 16−17.
284 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 17, 409.
285 See also Jacobsen, Flodoard, 18 and McKitterick, Kings, 233−234.
286 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 18, 410.
287 Nevertheless, as DChS 121 (31st May 922) for Saint-Thierry of Reims indicates, there was also still 
a party in Charles’ favour.
288 DChS 55 (4th April 907, Compiègne).
289 DChS 59, 127: …comes et illustris marchio…
290 On the problematic nature of the use of the term Lotharingia, see Schneider, Suche, 14−15. We 
also follow Schneider’s analysis of Lotharingia’s borders (Schneider, Suche, 69−114) without in-
cluding his findings on the southern part of the regnum in Provence and Burgundy since by 893 
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eastwards of Gray and then leaving it again to follow the borders of the diocese. 
North of Langres the frontier crossed the Marne to the west and back, running 
parallel to the Maas and touching the river north of Mouzon from where it turned 
to the west, now following the borders of the dioceses of Liège and Cambrai in a 
westward turn, joining the Scheldt north of Cambrai and following it to the North 
Sea. Thus, parts of the dioceses of Reims and Langres were part of Lotharingia.291 
In the east, the Rhine seems have been the border, with some exceptions: Mainz, 
Worms and Speyer belonged to the Eastern kingdom while Friesland—the mod-
ern Holland including the Kennemerland and Utrecht but not Middle and East 
Friesland—belonged to the regnum Hlotharii.292 At Zwentibold’s time, Verdun 
seems to have been the most southern city of Lotharingia, with Besançon being 
contested by Arnulf and Rudolf of Upper Burgundy, the latter being able to assert 
his control of the episcopal see by 903.293 Northern Alsace seems to have been held 
by Arnulf, the south by Rudolf.294 Thus the Rhine frontier remained stable, Alsace 
and Friesland constituting what Schneider calls “Bruchlinien.”295
Six out of ten Lotharingian dioceses, Strasbourg, Basel, Trier, Cologne, Ut recht 
and Cambrai, owned territory in other kingdoms, with some having over half 
of their territory outside Lotharingia. Moreover, for the bishops of Strasbourg, 
Basel and Cambrai, their respective metropolitans were located outside of the 
regnum, at Mainz, Besançon and Reims. The Lotharingian churches were thus 
strongly oriented towards the East and the West.296 Like the churches, the nobil-
ity had close relations with families outside the regnum. As Régine Le Jan argues, 
families originating from the Trier area were also implanted into the Verdunois, 
along the Middle Rhine, in the Vermandois and the Cambrésis, their connections 
not only surviving the partition of Verdun in 843 but persisting at least until Ot-
tonian times. Other examples of continuing relations would be the Adalberos, 
descendants of Count Wigeric of the Bidgau and Count of the Palace of Charles 
the Simple, who provided an archbishop of Reims and bishop of Laon during the 
10th century.297 To this one could also add King Odo’s brother Robert, who had 
held a county in Lotharingia in the early 880s;298 his nephew, Count Megingaud, 
who was murdered by Count Alberich in 892,299 the Lotharingians who held their 
they had either become part of the Western kingdom or of Boso’s realm. Much shorter but less 
precise is Parisse, Lotharingie, 34.
291 Schneider, Suche, 75−76.
292 Schneider, Suche, 77−93.
293 Schneider, Suche, 103−104 with Poupardin, Royaume, 26−27.
294 Zotz, Elsaß, 63.
295 Schneider, Suche, 108.
296 Schneider, Suche, 197−181.
297 Le Jan, Aristocratie, 75. On Wigeric’s family, see also Parisse, Généalogie.
298 DChF 105. See also chapter II.3.
299 Regino, Chronicon 892, 140. Megingaud had also been close to Archbishop Hincmar (Flodoard, 
HRE III, c. 26, 340). Archbishop Fulk was also drawn into the affair (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 375 
and c. 6, 389). On the conflict, see Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 110−111.
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amicitia with Odo, although they were supposed to support Charles the Simple 
in 894300 and, of course, Reginar Longneck.301 For similar phenomena in the East, 
we could name Count Gerhard, who married Oda, daughter of Count Otto of 
Saxony,302 or the Konradiner family, who had a strong influence on Lotharingian 
politics during the first decade of the 10th century.303
Did these nobles consider themselves to be Lotharingians and were they at-
tached to the idea of the existence of an entity called Lotharingia?304 A middle 
kingdom was certainly perceived as a separate regnum, although, in reality, this 
entity proved to be an extremely fragile one.305 In fact, it seems that the idea of 
Lotharingia was created by those foreign to the regnum,306 while the Lotharing-
ians themselves had not forgotten the old origin of the region as part of Francia.307 
Hence, doubts concerning the existence of a specific Lotharingian identity are 
understandable,308 even if some scholars argue in its favour.309 It may best serve 
us if we follow Régine Le Jan, who acknowledges the existence of a Lotharingian 
identity, but denies it being consistent and describes it as overall too weak to serve 
as a framework for the development of an independent kingdom.310 Thus, Lothar-
ingia presents itself not as a monolithic block resting between two kingdoms in the 
east and west, but as a region with a fragmented aristocracy,311 which latter pursued 
individual interests by using their relations reaching beyond the borders of the 
regnum into the neighbouring kingdoms.
These individual interests become apparent under the reigns of Zwentibold 
and Louis the Child, providing us with the necessary background to understand 
the implementation of Charles’  rule over Lotharingia. During these years, four 
factions, centred on individuals and families, struggled for control over the reg-
num: Archbishop Ratbod of Trier, Reginar Longneck, the Matfrid family and the 
Konradiner. The first to emerge as the leading figure was Ratbod, who became 
300 Annales Vedastini 894, 74−75.
301 See chapter I.2.2.
302 Regino, Chronicon 897, 145 and 900, 148.
303 On the Konradiner family, see Jackman, Konradiner; Heidrich, Adelsgeschlecht and Offergeld, 
Reges pueri, 547−555. Particularly on their influence in Lotharingian affairs, see Hlawitschka, 
Lotharingien, 189−193 and Boshof, Lotharingien, 144. For other examples see also Margue, Nous, 
412−413.
304 Following the basic definition of Henri Tajfel (Tajfel and Turner, Identitiy), a group consists of 
indiviuals who perceive themselves as belonging to the same social category, possess a certain 
amount of emotional attachment to this category and agree with the others about their member-
ship and the evaluation of the group.
305 Goetz, Perception.
306 Margue, Nous, 414 and 420.
307 Ewig, Beobachtungen, 349−356, Goetz, Perception, 122 and Margue, Nous, 397. For Regino’s 
perception of Lotharingia, see Goetz, Dux, 96−114.
308 Schneidmüller, Regnum, Brühl, Deutschland, 309 and Schneider, Suche, 273.
309 Anton, Synoden, 118−124 and Bauer, Lotharingien, 640. Against them, see Hartmann, Lotharing-
ien, 142 and Schneider, Suche, 123 and 484.
310 Le Jan, Aristocratie, 75.
311 Le Jan, Aristocratie, 77−79.
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Zwentibold’s archchancellor312 and appears in four of the king’s first diplomas, 
intervening as “most holy archbishop” and “our beloved” on behalf of Prüm, Saint-
Mihiel, Echternach and his own church.313 The following year, however, his in-
fluence seems to have suffered considerably. He did not intervene anymore and 
by the end of the year even lost his position as archchancellor to Hermann of 
Cologne.314 This was undoubtedly caused by the rise of Reginar at the royal court, 
who, at the same time, received the abbey of Saint-Servais of Maastricht, which 
had been given to the church of Trier by Arnulf in 889.315 Ratbod still remained 
in contact with the court, however, receiving further diplomas316 and slowly re-
gaining his influence and offices,317 until May 898, when Zwentibold turned away 
from Reginar and restored Saint-Servais to the church of Trier.318 Under Louis the 
Child, Ratbod’s importance remained unbroken, probably due to an alliance with 
the Konradiner family.319 Louis again confirmed his possession of Saint-Servais,320 
along with a number of other diplomas for the church of Trier.321 His influence at 
court, however, is probably best reflected by his continued service as archchancel-
lor for Lotharingian affairs,322 his intervention on behalf of Saint-Evre of Toul323 
and his personal receipt of a royal gift.324
Reginar’s first appearance at Zwentibold’s side is connected to the king’s expe-
dition to the Western realm in support of Charles. When tensions arose between 
the two kings, Reginar left Charles’  side for Zwentibold.325 From this point on-
wards, his star was on the rise. He intervened in front of the king326 and received 
Saint-Servais and Echternach;327 the latter, like the former, previously held by 
312 Schieffer, Urkunden Zwentibolds, 6. On the Lotharingian chancellery see also Schieffer, Kanzlei.
313 DDZ 2 (5th June 895, for Prüm, 19: …sanctissimi archiepiscopi Ratboti…), 3 (14th August 895, 
for Saint-Mihiel, dilectus noster), 4 (25th October 895, for Trier) and 5 (28th October 895, for 
Echternach, 26−27: …dilectus archiepiscopus sed et summus cancellarius noster Ratpotus…).
314 DZ 12 (11th November 896) figures Hermann of Cologne in the position usually reserved for the 
chancellor, yet only referring to him as archchaplain. DZ 13 (28th January 897) sees Ratbod again, 
DDZ 14−17 note again Hermann.
315 Beumann, Kurswechsel, 430 and DA 53. On Saint-Servais, see also Lößlein, Ressources.
316 DDZ 13 and 14.
317 DZ 18 (5th February 898) figures him acting as archchancellor again, in DZ 19 he intervenes on 
behalf of the abbey of Werden.
318 Parisot, Royaume, 544. DDZ 20 and 21 for the restoration of Saint-Servatius. On these diplomas, 
see also Beumann, Kurswechsel.
319 DLCh 17 notes him intervening with Conrad and Gebhard.
320 Lechner, Urkunden, N° 554, 871. Parisot, Royaume, 612 apparently did not know of this deper-
ditum. Hlawitschka, Lotharingen, did know about it but considered it to be a mere appeasement 
for Ratbod without any influence on the actual state of the abbey.
321 DDLCh 2 and 17.
322 Schieffer, Urkunden Ludwigs des Kindes, 84−85.
323 DLCh 49.
324 DLCh 59.
325 Annales Vedastini 895, 76.
326 DZ 7, 22nd January 896, for Saint-Denis.
327 Schieffer, Kanzlei, 31.
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Archbishop Ratbod.328 The high point of their relations was undoubtedly reached 
in late 897, when Reginar spent Christmas with Zwentibold and intervened as 
“our beloved” for Saint-Evre of Toul.329 Reginar’s own possessions and honores are 
hard to track330 and widely scattered, but the centre of his influence seems to have 
been in the Hesbaye and the Hainaut region, as whose count he is most commonly 
identified but never actually named in the sources. His intervention for an abbey 
so far from his own possessions underlines his influence at court just like Regino 
of Prüm’s description of him as Zwentibold’s “most loyal and only advisor.”331 It 
was probably also due to his influence that, after Megingaud’s murderer Alber-
ich had been killed by Count Stephen, Zwentibold intervened and withdrew not 
only Stephen’s own honores, but also those of his supporters, to distribute them 
amongst his own followers.332 Yet this moment also proved to be the zenith of Regi-
nar’s influence at Zwentibold’s court. Shortly after, the king restored his favour to-
wards Ratbod and, in turn, withdrew all the honores and possessions Reginar held 
within his realm and ordered him to leave the regnum within a fortnight.333 Instead 
of leaving the realm, the count withdrew to Durfos, sought out allies and called 
Charles into the realm.334 Zwentibold’s rule now started to deteriorate. After the 
negotiations that took place at St Goar early in 899 to settle the conflicts in Lothar-
ingia, the king renewed his efforts to make the count submit, yet not only failed 
but was also resisted by his bishops, who refused to excommunicate the rebels.335 
Rejected by the vast majority of the Lotharingian nobles and without the help of 
his father after Arnulf ’s death on 8th December 899, Zwentibold sought refuge in 
devastating the country. The Lotharingian aristocracy chose Arnulf ’s legitimate 
son Louis as a replacement king, to whom they paid their homage at Thionville 
and Aachen. Zwentibold found his end in battle against the Counts Stephen, Ger-
hard and Matfrid on 13th August 900.336
328 Schieffer, Kanzlei, 31 and 45−46. 
329 DZ 17, 28th December 897, 48: …Reginharius dilectus comes noster…
330 Goetz, Dux, 311−314 and Espace, 171 as well as Barth, Herzog, 30–36 and Hope, Development, 
201−205.
331 Regino, Chronicon 898, 145: Eodem anno Zuendibolch Reginarium ducem sibi fidissimum et uni­
cum consiliarium, nescio cuius instinctu, a se repulit et honoribus, hereditatibus, quas in suo regno 
habebat, interdictis eum extra regnum infra XIIII dies secedere iubet.
332 Regino, Chronicon 896, 144 and 897, 144. Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 110−111 with n. 175 and 176 
and Schieffer, Kanzlei, 23−30. Reginar’s influence has been proposed by Hlawitschka, Lotharing-
ien, 173. Hlawitschka points out that when Zwentibold did move against the counts, he did start 
from the Maas region where Reginar had his centre of power. Furthermore, after Zwentibold had 
turned on Reginar, he drew his support again from the region around Diedenhofen, where, in 
turn, the Matfrid brothers were based.
333 Regino, Chronicon 898, 145.
334 Regino, Chronicon 898, 145−146; Annales Vedastini 898, 80. Hlawitschka, Herzog, 433, n. 38 is 
probably right to identify Durfos with Furfoz, close to Dinant, or Fooz, south of Namur, over 
Doveren, close to Herzogenbosch.
335 Regino, Chronicon 899, 147; Annales Fuldenses (Altaich continuation) 900, 134. On the negative 
bias of the sources against Zwentibold, see Hartmann, Lotharingien, 126−128.
336 Regino, Chronicon 900, 148 and DDLCh 2 and 3.
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These latter two belonged to the powerful Matfrid family,337 which had its 
power centre around Metz with more possessions in the Bliesgau and the Spe-
yergau, and influence over the Jülichgau, the Zülpichgau and the Eifelgau, where 
the third brother Richer became abbot of Prüm in 899.338 Early during Zwen-
tibold’s reign, the family was represented at the royal court by Abbot Stephen 
of Saint-Mihiel.339 When Zwentibold went against Count Stephen, the brothers 
Gerhard and Matfrid supported the latter, in turn losing their honores.340 While it 
seems possible that they soon reentered the king’s favour and supported Zwenti-
bold against Reginar,341 they turned away from him again after the conference of 
St Goar—as noted, they killed him in combat. Under Louis the Child, the Matfrids 
renewed their efforts to extend their influence. Not long after Zwentibold’s death, 
Gerhard married his widow, Oda, daughter of Otto of Saxony and sister of Henry 
the Fowler, who was to become king of the Eastern realm in 919.342 This brought 
them into competition with the Konradiner family, who had dominated Arnulf ’s 
last years343 and whose own relative Louis had now become king.344 This family, 
highly involved in the regency for Louis together with Archbishop Hatto of Mainz 
and Bishop Adalbero of Augsburg, now also held some of the honores the Mat-
frids had lost in 897, including at least the abbeys of Saint-Maximin and Oeren 
of Trier.345 In addition to these, Gebhard, the leading member of the Konradiner 
in Lotharingia, whose dominance at court is not only reflected by his numerous 
interventions in Lotharingian matters346 but also by him being described dux of 
Lotharingia347 in one of Louis’  diplomas, held properties in the Wormsgau and 
was count of Wetterau.348 Other Konradiner were given honores in Lotharingia: 
Eberhard and Otto were given comital rights along the Lower Rhine while their 
337 On the earlier importance of the Matfrid family, see Brunner, Fürstentitel, 286−287.
338 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 167 with n. 29 and 30. See also Staab, Jugement, 382 for a map of the 
Matfrids’ possessions.
339 DZ 8, 3rd May 896. DLCh 57 describes Stephen as ipsius [Count Gerhard] proximus affini, point-
ing to a kinship by marriage. Also, under Louis the Child, Stephen remained important, receiv-
ing more diplomas for Saint-Mihiel (DDLCh 36 and 62) as well as for his new bishopric Liège 
(DDLCh 55 and 57).
340 DLCh 59.
341 DLCh 59.
342 Regino, Chronicon 897, 145 and 900, 148. On Oda, see Werner, Nachkommen, 459−460 and 
Hlawitschka, Anfänge, 59−60.
343 Gebhard and Conrad represented Arnulf at St Goar. See chapter III.2.1.1, n. 188. Hartmann, Lo-
tharingien, 137, also sees their dominance in relation to the accusations of adultery against Ar-
nulf ’s wife Oda.
344 Louis’ mother Oda is generally seen as a member of the Konradiner family (e.g. Werner, 
Nachkommen, 456). Against this view and pointing to more distant relation between Louis and 
the Konradiner, Jackman, Konradiner, 136−139 and Jackman, König. On Jackman’s work (how-
ever not on the passage concerning Oda), see Hlawitschka, Thronwechsel, 201−248. On the Kon-
radiner family, see also Heidrich, Adelsgeschlecht.
345 Regino, Chronicon 906, 150−151.
346 DDLCh 17, 18, 53, 55, 57 and 70.
347 DLCh 20, 126: … Kebehart dux regni qui a multis Hlotharii dicitur…
348 DDLCh 48 and 71. See also Heidrich, Adelsgeschlecht, 68.
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brother Conrad the Younger, the later king, received the abbey of Kaiserwerth 
and became count of the Keldachgau.349 Overall, they seem to have dominated 
the Middle Rhine between Worms and Cologne.350 The Konradiners’  dominance 
only became contestable when they became involved in the famous feud against 
the Babenberger351 in 906 and this was indeed the moment the Matfrids chose to 
strike. Gerhard and Matfrid captured Saint-Maximin and Oeren, but soon enough 
Conrad the Younger mustered an army in Lotharingia and forced them to retreat 
to the Bliesgau, where an armistice was concluded until the end of the Easter week. 
In October 906, during the assembly at Metz, the Matfrids were judged and lost 
their honores.352 Nothing further is known of the affair, but it can be assumed that 
they soon submitted and were reinstated into their holdings. At court, however, 
their influence remained low: not a single one of Louis’  diplomas shows them 
intervening.
Also present at Metz was Reginar Longneck,353 who probably had recovered his 
honores upon the fall of Zwentibold. His renewed political importance is not only 
reflected by his own connection with the Konradiner,354 but also by two diplomas 
that confirmed him holding the abbeys of Stavelot and Echternach.355 His big mo-
ment seems to have come when Konradiner power in Lotharingia was shaken 
by the death of Gebhard during the battle of Augsburg against the Hungarians 
in 910.356 In a private charter he issued after Gebhard’s death to exchange goods 
with a certain Harduin, he was depicted as “count and missus dominicus as well as 
abbot.”357 Sending missi around the realm to serve as royal legates and thereby as 
means to relate the royal centre with the local power holders was a practice that, by 
the early 10th century, had long ceased to exist.358 Of course Reginar’s charter was 
not a royal diploma and therefore does not necessarily reflect his actual standing 
at court. But he at least claimed to be a missus, the link between the nobles of the 
area and the king. That he could act as such is demonstrated by a number of other 
charters issued by him, showing him in connection with counts like Wigeric359, 
349 DDLCh 35 and 73.
350 Goetz, Dux, 317−318.
351 On this feud, see Störmer, Fehde.
352 Regino, Chronicon 906, 150−152 and DDLCh 51 and 57.
353 DLCh  50. Reginar was also present when property of the Matfrids was distributed in 908. 
DLCh 57.
354 DLCh  57 shows him acting together with Gebhard and Archbishop Hermann of Cologne at 
Aachen.
355 DLChS 16 and 53. 
356 On his death, see Dümmler, Geschichte III, 557 with n. 2.
357 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 51, 122: …comes ac missus dominicus nec non et abba… See also 
Kienast, Herzogstitel, 376.
358 On their roles see for example Werner, Missus, 192−211.
359 Wampach, Geschichte I,2, N° 161, 247−248. 4th February 903−3rd February 904. Wigeric, the 
new count of the Bidgau. See chapter III.2.1.5, n. 383.
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Otbert360, Isaac and Meginhard.361 We should therefore consider this charter as 
a sign of Reginar’s importance both at court and within the Lotharingian nobil-
ity, which placed him in a position similar to the one Gebhard had held until his 
death.362
III.2.1.5 The early Lotharingian network
By 911, Reginar appears to have occupied a central position within the Lotharing-
ian nobility, rivalled by Archbishop Ratbod of Trier; while the Matfrid family had 
lost much of its former influence. It is therefore hardly surprising that Reginar 
became the centre of Charles’  new network within Lotharingia, especially when 
taking into consideration their earlier contacts before 895 and in 899. As Charles 
entered his new regnum, Reginar moved southwards from his own powerbase to 
meet the king on his way to Alsace. For the next months he probably accompanied 
Charles, thus spending not only Christmas but also Easter with the king.363 Regi-
nar was now given control over several abbeys: Saint-Maximin of Trier,364 formerly 
in the hands of the Konradiner family, probably Chièvremont365 and, once again, 
Saint-Servais366 of Maastricht, taken from the church of Trier. Ratbod, on the other 
hand, did not appear in Charles’  diplomas until August 913,367 indicating that the 
most important cleric of Lotharingia kept his distance and waited to see how the 
events would unfold. Consequently, Charles gave no heed to the archbishop’s 
claims and returned the abbey to Reginar, making it clear that it was the count 
who was in the dominant position. Ratbod’s reluctance to acknowledge Charles 
was probably also why Saint-Maximin was granted to Reginar, who thus gained 
a foothold within the heart of Ratbod’s territory and ensured that the king could 
extend his influence over the city.368 Reginar remained Charles’  most important 
supporter in Lotharingia until his death in 915, as signalled by his appearances 
in five royal diplomas,369 setting him apart from the other nobles not only by the 
number of his petitions, but also by the use of the marchio title,370 otherwise only 
reserved for Robert and Richard in the West.371
360 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 50, 120−121. 6th April 907.
361 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 51, 122. 1st June 911. Isaac, count of Cambrai, also appears in 
 Louis’ last diploma for Lotharingia, DLCh 76, together with Count Conrad the Younger and 
Count Warner.
362 See Brunner, Fürstentitel 289−290, Schieffer, Kanzlei, 114−115 and Hlawitschka, Lotharingien 
193−194, and last Schneider, Suche, 144. Goetz, Dux, 334 argues for an actual royal office.
363 DDChS 69 (1st January 912) and 72 (12th April 912, Easter Sunday).
364 DChS 69.
365 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 202.
366 Lößlein, Ressources.
367 DChS 74.
368 On the use of abbeys to ensure royal power over border regions, see Helvétius, Abbatiat laique.
369 DDChS 69, 72, 76, 65 and 81.
370 DDChS 65, 147 (comes et demarchus) and 81, 181 (marchio strenuus).
371 William the Pious, usually added to the list, is only described as marchio in DChS 102, a forgery.
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The use of the title of marchio raises the question of Reginar’s actual position 
within Lotharingia, since it was otherwise only applied to Robert and Richard in 
the West—two men whose control over Neustria and Burgundy was rather tight. 
Comparing the applications of this title, we can make note of remarkable differ-
ences concerning the epithets accompanying it. In the West, these were substan-
tially more elaborate: “Richard, our illustrious count and beloved marchio”372 or 
“Robert, our most beloved marchio and abbot.”373 In contrast, the epithets used 
for Reginar remain on a level no different from those used for other nobles,374 
the exception being the otherwise unused “strenuous”375 and the more common 
“illustrious.”376 Interestingly, Reginar is never described as “beloved.” We should 
also note that, in fact, Reginar is never depicted as a marchio in diplomas in which 
he intervenes on his own, but only when he appears with the most important man 
of the West, Robert. This happened on only two occasions, once at an unknown 
date after April 912377 and then in August 915.378 Both diplomas were issued for 
the church of Liège to which Robert appears to have had earlier ties.379 In the first 
diploma, Reginar and Robert are depicted in the same way as “count and demar-
chus”; in the second, the title of “strenuous marchio” is reserved for Reginar alone, 
while Robert’s importance is underlined by the singular description as “our High-
ness’  most loyal executor.”380 The fact that Reginar is only named marchio when 
appearing with Robert indicates that the use of the title probably relies on Robert 
and is then extended to Reginar to emphasise his importance at Charles’  court by 
honouring him on par with the Robertian. As Andrea Stieldorf has remarked, for 
Reginar “marchio” is only used as an honorary title to express a particularly high 
degree of proximity to the king, not to describe a closely defined official function.381
372 DChS 32, 68: …Richaldi, illustris comitis et dilecti markionis nostri…
373 DChS 78, 175: …Robertus, dilectissimus nobis marchio atque abbas…
374 DChS 69, 155 (venerabilis), DChS 72, 162 (venerandus). Venerabilis is also used for the counts 
Guarner, Theoderic and Letard (DChS 67) as well as Count Ricuin of Verdun, who is further-
more described as vir nobilissimus (DChS 73). The venerandus also appears in connection with 
Count Berengar (DChS 72). On the importance of epithets see Brunner, Fürstentitel, 198−203.
375 DChS 81, 181: …Raginerus, marchio strenuus…
376 DChS  76, 171: …Reginarius, illustris comes... Illustris indeed only appears in connection with 
more important nobles, although not only for Robert and Richard, but also counts like Gerald 
(DChS 21), Aledramnus (DChS29), Ecfrid (DChS 35) and Ermenfrid (DChS 41). 
377 DChS  65, dated by Lauer, Recueil Charles  III, 146 to 911−915 and corrected by Font-Réaulx, 
Diplômes, 43 to 912−913 because of the use of the rex Francorum without the vir illustris. While 
I do agree with de Font-Réaulx for 912 being the earliest year, I cannot see why the diploma 
could not have been issued after 913. Since Reginar died in 915 (Parisot, Royaume, 609−610), in 
accordance with Lauer this would be the last possible year. On this diploma, see also Bonenfant, 
Malines, 96−108 and Dierkens, Abbayes, 149−151.
378 DChS 81.
379 DChF 105, dated to 884. In this diploma, Franco and Robert both plead the Emperor to grant a 
manse to Robert’s fidelis Sanctio. The identification of this count with Odo’s brother has been 
made by Joachim Wollasch, Gerard, 63.
380 DChS 81, 181: …Rotbertus, nostre serenitatis exequtor fidelissimus…
381 Stieldorf, Marken, 214−216.
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Reginar was undoubtedly a very powerful man within Lotharingia, royally en-
dowed with several rich abbeys and therefore having enormous resources at his 
disposal. Yet, the sources do not indicate that he controlled a large number of 
counties, enjoyed the functions of a wider military command or had any influence 
on the episcopal sees in his vicinity382—all of which are applicable to different de-
grees to Robert and Richard in the Western realm. Thus, Reginar’s importance to 
Charles did not so much stem from his control over significant abbatial resources, 
but from his personal connections to other important Lotharingian nobles like his 
sons-in-law, Count Berengar and Count Wigeric, who he introduced to Charles’ 
court,383 or the counts Otbert,384 Isaac and Meginhard.385 Charles used Reginar to 
gain access to his personal network, but Reginar was not an all-dominating figure 
like Robert in Neustria or Richard in Burgundy.386
Indeed, while Reginar was the most prevalent figure in Charles’  diplomas 
within Lotharingia and was honoured by the marchio title, the king’s connections 
to the Lotharingian nobility were by no means channelled through him as in the 
case of Burgundy and Richard. Charles’  initial journey to his new regnum shows 
a large variety of contacts covering most of Lotharingia. His first contact was with 
Bishop Stephen of Cambrai,387 who not only received two diplomas but also came 
with a group of counts, Guarner, Theoderic388 and Letard, the latter probably count 
of the Moselgau.389 In the south, Charles first passed through the territories of the 
382 Reginar does appear together with different bishops in Charles’ diplomas (as before under Zwen-
tibold and Louis the Child), namely Stephen of Liège and Dado of Verdun (DDChS 65 and 81, 
both for the church of Liège). However, in both cases Robert is also mentioned, who seems to have 
had a personal connection to the church of Liège. See chapter III.2.1. It was only Reginar’s son 
Gislebert who tried to extend his influence over the see of Liège, an endeavour over which he fell 
out with Charles. On Reginar’s limited power in Lotharingia, see Goetz, Dux, 362−364, 367−369, 
376−379, 397−400 and summarising 404−408. The few sources we have only show Reginar acting 
as a (powerful) count, only intervening in affairs directly concerning himself or his abbacies.
383 DChS 72. On Berengar being Reginar’s son-in-laws see Le Jan, Famille, 453. Wigeric married 
Cunigunde, daughter of Reginar and Ermentrude, Charles the Simple’s niece. On Count Wigeric, 
see last Hlawitschka, Ahnen I,2, 224−231. Nonn’s, Urkunde, hypothesis that Wigeric was Count 
Odacar’s son, followed by Le Jan, Famille, 184 and 384, n. 18, has been denied by Hlawitschka due 
to the charter evidence being forgeries and the missing connections between Odacar and Wigeric 
in the Liber Memorialis of Remiremont.
384 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 50, 120−121. 6th April 907.
385 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 51, 122. 1st June 911.
386 See also Goetz, Dux, 351 for Reginar’s network. Furthermore, he remarks that Reginar hardly 
ever acted alone, but always cooperated with other equal nobles.
387 DDChS 67 and 68. On DChS 67 see Vercauteren, Note and Bauer, Lotharingien, 106−111.
388 This Theoderic may have been the son Gerulf and brother to Waltger, a count in Friesland. Pari-
sot, Royaume, 584 and 590 argues against this identification, since Waltger appears in one of 
Conrad I’s diplomas, intervening on behalf of the church of Utrecht in 914 (DKoI 24), which 
indicates that they opposed Charles up until 916, when both were present at a judicium at Herstal 
(DChS 84). In this context, however, it may be worth pointing out examples like that of Richard 
and Boso in the 880s, two brothers who were not pursuing the same politics. Family bonds were 
certainly strong, yet do not necessarily mean that members of the same familiy always worked 
together.
389 Vercauteren, Note, 102.
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Matfrids around Metz.390 While none of the diplomas preserved indicates their 
presence at Charles’  court at that time, it, nevertheless, seems highly probable 
that were in contact. Next, he met with Bishop Drogo of Toul and Count Ricuin 
of Verdun391 as well as Abbess Rotrude of Andlau,392 indicating the extension of 
his network to the south of Lotharingia. The composition of this group reveals a 
distinctive shift in the circle of nobles in close contact with Charles in compari-
son with Louis the Child. The church of Cambrai had been favoured by Zwenti-
bold393 and Ricuin had belonged to his last supporters.394 Both, however, fell out 
of favour under Louis and do not once appear in his diplomas. Stephen was then 
granted the right to erect a castle, install a market and the right to issue coins at a 
place close to the holdings of his family.395 Ricuin probably gained decisive influ-
ence over Saint-Mihiel, on whose behalf he intervened twice and was described as 
“most noble man.”396 Drogo’s predecessor at Toul, Ludelm, had been close to both 
Zwentibold and Louis,397 yet Drogo himself did not appear at Louis’  court398 while 
he received two diplomas from Charles.399 These examples indicate that Charles 
sought out allies amongst those whose ambitions had been curbed by Louis. By 
allowing these nobles access to his court, Charles satisfied their ambitions and 
therefore tied them to his own rule. This method, however, did not work on all 
occasions, notably so in the regions described by Jens Schneider as “Bruchlinien,” 
Alsace and Friesland.400 Strasbourg and its Bishop Otbert stood with Conrad401 
and so did Bishop Radbod of Utrecht402—the former’s church last having been in 
contact with Arnulf, the latter’s with Zwentibold.403
Different from these cases is that of Bishop Stephen of Liège, the former abbot 
of Saint-Mihiel. Stephen had been close to both Zwentibold and Louis the Child, 
390 DChS 69, Metz. On his way back to the West, Charles passed again through Metz (DChS 73).
391 DDChS 70 (Drogo), 71 (Drogo and Ricuin) and 73 (Ricuin).
392 DChS 125. On this diploma, see de Font-Réaulx, Diplômes, 44 and Schieffer, Urkunden Zwenti-
bolds und Ludwigs des Kindes, 201.
393 DZ  23 and two deperdita (Schieffer, Urkunden Zwentibolds, 5), issued for Bishop Dodilo of 
 Cambrai.
394 DZ 27, 23rd January 899.
395 DChS 67 with Vercauteren, Note.
396 DChS 73 for the monk Uncrin of Saint-Mihiel (here also the vir nobilissimus, 164) and 83.
397 DZ 17 and a deperdita (Schieffer, Urkunden Zwentibolds, 5); DLCh 7 and a deperdita (Schieffer, 
Urkunden Ludwigs des Kindes, 80).
398 Drogo had succeeded Ludelm in 906, leaving about four years for him to appear at Louis’ court 
(Regino, Chronicon, 152−153). Ludelm died 11th September. See Parisot, Royaume, 570, n. 1.
399 DChS 70 and 71.
400 Schneider, Suche, 108.
401 Conrad issued diplomas at Strasbourg in 912 and 913. DDKoI 5 and 17. The Annales  Alamannici 
(912, 188) report that the city was burned down following the outbreak of hostilities between 
Charles and Conrad.
402 Bishop Radbod of Utrecht seems to have had connections to the Konradiner. DKoI 24 and  Heidrich, 
Adelsgeschlecht, 68. Büttner, Heinrich, 12, Große, Bistum, 20−21 and van Vliet, Kringen, 153.
403 DA 88 and DZ 9. On the positive memory of Zwentibold in Utrecht, see Hartmann, Lotharing-
ien, 139−140.
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requesting diplomas for both his abbey and his new bishopric.404 Now his church 
was granted some smaller abbeys on the Meuse and the Demer at the request of 
Reginar, Robert of Neustria and another Robert.405 The presence of both of these 
men indicates how well-connected Stephen was within the highest ranks of the 
nobility. But what is more, Stephen was also related both to the Matfrid family 
and Charles himself406 and had long had contacts with the Western realm. Before 
he had become bishop of Liège, he appears to have aimed for another (unknown) 
bishopric, using a connection to Archbishop Fulk to gain the see, albeit without 
success.407 But his relation to Charles himself becomes visible long before 912. At 
the beginning of his reign, Charles issued a diploma for Saint-Mihiel.408 While this 
diploma has to be read in the context of the relations between Charles and Zwen-
tibold and Charles and Robert,409 the choice to issue a diploma for this abbey was 
most probably also due to the relation between the king and its abbot—Stephen.410 
Now Charles not only issued a diploma for the church of Liège, but also confirmed 
a donation made to a monk at Saint-Mihiel, which had initially been granted by 
Louis the Child on behalf of Stephen.411 The bishop of Liège is, like Reginar, one 
example of a noble who preserved his influence at court and was perhaps able to 
extend it; undoubtedly, very much like Reginar, due to his earlier connections to 
Charles.
While Reginar and Stephen were easily integrated within Charles’  rule, Arch-
bishop Ratbod of Trier, Reginar’s old rival, appears to have been reluctant to ac-
knowledge Charles as the new king. Like other Lotharingian bishops, his origins 
lay in the east of the regnum, in his case in Alemannia.412 Maybe it was due to these 
connections that he remained absent from Charles’  court until August 913, when 
he met with the king at Thionville, on Charles’  way back to the Western realm.413 
Ratbod probably waited to see whether the new king in the East, Conrad, would 
be able to successfully challenge Charles.414 Only when it became clear that the 
404 Stephen appears in DZ 8 and DLCh 36 and 50. Saint-Mihiel and Liège received, without him be-
ing mentioned, the diplomas DDZ 3 and 24 as well as DLCh 55, 57 and 62.
405 DChS 65.
406 DChS 81, 181: …nostre consanguinitati affinis dilectissimi…
407 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 7, 396.
408 DChS 11, 13th February 898.
409 See below. 
410 Hlawitscka, Lotharingien, 171−172.
411 DChS 73 and DLCh 36.
412 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 182. Another example is Bishop Robert of Metz, whose roots were in 
Bavaria. Archbishop Hermann of Cologne was bound to the East by his interests in the bishopric 
of Bremen.
413 DChS 74, 13th August 913. Charles’ next diploma (DChS 76, 16th January 914) was issued at 
 Attigny.
414 Conrad tried to regain control of Lotharingia in 912 and 913. Annales Alamannici 912 (Cod. 
Modoetiensis), 188: Karolus in Alsatia et Chonradus in Hlodarios et facta fide ficta Chuonradus 
in Hlodarios iterum usque ad aquas et Hlodariique in Argentinam civitatem eaque vastata et con­
busta est. And 913 (Cod. Tur.), 190: …iterum Chuonradus cum exercitu regnum Hlutharingorum 
ingressus est. See also DDKoI 5 and 17.
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Carolingian would prevail did Ratbod seek him out—long after Charles had given 
a number of abbeys originally belonging to the church of Trier to Reginar. The 
diploma celebrating Ratbod’s entry into Charles’  service415 was a carefully pro-
duced textual object, written and designed not in the royal but the archiepiscopal 
chancellery.416 Its preamble referred to Gelasian doctrine, calling upon the king 
as a partner of the church of God,417 thus laying down the basis of the alliance: as 
long as Charles protected the Church, the archbishop would stand at his side.418 
The diploma also displayed a new monogram and seal, both modelled after ex-
amples from Charlemagne and Louis the Pious.419 These references may have been 
inspired by Charles’  interests in the early Carolingians, as can be seen from the 
use of the intitulatio rex Francorum, vir illustris. At that point, however, Charles 
had already given up the use of vir illustris.420 Therefore, it may indeed have been 
the case that monogram and seal had also been made as a gift for Charles in the 
archiepiscopal chancellery. In any case, they were only used in this one diploma. 
This newly found concord between Charles and the archbishop was celebrated 
by another singular event. Ratbod, who was made the king’s new archchaplain,421 
also acted as his archchancellor, despite this position being already occupied by 
Heriveus. If he had hoped to regain the position he had held under Louis the 
Child, that is to say, to act as archchancellor in all cases involving Lotharingian 
recipients, Ratbod was to be disappointed. The royal Lotharingian chancellery had 
415 DChS 74.
416 Schieffer, Kanzlei, 139−140; Bautier, Chancellerie, 21, n. 1 and Patzold, Episcopus, 88. Theodulf 
probably also wrote DDLCh 59 and 76. See also Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XXXVIIIXLVI.
417 DChS 74, 165−166: Cum totum sanctae Dei aecclesiae corpus sacerdotalis provisione et ammin­
istratione regalique tuitione procurari unumque sentire concorditer regia majestas cum ministris 
Domini debeat, aequum fore censemus pontificum nostrorum petitionibus pro aecclesiasticis ne­
gotiis subplicantium assensum praebere quorum orationibus nos et regni nostri statum incunctan­
ter credimus suffragari.
418 On the Gelasian doctrine in the Carolingian age, see Anton, Synoden; Delaruelle, En relisant; 
Ladner, Aspects; Benson, Doctrine and Sassier, Auctoritas. On the Gelasian doctrine in Charles’ 
diplomas, see Patzold, Episcopus, 88−90 and Koziol, Politics, 488−492. Three of Charles’ di-
plomas refer to the doctrine in their preambles: DDChS 40 (901, for the church of Noyon), 74 
and 106 (920, for the church of Cambrai). Trying to make any deductions concerning Charles’ 
own convictions based on these diplomas is extremly problematic. Font-Réaulx, Diplômes, 42, 
doubted the genuineness of DChS 40; Guyotjeannin, Episcopus, 40 considered it “profondément 
interpolé.” It seems that the diploma, as Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XIV assumed, was at least not 
written in Charles’ chancellery. DChS 74, in turn, was composed not in the royal, but the archi-
episcopal chancellery of Trier, similar to DChS 106, which seems to have been edited at Cam-
brai (Lauer, Recueil Charles III, 252, n. 5 and Duvosquel, Cession, 176). Concerning these last 
two, it should also be noted that both were issued under very particular political circumstances, 
DChS 106 just after Charles had reconciled with the nobles in 920 (see below, chapter III.2.2).
419 Lauer, Recueil Charles III, LXXVIII−LXXIX for the monogram and XLVII−XLVIII for the seal. 
See also above.
420 See above.
421 Usually, the office of archchaplain appears to have been held by the archbishops of Cologne. Since 
Zwentibold, however, the office appears to have been vacant. Schieffer, Kanzlei, 139.
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come to an end,422 and there was to be only one royal chancellery—the one under 
the archbishop of Reims.
III.2.1.6 A king of two regna?
As we have seen, Charles’  initial Lotharingian network contains no surprises but 
ties in with the one of Louis the Child, extending it to include those nobles who 
had risen under Zwentibold but lost their position under his successor. Charles 
maintained close contact with its nobles after his initial journey to the regnum 
Hlotharii from late 911 until 913.423 He returned there for a second visit from the 
second half of 915 to the first half of 916424 and again in the second half of 917.425 
Two years later, in 919, Charles again spent at least several months in Lotharingia 
in the context of the approaching conflict with Reginar’s son Count Gislebert.426 
This conflict and its implications also caused his expeditions in the following 
years, up until the revolt of the nobles in the West in 922. Charles’  itinerary is of 
course very sparse since the number of preserved diplomas is quite small. Never-
theless, trying to estimate the durations of his visits in Lotharingia and comparing 
them to his visits in the West, the king appears to have spent less than one third 
of his time between 914 and 919, a period covering the outbreak of the conflict 
with Gislebert but not the beginning of Charles’  struggle with the West Frankish 
nobles, in Lotharingia.427 Within this same period, after the initial journey and 
the following concentration of diplomas, but before the deep ruptures of his reign 
beginning in 920, eight out of thirty diplomas Charles issued went to Lotharingian 
recipients, less than one third.428 We have already remarked that Charles reacted to 
the acquisition of his new realm with an increase of his diplomatic activity while 
the number of recipients from the Western realm remained more or less stable.429 
Both Charles’  visits during these years and his increase in contacts with nobles 
point towards the last phase of his reign, which was marked by his efforts to find a 
422 Schieffer, Kanzlei, 142.
423 DDChS 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 125, 72, 73 and 74. Charles first diploma in Lotharingia dates to 20th 
December 911, his last to 13th August 913. His return to the West is documented by DChS 76 is-
sued at Attigny, 16th January 914.
424 DDChS 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, dating from 25th August 915 to 9th April 916. DChS 80, 7th July 915 
shows Charles at Compiègne, DChS 86, 7th June 916 at Attigny.
425 DDChS 90 and 91, 26th July 917. 28th May 917 Charles issued DChS 89 at Attigny and DChS 92 
14th March 918 at Compiègne.
426 DDChS 100, 101, 103 and 104, dating from 16th June 919 to 20th August 919. DChS 102, showing 
Charles at Tours-sur-Marne, is a forgery (see Lößlein, Diplôme). On 30th March 919 the king was 
at Soissons (DChS 99), where his presence is again indicated by DChS 105, 20th January 920.
427 Based on his itinerary, a careful but generous approach allows us to estimate that in 915 and 916 
Charles in total spent ten months in Lotharingia, in 917−918 six months and in 919 another six. 
This adds up to 22 months over a period of six years, or about 30.5% of his time. Therefore, we 
have to disagree with Mohr, Geschichte, 16; Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 202 and Schneidmüller, 
Tradition, 135 who argue that Charles favoured Lotharingia and put his main emphasis there.
428 DDChS 76, 81, 83, 84, 128, 100, 103 and 104.
429 See chapter III.1.1.
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balance between Robert, the other nobles from the West and those from his newly 
acquired regnum.
While the numbers of Charles’  diplomas and his itinerary certainly help us to 
understand how the balance shifted after 911, they also limit our view to a certain 
degree since a distinction between the two regna may be too sharp to illustrate the 
actual realities. As we have already argued, nobles from both realms had interests 
in and connections to each other. The church of Reims possessed various proper-
ties within Lotharingia which became the reason for a conflict with Count Erle-
bald.430 Reginar possessed property in the Western realm, Robert was related to 
nobles within Lotharingia431 and had his own contacts to the Liège area, contacts 
that became traceable again in 919 when Count Berengar sent a legation to him.432 
Richard’s family also had interests in the region. Richard’s son Boso acquired the 
estates of his father’s sister Richilde, the second wife of Charles the Bald, land held 
in precaria from the abbey of Gorze,433 furthermore pursued claims on the prop-
erty of her daughter Rothild434 and later took control of the abbeys Remiremont 
and Moyenmoutier,435 thus becoming one of the most powerful figures in southern 
Lotharingia. Finally, nobles from both regions acted together, as in the case of the 
rebellion against Charles in 922, when Robert’s son Hugh concluded an alliance 
with Reginar’s son Gislebert.436 Hence, noble relations did not stop at the borders, 
interests and connections were highly intertwined between the two regna.
The same image is also provided by the royal charters. Counts and bishops 
from the frontier area crossed the borders on various occasions,437 but also those 
living further away from the border followed the king. For example, a diploma 
issued at Gondreville shows Richard, Robert and Abbot Wicheramnus interven-
ing for the latter’s abbey of Saint-Philibert of Tournus.438 Two others were issued 
at Herstal: one for Abbot Acfred of San-Esteban of Bagnoles, confirming his ab-
bey’s rights,439 and another for Robert for Saint-Martin of Tours.440 Reginar also 
travelled to the West, visiting the king at Attigny where Charles issued a diploma 
430 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 16, 408.
431 We remember the death of Megingaud, Odo’s (and therefore also Robert’s) nephew. See chap-
ter  III.2.1.4, n.  299. For the Robertian family connections, see Werner, Robertiens, 14−16 and 
Depreux, Comte, 391−392.
432 Vita Gerardi abbatis Broniensis, c.  5, 657−658. The legation was sent in July 919. Misonne, 
 Gérard, 25.
433 On Boso, see Nightingale, Monasteries, 39−50, Robbie, Emergence, 75 and Hlawitschka, Herzog, 
432−433. 
434 Flodoard, Annales 929, 43−44. The conflict over the disputed land probably started earlier. 
Nightingale, Monasteries, 49.
435 Nightingale, Monasteries, 41−42 with n. 15 and 16.
436 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8 and 11.
437 For example Raoul de Gouy (DChS 106, Herstal) and Bishop Stephen of Cambrai (DChS 112, 
Noyon). See also the witness list of DChS 100 for further examples.
438 DChS 82.
439 DChS 85.
440 DChS 101.
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for Echternach.441 Furthermore, nobles from both regna can be seen cooperating 
in royal charters. The counts Raoul de Gouy442 and Sigard of the Liugau requested 
a diploma for the church of Cambrai443 and there are of course also the already 
mentioned diplomas for the Liège, featuring both Reginar and Robert.444
In this context, it is interesting to analyse the lists of nobles in two of Charles’ 
diplomas noting judgements in Lotharingia, as well as in the treaty of Bonn made 
with Henry the Fowler. The first diploma, dating to 916, marks the restoration of 
the abbey of Süsteren to Prüm445 and notes the presence of four bishops,  fourteen 
counts and a number of other witnesses.446 However, among them only one, Raoul 
de Gouy, came from the Western realm. At the assembly of Herstal in 919 where 
Saint-Servais of Maastricht was withdrawn from Gislebert and restored to the 
church of Trier,447 five bishops and eleven counts are accounted for,448 at least four 
of them from the West.449 The numbers at Bonn are similar, with five bishops and 
ten counts,450 among whom three were from Francia.451 Within these groups, no-
bles from the Western realm are underrepresented in comparison with those from 
Lotharingia. However, the Treaty of Bonn followed a ceasefire452 and did not re-
quire the presence of all of Charles’  nobles, but rather those directly involved with 
matters along the border—like the archbishops of Cologne and Trier or the bishop 
of Utrecht. The judgements were most of all regional affairs involving mainly those 
nobles concerned with the matter.453 They allowed the king to display the power 
441 DChS 76.
442 Raoul de Gouy, count of Ostrevent, was the son of Odo’s supporter Count Hucbald with Heil-
wich, daughter of Eberhard of Friuli. On him, see Grierson, Origine, 108−123.
443 DChS 106.
444 DDChS 65 and 81.
445 DChS 84.
446 DChS 84, 189: Rotgarius archiepiscopus, Herimannus archiepiscopus, Dado episcopus, Stephanus 
episcopus, Widricus comes palatii, Richuinus comes, Gislebertus, Matfridus, Beringarius comes, 
Theodericus comes, Reinherus comes, Erleboldus comes, Ruodolfus comes. Otto comes, Cunradus 
comes, Walcherus comes, Sigardus comes, Letardus comes… On the identifications, see Parisot, 
Royaume, 616−617.
447 DChS 100.
448 DChS 100, 230: Hęc sunt [nomi]na eorum quoque qui prefatum contulerunt judicium, videlicet 
episcoporum: Wiridus, Dado, Raubertus, Abbo, Stephanus; sed comitum: Matfridus, Segardus, 
Otto, Fulbertus, Cristianus, Erkengeros, Isembardus, Huntgerus, Ecfridus, Ermenfridus, Walterus, 
item Walterus… See Parisot, Royaume, 626 with n. 2.
449 Bishops Robert of Noyon and Abbo of Soissons; Counts Erkanger and Ecfrid, possibly also 
 Ermenfrid.
450 MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2: Episcopi ex parte domni regis Karoli: Herimannus archiepiscopus Agrippinae 
quae modo est Colonia vocitate, Rodgerus archiepiscopus Trevirorum, Stephanus praesul Cameraco­
rum, Bouo episcopus Catalaunensium, Baldricus Traictensium episcopus. Haec nomina comitum: Mat­
fredus, Erkengerus, Hagano, Boso, Waltkerus, Isaac, Ragenberus, Theodricus, Adalardus, Adelelmus.
451 Bishop Bovo of Châlons as well as the counts Erkanger and Adelelm. On Adelelm, successor of 
Count Altmar at Arras, see Kéry, Errichtung, 248.
452 Flodoard, Annales 921, 5−6.
453 On the origin of participants in assemblies, see Eichler, Reichsversammlungen, 75−76. While it is 
in most cases impossible to determine their origin, in some cases assemblies seem to have had a 
specific regional character.
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necessary to enforce the decisions taken there, again making the presence of nobles 
from the West not specifically necessary. In this context we should also take into 
consideration that Western nobles may have been present but unrecorded on these 
occasions. For example, Robert is attested to have been at Herstal only a fortnight 
after the judgement of 919, which makes it likely that he had also attended the as-
sembly dealing with the case of Saint-Servais.454 Indeed, if Charles had need for the 
presence of nobles from both regna, he was certainly able to call upon them. In a let-
ter to the bishops of his realm concerning the succession issue of the see at Liège,455 
he referred to an assembly that had taken place earlier, involving no less than sixteen 
archbishops and bishops as well as marchiones, counts and other nobles from his 
realm.456 Charles’ Lotharingia only consisted of nine bishoprics,457 indicating that 
there must have also been bishops from the Western regnum present, most likely 
from the archdiocese of Reims. Charles’ reference to marchiones points towards a 
large assembly with nobles from both realms since, after the death of Reginar in 915, 
the only men we know of carrying this title were Robert and Richard.458
As the evidence suggests, there was no clear distinction between the nobles 
from the two regna. Connections at all levels were manifold and it seems that 
Charles made no distinction between them. The strongest indication of such a 
policy is the royal chancellery. Under Louis the Child, a specific chancellery for 
Lotharingian affairs under Archbishop Ratbod of Trier had existed. Charles, as 
we have seen, put an end to this. Heriveus appears as chancellor in all diplomas, 
whether they were issued for Western or Lotharingian recipients, and so did his 
successor Roger of Trier. There are exceptions when the archbishop of Trier ap-
pears in the chancellor position already before 919, yet these cases are very few.459 
Charles did not intend to make a distinction between the two regna: he saw  himself 
as ruling over one single realm.
III.2.1.7 The later years
With these observations in mind, we can now turn to Charles’  network after 913. 
Robert remained central, with thirteen appearances in royal diplomas,460 as did 
Archbishop Heriveus of Reims. They were not the only nobles from the West to 
454 The judicium dates to Pentecost Sunday, 13th June 919 (DChS 100). Robert received a diploma for 
Tours on 27th June 919 (DChS 101).
455 MGH Capit. II, N° 290, 378−381, newly edited in MGH Conc. VI, N° 2, 41−48. 
456 MGH Conc. VI, N°  2, c.  2, 45: Cum quidam pestiferi viri, ut supra memoravimus, a nostra 
 fidelitate  deviarent, convocavimus archiepiscopos praesules XVI nostri regni, nonnullos etiam 
proceres, marchiones et comites optimatesque, ut eorum consilio, auctoritate atque virtute tantae 
vesaniae resisteremus. 
457 Cologne, Liège, Utrecht, Trier, Metz, Toul, Verdun, Cambrai and Strasbourg.
458 DChS 102, 242, does name a William marchio. The diploma, however, is a forgery. See Lößlein, 
Diplôme.
459 DDChS 74, 84 and 93.
460 DDChS 65, 9, 77, 78, 81, 82, 89, 92, 94, 98, 101, 105 and 110.
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have kept their positions at court however. Count Heribert II intervened together 
with Bishop Abbo of Soissons and Robert on behalf of the latter’s abbey Saint-
Germain-des-Prés in 918.461 By that point, Heribert had married a daughter of 
Robert,462 indicating that relations between the two had become closer.463 How-
ever, Heribert was also count of the Mézerais, where the abbey of Croix-Saint-
Ouen (that was now given to Saint-Germain) was situated and his presence, as 
well Abbo’s,464 may have been simply the result of his own involvement in the af-
fair. In any case, there is a second occasion to take into consideration. As Flodoard 
tells us, when the West Frankish nobles started their rebellion in 922, Heribert was 
with Charles, accompanying him out of Laon to Lotharingia.465 Being at the king’s 
side at this crucial moment certainly indicates that Heribert belonged to Charles’ 
inner circle. Next to these nobles, Richard’s family was still present at court: not 
only the marchio himself466 but also two of his sons, Hugh the Black467 and Boso;468 
although Richard’s overall presence at court can hardly be compared to the period 
just after 900. Furthermore, a number of Charles’  earliest supporters seem to have 
maintained their contact with the king: Erkanger, Ecfrid and Ermenfrid, all of 
whom appear in the lists of witnesses.469 However, caution is necessary concern-
ing this list of men, since quite a long time had passed between their earlier and 
their later appearances and it is rather likely that the earlier bearers of the names 
had died and hence are not identical with the later ones.470 In any case, at least Er-
kanger and Ermenfrid seem to have been in close contact with the king. Erkanger 
also accompanied Charles to Bonn, and Ermenfrid intervened at Aachen on be-
half of the abbey of Brogne.471 Last among those present both before and after 912 
was Anskeric’s successor as bishop of Paris, Theodulf. Charles now confirmed his 
461 DChS 92.
462 On the marriage, see Schwager, Graf, 68 and Exkurs  III, 401−402, against the hypothesis that 
Heribert’s wife was the same Adelaide who appears DChS 57. On this hypothesis, see also Set-
tipani, Préhistoire, 225, n. 242.
463 Schwager, Graf, 68.
464 Werner, Untersuchungen V, 100 has pointed out the close connection between Abbo and Herib-
ert, based on DChS 92 and Flodoard, who indicates that in 926 Abbo acted as Heribert’s legate 
to the pope (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 20, 411−412) in affairs concerning the archbishopric of Reims. 
Flodoard’s account certainly points towards a close cooperation between the bishop and the 
count in 926. However, we should be careful in assuming that events following the deposition of 
Charles can be projected back before 923. DChS 97 certainly shows them cooperating, yet their 
cooperation can be explained by their natural involvement in such a matter. On Abbo’s own posi-
tion at court, see below.
465 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8.
466 DChS 82.
467 DChS 79. 
468 Boso is listed as fourth among the counts accompanying Charles in the treaty of Bonn. MGH 
Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
469 DChS 100. Erkanger was also present at Bonn. MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
470 See Parisot, Royaume, 626 with n. 2 for Erkanger and Misonne, Diplôme, 70 with n. 6 for Ermenfrid.
471 DChS 127. On the diploma, see Misonne, Diplôme.
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restoration of property to the church of Paris, as well as a donation made by the 
bishop to Saint-Cloud.472
Within Lotharingia, three factions can be made out: those centred on the old 
rivals Reginar, the Matfrid family and the church of Trier, from 916 onwards rep-
resented by its new archbishop Roger. The most influential of these groups was 
at first the group around Reginar. The count himself received one more diploma 
before his death in 915 for his abbey of Echternach473 and intervened in a second 
one together with Robert for the church of Liège.474 His death marked the begin-
ning of the end for his faction’s influence at court, with the Matfrid family subse-
quently on the rise. The first sign of this shift was the first assembly at Herstal in 
916, where the abbey of Süsteren was restored to Prüm under Abbot Richer, one 
of the Matfrid brothers. It has been proposed that this moment should be seen as 
the beginning of the conflict between Charles and Reginar’s son Gislebert since 
Süsteren was situated in the latter’s heartland and might have even been taken 
from Prüm by him or someone close to him.475 However, the case is less clear 
than it appears at first glance. Erich Wisplinghoff has remarked on the presence 
of Gislebert and his brother Reginar at the assembly, yet assumed that they had 
been forced to give their consent.476 However, the two brothers were by no means 
the only ones belonging to Reginar’s old network present at Herstal. Among the 
witnesses we also find his two sons-in-law, Berengar, who he had introduced to 
Charles’  court in 912 when they intervened together on behalf of a priest from 
Berengar’s county on Easter Sunday,477 and Wigeric, who had become the king’s 
new count of the palace. Of the first seven counts appearing in the diploma, four 
can thus be directly linked to Reginar’s old faction and two of them, Wigeric and 
Gislebert, were even named before Matfrid. It is also likely that Count Ricuin of 
Verdun was related to this group, whose initial appearances in Charles’  diplomas 
were followed by another one for Saint-Mihiel in late 915.478 Ricuin and Wigeric 
had been in contact already during Zwentibold’s reign, when both of them inter-
vened on behalf of the church of Trier.479 After Wigeric’s death, Ricuin married his 
widow Cunigunde,480 tying him closer to Reginar’s family. When the conflict be-
tween the king and Gislebert broke out, Ricuin appears to have remained neutral 
472 DChS 97.
473 DChS 76.
474 DChS 81.
475 Wisplinghoff, Untersuchungen, 464.
476 Wisplinghoff, Untersuchungen, 464.
477 DChS 72 (12th April 912).
478 DChS 83 (27th November 915).
479 DZ 27.
480 Hlawitschka, Ahnen I,2, 204−206.
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at first.481 In 921, he entered into conflict with Charles,482 although he appears to 
have been forced to give in shortly afterwards.483 His son Otto, on the other hand, 
seems to have been one of Gislebert’s closest supporters, fighting with him against 
Charles484 and witnessing the count’s charters.485 Their earlier connection to Wig-
eric and Cunigunde, as well as their later support for Gislebert, indicate that in 
916 they most probably were also among those supporting the count. Hence, the 
assembly at Herstal marks a slight rise of influence for the Matfrid family, yet the 
presence of no less than six of the members of Reginar’s circle certainly underlines 
the political weight they still possessed at the royal court.
Gislebert’s position at court, however, seems to have differed significantly from 
Reginar’s. No diplomas mentioning him in central positions are preserved and 
after 916 he appears only as the usurper of Saint-Servais in the diplomas restor-
ing the abbey to the church of Trier.486 Why did Gislebert not inherit his father’s 
position at Charles’  side? The main reason for this may have been the particular 
nature of Reginar’s importance for the king. As we have argued, this importance 
was based not on the count’s possessions, but on the personal network that he 
offered Charles access to. Gislebert, on the other hand, does not seem to have in-
herited his father’s position in this network. In contrast to his father, only one of 
his private charters dating to Charles’  reign was signed by a witness, by the afore-
mentioned Count Otto, Ricuin’s son.487 Richer’s description of Gislebert’s revolt 
matches this impression. When the count prepared for conflict with Charles, he 
distributed landed property among the higher nobles and gifts of gold and silver 
among the lower ones.488 Richer’s account, of course, has to be treated with utmost 
care, yet, nevertheless, he seems to confirm that Gislebert, in contrast to his father, 
did not possess a strong network of personal contacts upon which he could rely 
on. He first had to create one to further his interests. Once this network was cre-
ated and a modus vivendi with the king had been found, Gislebert indeed appears 
to have gained the same acknowledgement by the king as his father. In the already 
481 While Ricuin does not appear at Herstal in 919, his son Otto figures among the witnesses 
(DChS 100). This seems to indicate that, at this moment, he had decided to remain neutral, his 
son’s presence allowing him to keep his ties with the king while demonstrating his own unwill-
ingness by his absence.
482 Flodoard, Annales 921, 5−6.
483 Richer, Historiae I, c. 27, 65.
484 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7.
485 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 55, 132−133.
486 DChS 100 and 103 (13th June and 9th July 919). DChS 100 reads Noverit igitur omnium sancte Dei 
ecclesie fidelium, nostrorum videlicet praesentium ac futurorum industria quoniam vir venerabilis 
nobisque admodum fidelis Rotgerus Treverensis ecclesiae archiepiscopus sepius plangendo adiit cel­
situdinem nostram, dicens quod abbatia sancti Servatii, quae est constructa in Trajecto, in comitatu 
Maseland, quam dedit per suum preceptum sibi commissae Treverensi ecclesiae Arnulfus rex, sed 
violentia Rageneri comitis et filii ejus Giselberti a predicta Treverensi ecclesia jam olim esset injuste 
ablata. 
487 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 55, 132−133.
488 Richer, Historiae I, c. 36, 71.
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mentioned private charter Gislebert signs as “dux, count and abbot.”489 That this, 
in fact, reflected the king’s own position and was not simply a sign of Gislebert’s 
aspirations can be deduced from the charter’s dating line, reading “in the 9th year 
of the reign of the most pious lord, King Charles”490 and thus not only acknowl-
edging Charles as the ruling king, but also, and in contrast to Gislebert’s previ-
ous charters,491 attributing him with an epithet in the superlative. The presence 
of Bishop Baldric of Utrecht, whose brother’s wife descended from Gislebert’s 
family,492 at Charles’  court during these years493 may also be a sign of the count’s 
growing influence.
From 916 onwards, however, Reginar’s rivals were on the rise. Count Matfrid 
was present at Herstal in 916 and 919 as well as at Bonn in 921. His growing im-
portance is best reflected in his position within the lists drawn up on these occa-
sions. In 916 he was still fourth among the counts; in the other two he was first.494 
His brother Richer also rose at Charles’  court. He received the diploma restoring 
Süsteren to Prüm in 916 and three years later, upon his request, Charles renewed 
the privileges given to the abbey by his predecessors.495 This diploma not only 
demonstrates Richer’s access to the king, but describes the relationship between 
Charles and the abbey in a very significant manner. In contrast to the diploma 
he issued in 916, Charles now makes mention of the abbey’s founder Pippin and 
his own relation to him,496 thus emphasising his own connection to Prüm and 
its abbot. Hence, it is not surprising that, not long after, Richer became Charles’ 
candidate for the episcopal see of Liège in succession to Bishop Stephen, after the 
previous candidate, Hilduin, declared for Gislebert,497 thus ensuring that the Mat-
frids continued to act as a counterweight to the Reginarids in the region. Besides 
them, Stephen of Liège498 continued to be close to the king. After Charles’  initial 
grant for his church, issued at the intervention of Robert and Reginar, the king re-
stored a forest in 915, again at the request of these two men.499 In this second case, 
however, there was also another member of the Matfrid family present: Bishop 
489 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 55, 133: dux, comes et abbas.
490 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 55, 133: …anno XI regni domni Karoli piissimi regis…
491 Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 53, 126 (14th April 915): anno IIII regni Karoli gloriosi regis and 
N° 54, 130 (915−923): regnante Karolo rege.
492 Althoff, Amicitiae, 186, based on MGH Poetae Lat. V,2, N° 26, 295. Balderic later joined Henry 
the Fowler’s side, like Gislebert. Althoff, Amicitiae, 187 and DHI 27.
493 Balderic features among those accompanying Charles at Bonn in 921. MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
494 DDChS 84 and 100; MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
495 DChS 104 (20th August 919).
496 DChS 104, 247: …inclitus ac venerabilis Richarius, abba Prumiensis monasterii, quod divae memo­
riae Pippinus, quondam rex Francorum, proattavus noster; suggessu et consensu Bertradae auguste 
conjugis suae, in honore domni et salvatoris mundi ejusque sanctissime matris genitricis Mariae, in 
juris sui proprietate a fundamentis extruxit…
497 On this conflict see, Zimmermann, Streit.
498 On his relation to the Matfrids, see chapter III.2.1.4, n. 339.
499 DChS 81.
 III.2 Breaking it down: Networks of royal power 183
Dado of Verdun, whose sister had married Count Matfrid.500 Dado’s appearance 
with Robert and Reginar shows the importance he enjoyed at court, as does his 
participation in both assemblies at Herstal, where he was named third and second 
among the bishops.501 Like Dado, Stephen may have also been present on the latter 
occasion. Unfortunately, however, neither diploma names the bishoprics of those 
attending and the Bishop Stephen appearing in them may have been his namesake 
at Cambrai.
Finally, the two assemblies at Herstal also mark the ascent of Ratbod’s succes-
sor as archbishop of Trier, Roger. The first one in 916 shows him as the first of the 
participants in the judgements in favour of Prüm.502 More significantly, however, 
this assembly is also the first of three exceptions prior to 919, in which the arch-
bishop replaced Heriveus as archchancellor.503 While these appearances mark a 
distinctive influence, his position appears significantly strengthened again in 919, 
when Charles and the second assembly of Herstal withdrew Saint-Servais from 
Gislebert and restored the abbey to the church of Trier. Not even a month later, 
when Charles confirmed the judgement of Herstal in another diploma, Roger also 
became Charles’  sole archchancellor, a position he seems to have kept up until 
the battle of Soissons.504 The timing of his ascent to this central position was cer-
tainly no coincidence. The conflict between Charles and Gislebert did not begin 
with the assembly of Herstal. On the contrary, the judgement must have been pre-
pared some time in advance, gathering supporters and concluding new alliances 
against the count. Roger, due to his position at the head of the church of Trier and 
to the rivalry between him and Gislebert, presented himself as the ideal ally and 
was therefore bound to the king in two ways: through the handing over of Saint-
Servais and through his appointment to one of the most central positions at court, 
that of archchancellor.
Charles’  rule thus saw the continuation of the rivalries between the three most 
powerful factions, the Reginarids, the Matfrids and the church of Trier. Regi-
nar’s death marks the beginning of a shift away from his faction in favour of the 
500 Hlawitschka, Anfänge, 71−73.
501 DDChS 84 and 100.
502 DChS 84.
503 DDChS 93 (28th April 918) and 96. The latter diploma is dated by Lauer, Recueil Charles III, 221 
to a period between 918 and 923, 1st June, based on his assumption that Roger became archchan-
cellor during that year. Font-Réaulx, Diplômes, 43, corrects this to 1st June 921 since the notary 
Gauzlin became Bishop of Toul in 922 and Roger, according to him, only became archchancellor 
in 921. Using the date of Roger becoming sole archchancellor of the realm to establish the date, 
however, is extremely problematic due to his earlier appearances in this position. We date this 
diploma to 917 or 918 since it appears to be strongly connected to the passing of Charles’ first wife 
Frederuna (10th February 917, see DChS 89). After her death, the king started issuing a series of 
diplomas establishing memorial services on her behalf. This practice ends roughly one year later, 
in 918. See below.
504 From DChS 103 (9th July 919) onwards, only Roger appears as archchancellor in Charles diplo-
mas. See also Schieffer, Kanzlei, 145, who considers DChS 102 (a forgery) as the starting point. 
Roger’s last appearance is in DChS 121 (15th June 922).
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Matfrids; and in 919, when the conflict with Gislebert broke out, increasingly in 
favour of Roger, although without casting the Matfrids aside. On the contrary, 
Charles appears to have successfully integrated both factions since nothing in-
dicates any conflicts between the two. However, we should not focus solely on 
these factions. The diplomas from the two assemblies of Herstal and the Treaty of 
Bonn contain long lists of participants—bishops, counts and men without title— 
indicating the broad support Charles enjoyed. While, undoubtedly, not all of them 
had significant influence at the royal court, some certainly did since they reappear 
several times or can be traced in the royal diplomas. For example, Archbishop 
Hermann of Cologne features in 916 and 921.505 His involvement in the succession 
at Liège506 may be explained by the see belonging to his archdiocese, although his 
own position in the case seems rather dubious. Hermann ordained Hilduin, yet 
later claimed that he had been forced to do so.507 Hermann’s actions were probably 
due to the influence of Gislebert and Henry the Fowler, who controlled large parts 
of his archdiocese,508 before he changed his course for Charles’  side. Present at 
Bonn, he also organised a synod on behalf of Charles and Henry in 922,509 which 
had originally been planned to be a grand meeting involving both kings, yet fell 
rather short of the high expectations due to the rebellion of the West Frankish 
nobles which kept Charles away.510 Hermann’s actual position at Charles’  court 
is hard to establish. He did cooperate with the king and his position in between 
the realms probably made him the ideal mediator between the interests of the two 
kings—hence also his presence at Bonn. Yet, this very same position probably also 
made him an unreliable ally for Charles, leading to the ordination of Hilduin at a 
time when the king himself was preoccupied with the nobles in the West.511 While 
Hermann undoubtedly wielded some influence at court, we should also not over-
emphasise his position. Others were more important.
Besides the archbishop, we should also note a number of counts. Theoderic, 
count of Kimmen, may have already been in contact with Charles in 912;512 later 
he accompanied the king at Herstal in 916 and Bonn while his brother Walker was 
also present in 919.513 Theoderic, however, also received a royal grant in 922, just 
after Charles had been forced to abandon his position at Reims against Robert’s 
505 DChS 84 and MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
506 Hermann asked Hilduin to present himself in front of a synod (MGH Conc. VI, N° 2, c. 7, 47). 
Pope John X asked Hermann to come to Rome on the same matter. MGH Conc. VI, N° 3, A, 
53−55 and B, 55−56.
507 Flodoard, Annales 920, 4; MGH Conc. VI, N° 2, c. 2, 45.
508 Zimmermann, Streit, 23−24. On the position of the archbishop of Cologne between Lotharingia 
and the Eastern realm, see chapter III.2.1.4. 
509 MGH Conc. VI, N° 4, 68.
510 See the editor’s comment, MGH Conc. VI, N° 4, 57−58.
511 Flodoard, Annales 920, 4.
512 See chapter III.2.1.5, n. 388.
513 DDChS 84 and 100; MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
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army and his own forces started to disintegrate.514 These frequent appearances in-
dicate that the brothers were close to the king and the 922 diploma is a safe sign 
that they remained loyal to Charles even in times of crisis. Huntger of Vimeu, 
who was present in 919,515 was probably less influential, yet at least also had access 
to king, as is demonstrated by a diploma issued at his request.516 Probably closer 
to Charles was Count Erlebald of the pagus Castriciensis. Like Huntger, he was 
present in 916,517 shortly after he had intervened together with Ricuin on behalf 
of Saint-Mihiel.518 In 920, however, Erlebald entered into conflict with the church 
of Reims. When he was excommunicated and his situation became desperate, he 
fled to Charles, yet was killed before reaching him.519 That he sought help from 
the king points towards close relations—he had access to him and could hope to 
profit from such a move, even against one of Charles strongest supporters, Arch-
bishop Heriveus. This deduction is further confirmed by Charles’  actions after 
the count’s death. The year after, at the synod of Trosly, the king intervened to 
demand, against common practice, his posthumous reconciliation.520
The connection between Erlebald and Charles already points us towards a last 
group of nobles that emerged during the second half of Charles reign. The cen-
tral documents for this group are two diplomas dating to 920 and 921.521 The first 
one shows the counts Hagano, Raoul de Gouy and Sigard intervening on behalf 
of Bishop Stephen of Cambrai and his church; the second the bishops Abbo of 
Soissons and Stephen of Cambrai together with the counts Hagano, Helgaud of 
Ponthieu and Raoul, supporting a judgement in favour of the king’s brother-in-
law,522 Bishop Bovo of Châlons, and his church. Apart from Count Helgaud, all 
of these men appear to have held elevated positions within the circle around the 
king, marked by their frequent appearances in Charles’  diplomas—even setting 
aside their appearances in the judgements and at Bonn. Stephen of Cambrai re-
ceived no fewer than four royal charters,523 Abbo made two interventions, both 
of them for important abbeys (Saint-Germain-des-Prés and Saint-Maur of Fos-
sés524), Raoul and Sigard each made another two,525 while Hagano’s position as 
Charles’  intimate companion is well known and will be addressed later. A number 
514 DChS 121 (15th June 922). Flodoard, Annales 922, 9.
515 DChS 100.
516 DChS 111.
517 DChS 84.
518 DChS 83 (27th November 915).
519 Flodoard, Annales 920, 2−3.
520 Flodoard, Annales 921, 5. See also Schröder, Synoden, 211.
521 DChS 106 (8th September 920) and 112 (20th September 921).
522 See DChS 95.
523 DDChS 67, 68, 128 and 106. Furthermore, he was present at Bonn and possibly also at both as-
semblies of Herstal. 
524 DDChS 92 (for Saint-Germain-des-Prés) and 108 (for Saint-Maur of Fossés). He was also present 
at Herstal in 919.
525 Raoul: DDChS 80 and 106. He was also present at Herstal in 916. Sigard: DDChS 128 and 106. He 
was present at both assemblies at Herstal.
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of these cases show some of these nobles working together, thus strengthening the 
image of a group cooperating with each other. For example, one of the diplomas 
for the church of Cambrai shows Sigard intervening together with Count Isaac of 
Cambrai;526 while the diploma for Saint-Maur features Hagano alongside Abbo.527 
Comital intervention per se is nothing special in Charles’  diplomas. Yet, the num-
ber of the appearances of these men is singular.
In contrast to counts, bishops very rarely intervene,528 and Abbo appears to 
have been in an especially influential position at court. The abbey Saint-Maur, 
for which he intervened together with Hagano, had been founded by Adelaide’s 
great-grandfather, as Charles’  diploma does not fail to mention.529 Even in the 
920s, it was closely linked to her family, its abbot Rumald being her kinsman and 
the abbacy reserved for family members.530 In the diploma, Abbo, Hagano and 
Rumald are mentioned to have restored and reformed the abbey,531 thereby link-
ing the former two to Charles’  family even closer than by their joint intervention 
and emphasising their proximity to the king. Abbo’s intervention for Saint-Ger-
main-des-Prés, on the other hand, shows him acting together with both Robert, 
its abbot, and Heribert II, in whose county were located the honores that Charles 
handed over to the abbey,532 and thus close to the most powerful man of the realm 
and another, who would become one of its leading nobles once Charles had been 
deposed.533 In fact, Abbo, the “excellent” and “most reverent bishop”,534 appears to 
have been one of the central men of the realm. When the Western counts assem-
bled to force Charles to dismiss Hagano as his councillor, they did so at Abbo’s see, 
Soissons.535 This choice certainly was not made at random, but may point to the 
bishop’s central role in these events. Either he had a part in organising the assem-
bly or Soissons was chosen because the nobles expected Abbo to be able to medi-
ate between them and the king—or both. Indeed, Abbo’s importance did not end 
with Charles’  rule. The bishop became Robert’s archchancellor and, after Robert’s 
death, Raoul’s.536 Both seem to have highly valued his connections to the nobility 
of Francia and placed some trust in him. But his position did not depend on his 
connections to the royal court. When Heribert II, after the death of Archbishop 
Seulf of Reims, installed his infant son in the see, Abbo aligned himself with the 
526 DChS 128.
527 DChS 108.
528 Clear cases are only DChS 10, with Honoratus of Beauvais and Rudolf of Laon intervening for 
Saint-Denis, and DChS 81, with Dado of Verdun supporting a request for the church of Liège.
529 DChS 108, 260: …qua continebatur qualiter ipsum monasterium Bego, genitricis nostrae proavus…
530 DChS 108.
531 DChS 108.
532 DChS 92. See also chapter III.2.1.7, n. 464.
533 On Heribert II’s later career, see Schwager, Graf.
534 DDChS 92, 211 (eximio episcopo) and 108, 259 (praesul reverentissums).
535 Flodoard, Annales 920, 2.
536 Dufour, Recueil Robert et Raoul, XXV–XXVII.
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count, agreed to the appointment and obtained the vicariate for the archdiocese 
for himself.537
Like Abbo, Stephen appears to have been well connected within the nobility. In 
the first diploma he received from Charles for his church, three counts intervened 
on his behalf, Guarner, Theoderic and Letard;538 while in later ones we find, be-
sides Hagano, Raoul and Sigard, Count Isaac of Cambrai, who had already been 
in contact with Louis the Child and Reginar.539 Stephen thus provided Charles 
with access to his own network, with Letard and Isaac also appearing at Herstal 
in 916 and at Bonn respectively.540 Moreover, one of the diplomas issued for him 
describes him as “the entire realm’s strenuous man,”541 a choice of words that prob-
ably points towards his heavy involvement in the daily affairs of the royal court, 
probably similar to Abbo’s. After Charles’  deposition, however, Stephen’s influ-
ence, unlike Abbo’s, seems to have declined. A conflict with Isaac ensued that only 
ended about 25 years later, when Otto I withdrew all comital rights from Isaac and 
handed them to Stephen’s successor, Fulbert.542 For the time being, Stephen prob-
ably was able to keep the count at bay. A synod at Trosly judged Isaac liable to pay 
a fine for burning down one of the bishop’s castles.543 However, Stephen’s influ-
ence appears to have been on the decline. The judgement of the synod may also 
have been due to the presence of Heribert II, who also had been attacked by Isaac. 
More importantly, however, Stephen appears neither in the diplomas of Henry 
the Fowler nor of Otto I. Only his successor Fulbert seems to have reentered royal 
favour.544
III.2.1.8 Liberty of choice?
As we have seen, the network of Charles’  later years differs considerably from 
the one Charles possessed before the acquisition of Lotharingia. Most of Charles’ 
early supporters had died. Archbishop Fulk, Bishop Anskeric and Count Heri-
bert I of Vermandois had all passed away during the first decade of the 9th century 
and were succeeded by Heriveus, Theodulf and Heribert II. Relations between the 
king and these successors, however, appear to have differed fundamentally from 
those with their predecessors. Theodulf was still in contact with the king, yet only 
played a minor role at court. Heribert II’s number of appearances is rather limited 
and they do not, apart from his appearance with Robert and Abbo, reveal any 
537 Dufour, Recueil Robert et Raoul, XXV–XXVII and Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 20, 411.
538 DChS 67.
539 DDChS 128 (Isaac and Sigard) and 106 (Hagano, Raoul and Sigard). On Issac’s earlier contacts, 
see chapter III.2.1.5, n. 361. 
540 DDChS 84 and MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
541 DChS 106, 253−254: …vir quippe totius regni strenuus…
542 DO I 100 (30th April 948). On this conflict, see also Prinz, Klerus, 183.
543 Flodoard, Annales 924, 24−25. See also Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 19, 410−411 and Schröder, Synoden, 
N° 37, 216−218.
544 DDO I 39 and 100.
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specific political weight. Yet he was present at Charles’  side in 922, a circumstance 
indicating that he was close to the king. Heriveus finally did play a central role 
at court; however, whether his influence was comparable to that of Fulk seems 
doubtful, especially since the latter’s position was occupied by Robert. Within the 
Lotharingian nobility, Charles appears to have been caught up in rivalries predat-
ing his reign, balancing between the factions of Reginar and his son Gislebert, the 
Matfrid family and the church of Trier.
From the interplay between these different groups, the extent to which Charles 
was at liberty to choose those around him becomes visible. The old group around 
Fulk had surrounded Charles since his first coronation in 893 and could build 
their claim to be close to him on their support during these years. Dismissing 
them would have meant, especially in the beginning, the loss of Charles’  entire 
support base. This situation changed with Fulk’s death, creating at the same time 
a vacuum of power and an opportunity for the king to decide on his future allies. 
His choices, however, were limited, the only two options being the powerful Rich-
ard or the even more powerful Robert. Here, Charles fell victim to a development 
that had occurred since the times of Charles the Bald: the rise of the marchiones. 
In Lotharingia, a similar situation had evolved. Here as well, Charles had to find a 
balance between the different claims to have access to the circle surrounding him. 
The circumstances were already in place and the king had to work within them by 
balancing between the different factions after the initial alliance with Reginar had 
ceased to exist with the latter’s death.
This, however, is not to say that Charles did not have any agency when it came 
to choosing those around him. After the acquisition of Lotharingia, a new group 
of nobles arose, composed of men from both regna, most of whom appear to have 
had a very close relationship with Charles. The nature of these relationships may 
indicate that their position at the king’s side was less due to their actual power and 
more the result of the king inviting them to his court. Within this group, Hagano 
is of course the prime example of a noble being elevated by the king. But likewise, 
Abbo may also have owed his position to the king. Nothing is known about him 
or how he became bishop of Soissons, and so the proposition that he was Charles’ 
choice for the see must remain speculation based on his later influence at court.545 
Yet, he was only one example of how the king could use episcopal succession to in-
stall men of his choice in key positions around the realm. Three, possibly four, men 
belonging to the royal chancellery or chapel are known to have become bishops, 
and the sees they occupied were spread throughout the realm. Heriveus, of course, 
became archbishop of Reims. Herluin, who succeeded Heriveus as notary in the 
545 Lauer, Recueil Charles III, 258, identifies Abbo as a relative of Charles’ mother Adelaide, which 
would make it quite possible that the king was indeed involved in his appointment. This, how-
ever, appears to be based on a misreading of DChS 108. See Werner, Nachkommen, 434, n. 19 and 
Dufour, Recueil Robert et Raoul, XXV, n. 6. Against this reading Koziol, Politics, 524, although 
without giving any argument.
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royal chancellery,546 might be identical with the namesake who became bishop of 
Beauvais during the 900s. At Girona, Guigo, a man who had been educated at the 
royal palace, became bishop in 908.547 And finally, fourteen years later, Gauzlin, 
up until this moment Charles’  notary, was appointed bishop at Toul548 after the 
see had been vacant for some time. As at Reims and at Girona, where Archbishop 
Arnust undoubtedly played a central role in the choice of Guigo,549 here as well we 
can note local cooperation with the king. After Bishop Drogo’s death,550 the canons 
of Toul sought out Charles at Duisburg. Soon after, the king issued a diploma in 
their favour and about a fortnight later Gauzlin was anointed.551 In two other cases, 
relatives of Charles became bishops. Frederuna’s brother Bovo became bishop at 
Châlons552 and in 913 at Strasbourg, Gauzfrid, one of Charles’  nephews, succeeded 
Bishop Otbert, yet died soon after.553 In both cases, the sources do not provide 
details of the circumstances of their appointments. However, their connection to 
Charles makes it highly likely that he was involved.
Episcopal successions did not occur very frequently and, given the different 
groups that struggled to raise their own candidate to a see, the few occasions in 
which we can actually trace royal influence may not be surprising. Two cases, 
however, do betray the particular interests of the king in having men of his choice 
appointed. The first was at Strasbourg, where, after the death of Gauzfrid, a noble 
Lotharingian called Ricuin554 became bishop. As the records of the synod of Ho-
henaltheim in 916 tell us, this had happened without the consent of the metropoli-
tan of the archdiocese, the archbishop of Mainz. Ricuin was requested to present 
himself at the synod yet failed to do so555—did he, like his predecessor, belong to 
Charles’  supporters; and was he therefore opposed by the elites of the Eastern 
realm? Such an interpretation appears, at least, not to be unfounded, making it 
likely that he was one of Charles’  candidates.556 More obvious is the case of Liège 
after Bishop Stephen’s death. As Harald Zimmermann has argued,557 it seems that 
at first the clergy and people of Liège elected Hilduin, assuming that he was an 
acceptable candidate for the king. Charles, however, appears never to have con-
firmed Hilduin, himself at that moment being occupied by the problems with the 
West Frankish nobles. Instead of waiting for the confirmation, Hilduin appears 
546 Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XIX.
547 Catalunya Carolingia V,1, N°  127, 147−148; HGL V, N°  35, cols. 124−125. Schröder, Synoden, 
N° 26, 178−179 and Magnou-Nortier, Société, 332−333.
548 Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XIX–XX and Flodoard, Annales 922, 7 and the editors comment in n. 3.
549 Koziol, Politics, 496.
550 28th January 922, see Lauer, Flodoard, 7, n. 3.
551 See Lauer, Flodoard, 7, n. 3. Drogo died 28th January 922. 4th Mars 922 Charles issued the di-
ploma (DChS 114), Gauzlin was anointed 17th March of the same year.
552 DChS 95, 219−220: …pro Bovone praesule, fratre Frederonae nostrae conjugis… 
553 Erkanbald, Bischofsliste II, 37 (MGH Poetae Lat. V,2, 512). See Dümmler, Geschichte III, 593.
554 Erkanbald, Bischofsliste II, 38 (MGH Poetae Lat. V,2), 512.
555 MGH Conc. VI, N° 1, 34, c. 29.
556 Similar also Büttner, Heinrich, 10−11.
557 Zimmermann, Streit, who we follow here.
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to have allied himself with Gislebert and Henry the Fowler, both attempting to 
exploit Charles’  momentary weakness to extend their influence in Lotharingia. 
When the king had managed to stabilise his position however, Charles did his best 
to remove Hilduin and replace him with Abbot Richer of Prüm, calling upon a 
general assembly, initiating a synod and finally also involving Pope John X in the 
matter.558 The king’s effort speaks volumes about how seriously he took such cases 
and how far he would go to protect his interests if he felt that they were threatened.
Hence, episcopal elections were a field used by Charles to increase his influence 
and a field where his agency in installing men of his choice becomes apparent. The 
choices he made on these occasions reveal the considerations he had to take into 
account. Richer at Liège belonged to the Matfrid family and the conflict between 
the king and Gislebert ensuing around the bishopric certainly overlapped with the 
rivalry between the two factions. By choosing Richer, Charles made certain that 
he had the support of the Matfrids against Reginar’s son and his supporters. In 
the other cases, the king probably did not install his candidates against the resist-
ance of the local elites. This, undoubtedly, also applies to the circle surrounding 
Charles and the choices the king made in who he invited there. Some, like Robert, 
were able to claim access to this circle due to the position they held within soci-
ety; others, like Fulk and Heribert, due to old connections or, like Bovo, because 
they were relatives; while, finally, another group had access to this circle due to 
their personal connections to the king. These different categories did not exclude 
each other and there would certainly have been cases when a noble could claim a 
position within the circle based on his own power as well as his personal relation 
to the king. However, as the problems surrounding the integration of Robert of 
Neustria again demonstrate, the question of access to the circle was not limited 
to the direct relations between the king and the respective nobles. When mak-
ing his choice, Charles needed to take into consideration the interests of those 
already within the circle. In the case of Robert, Archbishop Fulk’s interests were 
opposed to giving the marchio the position he desired and therefore his integra-
tion only succeeded after Fulk’s death. When the Lotharingian nobles needed to 
be integrated under Charles’  rule, it was, in turn, Robert’s interests that were at 
stake. The king’s reaction to this becomes clear in the two diplomas that show 
Robert and Reginar intervening together on behalf of the church of Liège, with 
Charles carefully balancing between the two men. Hence, the network surround-
ing Charles was a fragile construction dependant on his ability to mediate between 
the different interests of the various nobles. Integrating new men into the network 
was therefore always a difficult and dangerous endeavour, threatening to offset the 
balance between the individuals and factions already present within the network. 
We will have to keep this in mind when we now turn to the role his family and 
friends played in royal politics.
558 MGH Conc. VI, N° 2, c. 2, 45 and c. 7, 47 as well as the letters A and B, 53−56 with Zimmermann, 
Streit, 26−27.
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III.2.2 Family and friends
The queens
When Charles became king, the opportunities offered by his family connections 
were rather limited. Of his five siblings, his half-brothers Louis and Carloman, as 
well as his sisters Hildegard, Gisela and Ermentrude, three were already dead,559 
leaving only one niece, Ermentrude’s daughter Cunigunde and more distant rela-
tives. Hence, the main role at court fell to Charles’  mother Adelaide and, after 
her, to his wives Frederuna and Eadgifu and their relatives. At court, the queen 
occupied a central role.560 According to Hincmar, she was in charge of the royal 
household and had access to the royal treasury, a position that connected her to 
the dealings at court.561 Given her position at the king’s side, the queen was con-
sidered to be one of the most influential members of the royal court, expected to 
act as a mediator and to intercede in front of the king on behalf of others, most 
importantly her own family and friends.562 Depending on her character and abili-
ties, a queen could become one of the key figures of the realm, strongly influencing 
its affairs.563 Interventions by queens, however, were rather rare compared to the 
overall number of royal diplomas—with the notable exception of Charles’  mother 
Adelaide.564 From 898 until her death in 901565 she intervened no fewer than eleven 
times, featuring in only slightly less than a third of the diplomas issued during 
these years.566
Should we take the high number of her appearances as a sign of her special 
importance to Charles and of her playing a key role at court? The epithets used to 
describe her are the common ones used for queens, “dearest,” (carissima) “most 
beloved” (dilectissima) and “sweetest,” (per)dulcissima567 with the exception of the 
“venerable” (venerabilis),568 which might indicate that Adelaide had entered a con-
vent.569 These diplomas went to a large group of recipients, containing likewise 
559 Gisela died before 884. The date of Ermentrude’s death is unknown. Of Hildegard nothing is 
known but her name. See Settipani, Préhistoire, 317−318.
560 A general overview of current research on queenship is provided by Zey, Frauen, 10−15.
561 Hincmar, De ordine palatii, c. 5, 72−74. See also Erkens, Esther, 15−16.
562 Nelson, Queenship, 199−202 and Görich, Mathilde, 260, 266 and 271.
563 Nelson, Queenship, 203 and Erkens, Esther, 17. General studies on the role of queens are provided 
by Hartmann, Königin, esp. 162−179 and Fößel, Königin (with an emphasis on the post-Carolin-
gian periods).
564 Erkens, Esther, 20−21. On the role of the king’s mother, see Verdon, Veuves.
565 18th November, probably 901 since after that year she disappears from the sources. See Werner, 
Nachkommen, 453.
566 DDChS 10, 11, 14, 15, 22, 23, 27, 32, 35, 39 and 41.
567 Before 898 DChS 5 and 7, 6 and 10 (carissima), from 898 onwards DDChS 10, 32, 35 and 39, 16, 68, 
75 and 83 (dilectissima) and DDChS 14, 15 and 41, 25, 27 and 50 (dulcissima). The same epithets 
were, for example, used for Charles the Bald’s wives Ermentrude (DDChB 12, 189, 212, 223, 248, 
269, 277 and 278) and Richilde (DDChB 416 and 433).
568 DDChS 11, 22, 23 and 27, 18, 43, 46 and 57.
569 On the connection of the epithet to ecclesiastical institutions see Brunner, Fürstentitel, 201.
192 III. Networks of royal power: Charles the Simple
abbeys, churches and laymen. On all but two570 of these occasions, Adelaide ap-
pears together with other nobles, either petitioning or intervening alongside her. 
It is remarkable that none of these interventions were for relatives; of friends, only 
Charles’  early supporters Count Erkanger571 and Count Ecfrid appear, the latter 
together with Charles’  cousin Count Hugh of Maine.572 This last diploma, how-
ever, is a highly political one, marking the alliance between the king and Hugh 
against Robert of Neustria.573 This may point us towards a reason for Adelaide’s 
frequent appearances, as there seems to be a pattern behind them. Her first in-
tervention after 898 saw her together with bishops Honoratus of Beauvais and 
Rudolf of Laon, two former allies of Odo.574 In 900, she appears in the first diploma 
issued for Richard the Justiciar575 and in 901 she supported Count Ermenfrid of 
Amiens.576 In all of these cases, the diplomas issued mark newly forged alliances. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that Adelaide only intervened on Richard’s 
behalf once, although four more diplomas were issued on behalf of the marchio 
shortly afterwards.577 Were her appearances limited to these occasions? At first 
glance, the diplomas for the recipients in Septimania seem to speak against such 
a conclusion. Adelaide intervened twice for the church of Narbonne, in both 898 
and in 899,578 and supported another petition of Archbishop Arnust of Narbonne 
for a fidelis called Stephen and his wife Anne.579 However, the latter two of these 
cases took place at the assembly of Tours-sur-Marne, an event of special political 
importance for Charles that gave him the opportunity to present himself as king 
in front of a greater audience.580
All in all, it seems that Adelaide only intervened at moments of great political 
significance, when a certain message needed to be conveyed, giving her appear-
ances a strong symbolic weight. The question remains, however, whether this sym-
bolism was a reflection of her political importance. None of the diplomas names 
Adelaide as queen. Instead, she is presented as “our mother” (genitrix nostra),581 
placing the emphasis on her personal connection to Charles.582 However, her ap-
570 DDChS 11 (for Saint-Mihiel) and 22 (for San-Juan-de-las-Abadesas).
571 DChS 39.
572 DChS 35.
573 See above.
574 DChS 10. See above.
575 DChS 32
576 DChS 41.
577 DDChS 33, 31, 38 and 8. In 902, when DChS 43 was issued, Adelaide had already died.
578 DDChS 14 and 23.
579 DChS 27.
580 See above.
581 DChS  5, 6; DChS  7, 10; DChS  10, 16; DChS  11, 18; DChS  14, 25; DChS  15, 27; DChS  22, 43; 
DChS 23, 46; DChS 27, 57; DChS 32, 68; DChS 35, 75; DChS 39, 83; DChS 41, 90.
582 Charles’ diplomas betray a certain reluctance to apply the title regina. Even his wife Frederuna 
is only once mentioned as such and only in the first diploma issued after her death (DChS 87, 
14th  February 917). In this, his diplomas differ considerably from those of Charles the Bald, 
which frequently attribute the title. An example of a king’s mother carrying the title queen is 
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pearance would only have had significant value, if she occupied a central position 
at her son’s side and if this was generally known and acknowledged. Therefore, it 
seems plausible that her frequent interventions were indeed a sign of her impor-
tance within Charles’  inner circle. This allows us to cast some further light on the 
changes that the royal network underwent during the first years of his reign. The 
death of Archbishop Fulk in 900 had not only deprived Charles of his most cen-
tral advisor, but also provided him with the opportunity to fully integrate Robert 
into his rule by granting him the position formerly occupied by the archbishop. 
However, the king’s choice did not fall on Robert but on Richard, with Adelaide 
intervening in the very first diploma celebrating this new alliance. It seems rea-
sonable to assume that she, although for different reasons than Fulk, was likewise 
opposed to Robert: shortly after her death, relations between Charles and Richard 
appear to have started to deteriorate rapidly, leading to Richard leaving the court 
and finally to the integration of Robert.583 With Adelaide’s death, opposition to 
Robert at court seems to have come to an end. Although his mother’s death cer-
tainly meant a loss for Charles, it did increase his liberty to pursue his own policies 
towards Robert.
Several years after Adelaide’s death, Charles married Frederuna.584 Not much is 
known about her family. The argument that she was a sister of Mathilde of Saxony, 
Henry the Fowler’s wife,585 has been convincingly refuted by Eduard Hlawitsch-
ka.586 Frederuna has also been seen as a Lotharingian noblewoman, based on 
the assumption of a connection through kinship between her and Charles’  later 
intimate, the Lotharingian Count Hagano.587 This hypothesis is based on two of 
Charles’  diplomas for the canons of Compiègne, both issued after Frederuna’s 
death, which see Hagano intervening on her behalf588 and included in prayer 
services with the king, Frederuna and her brother Bovo.589 However, as Philippe 
Depreux argues, this is circumstantial evidence and falls short of proving any-
thing, especially when considering the case of Bishop Stephen of Liège.590 The latter 
Otto I’s mother Mathilde, who is often addressed as such in her son’s diplomas (e. g. DO I 186, 
228 and 328).
583 See chapter III.2.1.3.
584 Probably in early April 907, given the indication of their marriage in DChS 56 (19th April 907).
585 Eckhardt, Funde, followed by Werner, Nachkommen, 457. Similar also Sielaff, Fridrun. Eckardt 
tries to identify Mathilde’s sister Friderun with Charles’ wife Frederuna. Eckardt bases his hypoth-
esis on three arguments: a) Thietmar calls Henry Charles’ nephew; b) The name of Frederuna’s 
brother Bovo was common among the Liudolfinger family; c) Bishop Berengar of Cambrai, Bovo’s 
nephew, is known to be a relative of Otto I (Gesta Episcoporum Cameracensium, c. 80, 431).
586 Hlawitschka, Kontroverses, 45−50. Hlawitscka argues for a close kinship between the two, but 
refutes Eckardt’s hypothesis on several points: a) the St-Gall litanies for Mathilde’s family do not 
mention either Frederuna nor her brother Bovo; b) while Frederuna already died in 917, Friderun 
lived until 971; c) a possible confusion of Bishop Berengar of Cambrai with his namesake of Ver-
dun, the latter in fact being a relative of Otto I. 
587 Eckel, Charles, 99 and Hlawitschka, Anfänge, 69. 
588 DChS 90 (26th July 917).
589 DChS 95 (26th May 918).
590 Depreux, Comte, 389−390.
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was addressed in another diploma as “our most beloved kinsman by marriage,”591 
indicating that he was considered as belonging to Charles’  family—something 
that is never done in the case of Hagano, despite his frequent appearances.592 The 
connections of Frederuna’s brother Bovo may provide more clues. As Flodoard 
tells us, in 956, Bovo’s nephew Berengar became Bishop of Cambrai.593 This same 
Berengar is described by the Gesta Episcoporum Cameracenisum as a relative of 
Otto I.594 Bovo’s East Frankish roots may have also been the reason why his death 
was noted by the Merseburg necrology.595 In this context, another hypothesis, first 
proposed by Reinhard Wenskus, is worth making note of. Allegedly, Bishop Bovo 
of Châlons was identical to a monk named Bovo at Corvey.596 And indeed the 
Catalogus abbatum Corbeiensium does mention a Bovo episcopus for the abbacy 
of yet another Bovo, Bovo II (900−916).597 These years coincide with the begin-
ning of Bovo’s episcopate at Châlons. According to the episcopal catalogue of the 
church of Châlons, after Mancio’s death in 910, a certain Letoldus occupied the see 
for four years,598 meaning that Frederuna’s brother Bovo became bishop around 
913. However, whether this Bishop Bovo really belonged to the same family as 
the abbot, the Ekbertiner, as Wenskus proposes, seems rather uncertain, with the 
shared name Bovo apparently being the only reason for this hypothesis.599 What 
seems clear is that Bovo and, therefore, also Frederuna, descended from an im-
portant Saxon family, somehow related to the Ottonians—this may have been the 
Ekbertiner or the Popponids, in whose family the name Bovo was also common;600 
but this question must remain open.
Two diplomas from 907 mark the marriage and the ascent of the new queen. 
The first, dating to 19th April, tells us that, according to the law and with the con-
sent of his advisors, Charles had taken a young noblewoman called Frederuna for 
his wife and made her his consors regni (“partner in rule”).601 With this diploma, 
591 DChS 81 (25th August 915), 181: …nostre consanguinitati affinis dilectissimi…
592 Depreux, Comte, 389−390.
593 Flodoard, Annales 956, 143.
594 Gesta Episcoporum Cameracensium, 431: …vir siquidem ex nobili parentela Germaniae ortus sed 
et Ottonis imperatoris proxime consanguineus. On this connection, see also Althoff, Königsfami-
lien, 339, B 185.
595 See Althoff, Konvent, 30, n. 9.
596 Wenskus, Stammesadel, 249−250. See also Ravaux, Evêques. 
597 Catalogus Abbatum Corbeiensium, 275.
598 The catalogue is printed by Duchèsne, Fastes  III, 93−95. According to him, the catalogue is 
 extremely precise and credible. See Duchèsne, Fastes III, 99 for the year of Mancio’s death, based 
on the catalogue. Benner, Châlons-en-Champagne, 43, dates Bovo’s episcopat to 911/913−947, 
 succeeding Letoldus (908/909–911/913).
599 Unfortunately Wenskus only referred to Wilmans, Kaiser-Urkunden, 301 in this context. Wil-
mans, however, does not mention the monk/bishop Bovo. Wenskus’ hypothesis therefore seems 
to be based on the frequency of the name Bovo in the Ekbertiner family mentioned by him in this 
 context. Wenskus, Stammesadel, 248−250.
600 Wenskus, Stammesadel, 248−250.
601 DChS 56, 122: Eorum itaque admonitionibus sollicitati et consiliis exortati quamdam nobili prosapia 
puellam, nomine Frederunam, communi dumtaxat consensu fidelium, Deo, ut credimus, cooperante, 
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Charles granted his bride a dowry,602 consisting of two palaces603 belonging to the 
royal fisc: Corbeny, including his own foundation of Saint-Pierre, which he had 
constructed for the relics of Saint Marcoul only a year before;604 and Ponthion. 
The second diploma, issued a month later, saw Frederuna intervening together 
with Abbess Gisela of Nivelles, the daughter of Lothar II, Robert of Neustria, a 
Countess Adelaide, the counts Altmar and Erkanger as well as the fidelis Robert 
on behalf of bishop Anskeric of Paris and his Church, granting the church the ab-
bey of Saint-Pierre of Rebais, previously held by the bishop.605 As we have already 
discussed, this diploma seems to be a kind of who-is-who of the realm, displaying 
Charles’  family and his most important advisors. The use of the consors regni, a 
very uncommon expression for West Frankish diplomas,606 as well as the presen-
tation of Frederuna within the circle of the most influential nobles of the realm, 
both indicate that Charles intended to let Frederuna partake in the political affairs 
of the realm.
Early in the 10th century, two new ordines were created dealing with the coro-
nation of the queen.607 One of them derives the position of the queen from her 
marriage to the king by pointing out the positive effects for her people of the mar-
riage between the Jewish queen Esther and the Persian king, Ahasuerus/Xerxes.608 
This is basically the same reasoning also to be found in Charles’  first diploma for 
Frederuna, in which her new importance is derived from the marriage to him: he 
made her the consors regni because she had become his wife.609 If we find the same 
thought pattern in Charles’  diploma as well as the ordo, can we assume a direct 
connection between the two? It seems at least likely that Frederuna was crowned 
and anointed queen and that the ordine was created or used for this occasion.
These first diplomas show the importance the marriage had for Charles and 
that he appears to have at least intended to make his wife part of his rule. How-
ever, Régine Le Jan argues that the queen’s dowry was too limited to one region to 
allow her to completely fulfil the role as a consors regni.610 While we cannot argue 
against the limited distribution of the dowry, we should not forget that Charles 
secundum leges atque statuta priorum nobis nuptiali conubio sociavimus regnique consortem 
 statuimus. For the meaning of consors regni, see for example Fößel, Consors regni, 83.
602 On the queen’s dowry, see Hartmann, Königin, 158−160 and Le Jan, Douaires.
603 See also Bautier, Itinéraires, 108−109.
604 DChS 53.
605 DChS 54 (21st May 907).
606 Erkens, Esther, 23. While common in Italy and (later) the Ottonian empire, within the West the 
expression is otherwise only used in diplomas of Charles the Bald, DDChB 269 and 299. See him 
also for the importance of this expression.
607 MGH Font. Iur. Germ. IX, N° 3, 6−9 and XI as well as Schramm, Krönung, 141−149. Both were 
created at the beginning of the 10th century in Western Francia.
608 MGH Font. Iur. Germ. IX, N° 3, c. 2, 8−9.
609 See chapter III.3.2.2, n. 601 and Erkens, Esther, 24. Nelson, Rites, 311−312 sees a connection of the 
ordo to the marriage between Charles’ son Louis IV and Otto I’s sister Gerberga in 939, pointing 
out its incorporation into Ottonian pontificials in Italy and Germany.
610 Le Jan, Douaires, 474. On the actual control of the queen over her dowry, see Althoff, Probleme.
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himself mostly appears to have remained within Francia, the very same region 
where he chose to endow his wife. Hence, the size and distribution of the dowry 
do not help us when establishing Frederuna’s influence at court. More promising 
is the evidence of the royal diplomas. Up until her death in 917, only one diploma 
is preserved mentioning her. In 915, Count Raoul de Gouy and the fidelis Etbert 
intervened on her behalf in front of the king, asking him to donate some land at 
Compiègne to her to construct a chapel for Saint Clement.611 While a low number 
of interventions does not necessarily indicate that the queen was without influence 
at court,612 her absence from the diplomas, especially compared to the presence of 
Charles’  mother Adelaide, is remarkable. Her connection to Raoul de Gouy indi-
cates that she was part of the link between Charles and this special circle of close 
associates around him. Except for this, only the appointment of her brother Bovo 
as bishop of Châlons may give us an indication of her importance, assuming that 
he owed his position to her influence with the king.
Despite the lack of evidence from the diplomas issued during her lifetime, 
Frederuna appears to have been very close to Charles. Before her death, Charles’ 
diplomas twice connect her spiritual welfare to measures taken by the king.613 
Immediately after her death on 10th February 917,614 for about sixteen months, 
each of Charles’  diplomas either dealt with Frederuna’s last wishes or established 
prayer services on her behalf.615 Frederuna’s donation of Corbeny to Saint-Remy 
was confirmed,616 Ponthion given to Saint-Corneille,617 some property to her chap-
lain Mauger618 and other estates to her foundation of Saint-Clement,619 with two of 
the latter cases emphasising her wish620 or even letting her appear as petitioner.621 
611 DChS 80 (7th July 915).
612 Erkens, Esther, 22.
613 DDChS 64 (17th June 910 or 911, 146: …pro nostra tantummodo salute conjugisque nostrae Frider­
unae…) and 83 (27th November 915, 187: Et ob hoc pro remedio animae nostrae conjugis Friderunae…).
614 DChS 89 notes this day for her death.
615 The only exception is DChS 93 (28th April 918), which donates Charles’ foundation Saint-Vau-
bourg at Attigny to Saint-Corneille. This diploma mentions no prayer service, only the treasurer 
and the bailiff are requested to pay five solidi for a meal served the day of Charles’ coronation 
and later his deathday. On memorial services in general and also particularly for Frederuna, see 
Ewig, Gebetsdienst.
616 DChS 87 (14th February 917).
617 DChS 91 (26th July 917).
618 DChS 95 (26th May 918).
619 DDChS 95 and 96 (1st June 917 or 918) Lauer dated this diploma to 1st June 918−923; Font-Réaulx, 
Diplômes, 43 to 921, based on the beginning of the episcopate of Gauzlin in 922, Archbishop 
Roger of Trier only acting as sole chancellor from 921 onwards and the diploma being edited by 
the same person as DChS 110. Roger of Trier, however, occasionally acted as chancellor already 
before 919 (see chapter III.2.1.3). Furthermore, Font-Réaulx reasons to assume the same editor 
remain in the dark. The donation made on behalf of Frederuna on the other hand points to a con-
nection to this period after her death, which leads us to believe that it was issued during this time.
620 DChS 91, 207: ...volumus fieri quod conjunx nostra Frideruna carissima nostram flagitavit crebrius 
clementiam ut, post discessum suae hujus vitae, praeceptum nostrae corroborationis…
621 DChS 95, 218−219: …agnoscat industria quoniam praefata nostra conjunx celsitudinem serenitatis 
nostrae adiens, humiliter deprecata est…
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Prayer services for Charles, her and their children were installed at Saint-Remy,622 
at Saint-Denis for himself, her and Robert,623 at Saint-Germain-des-Prés for 
Charles and her,624 at Saint-Corneille for her625 and at Saint-Clement for Charles, 
her, Bovo and Hagano.626 This latter was the last diploma mentioning her or her 
death,627 letting her appear as if she was still among the living and marks the high 
point and end of this period.
Frederuna’s death appears to have left a deep impression on Charles, making 
us believe that, indeed, a deep connection existed between him and his wife. If this 
was indeed the case, we can assume that her influence on him was rather large. 
Yet, in contrast to Adelaide, Frederuna only appears twice connected to impor-
tant nobles: once just after her marriage in a diploma that probably was meant 
to show her at the centre of the court and a second time eight years later, with 
two men who seem to have belonged to the circle of men close to the king. Her 
appearances are rare and do not signify any new alliances or moments of special 
political importance—apart from her own wedding. Within the wider network of 
Charles’  political relations, Frederuna, therefore, does not seem to have played a 
major role. As the first diplomas for her indicate, Charles had certainly intended to 
make her part of his rule, yet, based on the lack of interventions from her side, we 
must assume that she did not fulfil that role, possibly because of a lack of interest 
on her side.628
Unlike Frederuna’s origins, those of Charles’  second wife Eadgifu are well 
known. She was the daughter of Edward the Elder, king of the Anglo-Saxons.629 
Due to this connection it has been suggested that, by marrying her, Charles had 
tried to strengthen his connections to Baldwin of Flanders, who had married 
Ælfthryd, a daughter of Alfred the Great and aunt to Eadgifu; and their son Ar-
nulf.630 While such a connection may indeed have played a role, other concerns 
probably were of greater importance. Viking incursions had by no means ended 
with the Treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte and still posed a major threat. In this 
context, a report from the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is most interesting: “And that 
same year [916] Earl Thurcetel went across the sea to France, along with the men 
622 DChS 88 (15th February 917).
623 DChS 89 (28th May 971). This diploma presents a remarkable case. Being preserved as an origi-
nal, we can note that the prayer service for Frederuna was added after the diploma’s original 
draft. See also McNair, Development, 88. For a facsimile of the original, see Lot and Lauer, Diplo-
mata Karolinorum VI, N° 20.
624 DDChS 92 (14th March 918) and 94 (15th May 918).
625 DChS 90 (26th July 917).
626 DChS 95 (26th May 918).
627 Setting aside DChS 96, which is difficult to date and only mentions her as the founder of Saint-
Clement. See chapter III.2.2, n. 619.
628 On the importance of individual character traits for queens and her power at court, see Erkens, 
Esther, 17.
629 Nelson, Eadgifu and Hlawitschka, Ahnen II, 292−293. On the Anglo-Saxon position concerning 
this marriage, see MacLean, Marriage, 30−31.
630 See for example Kalckstein, Geschichte, 145−146 and Settipani, Préhistoire, 325, n. 911.
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who were willing to serve him, with King Edward’s peace and support.”631 While 
this is the only mention of such an event, it, nevertheless, appears that not only 
Northmen used England unhindered as a basis for ventures into the West Frank-
ish realm, but also that at least some of them enjoyed the support of the king. 
Bearing this in mind, Charles’  marriage to the daughter of the same king only a 
few years later632 may be seen in a different light. A marriage alliance with Edward 
tied the king to Charles and would, undoubtedly, put an end to Edward’s support 
for the Northmen heading to the coasts of the West Frankish realm. Therefore, it 
seems safe enough to assume that the choice of Charles’  bride can also be read in 
the context of his policies to protect the realm from Viking incursions—not the 
first time was such an alliance concluded, as Charles the Bald had married his 
daughter Judith to King Æthelwulf of Wessex to strengthen the alliance between 
the two against the Northmen.633
Of Eadgifu’s role at court, however, the sources make no mention at all. She ap-
pears neither in the narrative accounts, setting back in around 919, nor in Charles’ 
diplomas. In regard to the effort Charles had made to introduce Frederuna to 
the court and the elites of the realm, the latter is rather surprising. It has been 
suggested that the king transferred Frederuna’s original dowry to her,634 yet this 
seems rather unlikely, given that he had confirmed Frederuna’s donations of the 
same dowry to Saint-Remy and Saint-Corneille only in 917.635 That Eadgifu was 
certainly capable and interested in influencing royal politics has been shown by 
Simon MacLean,636 yet all the evidence we have only accounts for her later years. 
Any judgement on her importance at Charles’  court is a mere assumption and we 
must therefore refrain from drawing any conclusions.
Kinsmen and marriage alliances
As we have already seen, we can find a number of Charles’  relatives at court. 
Count Aledramnus, a relative of Charles’  father Louis,637 was an early supporter; 
Count Hugh of Maine, Charles’  cousin, an important ally against Robert. Oth-
ers such as Charles’  nephew Gauzfrid and his brother-in-law Bovo were installed 
as bishops. There are also a number of other examples of how Charles furthered 
the interests of his kinsmen and how he constructed new relations with nobles 
important to him. The most obvious example is certainly Count Wigeric, who 
631 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, MS A, 916, 66: 7 þy ilcan geare for Þurcytel eorl ofer sæ on Froncland mid 
þam mannum þe him gelæstan woldon mid Eadweardes cynges friþe 7 fultume. Translation by 
Whitelock, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 64.
632 Between 917 and 919 (Nelson, Eadgifu), probably in 918 (Settipani, Préhistoire, 325). The earlier 
date is given by Frederuna’s year of death, the later by the beginning of Flodoard’s annals, which 
does not mention the marriage.
633 Hartmann, Königin, 193.
634 MacLean, Difference, 182−185.
635 DChS 87 concerning Corbeny and Saint-Remy, DChS 91 for Ponthion and Saint-Corneille.
636 MacLean, Difference.
637 See chapter II.1.
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was  married to Cunigunde, Reginar Longneck’s daughter with Charles’  half-sister 
 Ermentrude638—Wigeric, therefore, was Charles’  nephew. Wigeric’s first appear-
ance was in a diploma for the church of Liège, issued at the request of Reginar and 
Robert as well as another Robert.639 In this diploma, the abbey of Hastières, held 
by Wigeric, was given to the church of Liège. Charles and Reginar, however, made 
sure that Hastières, as well as another abbey already belonging to the church, were 
to be held by Wigeric, his wife and their son until the last of them had died.640 More 
importantly, however, Wigeric also became Charles’  new count of the  palace.641 
His proximity to the king is also clear from the first assembly held at Herstal in 916, 
when he was named first of the counts listed as participants in the judgement.642 
Of Wigeric’s further actions, nothing is known. He died before 922, leaving his 
widow Cunigunde to marry Count Ricuin of Verdun.643 His position as count of 
the palace, however, placed him in direct vicinity to the king which granted him 
access to the inner circle and established a second connection between Charles 
and the Reginars.
Wigeric’s marriage to Charles’  niece points us to the king’s own female 
 offspring. As the Genealogica dictata a Carolo Rege tells us, Charles had a number 
of daughters from his first wife Frederuna as well as from one or more of his 
concubines,644 allowing him to construct marriage alliances with men of his 
choice. A number of these connections can be traced in the sources, although 
some of them are rather problematic to assess. In Alberic of Trois-Fontaines’ 
13th century chronicle, for example, Raoul de Gouy is mentioned to have been 
married to Louis IV’s sister—hence Charles’  daughter.645 The famous poem Raoul 
de Cambrai, probably composed a little earlier, during the reign of Philippe- 
Auguste (1180−1223),646 names Alais, sister of King Louis, as his wife.647 While the 
Genealogica does not name an Alais, it does list an Alpais as a natural daughter of 
Charles648—close enough to make an identification possible. However, since both 
sources only date roughly 300 years after Charles’  death, doubts are allowed. And 
it seems indeed, as Philippe Grierson has argued, that Raoul was not married to 
Alpais, but to Eldegarde, the daughter of Count Ermenfrid.649
638  See chapter III.2.1.5, n. 383.
639 DChS 65 (912−913).
640 DChS 65, 148.
641 DChS 84, 189: Widricus comes palatii.
642 DChS 84.
643 On the date and the marriage, see Hlawitschka, Ahnen I, XIII, 2, 200−207.
644 Witger, Genealogia, 303: Karolus rex genuit ex Frederuna regina, Hyrmintrudim, Frederunam, 
Adelheidim, Gislam, Rotrudim et Hildegardim; ex concubina vero Arnulfum, Drogonem, Rori­
conem et Alpaidim. Denique vero defuncta Frederuna regina, sibi sotiavit alteram in coniugium 
reginam nomine Otgivam, ex qua genuit filium eliganti forma Hludovicum nomine.
645 Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronicon, 763.
646 Kay, Raoul de Cambrai, LXXIII.
647 Raoul de Cambrai, 72, v. 946−947; 217, v. 3382–3383 and 310, v. 5022.
648 See chapter III.2.2, n. 644.
649 Grierson, Origine, 101−104.
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Yet, tracing Alpais is not futile. Indeed, it seems that she married another  noble 
close to Charles, Count Erlebald of Castriciensis,650 who, in 921, sought the king’s 
help against the church of Reims and who Charles posthumously tried to free 
from excommunication. Therefore, Erlebald’s flight to Charles and the king’s 
 efforts on his behalf appear in a different light: Erlebald was his son-in-law, some-
one particularly close to the king. Also a second marriage of Charles’  daughters 
can be traced. Otto the Great’s count of the palace, Gottfrid, was, as Eduard Hla-
witschka has shown, married to a certain Ermentrude who, in turn, appears to be 
identical with Charles’  daughter of the same name.651 Gottfrid was the son of none 
other than Count Gerhard,652 one of the Matfrid brothers and therefore a member 
of a leading Lotharingian noble family belonging to the king’s most important 
supporters. Nothing indicates when this marriage took place; however, it seems 
very likely that it had been arranged by Charles—after his deposition, the Matfrid 
family would have had nothing to gain from such an alliance. Of Charles’  other 
daughters, only one more can traced in this context: Gisela, of whom Dudo of 
Saint-Quentin claims that Charles married her to the Viking leader Rollo. How-
ever, since this supposed marriage relates more to Charles’  policy towards the 
Northmen, we will return to this problem later on. In any case, we can note that 
Charles made use of his daughters to construct or reinforce links to a number of 
nobles important to him. In this respect, Charles’  practice differed considerably 
from that of his great-great-grandfather Charlemagne and Louis the German, who 
intended their daughters to join convents, yet fell in line with Louis the Pious and 
most of his descendants.653
Close friends
As we have seen, to some extent Charles’  circle was made up of relatives, such as 
Bovo of Châlons; but more importantly, by nobles of his choice, such as Raoul de 
Gouy, Stephen of Cambrai and Abbo of Soissons. Within the latter group, we also 
find, as mentioned, a certain Hagano, who Flodoard introduces to us as “his coun-
cillor, whom he had elevated from mediocrity.”654 Who was this man that the king 
was not willing to dismiss, even when threatened with the defection of a signifi-
cant group of nobles? Most often, scholars have taken Flodoard’s words as the ba-
sis of their interpretations and, in addition, assumed that he was of Lotharingian 
650 Werner, Nachkommen, 461. The marriage between Erlebald and Alpais was originally proposed 
by Vanderkindere, Formation II, 206−207, based on a charter issued by the count naming his 
wife Alpais and the proximity between the Charles and Erlebald.
651 Hlawitschka, Ahnen I,2, 261 with Hlawitschka, Anfänge, 57−58 and 68−69. For Ermentrude, see 
chapter III.2.2, n. 644.
652 Hlawitschka, Ahnen I,2, 260.
653 On the various daughters of Carolingian kings and their roles, see Schieffer, Töchter and Hart-
mann, Königin, 189−195.
654 Flodoard, Annales 920, 2: Pene omnes Franciae comites regem suum, Karolum, apud urbem Sues­
sonicam, quia Haganonem consiliarium suum, quem de mediocribus potentem fecerat, dimittere 
nolebat, reliquerunt.
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origin.655 This hypothesis seems to be based on his first appearance in the sources 
in 916, when he figures as third among the participants without title, the proceres, 
in the judgement of Herstal.656 Since all the bishops and counts participating in the 
judicium appear to have been Lotharingian nobles, it seems not too speculative 
to assume that the same applies for the proceres. This conclusion however, given 
that almost nothing is known about these men, must be treated with utmost care, 
even more so as the assembly of 919, also at Herstal, was visited by West Frankish 
nobles.657 Regarding Hagano’s “mediocre” origins, the account of Folcuin of Saint-
Bertin may be of help. His Gesta, composed forty years after Charles’  deposition, 
differ slightly from Flodoard in that they describe Hagano as someone “whose lin-
eage and nobility were unknown to the Franks.”658 Two conclusions can be drawn 
from this account: a) Hagano’s origins were not necessarily mediocre but b) they 
were either unknown to the nobles of the Western realm or they chose to ignore 
them. In both cases, Hagano appears not to have been a member of the high-
est echelons of the aristocracy, but someone who had joined the king from the 
outside. While this does not necessarily mean that Hagano was a Lotharingian 
noble, it makes it much more likely that, at the very least, he was not from Francia. 
Concerning Hagano’s family, two hypotheses have been developed by scholars. 
Hagano has long been considered a relative of Charles’  wife Frederuna, yet, as we 
have argued, this appears to be unfounded.659 The second hypothesis, however, 
sees in him a member of the Haganonide family, based in the Middle Rhine in the 
vicinity of Worms and Mainz660 and with connections to the Matfrid family.661 It 
is probably here, in the border region between Lotharingia and the East Frankish 
realm, where we can find Hagano’s origins—by no means mediocre, since his an-
cestors appear to have served Charlemagne662 and Louis the Pious.663
655 See, for example, Eckel, Charles, 99; Le Jan, Famille, 60; Depreux, Comte.
656 DChS 84. See Parisot, Royaume, 628−629.
657 See chapter III.2.1.6.
658 Folcuin, Gesta Abbatum S. Bertini Sithiensium, c. 99, 625: Qui confirmatus in regno, quendam 
Haganum, cuius genus et nobilitas ignorabatur a Francis, super omnes diligendo extulit et hunc fa­
miliarius ceteris sibi consiliarium ascivit. Quod videntes Franci, non leviter ignoti hominis amicitias 
tulerunt.
659 See above.
660 Le Jan, Famille, 59−60 and Depreux, Comte, 390−391. On the Haganonide family in the area, 
attested since the 7th century, see Gockel, Königshöfe, 296−297.
661 Depreux, Comte, 388−389 discusses this theory based on the Vita Gerardi abbatis Broniensis (c. 1, 
656: Pater eius Stantius ex prosapia Haganonis Austrasiorum ducis prosatus, mater autem Plictruidis 
nuncupata domni Stepheni Tungrorum episcopi soror traditur extitisse germana.). Stephen’s relation 
to the Matfrid Gerhard is confirmed by DLCh 57. See also above. A connection between Hagano 
and the Matfrid family may also be indicated by an entry in the Liber Memorialis of Remiremont, 
showing Hagano next to the count of the palace Gottfrid, Bishop Richer of Liège, Matfrid and 
Ermentrude. Hlawitschka, Anfänge, 72. Liber Memorialis Remiremont, 85 fol. 39r: IIII kal. april. 
obiit Godefridus comes; XII kal. … obiit Otlint; X kal. iuli obiit Richerus episcopus; XIIII kal. sept. 
obiit Matfridus; VIIII kal. … Haganon anniversarius; Adelardus. Ermentrut, Gerart, Godefrit…
662 Codex Laureshamensis N° 3, 273.
663 Urkundenbuch Coblenz N° 62 70. Metz, Reichsgut, 152−154.
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Hagano’s ascent was, as mentioned, marked by his appearance at Herstal in 
916, when he featured inconspicuously among the proceres. Eighteen months after 
the assembly, he makes his second appearance, intervening in a diploma for Saint-
Corneille664 and one year later his third, this time making requests for Frederuna’s 
chaplain Mauger and her foundation of Saint-Clément.665 Both diplomas reveal 
a very special relationship with Charles. The first shows Hagano as the one who 
is requesting donations and privileges for the souls of the deceased Frederuna 
as well as Charles’  own,666 while in the second Hagano is included in the prayer 
service installed for Charles and Bovo.667 Hence, Hagano’s ascent takes place in 
direct connection with some of the most intimate diplomas Charles issued for his 
deceased queen, which seems to indicate a very private connection between the 
two, probably developed over the death of his beloved wife.668
Flodoard tells us that early in 920—undoubtedly in late January—the Frank-
ish nobles left Charles because he was unwilling to dismiss Hagano.669 Given the 
evidence of the two diplomas, it seems safe to assume that Charles denied their 
request because of the special bond that had developed between the two—Hagano 
had become a friend, his intimate, someone he deeply cared for. Richer gives us a 
very interesting description of the relation between the two: “the same [Hagano] 
alone served the king while the magnates remained far away, and often in public 
he took the king’s hat from his head and put it on his own.”670 Richer is, of course, 
not a reliable source and should not, by any means, be taken literally. Nevertheless, 
his words seem to capture the relation between the king and his friend, at least as it 
was seen from the outside. Richer’s description of Hagano as the only one having 
access to Charles while the nobles remained distant is definitely wrong—in 919 
alone, Charles issued six diplomas, among them one for Robert of Neustria and 
another relating to the second assembly at Herstal.671 Nevertheless, if Charles and 
Hagano spent a lot of time together, this might have been perceived negatively, 
giving rise to rumours among the nobles that someone who they thought of as 
being an outsider, or at least not belonging to their own networks, had gained an 
unreasonable amount of influence over the king and the decisions made at court. 
This image might have been further fuelled by Hagano’s promotion. In 916 he was 
664 DChS 90, 26th July 917.
665 DChS 95, 26th May 918.
666 DChS 90, 204−205.
667 DChS 95, 219−220. For Frederuna a separate prayer service is established.
668 See also McNair, Development, 87−89.
669 See chapter III.2.2, n. 654. These events are the first Flodoard makes note of in 920. On 20th 
 January 920 Charles issued a diploma at Soissons (DChS 105) – the same city where the nobles 
assembled and therefore undoubtedly connected to the assembly.
670 Richer, Historiae I, c.  15, 51−52: Nam cum multa benignitate principes coleret, precipua tamen 
beatitudine Haganonem habebat, quem ex mediocribus potentem effecerat, adeo ut magnatibus 
quibusque longe absistentibus ipse regio lateri solus hęreret, pilleum etiam a capite regis sepissime 
sumptum, palam sibi imponeret.
671 DDChS 99, 100, 101, 103, 104 and 75.
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among the proceres, in 917 Charles’  diploma depicts him as “our fidelis” and in 918 
as “our fidelis and venerable count.”672 Hagano might, of course, have inherited the 
title from someone within his family, yet, given his close relation with Charles, it 
seems likely that the king granted it to his companion as a sign of his favour.
As Flodoard informs us, seven months after the assembly of Soissons, 
 Archbishop Heriveus was able to mediate a settlement between Charles and 
the Frankish nobles.673 One would expect that the conditions of the settlement 
 involved Hagano in some way and, indeed, the position of Charles’  intimate 
appears significantly changed from that moment onwards. In fact, at the end of 
Flodoard’s putative seven-month period, Charles issued a diploma at Herstal 
showing the counts Raoul de Gouy and Sigard intervening together with Hagano 
for the church of Cambrai.674 This diploma is only the first in a series, followed 
by three more in 921, in which Hagano features. The first one, issued for the 
 abbey of Fossés in April, shows him together with Bishop Abbo of Soissons and 
Abbot  Rumald; the second one, in August, with Count Ermenfrid for the abbey 
of Brogne; the third one as one of the participants in a judgement in favour of the 
church of Châlons, alongside the counts Helgaud and Raoul de Gouy as well as 
the bishops Abbo of Soissons and Stephen of Cambrai.675 Indeed, the first diploma 
from 920 is also the first one to show the group of nobles drawing their influ-
ence from their special relation to Charles acting together, although all of them 
had previously been in the king’s vicinity. Given that this was the first diploma 
issued after the reconciliation with the nobles from the Western realm and given 
Hagano’s own presence in it, it seems to carry special meaning. Undoubtedly this 
was a reaction to the reproaches the nobles articulated at Soissons and reflected 
the settlement negotiated thereafter.
Nothing is actually known about the terms agreed upon between Charles and 
the nobles, yet they must have included something about the relation between the 
king and his intimate. Since Flodoard fails to provide us with any details, we have 
to rely on the evidence of the royal diplomas in which, from September 920 on, 
Hagano becomes much more visible. Charles, as it would appear, had changed his 
tactics concerning Hagano. The two of them certainly continued to be extremely 
close: in 921 Hagano was included in a memorial service for the king, Frederuna 
and her relatives.676 Yet at the same time Charles now let Hagano openly participate 
in the political decisions taken at court, using those nobles most attached to himself 
to introduce his intimate into the networks of the Frankish nobility. The outsider 
was meant to become an accepted member of the circle at court, his  relation with 
672 DChS 90 (26th July 917), 205 (…fideli nostro Haganone…) and DChS 95 (26th May 918), 219 (…
fidele nostro ac venerabili comite Aganone…).
673 Flodoard, Annales 920, 2.
674 DChS 106 (8th September 920).
675 DDChS 108 (22nd April 921, for Saint-Maur of Fossés), 127 (27th August 921, for the abbey of 
Brogne) and 112 (20th September 921, judicium for the church of Châlons).
676 DChS 108. 
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the king publicly displayed to end any possible rumours. The next step would have 
been to widen this circle, and indeed Hagano features among Charles’ supporters 
in the treaty of Bonn.677 This was not an unreasonable  strategy: Hagano was not the 
first friend Charles had introduced to the highest circles.678 In 898, Charles issued 
a diploma for a certain Theodosius, granting him property in Septimania.679 This 
diploma was requested by a fidelis called Robert. This same Robert also appears in a 
number of other diplomas: in 904, he intervened in royal charter in favour of Bishop 
Mancio and the church of Châlons, this time depicted as “our fidelis and highly 
beloved”;680 in 907, he is mentioned in the diploma introducing Frederuna to the 
court, together with members of Charles’ family and some of the highest ranking 
nobles of the realm, among them Robert of Neustria, Count Erkanger and Bishop 
Anskeric of Paris, again described as “our beloved”;681 a diploma issued around 912 
shows him as “our beloved” intervening together with two of the most important 
nobles, Robert of Neustria and Reginar Longneck, on behalf of the church of Liège;682 
in 915, finally, he appears in a diploma together with Richard the Justiciar, alongside 
whom he intervened on behalf of the abbey of Tournus.683 Nothing more is known 
about him,684 but the diplomas,  nonetheless, give us the impression of a remarkable 
man. Carrying no title, yet nevertheless being depicted as “our beloved” (dilectus 
nobis), he seems to have been close to Charles, a conclusion that is further strength-
ened by his interventions on behalf of others. At the same time, his position seems to 
have been accepted by the leading nobles of the realm, most notably of course Robert 
of Neustria. This Robert was not alone however: in 915, we find another “beloved” 
fidelis called Etbert in Charles’ vicinity, intervening together with Raoul de Gouy 
on behalf of Frederuna, granting her property to found a chapel in honour of Saint-
Clément at  Compiègne.685 Like Robert, Etbert seems to have been close to Charles, 
and like the former, he was accepted by leading members of the court.
Thus, the West Frankish nobility was not generally opposed to Charles’ having 
intimates and to them participating in political affairs at court. What they seem to 
have opposed, however, was the special relation Charles and Hagano had developed 
during the years after Frederuna’s death. Charles’ solution to this problem seems to 
677 MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
678 On the king’s right to choose his advisors even from lower ranks, see Le Jan, Élites, 418−419 and 
Le Jan, Introduction, 12−13.
679 DChS 13 (24th June 898).
680 DChS 48 (17th March 904), 106: … Rotbertus videlicet noster fidelis nobisque admodum dilectus…
681 DChS 57 (21st May 907), 124: ...Rotberti nobis dilecti…
682 DChS 65 (912−913), 148: …Rotbertus nobis dilectus…
683 DChS 82 (10th October 915). Lauer identified this Robert as Robert of Neustria. However, while 
the magnate is otherwise always described with one or several of the titles comes, marchio or 
abbas as well as epithets like dilectus or venerabilis, this Robert is only depicted as fidelis nostri, 
concording with the aforementioned diplomas.
684 Already Lauer, Recueil Charles III, 123, n. 8 doubted the identification as Count Robert of Troyes. 
Indeed, the count had already died in 886 and was succeeded by Aleaume (Crété-Protin, Église, 
304−306).
685 DChS 80 (7th July 915), 179: …fideles nostri, videlicet Etbertus noster dilectus atque Rodulfus comes…
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have been the introduction of Hagano into the higher circles of the nobility and the 
public display of his new role at court. If Hagano was to be accepted by the other 
nobles, he had to have a position similar to their own. This, however, also meant that 
Hagano needed to be provided with honores according to his new position within 
the hierarchy of the nobility. In fact, Flodoard’s account contains a number of refer-
ences that indicate that by 922 Hagano had large resources at his disposal; he could 
muster a personal retinue strong enough to undertake military operations and had 
been able to assemble a treasury.686 Finally, Charles wanted to give Hagano his own 
lay abbacy. The king’s choice fell on the abbey of Chelles, held by his aunt Rothild. 
If, however, he had expected to encounter less resistance because of their kinship, he 
was soon proven wrong. Rothild’s daughter was married to Robert of Neustria’s son, 
Hugh the Great, who now intervened.687 The conflict soon developed into the rebel-
lion of the West Frankish nobles, leading to the coronation of Robert of Neustria.
III.2.3 The role of the marchiones
Three men within the Western realm are generally qualified as marchiones:  Robert 
of Neustria, Richard the Justiciar and William the Pious.688 The three of them 
 distinguished themselves from the other nobles by concentrating a large num-
ber of honores, including important abbeys, in their hands; by installing viscounts 
within the regions they controlled; and by close cooperation with bishops and 
abbots within their vicinity.689 There certainly were distinctive differences in how 
these men had come to power, Robert with royal consent taking control of a con-
glomerate of honores already long in existence, Richard extending his influence 
by means of violence at a time when royal attention was focused elsewhere; yet 
the result was rather similar. Karl Ferdinand Werner probably went too far when 
describing the marchiones as direct deputies of the king, wielding viceroyal power 
within their regions690 and therefore attributing the system a degree of institution-
alisation that negates the differences between the different regional hegemonies.691 
Nevertheless, his approach seems to point in the right direction.
As we have seen above, in Burgundy, Richard had established himself as inter-
mediary, controlling the direct contacts between the local nobility and the king, 
a position that seems comparable with those of the other marchiones. Such an 
accumulation of power was nothing new.692 As mentioned, the conglomeration 
686 See chapter VI.4.
687 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8.
688 On the meaning of the marchio-title, see Stieldorf, Marken, esp. 213−215 for the Western realm 
under Charles the Simple.
689 For William, see Lauranson-Rosaz, Roi, 426−428.
690 Werner, Westfranken, 738−739 and Werner, Ursprünge, 467−470.
691 Bur, Remarques.
692 Bur, Remarques.
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of honores in Robert’s hand, for example, had developed over quite a long time 
and passed from one magnate to the other. Charles the Fat had built his rule on 
the cooperation of these magnates, using them as conduits to transmit the royal 
will into the regions controlled by, for example, Odo and Bernard of Auvergne.693 
Charles, as we have seen, built his early reign mainly on his old allies, Archbishop 
Fulk of Reims, Bishop Anskeric of Paris and Count Heribert  I of Vermandois. 
Richard the Justiciar and William the Pious, who had followed their own course 
during the struggle between Charles and Odo, remained distant at first, waiting to 
see how Robert of Neustria would act. Only after the latter had paid his allegiance 
to Charles, did the former two follow.
William the Pious
A private charter issued by William just before this moment in May 898 has 
been preserved that is most enlightening about his attitude towards the king.694 
The charter dates “the year in which Odo, king of the Francs and Aquitanians, 
died”695—meaning that five months after Odo’s death and Charles’  coronation at 
Reims, William was not yet willing to accept the latter as his new overlord. His 
attitude towards the new king and his own self-perception becomes even clearer 
when analysing the charter’s legal content. William donated property to the abbey 
of Brioude, although when it came to the clauses protecting his grant, he made 
an interesting addition: neither man, nor king, nor count, nor abbot, nor canon 
or any other person was allowed to estrange the property.696 While such clauses 
were common, the addition of the king certainly was not697 and betrays the mar-
chio ’s exceptional self-confidence at that moment. Soon after, William paid his 
allegiance to Charles and, in 899, he was the first magnate to appear in one of the 
king’s diplomas. Present at the important assembly of Tours-sur-Marne, he served 
as ambasciator in a diploma Charles issued at the request of William’s friend Ger-
ald of Aurillac.698 William’s support for the king on such an occasion appears to 
have come at a price. An ambasciator was someone who investigated the justness 
of a plea to the king, serving at the same time as intermediary on behalf of the pe-
titioner in front of the king.699 Hence, like Richard in Burgundy, William acted as 
693 MacLean, Kingship.
694 Cartulaire Brioude, N° 309, 313−315.
695 Cartulaire Brioude, N° 309, 315: …anno quo mortuus est Odo rex Francorum vel Aquitanorum.
696 Cartulaire Brioude, N° 309, 314−315: Nullusque hominum, neque rex, neque comes, neque abbas, 
neque canonici aut aliqua persona vendendi, concambiandi aut quolibet modo ab ipsa casa alien­
andi potestatem habeant.
697 A similar phrasing was applied in the foundation charter for Cluny. Recueil Cluny 1, N°  112, 
124−128 (11th September 910): Placuit etiam huic testamento inseri ut ab hac die nec nostro, nec 
parentum nostrorum, nec fastibus regie magnitudinis, nec cujuslibet terrenȩ potestatis jugo subici­
antur idem monachi ibi congregati; neque aliquis principum secularium, non comes quisquam, nec 
episcopus quilibet, non pontifex supradicte sedis Romanae…
698 DChS 21. See above, 10−11.
699 Depreux, Bitte, 84−85.
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a layer between the local nobility and Charles, who seems to have acknowledged 
William’s position south of the Loire. Furthermore, a private charter issued by his 
sister Ava in 901 was signed by William as “princeps and count of the palace,”700 a 
title that is repeated in 905 in one of his own charters.701 Charles had made William 
his new count of the palace, succeeding or replacing Count Elduin, who had held 
this office previously. William appears too few times in royal diplomas to conclude 
that he was in fact an important figure in the palace itself.702 The title therefore has 
another meaning, indicating his proximity to the king and his importance within 
the hierarchy of the nobles.
The relations between William and the king appear to have faltered around 
908. As with Richard, Charles seems to have intervened within William’s sphere of 
influence south of the Loire. The marking point is a diploma the king issued on 5th 
June 909 for Abbot Regembald of Psalmody.703 Next to the abbot, Count Raymond 
of Nîmes and Albi, an important noble from the South, can also be found in the 
diploma, he is depicted as “illustrious count and our beloved fidelis”704, a very rare 
combination of epithets and titles that emphasises his importance for Charles. The 
Vita Geraldi tells us that Raymond took the nephew of William’s friend Gerald 
prisoner705 while his son took the Gothic March from William’s successor, two 
incidents that indicate the rivalry between the two.706 From the moment Charles’ 
diploma was issued, there is a shift in the tone of William’s private charters. The 
foundation charter of Cluny, dating to 11th September 910, repeats the exemption 
of the king from intervening in the abbey’s affairs.707 Equally important, William 
now started referring to Odo in his charters, indicating that his grants were made 
for the wellbeing of his senior, King Odo,708 while Charles never received such at-
tention. These mentions of Odo may further indicate that William now was lean-
ing more towards Odo’s brother, Robert of Neustria, with whom he had already 
appeared in a royal diploma in 905, restoring property in the Limousin to Robert’s 
abbey of Saint-Denis.709 Similarly, a certain shift also seems to have taken place 
in favour of Richard the Justiciar. William’s private charter from November 916 
700 Recueil Cluny I, N° 74, 83−84 (29th November 901), 84: princeps et comes palatio.
701 Recueil Cluny I, N° 89bis, 833−834 (October 905), 833: Ego Vuilelmus, comes, conspalacius et 
marchio… The charter is preserved in original (Paris, BNF ms. lat. 11829 n. 2b).
702 Apart from DChS 21 William appears only once more in the royal diplomas, in 905 (DChS 50). 
DChS 102 is a forgery and would, in any case, not have mentioned William the Pious but his 
nephew William the Younger.
703 DChS 61.
704 DChS 61, 135: … illustris comitis ac dilecti fidelis nostri Raimundi…
705 Vita Sancti Geraldi Auriliacensis II, c. 28−29, 232−234.
706 Dunbabin, France, 60; Caille, Vicomtes, 50–51.
707 Recueil Cluny, N° 112, 124−128. See chapter III.2.3, n. 697.
708 Recueil Cluny, N° 112, 125: …inde pro anima senioris mei Odonis regis… Similar in charters from 
May 912 (Acta Sanctorum Benedicti IV, 2, 254) …pro remdedio animae meae, … senioris quoque 
quondam mei Odonis… and from November 916 (Cartulaire Sauxillanges, N° 126, 135−137, here 
135): … pro remedio anime ... et senioris mei Oddonis…
709 DChS 50.
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seems to have been issued during a large regional assembly, including his nephew 
William the Younger, two bishops, three abbots, two counts and signing even be-
fore the bishops, a certain Boso, who may well be identical with Richard’s son.710 
However, after William’s death on 6th July 918,711 Richard’ son Raoul and Robert 
of Neustria seem to have joined forces to take Berry from William’s successor, his 
nephew William. This enmity seems to have lasted until 924, when William the 
Younger payed his homage to Raoul, by now the king, in return for having Berry 
restored;712 which at the same time indicates that he did not support Robert and 
Raoul in the rebellion against Charles.
Richard the Justiciar
After Richard was replaced by Robert at court in 903, he disappears from the 
sources for several years. Early in 907, a solution seems to have been found that 
allowed Richard to return to court. In a diploma issued for the provost of the 
church of Langres, Otbert, Richard intervened alongside the bishop of the church, 
Argrim, and his own ally, Manasses.713 The importance Charles attributed to Rich-
ard’s return to court is marked not only by the place the diploma was issued— 
Compiègne—but also by the date, the 4th April 907 being an Easter Saturday. 
Hence, the king and the magnate celebrated Easter together in Charles’ most im-
portant palace. About a year later, Richard again requested a diploma, this time 
marking the restoration of property to the abbey of Saint-Martin of Autun.714 While 
Richard himself only appears in Charles’ diplomas once more—in 915 he visited the 
king at Gondreville in Lotharingia, supporting the abbot of Saint-Philibert of Tour-
nus alongside the fidelis Robert715—contact with Charles was also had by his sons. 
In 914, Hugh received property from the king716 while Boso accompanied Charles in 
921 at Bonn.717 The fact that his sons did indeed represent him becomes clear from 
Richard’s private charters. A judgement held in 916 shows Richard in the presence 
of his three sons, Raoul, Hugh and Boso. The charter making note of the judgement 
is signed by Raoul, who did so at his father’s order and as his deputy,718 a procedure 
that was repeated two years later,719 while another charter issued by Richard shows 
710 Cartulaire Sauxillanges, N° 126, 135−137. The charter’s witnesses read: Ingilberge, Willelmi, Acfre­
di, Bosoni, Ermoldi episcopi, Hildeberti episcopi, Attonis abbatis, Sigualdi abbatis, Abboni abbatis 
[…] Rogerii comitis, Utberti vicecomitis…
711 Lauranson-Rosaz, Auvergne, 60.
712 Robbie, Emergence, 86. Flodoard, Annales 924, 19−20.
713 DChS 55 (4th April 907).
714 DChS 59 (8th August 908).
715 DChS 82 (10th October 915).
716 DChS 79 (21st June 914).
717 MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
718 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 50, 203: Signum Rodulphi comitis, filii praedicti principis, qui per 
 jussionem praenominati patris sui in conspectu illius et ejus vice firmavit et manu propria signavit.
719 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 51 (after 1st September 918), 207: Signum Rodulfi, illustris comitis qui 
per jussionem prenominati patris sui in conspectu illius sua et ejus vice firmavit et manu propria 
subscripsit.
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all of his sons among the witnesses.720 Thus, Richard did his best to integrate his 
sons into his rule and establish Raoul as his successor in Burgundy.
Richard’s importance at Charles’  court after his return in 907 is hard to esti-
mate. The effort Charles made with his first diploma in 907 certainly indicates that 
Richard was still considered to be a key figure within the realm. The newly won 
cooperation must have involved Charles’  acknowledgement of Richard’s control 
over Burgundy and its nobles. The Burgundian elites still held contact with the 
king: as we have seen, Bishop Argrim of Langres and Abbot Wicheramnus of 
Saint-Philibert sought out Charles, and the Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium 
mentions that Bishop Geran was on his way to the king in December of 914, when 
he died at Soissons.721 However, in all of these cases, Richard appears to have played 
a key role. While the Argrim and Wicheramnus were accompanied to Charles by 
the marchio, Geran seems to have acted with Richard’s consent. Thus, all three 
cases demonstrate Richard’s influence over contacts between the local elites and 
the king. This was probably also his role at court. As with William south of the 
Loire, Richard acted as mediator between Charles and the Burgundian nobility. 
While certainly not as influential as Robert, he remained a key figure in the affairs 
of the realm and was, at times, represented at court by his sons. Whether the, ex-
tremely pro-Ricardian, account of the Chronicon S. Benigni Divionensis is accurate 
in its judgement that Richard had always been loyal to Charles722 must remain 
unclear, yet it may be worth considering that the final rebellion against Charles 
only occurred after Richard’s death and with the aid of his son Raoul, while in 920, 
during his lifetime, it had still been possible to find an agreement.
Richard’s return to court, however, is unlikely to have happened against 
 Robert’s will. In fact, during the following years, an increasing level of  cooperation 
between the two can be traced. The first sign of this is their joint campaign against 
the Northmen leading to the battle of Chartres in 911. From this campaign, a letter 
is preserved which was copied during the 11th century into a 9th century manu-
script: “Count Robert and dux Manasses greet Count Richard. Know that we set 
off against the Northmen, but not having found them we are returning to Paris 
sending this to you and enquire whether you will come to us or not.”723 We will 
deal with the campaign itself in our next chapter, for now however, it is important 
to note that Manasses, Richard’s ally whose offensive words had been the final 
reason for Robert leaving the court in 900, was now working together with that 
same Robert, undoubtedly on behalf of Richard. This cooperation was seemingly 
strengthened over the course of the following years. Richard’s aforementioned 
720 Roserot, Chartes, N° 13 (18th May 918), 185.
721 Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium I, 199−201.
722 Chronicon S. Benigni Divionensis, 123: Et hoc post mortem Richardi Ducis, qui ab exequutione 
 iustitie cognomen accepit. Ipse namque quamdiu vixit, Carolo regi semper fidelis exstitit.
723 Bibl. commun. Chartres, ms. 92, fol. 38v (printed in Catalogue Chartres, 48): Rotbertus comes et 
dux Manassae Richardo comiti salutem. Scitote quoniam fuimus perrecti contra Normannos, sed non 
invenientes regressi sumus Parisius mittentes ad vos et requirimus utrum vos necne venieris ad nos.
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private charter dating to 918 was issued “for the absolution of our lord, the glori-
ous king Odo, and his most noble brother Robert, the illustrious marchio” and 
“for the peace of our lord Richard, most pious duke, and his most noble wife and 
their most famous sons.”724 While the list of people for whose souls the charter 
had been issued also contains Charles the Bald and his wife Ermentrude, no men-
tion is made of Charles the Simple, not even in the dating. The charter becomes 
even more interesting when taking into consideration the fact that the restoration 
of the villa of Tillenay to the church of Autun confirmed by the charter actually 
also confirmed the terms of a preceding royal diploma, issued by Odo for Bishop 
Adalgarius in 893.725 The 918 charter was the sign of an alliance concluded at this 
moment, constructing a link via Odo’s diploma and indicating their friendship 
by commemorating their families.726 The charter was not the only sign of the new 
alliance however. Probably around the same time, Richard’s son Raoul married 
Robert’s daughter Emma,727 strengthening their bond through matrimony. This 
new alliance was not necessarily aimed against the king: already before 922, Raoul 
and Robert joined their forces against William the Younger, taking Bourges and 
the Berry from William the Pious’ successor.728
Robert of Neustria
While William and Richard were both very important men for Charles’  rule, 
 Robert remained the leading man, whose proximity was apparently sought 
by both. His central role within the realm is undisputed, but his relations with 
Charles have recently been reassessed by Geoffrey Koziol. Most commonly, 
 scholars have assumed that, after the initial problems had been solved, Robert and 
the king cooperated up until around 919, when there was a sudden breakdown in 
their  relations leading to the assembly of Soissons.729 However, as Koziol rightfully 
points out, the absence of news about tensions and conflicts between the king and 
the marchio between 900 and 919 is not necessarily a sign of Charles’  and Robert’s 
good relations, but simply due to the lack of narrative sources for this period. In 
opposition to the older research, Koziol argues instead in favour of constant ten-
sions because of differing political views concerning kingship and the relations 
with the Northmen, meaning that there was a direct path leading from the early 
724 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 51 (after 1st September 918), 205: …sed et pro absolutione domni 
 Odonis gloriosi regis et nobilissimi fratris illius domni Rothberti illustris marchionis… et quiete 
domni  Richardi piissimi ducis et nobilissime conjugis illius ac clarissimorum filiorum illorum et 
omnium fidelium suorum…
725 DOdo 35. On this diploma and the forgeries produced by Bishop Adalgar of Autun, see Koziol, 
Politics, 358−361.
726 On the role of prayer requirements in the formation of alliances between nobles, see Althoff, 
Amicitiae and Ludwig, Krise.
727 Settipani, Préhistoire, 389 with n. 189 and 408. The date of the marriage is unknown.
728 Flodoard, Annales 924, 20.
729 For example Werner, Origines, 493–515 and Sassier, Hugues, chapter 2.
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 conflict between Charles and Robert to the later rebellion.730 While we will deal 
with Charles’   politics towards the Northmen in the next chapter, at this point 
it seems necessary to discuss Koziol’s arguments concerning Charles’  vision of 
kingship.
Koziol’s first argument revolves around Charles’  policies towards lay abbacies. 
Based on Charles’  diplomas, he reconstructs a political programme of the king 
aimed at containing the abuse of power by the lay abbots against their convents 
and at the protection of the mensae of the abbeys by means of royal control over 
transactions, with royal diplomas serving as guarantees; hence royal control over 
the dealings between lay abbots and the monks.731 Indeed, as Koziol convincingly 
shows, it was not uncommon for Charles’  diplomas to contain such clauses. The 
question is, however, whether these measures were directed against the magnates 
holding these abbeys and whether Charles was indeed as opposed to lay abbacies 
as Koziol claims. The best way to address this issue is, undoubtedly, to analyse 
Robert’s politics towards his own abbacies. A number of his private charters for 
Saint-Martin of Tours can help us to shed some light on this issue. In 892, Robert, 
faced with the resistance of the canons, who threatened to bring the case before 
the king, returned property to them that his vassal Patericus has usurped.732 A 
similar case occurred in 899, when Robert restored a cella to the abbey’s hospice, 
which his brother Odo had given to one of his fideles without having consulted the 
chapter733—a measure he confirmed again one year later.734 Robert, as we can see, 
was willing to correct former misdealings even if they had been done by himself 
or his brother and even if this meant giving up some power. Similarly, Robert 
appears not to have opposed royal interventions in the dealings between abbot 
and monks. The first example are of course the diplomas and charters concerning 
Saint-Amand in 906,735 in which Charles confirmed an exchange between Robert 
and the monks of the same abbey, an exchange that is laid down more precisely in 
two private charters issued shortly afterwards, both of them mentioning Charles’ 
approval.736 There is also another document showing that Robert was not opposed 
to royal intervention and was even willing to use the king as guarantor. In 912, 
he issued a charter for Marmoutier confirming that the abbey was independent 
from the archbishop of Tours who had tried to bring some of its property un-
der his control and furthermore promising to obtain a royal diploma addressing 
this problem.737 Thus, Robert was neither opposed to restoring property he or his 
supporters held nor to the king acting as a guarantor if necessary. In this light, it 
730 Koziol, Charles, esp. 364−370 and Koziol, Politics, 415−444.
731 Koziol, Politics, 505–511, here esp. 507−508.
732 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 37, 139−141. On Robert’s favourable politics towards his abbeys along 
the Loire, especially Saint-Martin of Tours, see Noizet, Ascension, 23−26.
733 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 41, 155−157.
734 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 42, 157−165.
735 DChS 54 (7th September 906).
736 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 46, 178−181 and N° 1, 208−210.
737 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 47, 181−186. On this charter, see also Guyotjeannin, Notice 680−686.
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seems rather questionable whether Charles’  and Robert’s opinions concerning 
the management of abbacies really differed fundamentally from each other. Simi-
larly, if Robert really had resented Charles’  politics towards the abbeys he held, 
why would he have consented to the king issuing diplomas expressing these same 
politics for these very same abbeys?
This brings us to the second issue Koziol identifies as a cause for tensions be-
tween the king and the magnate: the right of nobles to participate in ruling the 
realm. According to him, Robert derived his right to counsel the king from his 
rank within the hierarchy of the society while for Charles “counsel and consensus 
were elements in the display of royal majesty,” also meaning that the king was 
at complete liberty to choose his councillors.738 Koziol is right to point out that 
Charles’  diplomas convey a very distinctive image of royal majesty, describing 
even the highest magnates petitioning the king on their knees.739 However, at the 
same time, these very same diplomas also make numerous references to Charles, 
the king, listening to his advisors740 and even though there are others emphasising 
Charles’  majesty,741 they, nevertheless, seem to reflect the political reality. As we 
have seen, those surrounding the king were most often the most powerful men 
of the realm, old allies and new key figures. Despite all the emphasis on his royal 
majesty, Charles was very well aware of the political necessities and did his best 
to include the magnates into his rule. Thus, in 900, we find Robert, Richard and 
Heribert I at his side, planning a campaign against the Northmen;742 thus we also 
find Charles referring to the judgement of the nobles on various occasions743 and 
surrounded by them when treating with Henry the Fowler at Bonn in 921.744 The 
only time Charles can be seen to contravene this policy was with Hagano, with 
whom he enjoyed a very close and personal relation. Koziol is certainly right to 
point out the strain Hagano’s position placed on the relations with the nobles. 
However, as we have argued, Charles reacted to his in a way that acknowledged 
the nobles’  concerns, trying to remove its cause by establishing Hagano within the 
West Frankish hierarchy. In any case, Hagano was a very special—and isolated—
case that should not overshadow the other evidence provided by the sources.
738 Koziol, Politics, 513.
739 Koziol, Politics, 513, refering to DChS  65, 147−148 (comes Reynerus et demarcus et Rotbertus 
comes et demarcus … pronis flagitaverunt genibus).
740 For example DDChS 10, 16 (Quorum congrue petitioni…, aurem clementiae nostrae accomodantes, 
cum fidelium nostrorum consensu…), 49, 108 (Cujus humillimam peitionem cum consilio regni 
nostri utriusque ordinis principum mentaliter considerantes…), 53, 115 (…a nostris, tam episcopus 
quam et laicis, fidelibus responsa accepimus…), 56, 121–122 (Si regum consuetudines antiquorum 
exequimur necnon patrum mores praecedentium imitamur fideliumque nostrorum benigne con­
sulta suscipimus…), 88, 199 (…consultu fidelium procerum nostrorum, decrevimus…).
741 Koziol, Politics, 514.
742 Annales Vedastini 900, 82.
743 DDChS 84, 89, 100 and 112.
744 MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
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Hence, Charles’  and Robert’s convictions concerning kingship appear not to 
have differed as much as Koziol claims. As we have argued, the early tensions be-
tween the king and the marchio seem to have stemmed from Robert who was as-
piring a position at court equal to his standing in the hierarchy of the nobles of the 
realm. Charles, at first, blocked these aspirations, but not because he insisted on 
his right to choose those surrounding him, but because the position was already 
occupied by Archbishop Fulk of Reims. The arising conflict when the vacancy fol-
lowing the latter’s murder was not filled by Robert but by Richard, did create a rift 
throughout the reign. As we have seen, Charles created a network of alliances to 
contain the marchio. Robert’s own reaction to the rising tensions is documented 
by a private charter issued at Tours in September 900.745 Within the witness list, 
we find a large number of nobles from the region, Archbishop Erbernus of Tours, 
the bishops Raino of Angers, Fulcher of Nantes and Berno of Orléans, a certain 
abbot Aimo and, finally, the four viscounts Hatto, Guarnegaud, Fulk and Rainald. 
The charter was meant as a demonstration of Robert’s power, to be conveyed by 
the king’s new archchancellor, Bishop Anskeric of Paris, who signed the charter at 
the marchio ’s invitation.746 Anskeric’s presence, however, also indicates that from 
the beginning both sides remained in contact with each other, probably trying 
to negotiate a settlement, and hence that both sides were interested in finding a 
solution. For the time being, such an accord appears to have been out of reach. 
Richard’s position at court, undoubtedly, was one of the reasons why Robert could 
not yet be integrated into Charles’  rule and, as we have argued, it is also likely 
that Charles’  mother, Adelaide, was opposed to making concessions. By 903, how-
ever, after Adelaide’s death and the breakdown in relations between Charles and 
Richard, Robert not only returned to court but also, from now on, was seemingly 
acknowledged as the leading noble of the realm.747
From this moment on, up until Flodoard’s account begins, and possibly even 
after, the sources at our disposal do indicate a general cooperation between the 
745 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 42, 157−165 (13th September 900, Tours).
746 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 42, 164: Askericus, Parisiorum episcopus, hanc auctoritatem, rogante 
ipso Rotberto comite, firmavi. Next in the list is Bishop Otger of Amiens, who signed the list as 
episcophilax. Since it is not clear whether he belonged to Robert or was part of Anskeric’s em-
bassy, I have refrained from mentioning him here. See also chapter III.2.1.2.
747 The process of his final integration into Charles’ rule was probably furthered by Robert’s marriage 
to Beatrix, daughter of Heribert  I of Vermandois (on the marriage see Werner, Nachkommen, 
458). Unfortunately, the date of the marriage is unknown. Settipani, Préhistoire, 407−408. Accord-
ing to him, Werner argued for 897 as the date since during this year a) Heribert I reconciliated with 
Robert’s brother Odo, b) Robert received the abbey of Morienval in the Vermandois, c) Robert and 
Beatrix’ son, Hugh the Great, was already married in 914 since during this year his brother-in-law 
Hugh of Maine figured in one of Robert’s private charters. However, a) the reconciliation between 
Odo and Heribert does not necessitate a marriage, b) nothing indicates that Morienval passed into 
Robert’s hands in 897 (see below) and, c) Hugh of Maine’s presence in Robert’s charter does not 
necessitate that the marriage between his sister and Robert’s son had already taken place. It seems 
to me that any date other date would equally be possible—for example before 893, when Odo fur-
thered Heribert’s interests, and likewise around 898 or even only in 903, when Robert and Charles 
(and hence Heribert), were on good terms.
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king and the marchio. The most interesting evidence for this is, without a doubt, 
one of Robert’s private charters, informing us that the marchio had been absent 
from Tours for two years because he had been charged by the king with the man-
agement of various affairs in the regna of Francia and Neustria.748 This corresponds 
well with an expression used in one of Charles’  own diplomas, issued in 915 and 
depicting Robert as “our Highness’ most loyal executor.”749 Hence, Robert’s pri-
vate charter reflects not only the marchio ’s view of how he participated in the 
management of the realm, but also the king’s, thus indicating that they indeed 
mirrored the actual state of affairs.
If we follow the charter dating to 11th November 912, Robert’s absence from 
Tours covered most of the years 911 and 912, that is to say the time of the campaign 
against the Northmen leading to the battle of Chartres and Charles’  initial voyage 
to Lotharingia. Concerning the campaign against the Northmen, hardly anything 
is known at all apart from the battle and the aforementioned letter sent by Robert 
and Manasses to Richard.750 So far, nothing in the sources allowed us to determine 
the role the king played in this campaign. Robert’s charter, however, when read 
in relation with these events, indicates that Robert and Richard had acted on the 
king’s behalf, instructed by him to protect the realm from the Viking incursion. 
It is interesting to note that this command falls into a period which is marked by 
a long absence of diplomas issued for Robert. After the initial period with a high 
density of diplomas for the marchio, from September 906751 up until August 911, 
Robert is only mentioned once in the royal diplomas, namely in 907, when he 
appears together with other important nobles for the realm in the charter intro-
ducing Frederuna to the highest nobility.752 The new diploma, issued 3rd August 
911 at Compiègne for Saint-Denis,753 only two weeks after the battle of Chartres,754 
undoubtedly marked the reception of the victorious marchio by the king. Read in 
the context of Robert’s charter, the relations between the two appear to have been 
strong when no charters were issued.
The high degree of trust between the two is also revealed by the second pe-
riod of Robert’s absence from Neustria marked by his charter, Charles’  voyage to 
Lotharingia. Two royal diplomas mention Robert shortly after the acquisition of 
748 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 47, 181−186 at 184: Domnus Rotbertus […] gloriosus abbas necnon et 
comes, propter diversa regnorum Francię atque Neustrię negotia, quibus a rege prepositus erat, ab 
urbe Turonica fere per biennium defuisset… On this charter, see also Guyotjeannin, Notice and 
Guillot, Formes, 83, n. 101.
749 DChS 81, 181: … Rotbertus, nostre serenitatis exequtor fidelissimus…
750 See chapter III.2.3, n. 723.
751 DChS 54 (7th September 906, for Saint-Amand)
752 DChS 57 (21st May 907).
753 DChS 66.
754 20th July 911. Eckel, Charles, 70.
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the new regnum.755 Both were probably issued after April 912756 which, in connec-
tion with Robert’s charter making no mention of Lotharingia, seems to indicate 
that Robert only joined the king later on, possibly as late as 913. Hence, Charles, 
while he himself was absent, charged Robert with the management of affairs in 
the region that had so far been his most important basis of support. This choice is 
much less surprising when taking in consideration that Robert had already built 
up connections within Francia. Charles himself may have installed the marchio as 
abbot of Saint-Amand in 906, when he issued a diploma for the abbey at Robert’s 
request.757 On this occasion, Robert also issued a private charter for the monks,758 
containing a rather large witness list featuring the new bishop of Noyon, Robert, 
and five counts, Almanus, Odilard, Hilmeradus, Richer and Erlebald. At least two 
of them, Odilard and Erlebald, appear to have had close connections to Charles,759 
the others being unknown. Their relations to the king points towards them act-
ing as witnesses on Charles’  behalf, meant to guarantee Robert’s concessions to 
the monks. However, at the same time, the charter also demonstrates that Robert 
now entered into relations with nobles outside Neustria, allowing him to build 
up a network of connections within Francia, a network he could use on Charles’ 
behalf to mediate the royal will and carry out the tasks he had been charged with 
by the king.
The absence of diplomas issued for Robert from 907 to 910 contrasts with the 
situation after Charles’  acquisition of Lotharingia. From 912 until 919, the marchio 
received seven diplomas for his abbeys and intervened in another three for the 
755 DDChS 65 and 9. 
756 Neither of the diplomas carries a dating line. The intitulatio used in both diplomas calls Charles 
rex Francorum yet already drops the vir illustris which is last used in DChS 72 (12th April 912).
757 DChS 54. Saint-Amand is last recorded to be held by Gauzlin. Koziol, Politics, 502, n. 173 pro-
poses that after him the abbey passed to Abbot Rodulf of Saint-Vaast and Saint-Bertin, arguing 
against Platelle, Temporel, 61−62, who discarts the arguments in Rodulf ’s favour. In any case, 
the first mention of Robert being its abbot is DChS 54, while DChS 18, dating to 899 makes no 
mention of an abbot and sees Archbishop Fulk acting on behalf of the monks. Koziol proposes 
that the phrasing of the latter diploma, the monks complaining about their former lay abbots 
(30: Unde, propter suspectas succedentium rectorum vel aliorum malorum hominum voluntates, 
prefati monachi per eundem venerabilem archiepiscopum dovete nostram postulaverunt… We 
should note that the diploma also protects the monks from its abbots, a singular phrasing, 33: 
nec quelibet humana potestas sine sui periculo discriminis possit eas in alias partes convertere vel 
detorquere, et ut neque ipsius loci abbas, neque aliquis judex publicus in ecclesias aut loca… juste 
et legaliter possident) was indeed directed against Robert since it mentions a donation made 
by Rodulf. This is of course possible, but necessitates rather strong tensions between Charles 
and Robert at that point, which seems rather unlikely since the diploma falls in a period when 
Charles’ diplomas date in successione Odonis, indicating that relations with Robert were compa-
rably good (though this particular diploma does not mention the in successione Odonis). See also 
McNair, Development, 64−66, who applies the argument for Saint-Amand only being granted by 
Charles the Simple also to Saint-Germain-des-Prés.
758 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 46, 178−181.
759 For Erlebald, see above. Odilard intervened in 905 together with Bishop Rudolf of Laon on behalf 
of Charles’ notary Ernustus (DChS 51). Almanus may be identical with Count Altmar of Arras, 
which would make him the third.
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churches of Tours and Liège.760 The king appears to have reacted to the structural 
changes in the realm and in the circle surrounding him by publicly demonstrat-
ing the accord between him and the most powerful noble of the realm. The two 
diplomas issued for the church of Liège, showing Robert intervening together with 
Reginar, can, in this context, be read as a demonstration of Robert’s importance 
and the care Charles attributed to manage the relations between him and the 
 marchio. They are the only examples of Robert intervening on behalf of a church, 
not only outside his own zone of influence, but also the only examples of  Robert 
intervening together with other nobles.761 By these diplomas, Charles demon-
strated that, after the acquisition of the new regnum, Robert still occupied the cen-
tral position at his side, more important than the leading noble from Lotharingia, 
Reginar Longneck.
Relations between Charles and Robert appear to have peaked (at least for the 
first time) in 914, when the king issued two diplomas for Saint-Aignan at the mar-
chio ’s request.762 The accumulation of titles and epithets used to describe Robert 
reached thus-far unprecedented levels: “Robert, our most beloved marchio and 
abbot.”763 More important, however, are the circumstances under which the di-
plomas appear to have been issued. Only two days after these two, another one 
was delivered, this time for Richard’s son Hugh the Black, according to Philippe 
Lauer issued at Collège (Sarthe).764 If Lauer’s identification is indeed correct, this 
would mean that in June 914 Charles, together with Robert and Richard’s son, 
was on a voyage to the very west of his realm, close to the Breton frontier. Since 
the death of Alan the Great in 907, Brittany had lived through troubled times.765 
Alan appears to have been succeeded by Count Uurmaelon,766 whose death in 913, 
along with the destruction of the abbey of Saint-Gwénolé of Landévennec in the 
centre of the Breton royal lands, marks the breakdown of the internal order of 
the regnum. In the wake of these events, the Breton clergy appears to have fled to 
Western Francia, evacuating their relics, while Brittany lay open to the incursions 
760 DDChS 77 and 78 (19th June 914), 89 (28th May 917), 92 (14th March 918), 94 (14th May 918), 98 
(1st December 918) and 101 (27th June 919) as well as DDChS 9 (for the church of Tours, unknown 
date after April 912, see chapter III.2.3, n. 756), 65 (for the church of Liège, after April 912−915, see 
chapter III.2.3, n. 756) and 81 (for the church of Liège, 25th August 915). In comparison: in 903, 
marking Robert’s ascent, three diplomas were issued, followed by another three over the course 
of the next three years: DDChS 45 (25th April 903), 46 (30th April 903), 47 (5th June 903), 49 
(13th July 904), 50 (9th February 905) and 54 (7th September 906).
761 Except DChS 57, the diploma introducing Frederuna to the highest circles of the nobility at court.
762 DDChS 77 and 78 (19th June 914).
763 DChS  77, 173: …Robertus, dilectissimus nobis marchio atque abbas. DChS  78, 175: … Rober­
tus, videlicet dilectissimus nobis marchio atque abbas… While dilectus is frequently used before 
(DDChS 45 (admodum dilectus), 47 and 66), it is the first time that the superlative is applied 
(except for DChS 54, which describes Robert as carissimus). 
764 DChS 79 (Actum villa Collega, 21st June 914). DChS 77 and 78 were issued in villa Ruio. On the 
problem of the identification of these places, see chapter III.1.1, n. 24.
765 Short studies of Britanny during these years are provided by Quaghebeur, Norvège and McNair, 
Language, who we follow here.
766 Cartulaire Redon, N° 279, 226, dating Gurmabilon regnante Britanniam.
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of the Northmen. These events can hardly have been left unanswered by Charles 
and Robert and the deliverance of the three diplomas for Robert and Hugh may be 
the sign of their reaction: a campaign with troops, composed not only of  Robert’s 
own men, but also of contingents from Burgundy and Francia to stabilise the 
frontier and possibly also make territorial gains. This fits well into the picture: 
before the campaign, Robert had already shown an interest in the Breton  frontier. 
In November 912, Bishop Isaias of Nantes witnessed a charter issued by the 
marchio767 and, in the following year, one of Robert’s viscounts, Fulk of Anjou, be-
came count of Nantes, probably after the city had been taken from the  Northmen.768 
Finally, in 921, Robert concluded a treaty with the Northmen operating on the 
Loire, conceding them Brittany and the pagus of Nantes.769 Flodoard’s account 
of these events seems to indicate that Robert at least claimed a certain kind of 
authority not only over Nantes, which can be explained by his viscount Fulk being 
count there, but also over Brittany itself. If, in 914, a campaign to the Breton fron-
tier had indeed taken place, this would explain how and when such a claim could 
have been created. Apart from this (possible) campaign and the two diplomas for 
Robert, there is also another sign that the cooperation between the king and the 
marchio had reached a very high level. A private charter issued by Robert in March 
914 was witnessed by his son, Hugh the Great, as “Hugh, son of the abbot and 
count, who, after himself, was already given his honores,” that is to say, he had been 
confirmed as his father’s heir.770 Hugh’s succession in Robert’s honores is repeated 
by a charter supposedly issued two months later, adding that he would hold all of 
the honores with Charles’  consent.771 This second charter, however, appears to be a 
forgery produced in Saint-Martin of Tours.772 While this devaluates the charter as 
a source, we may ask ourselves why the monks would introduce such a phrasing 
if there had not been a tradition at the monastery recording Charles’  role in the 
succession. Following this reading, it would seem that, early in 914, Charles had 
indeed confirmed Hugh as Robert’s successor, undoubtedly a sign of his favour.
The highest density of royal diplomas for Robert—after 903—is recorded even 
later, between 917 and 919, when five diplomas were issued by the king. The first 
two of these diplomas continue the accumulation of epithets and titles attributed 
to Robert. He is the “abbot and dearest demarcus and our most loyal [fidelis],”773 
767 Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 47, 181−186 (11th November 912).
768 Werner, Untersuchungen I, 286−287 (31st March 914). The charter is signed by Fulconis 
 Namnetensis comitis et Andegavensis vicecomitis. In Robert’s charter, dating to 11th November 
912, Fulk signed without any titles, in contrast to the counts featuring in it before him.
769 Flodoard, Annales 921, 6.
770 Werner, Untersuchungen I, 286−287 (31st March 914), 287: Signum domni Hugonis, filii sui 
 abbatis et comitis cui post ipsum iam sui honores dati erant.
771 Recueil Robert et Raoul N° 48B, 187−199, 192: … filius noster Hugo, cui post nos cum seniore 
 nostro rege Karolo omnes honores nostros impetratos habemus…
772 See comment of Jean Dufour, Recueil Robert et Raoul N° 48B, 188−191.
773 DChS 89 (28th May 917), 201: …abbas […] atque demarcus carissimus ac fidelissimus noster Rot­
bertus...
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the “venerable marchio, namely our realm’s counsellor and aid, as well as abbot”774 
and even, strangely enough, “our kinsman,” who is united with Charles in a prayer 
 service.775 The two diplomas again mark Robert’s special position at Charles’ 
court, underlined by the third one, issued on Ascension Day at Compiègne.776 
Interestingly enough, these diplomas fall into the same period as the diplomas 
indicating the special relation between Charles and Hagano.777 It is hard to tell 
whether these two developments were related to each other. Did Charles try to 
reinforce relations with Robert to prevent him from being irritated about Charles’ 
intimate? This would imply that the king was aware of the dangers of his favour 
towards Hagano. Indeed, despite diplomas for Robert still being issued, from May 
918 onwards their relations seem to have cooled down. The exuberant epithets 
used in the first diplomas disappear from May 918 onwards, leaving Robert to be 
depicted simply as “venerable abbot”778 and “our venerable count and marchio.”779
This, however, does not mean that irreconcilable differences had now devel-
oped between the two. Flodoard’s account of the events at Soissons speaks of “al-
most all of the counts of Francia” who decided to abandon the king because of 
his councillor Hagano.780 Robert is not mentioned, although he was undoubtedly 
present at the assembly. This is revealed by a royal diploma issued on that occa-
sion at Robert’s request for Notre-Dame of Morienval.781 The diploma, naming the 
marchio as its abbot, is the first sign that Robert had taken control of the abbey. 
Karl Ferdinand Werner assumed that Morienval had passed from its last known 
abbot Theoderic, the count of Vermandois, directly to Robert.782 This assumption 
is based on the record of the Gallia Christiana, which names Theoderic and after 
him Robert as lay abbots of Morienval.783 This statement, however, is solely based 
774 DChS 92 (14th March 918), 211: …venerabilis marchio, nostri quidem regni et consilium et juvamen 
simulque abbas…
775 DChS 89, 201: …consanguinei nostri Rotberti abbatis... Werner, Nachkommen, 424, n. 14 tried 
to explain this expression with the marriage of Robert’s son Hugh with the daughter of Charles’ 
aunt Rothild. Against this reading Settipani, Préhistoire, 407, n.  41, who derives the consan­
guineus from Charles’ grandmother Judith, whose family was related to Robert’s mother.
776 DChS 94 (14th May 918).
777 DDChS 90 (26th July 917) and 95 (26th May 918).
778 DChS 94 (14th May 918), 216: …venerabilis Rotbertus abbas…
779 DChS  98 (1st December 918), 226: …comes et markyo noster venerabilis Rotbertus.... The last 
 diploma issued during this period, DChS  101, has either been forged or rewritten during the 
11th century, we hence refrain from referring to it in this context.
780 Flodoard, Annales 920, 2: Pene omnes Franciae comites regem suum, Karolum, apud urbem Sues­
sonicam, quia Haganonem consiliarium suum, quem de mediocribus potentem fecerat, dimittere 
nolebat, reliquerunt.
781 DChS 105 (20th January 920, Soissons).
782 Werner, Gauzlin, 461.
783 Gallia Christiana IX, col. 449: I. Theodericus comes, quo deprecante Carlomannus Caroli Simpli­
cis frater fratribus et sanctimonialibus coenobii Maurinianae­vallis dedit de jure suae proprietatis 
fiscum, qui vocatur Frasnedus, situm super fluvium Altonae in pago Silvanectensi.  II. Rotbertus 
comes filius Roberti Fortis, frater autem Odonis regis qui Caroli Simplicis minorennis tutor fuerat 
abbas secularis post Theodericum a Carolo Simplice renovari obtinuit praecepta Caroli Calvi et 
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on Charles’  diploma, in which Theoderic is named as a former abbot.784 Hence, it 
is possible that Robert did not directly follow Theoderic as abbot, but was given 
the abbey at a much later point, maybe even only at Soissons in 920. In any case, 
the diploma, not only being issued at Robert’s request but also confirming one of 
his brother’s diplomas,785 was a symbol of the continuing cooperation between 
Charles and Robert and was directed towards the assembly of the counts. This 
also allows us to cast some doubts on Flodoard’s accounts of the events: since the 
monk does not mention Robert at all in the context of Soissons while the diploma 
issued at that moment suggests that Charles still enjoyed Robert’s support, should 
we really believe him when he tells us that the reconciliation between the king 
and the nobles was solely Archbishop Heriveus’ doing? It would rather seem that 
Robert had also been involved in these negotiations, taking the king’s side.
For the outcome of the negotiations, Robert certainly was the decisive factor. 
Mostly isolated at the beginning of Charles’  reign, by now he had built up a net-
work covering most the West Frankish realm. We have already seen how he had 
become close with William the Pious, although this link died with William.786 By 
920, other connections were more important. Robert’s daughter Emma had mar-
ried Richard’s son Raoul, tying the two families close together.787 This marriage 
was probably the result of a development that had started around 907, when Rich-
ard returned to court, as shown by a royal diploma issued at his and Manasses’ 
request for Bishop Argrim of Langres,788 a development that led to the coopera-
tion of the two marchiones in the campaigns of 911 and 914. The marriage between 
Raoul, and Emma as well as Richard’s private charter of 918789 mark the end of this 
convergence, leading to an open alliance that found its first target in William the 
Younger, from whom Robert and Raoul took the Berry790. Probably around the 
same time, Robert and Richard’s sons also appear to have visited Remiremont, 
where they made an entry in the Liber Memorialis.791 And there were other impor-
tant ties Robert had forged over the past decades. Heribert II of Vermandois mar-
Carlomanni, quae coenobio igne cremato exusta fuerant, XIII cal. Febr. indict. VIII, anno XXVIII, 
regnante Carolo, redintegrante XXIII, largiore hereditate adeptae VIIII; hic est annus 920.
784 DChS 105, 251: Praetera, Theoderico comite venerabili et abbate jam dicti monasterii depraecante 
postea, dignus memoria rex Karlomannus, qui noster fuit frater, saepedictae congregationi in pago 
Silvanectensi dedit de jure suae proprietatis fiscum qui vocatur Fraxinedus, et est situs super flumen 
Altona, in quo habentur mansi septuaginta in his locus conjacentes... Carloman II’s diploma is-
sued on that occasion (DCmII 90) is not preserved. The phrasing of the Gallia Christiana record-
ing Theoderic corresponds exactly with Charles’ diploma, as does its account for Robert (apart 
from Robert’s genealogy which is based on a later tradition).
785 DChS 105, 252.
786 See above.
787 See chapter III.2.3, n. 727.
788 DChS 55 (4th April 907).
789 See above chapter III.2.3, with n. 724.
790 See above chapter III.2.3, with n. 712.
791 Liber Memorialis Remiremont, fol. 5v, 8, N° 6: Ugo com., Boso com., Ruodulfus com., […], Robret 
com., Ima com. The entry was probably made shortly after Christmas 921. See Schmid, Quellen, 
127−128 and Büttner, Politik, 27−28.
220 III. Networks of royal power: Charles the Simple
ried another of Robert’s daughters, possibly the Adelaide792 appearing in Charles’ 
diploma of 907.793 Heribert appears to have witnessed one of Robert’s charters 
for Marmoutiers794 and, like Bishop Abbo of Soissons, was also involved in the 
grant of the abbey of Croix-Saint-Ouen to the monks of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, 
where Robert was lay-abbot.795 While not necessarily a sign of them being  allied—
Croix-Saint-Ouen was situated in the Mérezais, a county under Heribert’s con-
trol796—the diploma issued at that occasion certainly shows them cooperating in 
an important case. The last of the links forged by marriage concerned Robert’s son 
Hugh, who was married to the daughter of Count Roger of Maine and Rothild, 
hence the sister of Count Hugh of Maine, who we have seen among Charles’  allies 
in 900.797 The connections to these three, Richard, Heribert II and Hugh of Maine, 
as well as those to the counts from Francia witnessing in Robert’s private charter 
from 906,798 indicate that Robert’s position within the West Frankish nobility had 
changed much in comparison to the beginning of Charles’  reign. He had now 
managed to construct links, even forge alliances, to those men or their successors, 
who had originally been key members of Charles’  own network, supporting the 
king against the ambitions of the marchio before his integration into the rule in 
903. Robert’s network was certainly not constructed with the purpose of opposing 
the king but, without a doubt, the consequence of his position at Charles’  side that 
made the marchio a potential partner for all those who wanted to influence royal 
politics. Developed over decades, it was an expression of Robert’s special impor-
tance within the realm and the circle around the king.
After the reconciliation with the West Frankish nobles, Charles’  diplomas 
mainly betray his efforts to stabilise his relations with them. The central role in 
these efforts seems to have fallen to the circle around Abbo of Soissons, Stephen 
of Cambrai, Raoul de Gouy and Hagano, for whom the central diplomas were is-
sued during this period.799 Robert’s role, however, should not be underestimated 
either. In the case of the episcopal succession at Liège after the death of Bishop 
Stephen,800 Robert seems to have participated in the assembly dealing with the 
case of Hilduin801 and, therefore, supported Charles’  politics concerning the siege. 
792 On the marriage see, Brandenburg, Nachkommen, 88. For Adelaide, see chapter III.2.1.1, n. 192. 
See also Settipani, Préhistoire, 408 with n. 44 concerning the possibility of Heribert II’s wife be-
ing called Liedgardis.
793 DChS 57. Werner, Nachkommen, 458.
794 DRoI 48A (30th May 914).
795 DChS 92 (14th March 918).
796 Werner, Untersuchungen V, 94.
797 Settipani, Préhistoire, 409. Flodoard, Annales 922, 8: …Rothildis, […] socrus autem Hugonis… 
See above for the circumstance of the alliance between the king and Hugh of Maine. 
798 See above, Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 46, 178−181.
799 DDChS 106, 108 and 112.
800 19th May 920. Gesta Episcoporum Tungrensium, 201, n. 92.
801 MGH Conc. VI, N° 2, c. 2, 45: Cum quidam pestiferi viri, ut supra memoravimus, a nostra fideli­
tate deviarent, convocavimus archiepiscopos praesules XVI nostri regni, nonnullos etiam proceres, 
marchiones et comites optimatesque, ut eorum consilio, auctoritate atque virtute tantae vesaniae 
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A royal diploma issued in 921802 further underlines their continuing cooperation. 
This is not to say that their relations were not subject to increasing tensions. The 
decline in the use of epithets and titles to describe Robert in the royal diplomas 
that set in around 918 is also visible in this new diploma, addressing Robert merely 
as “venerable abbot”803 of Saint-Amand, indicating that the rift between the two 
was continuing to grow.
Yet even when Charles gave Rothild’s abbey Chelles to Hagano and thereby 
violated the interests of a family now closely tied to Robert’s, the relations be-
tween the two do not seem to have been irrecoverably damaged. According to Flo-
doard, the events now unfolded in a number of steps: first, Charles gave Chelles to 
Hagano. The king having returned from Lotharingia to Laon, Robert’s son Hugh 
met with Heriveus’ fideles and certain counts at the villa of Fismes after Easter. 
After this meeting, he then advanced on Laon, from where Charles withdrew, ac-
companied by Heribert II and Hagano, ob Haganonis amorem, because of his love 
for Hagano. Hugh now met with Gislebert and both were called to a colloquium 
with Robert. Soon after, Charles returned with Lotharingian forces and started to 
devastate property of the church of Reims, marking the beginning of the armed 
conflict.804 Flodoard’s account reads like a progressive escalation. The first meeting 
of Charles’  opponents reads like the creation of a threatening posture, meant to 
exert pressure on the king. Charles evades this pressure by removing himself from 
Laon. This is the crucial moment in the development: the king refused to give 
in and later even started to attack his opponents. The consequence of this royal 
policy and the ultimate point of no return, but certainly not the original intention 
of the nobles, was Robert’s coronation on 30th June 922,805 about two months after 
Hugh’s initial advance after Easter.806 The decision to depose Charles was certainly 
resisteremus. As discussed above (chapter III.2.1.6), the use of marchiones here refers to the 
 magnates from the Western realm, Robert and Richard, the only nobles carrying that title in the 
royal diplomas after Reginar’s death in 915.
802 DChS 110 (11th June 921).
803 DChS 110, 265: …venerabilis abba […] Robertus…
804 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7−8: Hugo, filius Rotberti, post Pascha supra Vidulam venit, ubi, apud 
villam Finimas, Herivei archiepiscopi fideles cum quibusdam Franciae comitibus obvios habuit. 
Quo cum eisdem super Axonam in pagum Laudunensem profecto propter praedictum Haganonem, 
cui rex abbatiam Rothildis, amitae suae, socrus autem Hugonis, dederat, nomine Calam, Karolus 
cum Heriberto et Haganone clam Laudunum egressus, ob Haganonis amorem, hujus causa timoris 
trans Mosam profectus est. Quem insecutus Hugo cum ceteris pugnatorum duobus milibus usque 
Mosam, Gislebertum Lothariensem obvium habuit; cum quo a patre, qui eum prosecutus fuerat 
et super Axonam in pago Laudunensi sedebat, ad colloquium revocatus revertitur. Quo comperto, 
Karolus, Mosa retransmissa, cum nonnullis qui ad se venerant Lothariensibus, villas Remensis 
aecclesiae depraedari necnon incendere coepit…
805 Flodoard, Annales 922, 10: Franci Rotbertum seniorem eligunt, ipsique sese committunt. Rotbertus 
itaque rex Remis, apud Sanctum Remigium, ab episcopis et primatibus regni constituitur. Heriveus, 
Remorum archiepiscopus, obiit tertia die post consecrationem regis Rotberti, scilicet VI nonas Ju­
lii… Hervieus’ death hence fell on 2nd July, Robert’s coronation on 30th June. 
806 See chapter III.2.3, n. 804. Easter 922 concordes with 21st April.
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not a simple one. Robert’s only preserved diploma807 is, as Geoffrey Koziol ex-
pressed it, “a coded defence of Robert’s action,”808 depicting his coronation as a 
necessity for the wellbeing of the entire realm due to “indispensable reasons.”809 
Therefore, in Robert’s view, Charles’  deposition had not been inevitable but was 
the last resort. Up until the last moment—the king withdrawing from Laon and 
taking up arms—he was interested in a continuation of their cooperation. In the 
end, it was Charles’  decision not to respond to the demands of the nobles but to 
pursue, according to Flodoard because of his love for Hagano, his own policy. 
With this decision, the basis of their cooperation was shattered.
III.3 Conclusion: The development of Charles’ network and its dissolution
The beginning of Charles’  rule was marked by the dominance of the circle of his 
old supporters from the fight against Odo, most importantly Archbishop Fulk of 
Reims, Heribert I of Vermandois and with his mother Adelaide probably also play-
ing a central role. Despite the dominance of these men and women, his reign was 
soon acknowledged by the most powerful men of the realm who had either op-
posed his claim or pursued their own policies during the years preceding his final 
ascent to the throne. Robert of Neustria took the leading role here, with Richard 
the Justiciar and William the Pious following him. However, Robert, in particular, 
perceived this situation as unsatisfactory. He had been the key figure of Odo’s later 
years, the right hand of the king, a position that now was held by Fulk. During 
these years, Charles’  emphasised his right to rule, although not by underlining 
the legitimacy of his claim based on his Carolingian descent—in fact, his policy 
on this matter did not differ from that of his predecessors—but by demonstrating 
to the realm that he was willing to act like a true king, a protector of the Church. 
To do so, he used his connections to the nobles of Septimania and the Spanish 
March, with whom he organised the assembly of Tours-sur-Marne in 899, where 
he did exactly that: restored ruined churches and protected their interests. While 
these measures probably had no influence on the actual conditions in the distant 
South, the assembly of Tours-sur-Marne was, nevertheless, a powerful signal to 
the realm: Charles was the king, and he was willing to act as one.
The first crisis developed in 900 when Archbishop Fulk was murdered, yet the 
now vacant position at the king’s side was not given to Robert, but to Richard. 
Robert now left the court and both sides mustered their forces, although most 
likely without ever actually taking up arms. Robert’s integration into Charles’  rule 
807 DRoI 1 (25th January 923). 
808 Koziol, Robert, 250. See also chapter VI.4.
809 Koziol, Robert, 250−252. The diploma’s address (DRoI 1, 8) reads Notum autem manet sagaci­
tati omnium fidelium nostrorum, procerum scilicet Francorum, qualiter per divinam clementiam, 
causis necessariis existentibus, omnium favore principum ad regni gubernacula moderanda regie 
majestatis sceptra suscepimus. 
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followed about three years later, after Adelaide’s death, when the relations between 
the king and Richard seem to have deteriorated severely. At this point Richard 
disappeared from the court while his position was taken over by Robert, who now 
became the leading noble of the realm up until the end of Charles’  rule. This, 
however, did not mean that he dominated the circle around the king. On the con-
trary, members of the group of Charles’  old supporters, like Bishop Anskeric of 
Paris, and their successors, such as Archbishop Heriveus of Reims and Heribert II 
of Vermandois, can be found present at court during the entire reign, occupying 
key positions, like the new archbishop of Reims, who succeeded Anskeric as arch-
chancellor. Charles’  contacts with local nobles outside Francia, however, remained 
limited. Just like under his predecessors, petitioners and recipients from Aquitaine 
are very rare, again with the notable exception of Septimania and the Spanish 
March. In these latter cases, however, the diplomas issued for nobles from the 
regions were, with few exceptions, concentrated on the two assemblies at Tours-
sur-Marne in 899 and 922. In the other regions, most notably in Neustria and 
Burgundy, communications between the king and the local nobility seem to have 
been channelled through the local magnates, Robert and Richard respectively. The 
relationship between Charles and these magnates was, in general, characterised by 
mutual cooperation, with the king testing out his room for manoeuvre on different 
occasions. In the early conflict with Robert, Charles constructed a network of alli-
ances keeping the marchio in check; in Richard’s case, he directly intervened in his 
zone of influence; in Aquitaine, he later favoured William the Pious’ opponents 
around Raymond of Toulouse. All in all, Charles’  rule during these years seems to 
have been undisputed and, from 903, onwards stable.
While between 903 and 911 changes in the network took place only gradually—
old members died and were replaced by new ones, as in the case of Theodulf ’s 
replacement of Anskeric as bishop of Paris, although not as archchancellor—the 
acquisition of Lotharingia was followed by major changes in its overall composi-
tion and the addition of Lotharingian nobles to the royal contacts. In his new 
regnum, Charles’  rule was based on the cooperation with the already-dominating 
elites, Reginar Longneck, the Matfrid family and the church of Trier, who had 
already rivalled for influence at court under Zwentibold and Louis the Child. 
However, in addition, Charles also established contacts with nobles like Bishop 
Stephen of Cambrai and Count Ricuin of Verdun who had been staunch support-
ers of Zwentibold but had lost their influence at court under Louis. Up until his 
death in 915, Reginar and his network of personal contacts appear to have played 
a central role in Charles’  new network. His death marked a slow turn towards 
the Matfrid family and the church of Trier, with his son Gislebert and his old 
party remaining important at least up until 916, when they participated in large 
numbers at the assembly of Herstal. While the acquisition of Lotharingia re-
sulted in distinctive changes in Charles’  network and his itinerary—in addition 
to Francia, after 911 he also travelled within Lotharingia—its overall impact on 
his relations to the Western nobles appears to have been rather limited. Charles 
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did his best to integrate Robert in particular into his rule and demonstrated pub-
licly that Robert’s position as the most important noble remained unchallenged. 
Diplomatic contacts with the Western realm remained on a constant level and 
his other supporters from earlier on remain visible and took part in Lotharing-
ian affairs, such as the assembly of Herstal in 919 and the episcopal succession 
of Liège. These participations are not the only signs that Charles intended to 
merge his two regna into one. The separate Lotharingian chancellery, founded 
under Louis the Child, ceased to exist. Archbishop Heriveus of Reims remained 
sole archchancellor, later succeeded by Roger of Trier. Count Wigeric, married 
to Charles’  niece, became the new count of the palace, replacing William the 
Pious in this position. Nobles from both regna can be found acting together in 
royal diplomas, which underlines the existence of strong contacts and common 
interests across the borders.
The last years of Charles’ rule saw the formation of a new group close to the 
king, centred on the bishops Abbo of Soissons and Stephen of Cambrai as well 
as Count Raoul de Gouy. First appearing alone in the royal charters, from 920 
onwards they can be found acting together. While new to the circle around the 
king, they appear to have had exceptionally good contacts to the rest of the no-
bility, especially visible in the case of Abbo, who seems to have played a key role 
in the relations between Charles and the nobles in early 920 and later became 
Robert’s and Raoul’s archchancellor. While this group demonstrates that Charles 
was able to further nobles of his choosing and to influence the composition of 
the circle around him, his liberty in doing so was also subject to clear restric-
tions. Archbishop Fulk’s presence at his side had prohibited him from granting 
Robert the position he desired; while after the acquisition of Lotharingia it was 
the marchio whose interests the king had to take into consideration. These same 
limitations also become clear when considering Charles’ influence over epis-
copal successions. While there are a number of examples of him furthering his 
own interests by promoting his relatives and associates, the case of the succes-
sion at Liège also demonstrates that, when encountering serious resistance, he 
had to ally himself with groups rivalling his opponents, in this case the Matfrid 
family. Here, Charles appears to have gone even further, tying the family close 
to him by means of marriage: his daughter Ermentrude married Gottfrid, the 
son of Gerhard.
His own family members certainly played an important role for Charles. His 
mother Adelaide’s influence in royal politics becomes apparent from the number 
of her interventions in Charles’  diplomas. On the other hand, Charles’  first wife, 
the Saxon noblewoman Frederuna, remains mostly invisible. Intervening together 
with the highest nobles in 907 shortly after their marriage, in the sources she is 
mentioned almost exclusively only after her death, when Charles put considerable 
effort into establishing prayer services for her memory. This points to the close 
relation they had enjoyed and her importance for him; but her political influence 
remains indeterminable. The same also applies for his second wife Eadgifu. While 
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being politically very active in her later life, during Charles’  reign, the sources 
make no mention of her.
Close to the king, although not a member of his family, was Hagano, the man 
about whom the sources report that Charles lost his crown because of favour-
ing him over the other nobles. Descending from a family based on the Middle 
Rhine in the East Frankish-Lotharingian border region, he seems to have made 
his first appearance in 916. His ascent appears to have taken place in the wake of 
Frederuna’s death, when he acted as intercessor on the deceased queen’s behalf 
in a number of diplomas and was even included in a prayer service with the king, 
the queen and her brother. Only after the settlement with the nobles following 
their protest against Hagano in early 920 is he shown acting together with other 
nobles. It would seem from this development that the protest of the nobles was 
not directed against Hagano’s presence per se, but against the form of his presence 
at Charles’  side. In fact, preceding Hagano, we can already trace other men who 
seem to have derived their position from their special relationship with the king 
yet who were accepted by the highest ranks of the nobility. Hence, the problem 
with Hagano appears to have been the way he and his relation to Charles was 
perceived by the nobility. The king responded to this problem by trying to intro-
duce his intimate to the nobles and to integrate him into the highest ranks of the 
nobility. However, despite these efforts, in 922 some of the leading nobles rebelled 
against Charles. Yet, the crucial point in the breakdown of their relations appears 
to have been less related to Hagano and the circumstance that Charles violated the 
interests of a family close to Robert, but that Charles refused to negotiate over the 
subject at hand.
The rebellion against Charles certainly was not the result of a sudden develop-
ment but points to a large crisis in the relations between the king and the nobles. 
Some scholars have argued that this crisis already commenced before 920,810 when, 
according to Flodoard’s History of the church of Reims, the Hungarians devas-
tated Lotharingia. Charles called the Frankish nobles to aid, but only Archbishop 
Heriveus responded by mobilising his forces.811 Flodoard’s account, however, is 
not without problems, the first being the dating of the event. It seems to corre-
spond with the first entry in his Annales, where he reports a Hungarian invasion 
in Lotharingia.812 However, the Annales do not mention Charles’  call to arms and 
it seems possible that the Historia actually refers to an invasion taking place in 
917.813 Furthermore, certain doubts can be issued whether Flodoard’s account in 
810 Eckel, Charles, 107, Parisot, Royaume, 628. The connection of these events with the later rebellion 
has been questioned by Schmitz, Heriveus, 80 with n. 86. According to him, the nobles did not 
support Charles out of self-interest or a lack of interest in the defence of the realm. In this context, 
it is worth pointing out the campaigns against the Northmen in 911 and (possibly) in 914 which 
saw Robert and Richard participating.
811 Flodoard, HRE IV, 14, 407.
812 Flodoard, Annales 919, 1.
813 For example Annales S. Medardi 917, 520 (Hungri primum Rhenum transierunt et usque  Burgundiam 
pervenerunt.), Annales S. Vicentii Mettensis 917, 157 (Ungarii primitus regnum Lotharii ingressi sunt.) 
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the Historia is entirely accurate on this matter. While Flodoard was biased against 
Charles,814 Heriveus is always depicted in a positive manner.815 For example, in 
the chapter describing Heriveus’ appointment Flodoard provides an account of 
Heriveus pontificate: “While he occupied himself with enthusiasm with the spir-
itual affairs, the temporal goods flowed from all parts, and he dispensed with them 
with admirable prudence. He conferred the administration of the bishopric to able 
officers while he busied himself incessantly to the prayer.”816 This reads much less 
like an objective account than the description of an ideal bishop, especially when 
taking into consideration that in the preceding passages Flodoard used quotes 
from the Liber Pontificalis to describe Heriveus’ virtues.817 Furthermore, in this 
same paragraph, Flodoard remarks that Heriveus recuperated property that his 
predecessors had given away,818 failing to mention that, very much like these same 
predecessors, Heriveus also gave property of the Church to his own kinsmen.819 
This same method of withholding information while depicting Heriveus as an 
ideal archbishop can also be found some chapters further on when Flodoard turns 
to the events of Soissons in 920: “The following year, almost all of the Frankish op-
timates renounced their king Charles at Soissons… This loyal and pious bishop, al-
ways firm in times of danger, courageously took care of the king, leading him from 
this place and bringing him with him to the city of Reims; and he accompanied 
him and followed him everywhere just until he had brought back these counts to 
him and had restored him to his regnum.”820 Again, Flodoard’s account reads like a 
eulogy for Heriveus, emphasising the archbishop’s virtue while withholding parts 
of the history: the central roles Robert of Neustria and Bishop Abbo of Soissons 
certainly also played in mediating between the king and the nobles.
Hence, Flodoard’s bias towards Heriveus and his habit of withholding certain 
information may also apply in the case of Charles’  call to arms against the Hun-
garians. While it seems unlikely that Flodoard invented the entire affair, it does 
and Continuatio Reginonis 917, 155 (Ungarii per Alemanniam in Alsatiam et usque ad fines 
 Lothariensis regni pervenerunt.). See also Schmitz, Heriveus, 80 with n. 86. On the invasion of 917 
see Lüttich, Ungarnzüge, 66–68. It is worth pointing out that neither of the sources cited above, nor 
the later chronicle of Herman of Reichenau (112), mention a Hungarian invasion in 919. On Hun-
garian invasions in general, see also Fasoli, Incursioni; Fasoli, Points and Kellner, Ungarneinfälle.
814 See Introduction and Jacobsen, Flodoard, 15−16.
815 On Heriveus as an ideal archbishop, see also Sot, Historien, 236−244.
816 Flodoard, HRE IV, 11, 404: Cui sedula intentione sectanti spiritalia affluenter exuberabant tempo­
ralia, qua ipse honesta dispensabat prudentia, disponens competentibus episcopium ministeriali­
bus, ipse orationibus incessanter intentus.
817 Jacobsen, Flodoard, 146−147 with n. 27.
818 Flodoard, HRE IV, 11, 404. On this subject, see Schmitz, Heriveus, 65−66.
819 Schmitz, Heriveus, 65−66, based on Flodoard, HRE IV, 18, 410.
820 Flodoard, HRE IV, 15, 408: Sequenti vero anno cum pene cuncti Francorum optimates apud urbem 
Suessonicam a rege suo Karolo desciscentes propter Haganonem, consiliarium suum, quem de 
mediocribus electum super omnes principes audiebat et honorabat, eum penitus reliquissent, hic 
pontifex fidelis et pius atque robustus in periculis semper existens, regem intrepidus ab eodem loco 
suscipiens ad metatum suum deduxit indeque secum ad urbem Remensem perduxit et per septem 
fere menses eum prosecutus atque comitatus est, donec illi comites suos eundemque regno restituit.
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seem very likely that he exaggerated or misinterpreted the failure of the nobles to 
respond to the king’s call. For example, Charles would probably first have called 
upon Lotharingian forces to respond to the invasion. Robert, on the other hand, 
might have been unable to respond to the call because of the threat still posed by 
the Northmen—in 919, Flodoard tells us that they once again devastated Britta-
ny.821 And finally, given his account of Heriveus’ role in 920, it seems rather likely 
that other nobles also had responded to the call. Of course, these are only as-
sumptions based on Flodoard’s way of describing Heriveus’ episcopate. Especially 
when taking into consideration that after the reconciliation the nobles continued 
to cooperate with Charles, it nevertheless seems inappropriate to take Flodoard’s 
note of the Hungarian invasion as a sign for any deeper problems between Charles 
and the Frankish nobles at that time.
Therefore, the first indication of a rift between Charles and the nobles seems 
to have been the confrontation at Soissons early in 920, leading to him being 
abandoned by the Frankish counts up until the mediation of an agreement seven 
months later. This event, while without a doubt revealing major problems in the 
relations between the king and parts of the nobility, should not be overempha-
sised either. On the one hand, the key figures of the Western realm, Robert, Rich-
ard, Heriveus and Abbo did not belong to the opposition that had formed against 
Charles, nor did the bishops.822 On the other hand, after an agreement had been 
reached, the nobles again cooperated with the king as his diplomas, featuring a 
rather large number of bishops and counts, as well as the assembly concerning 
the succession at Liège823 and Charles’  entourage at the meeting with Henry the 
Fowler at Bonn824 demonstrate. Tensions definitely remained and the nobles most 
probably were still vigilant about the king, yet nothing indicates that there was 
an inevitable development leading from the protest of 920 to the rebellion of 922.
The keys to the dissolution of Charles’  network in 922 were certainly the illness 
and death of Heriveus and the breakdown of relations with Robert, thus depriv-
ing Charles not only of two of his most powerful and influential supporters, but 
also making the latter his opponent. Robert’s turn from cooperation to hostility 
must have placed enormous pressure on Charles’  network, since many of his con-
tacts also entertained good relations with Robert.825 Thus, Raoul, Richard’s son 
and successor in Burgundy, was married to Robert’s daughter Emma. Yet while 
he decided to support his father-in-law,826 Heribert II, likewise married to one of 
821 Flodoard, Annales 919, 1. See also Chronique de Nantes, 81−82. See also Koziol, Politics, 525.
822 For Robert and Abbo, see above. Richard’s position is not known, yet it seems to me that 
 Flodoard’s phrasing Francorum optimates (see chapter III.3, n. 820) and pene omnes Franciae 
comites regem suum Karolum … reliquerunt (Annales 922, 2) does not point to an involvement of 
the marchio from Burgundy. These same phrasings also exlude the bishops from the opposition 
against Charles.
823 See chapter III.2.1.6.
824 MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
825 See chapter III.2.3.
826 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8.
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Robert’s daughters, remained, for the time being, on Charles’  side.827 The ques-
tion over whether to support Charles or Robert must have been a difficult one for 
the individual nobles. Private charters from the regions south of the Loire dating 
after the regnal years of Charles even after his deposition reveal the division of the 
nobles over this question. As Wojciech Falkowski has shown, there were some-
times differing opinions on the matter, even within the same monasteries since 
their cartularies contain charters dating after both kings.828 North of the Loire, 
in Neustria, Burgundy and Francia, no such datings are preserved, yet there was 
certainly division among the nobility: Heribert II was not the only one continuing 
to support Charles. Laon had remained loyal to the king and had to be conquered 
by Robert,829 probably indicating that its bishop, Adelelm, had joined the king’s 
side. On the other hand, the position of Count Roger of Laon is less clear. Given 
the power of the bishop at Laon,830 the circumstance of the city’s remaining loyal 
to Charles does not necessitate that Roger had done likewise. In any case, by 923, 
when he took part in the battle of Soissons on Robert’s side,831 he had opted for 
the rebels. His support for Robert might have come at a price: in 925, he appears 
as abbot of Saint-Amand,832 formerly held by Robert, who might have given up 
his abbacy before his death.833 Finally, like Roger, Bishop Abbo of Soissons can be 
made out to have joined Robert’s side at an unknown point, in his case before 25th 
January 923, when he appears as Robert’s archchancellor.834
The turning point in favour of the rebels, and in the support Charles still en-
joyed in Francia, seems to have been reached around Pentecost.835 Just before, 
when Charles’  and Robert’s armies had been encamped in close vicinity to each 
other, nobles from Charles’  army negotiated with Robert and Raoul.836 Charles’ 
reaction was twofold: he moved his army to the vicinity of Reims837 and tried to act 
like a king, demonstrating that he was the protector of the Church and willing to 
compensate those loyal to him. To do so, he reenacted the assembly that had taken 
place in June 899 at Tours-sur-Marne: at the same place, around the same time of 
the year, he again issued numerous charters for recipients from Septimania, the 
churches of Narbonne and Girona, fideles and abbeys in the region,838 as well as a 
827 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7−8.
828 Falkowski, Contra legem, 229−233.
829 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9−10.
830 On the power of the bishop at Laon and his relation to the count see Kaiser, Bischofsherrschaft, 
581.
831 Flodoard, Annales 923, 13.
832 DRa 7 (6th April 925).
833 Platelle, Temporel, 63.
834 DRoI 1. Dufour, Recueil Receuil Robert et Raoul, XXV–XXVII.
835 At pentecost (9th June), Charles attacked the city of Reims. Flodoard, Annales 922, 9. See below, 
chapter III.3, n. 841. 
836 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9.
837 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9.
838 DDChS  116–120 (5th−7th June 922, Tours-sur-Marne) and probably also D’Abadal, Catalun-
ya II,2 384 and 472−473. 
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diploma for the abbey Saint-Thierry of Reims,839 granting Bishop Guigo, the only 
noble actually attending, “what little is left at the disposition of the royal power” 
because of the fidelity shown by him.840 The message was clear and might have 
drawn more nobles back to his side, yet after his attack on Reims failed and Laon 
was captured by Robert’s men, the latter’s forces “increased each day while those 
of Charles diminished.”841 This was probably the moment when nobles like Heri-
bert II of Vermandois842 went over to Robert. The opposition against Charles had 
now reached a point when it became strong enough to claim the right to choose 
a new king. With Charles having withdrawn to Lotharingia, the “Franks chose 
Robert as senior and committed themselves to him”, thus making him their king.843
The Lotharingian nobility seems to have been as divided as the West Frank-
ish. While Flodoard, without going into any further detail, repeatedly emphasises 
the role of Charles’  Lotharingian connections,844 he also reports that, on two oc-
casions, Lotharingian nobles left Charles’  army to return to their homes845 and 
that on another some of them negotiated separately with Robert846 only to rejoin 
Charles soon after.847 Among those remaining loyal to Charles appears to have 
been Count Theoderic, who, shortly after Charles’  failed advances on Reims and 
Laon, received a diploma from the king.848 Likewise, Archbishop Roger of Trier 
seems to have remained loyal to Charles up until this moment since he features as 
archchancellor in this very same diploma. Count Gislebert, Reginar Longneck’s 
son, and Count Otto, son of Count Ricuin of Verdun, on the other hand, were 
obvious allies for the West Frankish rebels since they were already in conflict with 
839 DChS 115 (31st May 922, Tours-sur-Marne).
840 DChS 120, 285: Supra quae praefato episcopo Wigoni suaeque ecclesiae […] pro remedio  animae 
 nostrae ac genitorum nostrorum, ob nimiam etiam fidelitatem quam illum erga nos cernimus 
habere, largimur perpauca nostrae regali jure competentia potestati…
841 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9−10: Karolus, abnegato sibi introitu Lauduni, resedit super fluvium 
Saram, et Rotbertus castra metatus est super Aleam; et cum cotidie, copiis Rotberti crescentibus, 
 decrescerent Karoli, clam tandem secedens cum Haganone trans Mosam proficiscitur.
842 Heribert, who at the beginning of the rebellion was at Charles’ side (see Flodoard, Annales 922, 
7–8), had joined Robert’s side during the time of the battle of Soissons (Flodoard, Annales 923, 
13).
843 Flodoard, Annales 922, 10: Franci Rotbertum seniorem eligunt, ipsique sese committunt.  Rotbertus 
itaque rex Remis, apud Sanctum Remigium, ab episcopis et primatibus regni consituitur.
844 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8−9 notes Charles crossing the Moselle with forces from Lotharingia to 
engage in a campaign against the rebells. Flodoard, Annales 922, 9, describes Charles’ attack on 
Reims at Pentecost with Lotharingian troops.
845 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9−10 and 923, 13−14 (after the battle of Soissons).
846 Flodoard, Annales 923, 12, after Robert had met with Henry the Fowler.
847 Flodoard, Annales 923, 13.
848 DChS 121 (15th June 922). While Lauer, Receuil Charles III, 286 and 381, identifies the place of 
issuance Pladella villa with Bladel, close to Eindhoven, Bautier, Itinéraires, 100, n. 16 argues for 
Presles-l’Evêque, south of Laon, given that Charles’ attack on Laon had taken place only six days 
earlier (9th June). While, regarding the dangerous position Charles was in at that moment, it does 
not seem impossible that he covered the distance between Laon and Bladel (about 250 km) in 
such a short time (on the travelling speed of kings under such circumstances, see Reinke, Reise-
geschwindigkeit), nevertheless, Bautier’s identification seems preferable.
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the king.849 And indeed Gislebert is mentioned to have met first with Hugh and 
then with Robert just after the rebellion had broken out.850 Later in 922, Hugh led 
an advance to relieve Gislebert’s castrum at Chièvremont, which was besieged by 
Charles.851 However, Gislebert’s position in the rebellion is less clear than it seems 
on first glance. Indeed it appears that the king and the count had concluded a 
peace treaty at some moment before the siege—albeit not a lasting one.852
The rebellion, as we have seen, cut deep through Charles’  network of support. 
Setting Robert aside, the extent of the breach between Charles and the nobles be-
comes clearest when considering the positions of Heribert II of Vermandois and 
Bishop Abbo of Soissons. They both had belonged to Charles’  inner circle and 
Abbo even appears to have been one of the most influential nobles at court. After 
the battle of Soissons, despite the death of Robert, Charles was abandoned by his 
remaining followers while his opponents refused to return into his peace.853 As in 
897, when Charles had faced a similar situation, he now turned to his last resort: 
the Northmen of the Loire.854 However, as in 897, this alliance did not help to 
further his cause. The Frankish nobles, having called upon Raoul of Burgundy, 
blocked the Northmen’s path and soon after Charles was captured and impris-
oned by Heribert II.
A comparison between the attitude of the Lotharingian nobles to Charles and 
that of those from the West Frankish realm seems hardly possible due to the na-
ture of Flodoard’s account. While emphasising the importance of the Lotharing-
ians for Charles, he fails to mention those West Frankish nobles who continued 
to support the Carolingian but concentrates on the leading figures, Robert and 
his son Hugh. As it seems, Charles faced the same problems in Lotharingia that 
he was facing in the Western realm. From early on, he was losing support and 
was finally abandoned after the battle of Soissons. However, there also appears to 
be a distinctive difference. Nobles from Lotharingia, not least Gislebert, returned 
into the king’s peace even after they had turned away from him. The reason for 
this difference was probably their attitude towards Robert. Robert’s own network 
extended over Neustria, Francia and Burgundy and it was the nobles from these 
regions who chose him as their king.855 In Lotharingia, on the other hand, his 
influence and the support for his claim, were rather limited. Here, he was not 
perceived as king but as a potential ally in private conflicts with Charles. Only 
once Charles was imprisoned, did the Lotharingians look out for a new ruler and 
again the different interests of the various nobles surfaced. A group of nobles, 
849 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7. On the conflict, see chapter VI.3.
850 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8.
851 Flodoard, Annales 922, 11.
852 See chapter VI.3.
853 Flodoard, Annales 923, 13−14.
854 Flodoard, Annales 923, 14.
855 Flodoard, Annales 922, 10.
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among them Bishop Wigeric of Metz, turned to Raoul while soon after Gislebert 
and Archbishop Roger of Trier called upon Henry the Fowler.856
The question remains however: what caused this dissolution of Charles’  net-
work? In 920, when the Frankish counts first articulated their reproaches concern-
ing Hagano, they challenged royal power but not Charles’  right to rule. Charles’ 
relations with Hagano certainly did play a major role both in 920 and in 922, yet 
the nobles’  concerns do not seem to have been directed against the king’s com-
panion. The settlement agreed upon seven months after Soissons did not include 
Hagano’s removal from court and there still seems to have been room for nego-
tiation in 922. Yet, the rebellion of 922 reveals a deep mistrust against the king, a 
mistrust so deep that, even after Robert’s death, the nobles preferred to turn to 
Raoul instead of returning to Charles. Given the length of Charles’  reign at that 
moment—24 years—and the fact that the rebellion broke out only in 922 and not 
in 920, this mistrust must have been a rather recent development, possibly setting 
in around 918, when the first signs of a cooling down in the relations between 
Charles and Robert become visible, and rapidly increasing from 920 onwards. The 
reasons for this mistrust are probably to be found in Charles’  actions in the vari-
ous conflicts during these years, a question that we will address in our last chapter.
856 Flodoard, Annales 923, 17 and 18.

IV. Relations with other rulers
So far, royal politics have been dealt with as the result of the interaction between 
the ruler and the nobles around him. While in general correct, in some cases 
this model proves too narrow since there are also other political actors to take 
into consideration. Late Carolingian royal politics did not stop at the borders of 
a ruler’s realm but took place in the greater Frankish world (and beyond). No-
ble networks, including contacts of the rulers to nobles, reached over the borders 
into the neighbouring realms. Next to political or ecomonical interests this also 
included family ties, last but not least also between the Carolingian rulers. This 
means that in certain situations the balance between a ruler and the nobles around 
him could be influenced by relations with actors outside his realm. Other rulers 
could become allies as well as enemies, they could intervene in the politics of a 
realm in one way or another. Archbishop Fulk was all too aware of the possibili-
ties and threats this wider framework offered and tried to play it as best he could 
when leading Charles the Simple’s struggle against Odo. Not only rulers, also the 
nobles themselves could seek support from the outside. Reginar Longneck seeking 
Charles the Simple’s aid against Zwentibold was only one example of how con-
flicts between a noble and his ruler could provide a window for intervention. This 
chapter is dedicated to the different effects of this wider framework on the various 
West Frankish rulers’  politics and to their efforts to make use of the possibilities 
it provided.
IV.1 Creating cooperation: Louis the Stammerer
As the first chapter of the treaty concluded between Louis the Stammerer and 
Louis the Younger at Fouron states, the amicitia agreed upon was only of tempo-
rary character because of “some hindering causes.”1 This phrasing points to the 
ongoing problems that had arisen over the succession of Louis II of Italy, whose 
regnum had then yet to be divided under the remaining rulers.2 Louis the Stam-
merer was pursuing a policy aimed not only at becoming the ruler of Italy, but 
in particular at aquiring the imperial crown previously held by his father. When 
he had met with Pope John VIII at the Synod of Troyes, he had made an initial 
attempt to secure the crown for himself when he asked the pope to confirm his 
1 MGH Capit. II, N° 246, c. 1, 169: Ut, quia firmitas amicitiae et coniunctionis nostrae modo quibus­
dam praepedientibus causis esse non potuit, usque ad illud placitum, quo simul ut conveniamus 
statutum habemus, talis amicitia inter nos maneat Domino auxiliante de corde puro et conscientia 
bona et fide non ficta, ut nemo suo pari vitam, regnum aut fideles suos vel aliquid, quod ad salutem 
sive prosperitatem ac honorem regni pertinet, discupiat aut forsconsiliet.
2 MGH Capit. II, N° 246, Preamble, 169.
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father’s order handing the realm on to him.3 It is certain that Louis was not asking 
for John to approve his rule in the West Frankish kingdom, for he had already won 
this when the pope had crowned him a short time earlier; rather, he was seeking 
John’s support in succeeding Charles the Bald as emperor.4 Although the pope 
refused to fulfil the request, the two of them appear to have come to an agreement 
in private talks shortly afterwards.5 In a letter John later sent to Louis, he refered 
to a secretum which the two of them had agreed upon at Troyes: Louis was to sup-
port the pope militarily, while the pope would fulfil his wishes in return.6 The first 
portion of Louis’  aid appears to have consisted of Louis sending Boso to accom-
pany John back to Italy, where he remained for several months.7 As Johannes Fried 
has convincingly argued, Louis in turn became John’s candidate for the imperial 
crown.8 Louis’  imperial ambitions must have been brought up during the negotia-
tions preceding the treaty of Fouron, and it is hardly surprising, given the progress 
he had already made, that he was unwilling to renounce them. Nevertheless, the 
overall tenor of the treaty of Fouron was one of friendly cooperation. Both rulers 
agreed to support each other in the event of Viking incursions9 and to protect the 
property of the churches of each other’s realms,10 indicating that the intention was 
to develop a wide-ranging spirit of co-operation between the two rulers.
This image is further strengthened when considering yet another chapter of 
the treaty that was of special interest for Louis the Stammerer. Not only was the 
succession of his sons Louis and Carloman secured in this passage, but also the 
succession of any future sons “whom God’s mercy might be willing to give him.”11 
This was a de facto acknowledgment by Louis the Younger of the official posi-
tion of the West Frankish court on the validity of both of Louis the Stammerer’s 
marriages.12 Yet there is even more to the passage. For one, it is stated that all of 
Louis’  sons should be able to hold the paternal regnum by right of inheritance, 
passing over the role of the nobility in the question of succession. This impression 
is strengthened by the second part of the passage, which committed Louis the 
 3 Annales Bertiniani 878, 227−228.
 4 See also Fried, Boso, 207−208.
 5 Annales Bertiniani 878, 228: Denique IIII idus praefati mensis Hludouuicus rex quorundam primo­
rum compulsus petitionibus uenit ad apostolici mansionem, et, cum eo familiariter locutus, unacum 
illo reuersus est ad conuentum episcoporum in exedram juxta mansionem apostolici.
 6 MGH Epist. VII, N° 187, 149: Secretum, quod Deo auxiliante vobiscum Trecascio existentes habuimus…
 7 Annales Bertiniani 878, 230; Annales Vedastini 878, 43; MGH Epist. VII, N° 102, 95−96. Further 
references can be found in N° 109, 110, 121 and 122, 101−102 and 110−111.
 8 Fried, Boso.
 9 MGH Capit. II, N° 246, c. 2, 169.
10 MGH Capit. II, N° 246, c. 7, 170.
11 MGH Capit. II, N° 246, c. 3, 169: Ut, si ego vobis superstes fuero, filium vestrum Hludowicum adhuc 
parvulum et alios filios vestros, quos Dominus vobis donaverit, ut regnum paternum hereditario 
iure quiete tenere possint, et consilio et auxilio, prout melius potuero, adiuvabo. Si autem vos mihi 
superstes fueritis, filios meos Hludowicum et Karlomannum et alios, quos divina pietas mihi donare 
voluerit, ut regnum paternum quiete tenere possint, similiter et consilio et auxilio, prout melius po­
tueritis, ut adiuvetis rogo.
12 For this problem, see Offergeld, Reges pueri, 355–356 and chapter I.1.1.
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Younger to counsel and aid Louis’  heirs.13 This agreement seems to reflect Louis 
the Stammerer’s own problems at the time when he had succeeded his father and 
faced the displeasure of the leading nobles, who resented his attempts to create his 
own power base independent from them. Were Louis to die, this treaty would not 
only secure the succession of all of his sons, but also provide them with a powerful 
ally against the nobles if need should be.
Two other passages, although certainly in line with earlier treaties,14 appear 
to have been motivated by current events. Both kings agreed not to receive “any 
whisperers and disparagers, envious of our peace and unable to bear the realm’s 
being peaceful, wish[ing] to sow quarrels and contentions and discords between 
us,”15 adding later on that “the peace and quiet of the realm keeps being shaken by 
rootless men who lack respect for anything and behave like tyrants”; these men 
were also to be rejected and either “brought to right reason” or pursued by both 
parties.16 For Louis the Stammerer, these passages, at a minimum, secured Louis 
the Younger’s neutrality in his ongoing conflict with Bernard of Gothia, against 
whom he prepared a campaign early the following year.17 According to the treaty, 
Bernard would henceforth find neither support nor shelter in the Eastern realm, 
while Louis could request his cousin’s help should the marchio turn there.
Thus, the treaty of Fouron strengthened Louis the Stammerer’s position con-
siderably, securing not only the succession of his sons but also ensuring that his 
neighbour would not interfere in his internal affairs. The agreements, of course, 
were mutual and would deny Louis the opportunity of taking advantage of any 
problems Louis the Younger might have had at the same time. However, this ap-
pears to have been a price he was willing to pay, especially considering that Fouron 
was only a preliminary meeting, held in preparation for a second, larger one that 
was to include Louis the Younger’s brothers Carloman and Charles.18 It seems that 
the intention was to create a large network that included all the Carolingian rulers 
13 On the development of the phrase consilium et auxilium applied here, see Devisse, Consilium.
14 Kolb, Herrscherbegegnungen, 143−144.
15 MGH Capit. II, N° 246, c. 4, 169−170: Ut, si aliqui susurrones et detractores et, qui paci nostrae invi­
dent et quietum regnum esse non patiuntur, inter nos lites et contentiones atque discordias seminare 
voluerint, nullus nostrum hoc recipiat aut libenter acceptet; nisi forte hoc ad rationem coram nobis 
utrisque et communibus fidelibus nostris perducere voluerit. Si vero hoc noluerit, cum nullo nostrum 
aliquam societatem habeat, sed omnes illum, sicut mendacem et falsatorem et inter fratres volentem 
seminare discordias, communiter a nobis abiciamus, ne de cetero quisque talia mendacia auribus 
nostris inferre audeat. Translation by Nelson, Annals, 214.
16 MGH Capit. II, N° 246, c. 8, 170: Et quia per vagos et in tyrannica consuetudine inreverentes hom­
ines pax et quies regni perturbari solet, volumus, ut, ad quemcumque nostrum talis venerit, ut de 
his, quae egit, rationem et iustitiam subterfugere possit, nemo ex nobis illum ad aliud recipiat vel 
retineat, nisi ut ad rectam rationem et debitam emendationem perducatur. Et si rationem rectam 
subterfugerit, omnes in commune, in cuius regnum venerit, illum persequamur, donec aut ad ratio­
nem perducatur aut de regno expellatur vel deleatur. Translation by Nelson, Annals, 215.
17 Annales Bertiniani 878−879, 234.
18 MGH Capit. II, N° 246, c. 5, 170.
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and was designed to stabilise their realms by solving the Italian problem as well as 
by cooperating against rebellious nobles.
IV.2	 Carolingian	networks:	Louis III	and	Carloman II
Louis the Stammerer’s early death led to exactly the situation that he had tried to 
avoid with the treaty of Fouron. His sons became objects of the rivalries between 
the noble factions around Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin, which in turn led the 
latter to invite Louis the Younger to intervene in the Western realm and thus to 
the support of an external power for a group within the realm. The situation is 
not as clear cut as it would appear from this characterisation, however. In his last 
actions, Louis the Stammerer had made it clear that he intended only his oldest 
son Louis to succeed him while the faction around Gauzlin aimed at realising the 
treaty of Fouron.19 It could even be argued that by his intervention in the West, 
Louis the Younger acted in accordance with the treaty by coming to the aid of his 
cousin’s sons and ensuring that both of them would succeed their father. However, 
his motives appear not to have been altogether altruistic. Hincmar sees Louis the 
Younger’s wife Liutgard as a driving force, who, he insinuates, held ambitions to 
take over the entire Western realm.20 While this part of Hincmar’s report might 
simply have served to denounce Gauzlin21 by grossly exaggerating the danger to 
the Western realm and Louis the Stammerer’s sons, it nevertheless points towards 
another result of Louis’  intervention: the Western realm lost the part of Lotharin-
gia that had been acquired by Charles the Bald via the treaty of Meersen in 870 to 
Louis the Younger.
It is interesting to note the difference between the accounts of two of the main 
sources on the subject. According to Hincmar, it was Gauzlin and his allies who 
offered the regnum to Louis,22 while the Annales Vedastini report that Hugh the 
Abbot offered Lotharingia to Louis, not to make him come, but to make him 
leave.23 Whether it was Gauzlin or Hugh who was the originator of the cession, it 
appears to have been supported by both parties—the price that was to be paid for 
19 See chapters I and II and Werner, Gauzlin.
20 Annales Bertiniani 879, 238: Audiens autem hoc uxor illius, satis moleste tulit, dicens quia si illa 
cum eo uenisset, totum istud regnum haberet.
21 On Hincmar’s bias against Gauzlin see Werner, Gauzlin, 437.
22 Annales Bertiniani 879, 236−238: Gozlenus et Chuonradus cum illorum, complicibus machinaban­
tur, miserunt Vultarium episcopum Aurelianensem et Goiramnum ac Ansgerum comites ad Hlu­
douuicum apud Viridunum ut ei offerent partem de regno Hlotharii iunioris quam Karolus contra 
fratrem suum Hludouuicum, ipsius Hludouuici patrem, acceperat… et accepta regni parte sibi ob­
late, Hludouuicus ad palatium suum Franconofurth rediit.
23 Annales Vedastini 879, 45: Et dum haec aguntur, Hugo abba Waltherum Aurelianensium episcopum 
misit, obsecrans Hludowico regi, ut partem regni Hlotharii, quam suus genitor Karolo inter se divi­
dendo regnum consensit, acciperet et abiret in regnum suum et pacem suis sineret habere consobrinis. 
Quod ille audiens, recepta parte regni, abiit in terram suam.
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Louis’  intervention. This might have been due to the terms under which the west-
ern part of Lotharingia became part of Louis the Younger’s realm. Hincmar tells 
us that after Louis the Younger’s death, “the leading nobles from the part of this 
king’s regnum which had been given to this Louis as a lease”24 were coming to meet 
Louis III. This phrasing is repeated shortly onwards when Hincmar reports how 
Hugh the Abbot sought out Charles the Fat, requesting that the emperor “should 
restore to Carloman, as he himself had promised to do, that part of the kingdom 
which his brother Louis had received as a lease.”25 The two reports specify that 
western Lotharingia had not been ceded in perpetuity but only temporary—as a 
lease—and that (as evidenced by Hugh the Abbot’s request that Charles the Fat 
return the region) this lease was probably supposed to end with Louis the Young-
er’s death, at least in the Western leaders’  point of view.26 Charles the Fat indeed 
appears to have been involved in the agreement from an early point,27 probably 
to avoid any future tensions over the subject. This circumstance is probably the 
best example of the relations between the various parties involved and their goals. 
Louis the Younger wanted to make personal gains from his intervention in the 
West, a demand that was accepted by the factions around Hugh and Gauzlin as 
well as by Louis the Stammerer’s sons. Yet, at the same time, the idea of coopera-
tion that had been so dominant in the treaty of Fouron still wielded a strong influ-
ence over the different parties.
That this cooperation was still highly valued was probably due to the common 
threats the different rulers now had to face. In 879 the Vikings had returned to the 
24 Annales Bertiniani 882, 245−246: Indeque reuersus [Louis  III] apud Compendium […] ubi 
 nuntiatum est quia sobrinus suus Hludouuicus, Hludouuici regis Germaniae filius, inutiliter sibi 
et Ecclesiae ac regno uiuens, morti subcubuit. Venientes autem primores partis illius regni quae ipsi 
Hludouuico in locarium data fuerat, quatenus quae pater et auus illorum habuerunt eis consentiret, 
uoluerunt se illi commendare. Sed consilio primorum suorum propter sacramenta quae inter eum 
et Karolum facta fuerunt, non eos in commendationem suscepit, sed scaram hostilem, cui praefecit 
Theodericum  comitem, quasi in adiutorium illorum contra Nortmanos disposuit.
25 Annales Bertiniani 882, 249: A quod placitum Hugo abbas, quibusdam sociis secum assumptis, 
 perrexit pro petitione partis regni quam frater suus Hludouuicus in locarium acceperat, ut, sicut ipse 
Karolus olim promiserat, Karlomanno restitueret.
26 MacLean, Response, 30−33, following Nelson, Annals, 223 and 225, interprets these passages of 
the Annals in a different way. According to him, based on her translation, it was Louis III who had 
leased back western Lotharingia. However, in the context of Louis the Younger’s just mentioned 
death, ipsi Hludouuico in difference to pater et auus illorum and se illi commendari, clearly seems 
to refer to the former and not to Louis III. Similarly, the second passage directly follows after a 
description of Charles the Fat’s deeds, so frater suus Hludouuicus has to refer to Louis the Younger 
and not, as Janet Nelson translates, to “Carloman’s brother Louis.” Our solution also facilitates to 
explain why the West Lotharingian nobles were not to commend themselves to Louis III in 882 and 
why the Annales Fuldenses (Mainz continuation, 881, 96) state that a number of locations in west-
ern Lotharingia were in the hands of Louis the Younger: At illi instaurato exercitu et amplificato 
numero equitum plurima loca in regione regis nostri vastaverunt, hoc est Cameracum, Traiectum 
et pagum Haspanicum totamque Ripuariam, praecipua etiam monasteria, id est Prumiam, Indam, 
Stabulaus, almundarium et Aquense palatium, ubi in capella regis equis suis stabulum fecerunt.
27 MacLean, Response, 33, argues for the preparations of the campaign against Boso in 880, a view we 
also take.
238 IV. Relations with other rulers
continent,28 in Lotharingia Lothar  II’s illegitimate son Hugh had rebelled29 and 
 finally, most importantly for the Western realm, Boso had initiated his own corona-
tion at Vienne.30 As Simon MacLean argues, the summits that took place between 
the various rulers from late 879 until June 880—among them three involving the 
new kings of the Western realm, Louis III and Carloman II—were meant to  settle 
ongoing disputes and coordinate the actions taken against these threats.31 The 
measures decided upon unfolded over the following months: first, Louis III and 
Carloman II, with the support of forces provided by Louis the Younger, launched 
an attack on the rebellious Hugh. From there, this united army turned south into 
Burgundy against Boso where it was joined by Charles the Fat.32 Meanwhile, an-
other army was placed under the command of Gauzlin and other nobles to deal 
with the Northmen who had installed themselves on the Scheldt.33 The Annales 
Vedastini provide a detailed account of this last campaign which reveals that the 
extent of cooperation in this theatre of war did not differ from that of the others: 
the attack led Gauzlin and the others deep into Lotharingian territory—hence into 
Louis the Younger’s realm—where they coordinated their actions with the local 
forces.34 United against common enemies, the joint armies operated over the bor-
ders of the regna: this is how far the various kings were willing to cooperate, and 
shows how much importance they attributed to dealing with these threats.
This cooperation continued over the following years. When Charles the Fat left 
the siege of Vienne early on, he did so with the approval of Louis and Carloman 
after both sides had sworn oaths,35 oaths that probably also included agreements 
about Charles’  succession36 and the two brothers’  acknowledgment of his claim to 
the imperial crown. Later, he rejoined the efforts against Boso, sending forces to 
deal with the remnants of the rebellion.37 And when asked by the pope to release 
Engelberga, the widow of Emperor Louis II who had been imprisoned to prevent 
her from supporting Boso, Charles pointed out that he needed the consent of Louis 
and Carloman before doing so.38 Meanwhile in the north, as the Annales Fuldenses 
28 See chapter V.1.1. 
29 Annales Bertiniani 879, 239; Annales Fuldenses (Mainz continuation) 879, 93. On Hugh and his 
revolt see Hope, Political development, 86−110. 
30 Annales Bertiniani 879, 239.
31 MacLean, Response, 34−35. Louis and Carloman participated in the meetings at Orbe towards the 
end of 879, Ribemont in February 880 and finally Gondreville. For Orbe: Annales Bertiniani 879, 
240. For Ribemont: Annales Bertiniani 880, 240−241. For Gondreville: Annales Bertiniani 880, 
242−243.
32 Annales Bertiniani 880, 242−243.
33 Annales Vedastini 880, 47.
34 Annales Vedastini 880, 48.
35 Annales Bertiniani 880, 243.
36 MacLean, Response, 35.
37 Annales Vedastini 882, 52. This Bernard mentioned by the annals appears to have been one of 
Charles the Fat’s men. Hlawitschka, Franken, 147−148 and MacLean, Response, 38 with n. 51.
38 MGH Epist. VII, N° 268, 236.
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report, Louis the Younger and Louis III held a “fitting meeting” at Gondreville.39 
Unfortunately, the annals do not give any details about the discussions. Yet, as 
Simon MacLean argues, the meeting is reported immediately following to the ac-
count of the rebellion of Lothar II’s son Hugh, thus making it “fitting” if both kings 
met to coordinate their measures against this new threat.40 These numerous signs 
of intense cooperation also cast some light on an occurrence already mentioned 
above. When Louis the Younger died, Lotharingian nobles approached Louis III to 
commend themselves to him.41 As we have argued, the western part of Lotharingia 
had only been temporarily leased to Louis the Younger and was to revert back to 
the Western realm upon his death. Thus, while it would have been legitimate for 
Louis III to accept their commendation, he nevertheless refused their offer. Since 
Charles the Fat had also been involved in the agreement concerning Lotharingia, 
it seems safe to assume that it had been negotiated that the regnum should not 
automatically revert to the West, but that Charles should return it publicly,42 an act 
that Louis did not want to anticipate in order to avoid any unnecessary tensions. 
Fulfilling his side of the bargain, he, nonetheless, appears to have maintained a 
certain degree of caution. While he did send back the Lotharingian nobles, he also 
dispatched an army under Count Theoderic of Vermandois, “as if to help them 
against the Northmen”,43 as Hincmar writes. His account, strongly biased against 
Louis III and the nobles surrounding him,44 may not be entirely reliable in this 
case, falsely implying that there were also other motives behind this campaign. 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that Theoderic’s intervention was not 
only meant to aid the Lotharingians, but also to strengthen links with the local 
nobility and to emphasise Louis’  claim on his father’s and grandfather’s lands.
This episode also reveals the problems attendant on this cooperation between 
Louis and Carloman. While they profited enormously from the aid provided by 
Louis the Younger and Charles the Fat in their fight against Boso, it also limited 
their ability to pursue their own interests when doing so would have threatened 
the foundations of this same cooperation. These limitations become even more 
apparent when taking into consideration Hugh the Abbot’s attempt to regain 
Western Lotharingia from Charles for Carloman II, soon after Louis III’s death: 
39 Annales Fuldenses (Mainz continuation) 881, 96: Rex cum suo nepote Hludowico apud villam Gun­
dolfi congruum habuit colloquium; inde transiens omne tempus aestivum in Baioaria moratus est. 
40 MacLean, Response, 35−37.
41 See chapter IV.2, n. 24.
42 This would also explain why Hugh the Abbot, soon after trying to negotiate the return of western 
Lotharingia to Carloman, reminded Charles the Fat of his promise. Annales Bertiniani 882, 249: 
A quod placitum Hugo abbas, quibusdam sociis secum assumptis, perrexit pro petitione partis regni 
quam frater suus Hludouuicus in locarium acceperat, ut, sicut ipse Karolus olim promiserat, Karlo­
manno restitueret.
43 Annales Bertiniani 882, 246. After Louis had met with nobles from Lotharingia: [Hludouuicus] 
scaram hostilem, cui praefecit Theodericum comitem, quasi in adiutorium illorum contra Nortman­
nos disposuit.
44 See chapter II.1.
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reminded of his own promises, the emperor simply played for time by not com-
miting himself.45 For him, cooperation was seemingly less important than it had 
been for Louis and Carloman, especially since by now Hugh and Boso had been 
defeated. Carloman, on the other hand, was not only weakened by the resistence 
of the nobles of the northern part of his realm to his rule, but also at the same 
time confronted with the Northmen.46 Thus, he lacked the power to challenge the 
emperor and force him to keep his part of the bargain.
IV.3. Structural weaknesses: Odo
In comparison to his Carolingian predecessors, Odo’s dealings with other rulers 
started under completely different conditions. Whereas Louis the Stammerer and 
his sons negotiated as equals, at least in rank, Odo’s first meeting with Arnulf of 
Carinthia only took place because the latter summoned him to a placitum.47 Ac-
cording to the Annales Fuldenses, Odo “adopted the sensible plan of saying that he 
would prefer to hold his kingdom in peace by the grace of the king than to rebel in 
pride contrary to his fidelity, and coming there humbly to the king he was received 
with grace.”48 While certainly the exaggeration of an East Frankish source, its mes-
sage, nevertheless, concords with that of the Annales Vedastini, which adds some 
more details. They report that Arnulf received Odo honourably at Worms and, 
after they had concluded an amicitia, Arnulf sent Odo back to his regnum, asking 
him to forgive those who had come to him.49 Both sources agree that Arnulf was 
the higher-ranking ruler of the two. This superiority in rank was certainly a ques-
tion of power, as Arnulf was already a well-established ruler; yet Arnulf ’s Caro-
lingian blood and consequently more legitimate position must also have played a 
role.50
However, this ignores the question of why Odo would so willingly acknowledge 
Arnulf as a ruler superior to him in rank. When Odo met with the East Frank-
ish ruler, his own claim to the throne was still challenged by Archbishop Fulk of 
Reims, Abbot Rodulf of Saint-Vaast and Count Baldwin II of Flanders, who had 
turned to Arnulf, inviting him to come to the Western realm and take the realm 
45 See chapter IV.2, n. 42.
46 See chapter II.2 and below.
47 Annales Vedastini 888, 65−66.
48 Annales Fuldenses (Ratisbon continuation) 888, 116: His auditis rex Franciam peciit habitoque ad 
Franconofurt generali conventu disposuit adventare Wormaciam. Quod vero Odo comperiens sa­
lubri utens consilio contestans se malle suum regnum gratia cum regis pacifice habere quam ulla 
iactantia contra eius fidelitatem superbire; veniensque humiliter ad regem et gratanter ibi recipitur. 
Rebus ab utraque parte, prout placuit, prospere dispositis unusquisque reversus est in sua. Transla-
tion by Reuter, Annals, 116.
49 Annales Vedastini 888, 66.
50 On the strength of Arnulf ’s Carolingian heritage, see Kasten, Chancen and Becher, Arnulf. See 
Brühl, Frankreich, 379 on Arnulf ’s dominating role in post-888 politics.
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that was lawfully his.51 By gaining Arnulf ’s acknowledgement, Odo was able to 
eliminate another claimant to the throne and to deliver a serious blow to the fac-
tion opposing him. During the negotiations between Odo and Arnulf preceeding 
the actual meeting, Baldwin abandoned his allies and commended himself to the 
king,52 a clear sign of the success of this strategy. Apart from this, Odo had even 
more to gain from Arnulf. As his own ascent to the throne rested on military 
prowess rather than blood and heritage, and his kingship was being challenged by 
a part of the nobility and external competitors, he needed to strengthen his posi-
tion by finding other ways to legitimise his claim. Arnulf ’s Carolingian descent 
made him a source of legitimation, a source that Odo could use to negate the dif-
ference between himself and his Carolingian predecessors.53 Just how important 
Arnulf ’s acknowledgment was for Odo is further revealed by his second corona-
tion with a crown sent to him by Arnulf.54
The extent to which not only Odo but also Arnulf adjusted their mutual rela-
tions in accordance with their own necessities is revealed by events during the 
time of the struggle between Odo and Charles the Simple. In 894, Arnulf agreed 
to Charles coming to him and acknowledged him as king—something that cost 
him nothing but allowed him to demonstrate his superiority over a fellow Caro-
lingian king during a time when he needed to strengthen his own position.55 This 
did not mean that Arnulf now stopped considering Odo a legitimate king as well. 
Similarly, Pope Formosus had accepted Charles’  coronation, congratulating him 
on his elevation.56 Yet, at the same time, Formosus also wrote to the bishops of the 
Western realm, asking them to join Odo, to keep an armistice and to work on the 
restoration of peace.57 If we can have faith in Flodoard’s regesta of the archbishop’s 
letters, even for Fulk, Charles’  coronation had not deprived Odo of his crown. In 
a letter to the pope, Fulk spoke of “the conflict which was going on between the 
kings Odo and Charles.”58 While Odo’s legitimacy did not suffer by Charles being 
acknowledged as king, his position nevertheless took a severe blow, as Charles’ 
claim was now sanctioned as legitimate by the dominant Frankish ruler. To make 
things worse for Odo, Arnulf went even further and now supported Charles 
openly with Lotharingian forces,59 thus shifting the balance of power against Odo 
and making Charles’  side even more attractive for other potential allies.
51 Annales Vedastini 888, 62. See also Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 381.
52 Annales Vedastini 888, 66.
53 For Odo’s legitimation and his preference for Carolingian traditions, see chapter I.1.4.
54 Annales Vedastini 888, 67. On the importance of the second coronation, see Guillot, Étapes, 
215−217.
55 See chapter I.2.6. 
56 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 374.
57 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 374.
58 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 375: Idem quoque presul Folco nonnulla prefato pape preter premissa reperi­
tur direxisse scripta, tam pro sua vocatione, qua vocabatur ab ipso ad sedem apostolicam, quam pro 
contentione, que versabatur inter reges Odonem et Karolum…
59 Annales Vedastini 894, 74.
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This was undoubtedly the reason why, the following year, Odo obeyed Arnulf ’s 
summons to Worms although this meant that he not only would have to acknowl-
edge Arnulf ’s superiority once more, but that he also ran the risk that Arnulf 
would try to act as judge over him and Charles, who had likewise been called 
because Arnulf “wanted to put an end to this misery between them.”60 By coming 
to Worms, Odo risked that the conflict would be settled to his detriment. Odo 
gambled, but it paid off when Charles did not come to Worms. Bearing generous 
presents, he “was received honourably and sent back home with delight.”61 Thus he 
was able to publicly demonstrate that his own claim to the throne was as valid as 
Charles’—or maybe even more valid, since Charles had not turned up—and that 
Arnulf ’s support for Charles had ended.
The whole affair reveals how vulnerable Odo’s position had become and how 
the internal problems of his rule influenced his relations with other kings. The sec-
ond meeting between Odo and Arnulf was the direct result of the latter’s interven-
tion in the affairs of the Western realm, an intervention that forced Odo to again 
acknowledge Arnulf ’s superiority in rank and take an enormous risk that might 
have severely threatened his position. This vulnerability becomes even more ap-
parent when, after the meeting at Worms, Charles allied himself with Zwentibold, 
who then intervened in the Western realm.62 In contrast to his father, Zwentibold 
appears not to have been interested in gaining prestige but in gaining territory, for 
that was promised to him by his new allies. This difference allows us to draw some 
conclusions about Odo’s military strength in comparison to his eastern neigh-
bour. Odo, faced with the alliance between Charles and Zwentibold, withdrew 
over the Seine, indicating that his forces were not sufficient to challenge his op-
ponents. Soon afterwards, however, Charles’  supporters and Zwentibold fell out 
with each other, leading to Odo’s return and Zwentibold’s quick withdrawal to his 
own regnum. Odo was strong enough to deal with an isolated opponent, but not 
with an alliance between the two.
Thus, Odo’s relations with other rulers are revealed to have suffered from two 
major problems: Arnulf ’s superior rank and the conflict with Charles. While Odo 
was at first able to profit from the former by strengthening his own legitimation 
via Arnulf ’s acknowledgement, later on this same constellation turned against 
him when Arnulf recognised Charles’  claim as legitimate and allied himself with 
him. Now it was Odo’s Carolingian rival who profited. Moreover, the conflict be-
tween Odo and Charles led to Zwentibold’s intervention in the Western realm, 
60 Annales Vedastini 895, 75: Constricti vero hi qui sequebantur Karolum—nam Odo rex eis quicquid 
in Francia habuerant tulerat—Burgundiam acriter depopulati sunt. Venitque clamor eorum ad au­
res Arnulfi regis. Qui missos in Franciam mittens iussit, ut Odo et Karolus ad eum venirent, quatinus 
tantae calamitatis malum inter eos finiret.
61 Annales Vedastini 895, 75: Odo vero rex strenuis secum assumptis viris ire ad regem perrexit Arnul­
fum multisque honoribus eum honoravit. Rex vero illum cum honore excoepit atque cum laetitia ad 
sua remisit, filiumque suum rex Arnulfus in praesentia Odoni regis nomine Zuendebolchum benedici 
in regem fecit eique concessit regnum quondam Hlotharii.
62 Annales Vedastini 895, 76.
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threatening not so much Odo’s rule as the territorial integrity of his realm. This 
was the exact situation that Louis the Stammerer had feared and tried to avoid 
with the treaty of Fouron, a situation that is strongly reminiscent of Louis the 
Younger’s intervention in the Western realm, which lead to the loss of the western 
part of Lotharingia.
IV.4 Possibilities and limits of royal power: Charles the Simple
As in Odo’s case, Charles the Simple’s relations with other kingdoms initially 
aimed at legitimising his claim to the throne by gaining Arnulf ’s acknowledge-
ment. A number of Archbishop Fulk’s letters reveal the problems Charles was fac-
ing in this context. In the first one, addressed to Arnulf himself, Fulk expresses his 
concerns about Arnulf being biased against Charles.63 The failure of his endeavour 
becomes apparent from a second letter, this time addressed to Pope Formosus, 
asking for his support on the same matter,64 while a third one shows that Arnulf 
had not only refused to come to Charles’  aid but even taken a hostile attitude 
towards his supporters and got his hands on property belonging to the church of 
Reims.65 Yet, while getting Arnulf ’s acknowledgement was certainly important for 
Charles, this goal was not the principal factor in their early relations. In contrast to 
Odo, Charles had a strong claim to the throne based on his Carolingian descent, a 
claim that was immediately recognised, if not by Arnulf, then at least by the pope 
who congratulated him on his coronation.66 While Arnulf ’s acknowledgment was 
very still valuable for Charles, Fulk’s letters reveal a second aspect that seems to 
have carried more weight: the need for the actual material support that Arnulf 
could provide.
When Arnulf changed course in 894 and invited Charles to come to Worms, 
this was a great success for the young king, even if, like Odo before and again soon 
after, he had to acknowledge Arnulf ’s superiority in rank. The Annales Vedas-
tini ’s description of this occasion emphasises this factor even more than the East 
Frankish account provided by the Annales Fuldenses. Seemingly, Arnulf granted 
Charles his father’s regnum.67 This phrasing is most interesting since it reveals the 
complexity of the relations between the two rulers. Firstly, the mention of Charles 
63 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 380−383: Arnulfo regi Transrenensi litteras mittens pro causa regis Karoli, 
quem parvulum adhuc unxerat in regem, reddit causas eius provectionis eo, quod audierat motum 
fuisse animum ipsius Arnulfi contra se pro hac perpetratione…
64 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 375.
65 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 375.
66 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 374.
67 Annales Vedastini 894, 74: Arnulfus vero rex benigne suum excepit consobrinum eique regnum pa­
ternum concessit adiutoresque ei delegavit hos qui erant ex superiori Francia. Annales Fuldenses 
(Ratisbon continuation), 894, 125: Wormacia habitum est generale conventum; ibi inter alia Karolus 
puer indole iuventutis, Hludowici Karoli de occidentali Francia regis filii filius, nepos regis, ad eum 
veniens, quem rex cum dilectione suscepit et ab solvit.
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receiving his father’s realm demonstrates that his claim was independent and not 
reliant on receiving it from Arnulf. Secondly, the circumstance that Charles re-
ceived the realm from Arnulf once again underlined the latter’s superior position 
as well as his status as a source of justice and legitimation, the same source that 
Odo had used five years earlier. Thirdly, the act appears to have created a bond be-
tween Arnulf and Charles, requiring Arnulf to impose the judgement he had just 
spoken. And indeed Arnulf now provided Charles with “helpers” from Lothar-
ingia to aid his cause. The price Charles had to pay for this help was even higher 
than the acknowledgement of Arnulf ’s superior rank. As another letter from Fulk 
reveals, he also had to make a promissio about which nothing further is known.68
In the following year, when Arnulf called both Odo and Charles to come to 
him, Fulk’s letter and the reference to this promissio was at first the only response 
from Charles’  side. The reasoning behind this decision was probably that Charles 
had nothing to gain from the renewal of his public submission under Arnulf and 
that his independence would be questioned if he obeyed the summons. Only 
when it became known that Odo had in fact gone to Arnulf did Fulk react, quickly 
preparing for a journey to Worms, yet losing his baggage with the gifts for Arnulf 
to Odo, who was already returning to the West.69 Fulk’s visit was probably meant 
as a compromise: Charles would again acknowledge Arnulf ’s superiority, yet lose 
none of his own prestige by avoiding a meeting in person. In any case, Fulk set out 
too late, and the assembly of Worms was already over. The winner on this occa-
sion was Odo, whose claim was publicly strengthened by the demonstration of the 
good relations between him and Arnulf.
Setting aside the fact that Odo’s position had been strengthened, the setback 
for Charles appears to have been only a minor one. While not receiving any more 
help from Arnulf, he was able to secure an alliance with Zwentibold, who immedi-
ately intervened in the Western realm and joined his forces with Charles, forcing 
Odo to retreat behind the Seine.70 Just like Arnulf ’s, Zwentibold’s aid came at a 
price, in his case in the form of a promise for territorial gains. This again reveals 
the underlying problem of Charles’  relations to other rulers during these years: 
while his claim was quickly acknowleged, he depended on external aid to actually 
impose it against Odo. This considerably weakened his position in negotiations, 
forcing him to make rather large concessions. Furthermore, while he depended 
on his partners, they could cease their support for him without the risk of losing 
anything. This was why Zwentibold could plot against Charles during the siege 
of Laon before retreating to Lotharingia: he had nothing to fear from Charles but 
could hope to gain even more by strengthening his ties to Charles’  other support-
ers. There was, however, one exception to this rule. In late 895, after the alliance 
68 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 3, 383: Promissio nem quoque, quam rex suus Karolus eidem Arnulfo, qui 
regnum sibi contradiderat, promisisset manere inconvulsam…
69 Annales Vedastini 895, 75−76; Regino, Chronicon 895, 143.
70 Annales Vedastini 895, 76.
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with Zwentibold had been dissolved and negotiations between Charles and Odo 
had commenced,71 Charles met with Emperor Lambert and King Rudolf of Upper 
Burgundy at Remiremont.72 All three of them were under considerable pressure at 
that moment and in dire need of allies,73 so for the first time Charles’  position was 
as strong as his partners’. However, nothing appears to have come from this meet-
ing. This was probably not only due to the fact that none of the three rulers had 
any forces to spare, but also because Lambert and Rudolf had a different enemy 
than Charles: Arnulf. Setting aside this outcome, the meeting, nevertheless, points 
again to another characteristic of Charles’  relations to other rulers during these 
years: that he faced no problems in being accepted as one of them.
Lotharingia
Charles’  major problem during these years, his dependence on external help, was 
solved the moment he came to an accord with Odo and soon after became the sole 
ruler of the Western realm. His politics changed immediately: after a request from 
Reginar Longneck and his allies, he invaded Zwentibold’s regnum.74 Managing to 
liberate the besieged Durfos, he marched on Aachen, Nimwegen and Prüm, tak-
ing possession of the old Carolingian palaces,75 but when faced with Zwentibold’s 
newly gathered forces, he had to conclude an armistice and return home. While 
the campaign demonstrates Charles’  determination to make the most of the op-
portunities presented to him, it also reveals the limits of his power. The basis of 
his support in Lotharingia consisted only of Reginar Longneck and his allies, and 
he was unable to rally more of the local nobility to his cause. Moreover, his own 
forces were apparently insufficient to challenge Zwentibold’s rule over the regnum.
However, the affair did not end when Charles left Lotharingia. Early in 899, 
Zwentibold met with legates sent by Charles and Arnulf at St Goar. The exact pro-
ceedings of the conference are unknown. Regino of Prüm only states that “later 
events brought more clearly into the light what was discussed at this meeting in 
private, when the king wasn’t present.”76 Nevertheless, some observations can be 
made. Charles’  legation consisted not only of his archchancellor Anskeric, but 
also of Count Odacar, who had fallen out with Zwentibold alongside Reginar.77 
Odacar’s presence points to one of the reasons behind the meeting: the ongoing 
71 Annales Vedastini 895, 76 and 77.
72 Liber Memorialis Remiremont, 21, fol. 11v: Karolus rex iuuenis, Lanbertus imperator, Rodolfus rex, 
Rampo, Vuitbertus, Rotrudis, Adeldrudis, Siifridus, Gotdofridus, Manases, Eldigarius ep., Folco ep., 
Uuilerius, Lehutaldus. For the dating and identifications, see Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 147−152.
73 See chapter I.2.6 and Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 145−155.
74 Annales Vedastini 898, 80−81; Regino, Chronicon 898, 146.
75 Schneidmüller, Lothringenpolitik, 6−7.
76 Regino, Chronicon, 899, 146−147: Zuendibolch colloquium habuit cum optimatibus Arnulfi et Car­
oli et suis apud sanctum Goarem; ex regno Arnulfi interfuerunt Hattho archiepiscopus, Cuonradus 
et Gebehardus comites, ex parte Caroli Haschiricus episcopus et Odacar comes. Quid vero in eodem 
conventu seorsum sine presentia regis pertractatum sit, postea eventus rei luce clarius manifestavit.
77 See also chapter III.2.1.4.
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conflict between the Lotharingian king and the group around Reginar. Charles’ 
being invited to take part in the meeting allows us to conclude that his alliance 
with Reginar had not ended with his withdrawal from Lotharingia but continued 
on, and that he was considered as a power in his own right who needed to be 
involved in efforts to restore peace in the regnum. Charles’  actual influence on 
the proceedings at St Goar is impossible to discern. It would seem that no final 
peace was made with Zwentibold, as both kings met later that year at Cambrai to 
make peace.78 The conflict between Zwentibold and Reginar and his allies appears 
to have remained unresolved as well, since the king renewed his attacks on them 
at Durfos and soon after tried to have them excommunicated.79 Finally, it also 
appears highly unlikely that Charles took part in the negotiations over Zwenti-
bold’s future as Regino hints at in his phrasing.80 If he had been involved in these 
secret proceedings, and therefore had known that Zwentibold’s fate had already 
been decided upon, he would hardly have deemed it necessary to conclude a sepa-
rate treaty with him some time after. Hence, Charles appears to have played only 
a secondary role at St Goar, a conclusion further emphasised by the location of 
the meeting on the Rhine, the border between Lotharingia and the East Frankish 
kingdom, indicating that Zwentibold and Arnulf were the primary participants. 
For Charles, however, this probably hardly mattered. For him, the situation had 
changed completely. Now it was he who could take advantage of the others’  weak-
ness. While his anwer to Reginar’s and his allies’  call had brought him no immedi-
ate gain, it had not harmed his position either.
Having dealt with Charles’  first incursion into Lotharingia, we must now ad-
dress one of the central questions concerning his reign, his ambitions to add this 
regnum to his rule. Charles had a long history of relations with this region. Dur-
ing the years of the fight against Odo, Lotharingia had served as a refuge on more 
than one occasion; in 898, as we just have seen, Charles responded to Reginar’s 
appeal for aid; and in late 911 he finally acquired the regnum. Consequently, schol-
ars have often argued that Charles had a strong ambition to add the lands of his 
Carolingian ancestors to his realm.81 Since these ambitions would have had a ma-
jor impact on Charles’  politics, it seems necessary to reevaluate the arguments on 
which these conclusions are based and to compare Charles’  position in regard to 
Lotharingia with those of his predecessors.
“Count Reginar, however, went to King Charles and swearing his allegiance to 
him, he persuaded him and his fideles to invade Zwentibold’s realm.”82 According 
78 Annales Vedastini 899, 81.
79 Regino, Chronicon 899, 147.
80 For the connection between Regino’s phrasing and Zwentibold’s downfall, see for example Hart-
mann, Lotharingien, 136−137.
81 For example Parisse, Lotharingia, 313; Schneidmüller, Lothringenpolitik, 6−7; Bruand, Francie, 25; 
Koziol, Politics, 484.
82 Annales Vedastini 898, 80: Ragnerus vero comes venit ad regem Karolum et fidem ei promittens 
suasit illi atque suis fidelibus invadere regnum Zuendebolchi.
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to this report of the Annales Vedastini and the very similar one composed by Reg-
ino of Prüm,83 in 898 the initiative for Charles’  invasion of Lotharingia lay not 
with the king, but with Reginar Longneck. Reginar, until that moment one of the 
most influential nobles at Zwentibold’s court, had not only lost his position at 
the Lotharingian king’s side, but also been relieved of his honores and banned 
from the realm.84 That he turned to Charles is hardly surprising for a number of 
reasons. Relations between Charles and Zwentibold had probably been tense ever 
since the siege of Laon, when the alliance between the two kings quickly deterio-
rated before it finally broke over rumours that Charles was to be murdered,85 even 
if Charles was still able to seek refuge within Zwentibold’s realm. The tensity of 
their relation becomes apparent from one of Charles’  early diplomas, issued for 
the abbey of Saint-Mihiel close to Verdun.86 In this diploma, at the request of his 
mother, Charles granted property in the Verdunois and the Charpeigne to the 
monks. Charles’  grant was no more than a confirmation of an earlier diploma of 
Zwentibold issued about three years earlier at Trosly-Loire, west of Laon,87 at the 
time of Zwentibold’s campaign into the West Frankish realm. This can hardly be 
a coincidence. Given that Zwentibold’s diploma was issued either at a time when 
the two kings were allied or at least shortly after, it is most likely that Charles knew 
of the earlier grant. The monks of Saint-Mihiel had nothing to gain from a second 
grant of the same property made by a king who was not even their ruler. On the 
other hand, for Charles the issuance of the diploma made sense. By doing so, he 
could send Zwentibold a message that the events of Laon had not been forgotten 
and also that he was able to lure Zwentibold’s supporters from his side, just as 
the Lotharingian king had done with Charles’  allies Reginar and Baldwin. Saint-
Mihiel’s cooperation on this occasion can be easily explained: its abbot, Stephen, 
had strong ties not only to Charles himself, being related to him by marriage,88 but 
also to Archbishop Fulk, with whom he appears to have cooperated to become 
bishop.89 When Reginar sought aid against Zwentibold outside of Lotharingia, he 
could not only point to his earlier marriage to Charles’  sister—a rather weak ar-
gument, given that she had already died and that he had abandoned Charles at 
Laon—he could also count on their common enmity towards Zwentibold.
While Charles’  motives for invading Lotharingia can be partly sought in the 
fallout from events at Laon, his actions also reveal that he intended to make the 
most out of the opportunity presented to him by the invitation of Reginar and 
his allies. According to Regino, he marched to Aachen, then to Nijmegen before 
83 Regino, Chronicon 898, 146: Rege ab obsidione recedente prefati comites Carolum adeunt et eum 
cum exercitu in regnum introducunt.
84 Regino, Chronicon 898, 145. On Zwentibold’s turn against Reginar see Beumann, Kurswechsel.
85 Annales Vedastini 895, 76.
86 DChS 11 (13th February 898).
87 DZ 3 (14th August 895).
88 In DChS 81, 181, Stephen is adressed as nostre consanguinitati affinis dilectissimi by Charles, indi-
cating him being a relative by marriage.
89 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 7, 396.
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finally turning to Prüm.90 By taking control of the old Carolingian palaces, espe-
cially the one at Aachen, which was so closely associated with Charlemagne and 
Louis the Pious,91 he could legitimate his claim to rule over Lotharingia.92 His posi-
tion in the regnum, however, appears to have been rather isolated and limited to 
his alliance with the group around Reginar. The rest of the Lotharingian nobility 
seems to have either remained loyal to Zwentibold who was able to muster suf-
ficient force to confront Charles and bring about an armistice;93 or to have been 
oriented towards the East Frankish realm.94 This becomes apparent at the meeting 
of St Goar during the following year when Charles, as we have argued above, was 
not included in the negotiations between the Lotharingian nobles and Arnulf ’s 
legation concerning the deposition of Zwentibold. Charles’  retreat to the West 
and the subsequent treaty of Cambrai hence appear as the result of a realistic as-
sessment of his overall position in the regnum, leading to the conclusion that there 
was nothing to gain for the moment. This assessment probably also influenced his 
decision not to intervene in Lotharingia when the local nobles turned away from 
Zwentibold. When Zwentibald’s downfall had been decided upon at St Goar, it is 
likely that the future course of the regnum and its allegiance to the East Frankish 
ruler also had been determined at that moment.95
Regrettably, we lack corresponding narrative accounts for 911, the year when 
Charles finally acquired Lotharingia. Only the Annales Alemannici report that 
during this year, the leading Lotharingian nobles broke away from Louis’ reign, 
which, since the annals note Louis the Child’s death only in 912, seems to indicate 
that the Lotharingian nobles might have renounced Louis the Child as their king 
even before his death on 24th September 911.96 Whether this was the case or not, 
over a month appears to have passed until the question of succession was resolved. 
The Annales Prumienses note the 1st November as the start of Charles’  rule over 
90 Regino, Chronicon 898, 146.
91 On the importance of Aachen, see Falkenstein, Pfalz and Margue, Nous, 416−417.
92 Schneidmüller, Lothringenpolitik, 6−7.
93 Regino, Chronicon 898, 146.
94 Archbishop Ratbod of Trier originated from an Alemannian family, as did Bishop Robert of Metz 
while Bishop Baltram of Strasbourg came from Bavaria. The archbishop of Cologne was highly 
involved in the East by trying to incorporate the bishopric of Bremen into his archdiocese. Ad-
ditionally, several counts appear to have had interests across the border: Count Burchard, who had 
married Megingaud’s widow, appears to have held counties in both realms while the Matfrids held 
possessions in the Speyergau. Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 182.
95 Hauck, Ottonen, 49 and Hartmann, Lotharingien, 137 emphasise the influence of the Konradiner 
family over the future course of Lotharingia at this moment.
96 Annales Alamannici 911 and 912, 55: Hlotharium principes a Hludovico rege divisi. Parisot, 
Royaume 578−579, Sproemberg, Politik, 125–126, Mohr, Geschichte, 15 and Brühl, Deutschland, 
399−403 argue for a moment only after the death of Louis. Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 196–198, 
Schneidmüller Lothringenpolitik, 9−10, Bund, Thronsturz, 497 and Bauer, Lotharingien, 16, who 
we follow here, argue for a Königsverlassung despite the unreliability of the Annales Alamannici. 
Eckel, Charles, 94 gives the period from June to September 911.
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Lotharingia,97 which coincides with the time frame between 10th October and 27th 
November deduced by Philippe Lauer based on an analysis of Charles’  diplomas;98 
while Conrad’s coronation at Forchheim only took place between (probably) 7th 
and 10th November.99 However, Charles only arrived at Metz 1st January 912,100 
so over three months after Louis’  death and two after he had become king of Lo-
tharingia. For example in 869, Charles the Bald had quickly reacted to Lothar II’s 
death 6th August 869 at Piacenza and arrived at Metz already 5th of September.101 
Charles the Simple, it would seem, was simply not prepared to move towards the 
east, indicating that he was rather surprised by the events and hence was not di-
rectly involved in them.
Lotharingia submitting to Charles’  rule at that point indicates that some major 
changes had taken place since the earlier period. The first change was the rise of 
Reginar Longneck, who had become the most influential noble within Lotharingia 
over the course of Louis the Child’s reign.102 His rise had been directly tied to the 
death of Count Gebhard, who had been described by one of Louis’  diplomas as 
dux of Lotharingia,103 a rise that undoubtedly brought him in conflict with Geb-
hard’s family, the Konradiner, the family dominating the circle around the East 
Frankish king.104 In this conflict, Reginar was joined by the Matfrid family, whose 
attempt to extend their influence in Lotharingia had been thwarted by Louis and 
his allies.105 Two of the three major factions within the regnum would hence not 
support the succession of Conrad,106 and the third, the church of Trier, remained 
hesitant. Furthermore, a number of changes in important positions had taken 
place. At Liège, one of Charles’  relatives, Stephen,107 had become bishop. The lat-
ter, formerly abbot of Saint-Mihiel, had also been close to the Matfrid family,108 
a connection he now undoubtedly brought into Charles’  new network.109 In ad-
 97 Annales Prumienses, 1292, mistakenly recording Louis instead of Charles: Eodem etiam anno 
Ludowicus rex regnum Lotharii suscepit Kal. Nov. Becher, Von den Karolingern, 254 speaks of an 
“open situation.”
 98 Lauer, Recueil Charles, LXXXVI.
 99 Brühl, Deutschland, 399 and 403 with n. 298.
100 DChS 69. DDChS 67 and 68 (20th December 911) give a villa Cruztiaco, which probably was 
located in Alsace or the Saarland. See Kienast, Vasallität, 520.
101 Annales Bertiniani 869, 156−157.
102 On these developments, see chapter III.2.1.4.
103 DLCh 20, 126: … Kebehart, dux regni qui a multis Hlotharii dicitur…
104 On their position, see Offergeld, Reges pueri, 547−555.
105 Parisot, Royaume, 569; Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 191.
106 On Conrad’s succession, see Becher, Von den Karolingern, esp. 254−255. According to him, Con-
rad was elected since he was a member of the dominating group.
107 DChS 81, 181: Interventu Stepheni venerabilis Tungrorum episcopi, nostre consanguinitati affinis 
delectissimi.
108 DLCh 57, 184, names Stephen ipsius [Count Gerhard] proximus affini, pointing to a kinship by 
marriage between him and the Matfrid family.
109 The earliest contact between Charles and Stephen is probably marked by DChS 65 for the church 
of Liège, dating to 912−915 (against Lauer (911−915) and Font-Réaulx, Diplômes, 43 (912−913). 
The diploma using the rex Francorum, yet without the vir illustris, it probably dates after 12th 
April 912, the last time the rex Francorum, vir illustris is preserved. Why Font-Réaulx would 
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dition, Bishop Dodilo of Cambrai who had always followed a more independent 
policy110 and supported Zwentibold against Charles,111 had been succeeded by an-
other Stephen. This new bishop was seemingly more cooperative, being among the 
first to receive a diploma from Charles.112 Stephen of Cambrai also represents yet 
another group of nobles who had earlier on belonged to Zwentibold’s network but 
then lost their influence under Louis the Child’s reign—nobles that now joined 
Charles’  side.113
Hence, within Lotharingia there were a number of factions that would opt for 
Charles for different reasons: rivalry with the Konradiner, personal relations with 
Charles, dissatisfaction with their own influence at court. These different factions 
prepared the field for Charles and provided him with the support necessary not 
only to take over the rule, but also to defend it against the Konradiner attempts 
to regain control over the regnum or at least over some of its parts. Two of these 
attempts can be traced by the Annales Alamannici: a first encounter between the 
two kings appears to have taken place close to Strasbourg, where Conrad issued 
a diploma in March 912,114 when both kings seem to have concluded a treaty.115 
However, since the annals refer to a breach of faith around the same time, this 
treaty appears not to have lasted long and was followed by an attack of Conrad 
on Aachen.116 Meanwhile, at Strasbourg a strong pro-Carolingian party appears 
to have existed—maybe the reason why Conrad had moved there: to maintain 
control over the city. With Conrad’s absence from Strasbourg, Charles’  allies in 
the south appear to have become active, attacking and devastating the city,117 albeit 
without being able to hold it: Conrad returned there in March 913.118 Nevertheless, 
within Strasbourg, the pro-Carolingian party seems to have won the upper hand. 
After the inhabitants had killed Bishop Otbert, they elected Charles’  nephew 
Gauzfrid.119 Gauzfrid died soon after and was replaced with Ricuin, a Lotharingian 
noble who in 916 at the synod of Hohenaltheim, while himself being absent, was 
consider 913 to be the latest possible year during which the diploma was delivered is not clear. 915 
corresponds with the year of Reginar Longneck’s death at whose request the diploma was issued).
110 See Archbishop Fulk’s remarks against him. Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 390 and 392.
111 DZ 23. See also Schieffer, Kanzlei, 32 and Bauer, Lotharingien, 106. Bauer refuses Schieffer’s as-
sumption that the diploma reflects Dodilo’s aid for Zwentibold against Charles, but agrees on it 
being aimed against the king of the Western realm.
112 Vercauteren, Note, 102. Vercauteren also brings forward the hypothesis that it was Charles who 
installed Stephen on the siege of Cambrai. While this may indeed be possible, considering that 
Cambrai was part of the archdiocese of Reims, it cannot be further proven.
113 See chapter III.2.1.4.
114 DKoI 5.
115 Annales Alamannici 912, 188: Karolus in Alsatia et Chonradus in Hlodarios et facta fide ficta 
Chuonratus in Hlodarios iterum usque ad Aquas et Hlodariique in Argentinam civitatem eaque 
vastata et conbusta est.
116 Annales Alamannici 912, 188.
117 Annales Alamannici 912, 188.
118 DKoI 17 and Annales Alamannici 913, 190: Iterum Chuonradus cum exercitu regnum Hlutharin­
gorum ingressus est.
119 Dümmler, Geschichte III, 593 with n. 1.
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accused by Conrad’s supporters of being elected uncanonically,120 which seems 
to indicate that he as well prefered to side with Charles.121 The loss of Strasbourg 
also marked the end of Conrad’s efforts to regain control over at least parts of Lo-
tharingia. It is clear that local support played a central role in Charles’  success in 
taking over and defending Lotharingia.
However, the question remains as to whether Charles pursued an active policy 
to influence conditions in his favour. Given the lack of narrative accounts, we have 
to rely on the reconstruction of the chronology to draw any conclusions. As we 
have seen, a rather long period of time passed between Louis’  death and Charles’ 
arrival in his new regnum, indicating that he was not prepared to act quickly. This 
is not to say that Charles was not using his contacts within the Lotharingian nobil-
ity to influence their decision in his favour, yet, nevertheless, the initiative appears 
to have lain with the nobles, not with him.122
The events of 898 and of 911 follow the same pattern: Lotharingian nobles 
approached Charles and offered him the rule over the regnum, a call to which 
Charles reacted positively, ready to defend his claim. The circumstance that the 
nobles took the initiative does not mean that Charles did not carry any ambitions 
towards Lotharingia, however. Quite the contrary, the nobles turning to him was 
undoubtedly due to the fact that they expected a positive response from his side. 
However, the question is how grand his ambitions actually were. In this context, 
a number of arguments have been brought forward. Based on Charles’  itinerary 
and the number of Lotharingian nobles in his diplomas after the acquisition of the 
regnum, it has been assumed that Charles felt a deep attachment to the lands of 
his ancestors.123 This seems problematic for two reasons. First, how, based on the 
sources we have, can we distinguish between sojourns and contacts motivated by 
personal attachment and those necessitated by political circumstances? Second, 
as we have argued in the previous chapter, setting aside the times when those 
stays were definitely due to political necessities, contacts with Lotharingia appear 
to been on a reasonable level, while those with nobles from the Western realm 
remained stable.124
Another argument is based on the genealogy dictated by Charles to the can-
ons of Saint-Corneille of Compiègne.125 According to Geoffrey Koziol “its details 
are unmistakably oriented to Charles’  Lotharingian aspirations. Thus, while not-
120 MGH Conc. VI, N° 1, 34. According to Fuhrmanns commentary (MGH Conc. VI, 1−2), it ap-
pears that the Frankish and Swabic bishops dominated the synod of Hohenaltheim. See also 
Büttner, Heinrich, 10−11.
121 On these events, see Bührer-Thierry, Évêques, 191−194.
122 See also Eckel, Charles, 94, Parisot, Royaume, 576–581 (who argues that the Lotharingian nobles 
saw in Charles the last Carolingian and therefore their legitimate king), Sproemberg, Politik, 125; 
Büttner, Heinrich, 10 and Mohr, Geschichte, 15. Only Büttner, Geschichte, 147 sees the initiative 
on Charles’ side.
123 Schneidmüller, Lothringenpolitik, 12−13.
124 See chapters III.1.1, III.2.1.5 and III.2.1.6.
125 Witger, Genealogia.
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ing all Louis the German’s sons, it only traces the descent of Carloman, through 
whom Lotharingia passed via Arnulf to Zwentibold and Louis the Child. Fur-
ther attesting to Charles’  insistence on legitimacy, it also notes Zwentibold’s 
illegitimacy.”126 While the genealogy indeed only follows Carloman’s lineage and 
ignores the offspring of Louis the German’s other sons, this has nothing to do 
with any Lotharingian aspirations on Charles’  side. Indeed, there is a far simpler 
explanation for why the genealogy is constructed the way it is: it is focused on the 
West Frankish lineage, which is described in large detail, naming all the offspring 
of the successive rulers including the names and titles of their mothers. All the 
other lineages only name those sons who were crowned rulers, ignoring daugh-
ters and illegitimate children.127 Also, while the genealogy does mention Zwenti-
bold’s birth by a concubine—indeed revealing Charles’  sense of  legitimacy—this 
is hardly a sign that he claimed Lotharingia. By naming Zwentibold, Charles 
added him to those he acknowledged not only as belonging to the family, but also 
as a legitimate ruler.
In the context of Charles’  Lotharingian ambitions, Koziol furthermore points 
to the names of Charles own illegitimate offspring, his sons Arnulf and Drogo, 
both carrying names “distinctive to the Lotharingian side of his family.”128 Both 
names certainly have a Lotharingian touch, as their first bearers had been Arnulf, 
the Carolingian progenitor, and Drogo, an illegitimate son of Charlemagne, both 
of whom had been bishops of Metz. However, in both cases there are alternative 
readings. According to Karl Ferdinand Werner, of seventeen illegitimate sons of 
Carolingian rulers, four were called Arnulf, three Hugh and two Drogo, while 
all other names only appear once.129 While there certainly were other potential 
choices, as is shown by the name of Charles’  third son, Rorico, Arnulf in particular 
appears to have been a far too common choice of name to use as an argument for 
Lotharingian aspirations on Charles’  side. In the case of Drogo—his name be-
ing rather uncommon—it is worth pointing out another possible reason. The first 
bearer of this name was bishop of Metz and one of Louis the Pious most important 
advisors130 and it might have been that Charles hoped for his illegitimate son to oc-
cupy a similar role under his own, yet unborn, heir,131 although this has to remain 
mere speculation.
While the sources thus do not provide any further insight into Charles’  ac-
tual ambitions, it is worth comparing his endeavours to acquire Lotharingia with 
those of his brothers. As we have noted above, the western part of the regnum, 
126 Koziol, Politics, 480 with n. 84.
127 See chapter III.1.3.
128 Koziol, Canons, 176 and Koziol, Politics, 480 and 484. 
129 Werner, Nachkommen, 418. 
130 On him, see Pfister, Drogon, and Depreux, Prosopographie, 163−167.
131 Becher, Arnulf, 667, concerning Charles the Bald’s choice to name one of his twins by Richilde 
Drogo.
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which Charles the Bald had acquired for himself in the treaty of Meersen,132 had 
fallen to Louis the Younger in the wake of his intervention in the Western realm. 
On two occasions, these sons made efforts to regain control of this area which had 
apparently been intended to revert to them upon Louis the Younger’s death.133 
Louis, on the one hand, refused the Lotharingian nobles who were trying to com-
mend themselves to him, but, on the other hand, sent an army to the regnum 
under Count Theoderic of Vermandois, one of his most important advisors, sup-
posedly to protect Lotharingia from the Northmen. This, however, was probably 
not the only reason. By showing his face in Lotharingia and demonstrating his 
willingness to act in a royal manner by fighting the Vikings, he ensured that his 
claim on his father’s part of Lotharingia remained visible. While he did not want 
to jeopardise the cooperation established between the various Carolingian rulers 
by acting without the consent of the new East Frankish ruler, Charles the Fat, he 
nevertheless betrayed his ambition to regain the lost territory. After Louis’  death, 
it fell to his brother Carloman to secure his father’s heritage. Under his rule, Hugh 
the Abbot sought out Charles the Fat to remind him of the treaty his father had 
concluded and to have the western part of Lotharingia returned to him. Like 
Charles the Simple, his brothers Louis and Carloman had strong ambitions to 
re-acquire parts of Lotharingia. In the light of these earlier developments, it even 
seems possible that the new addition to the dating clauses of Charles’  diplomas, 
the largiore vero hereditate indepta (“attaining [his] larger inheritance”), did not so 
much refer to a general claim based on him being the last remaining Carolingian 
king, but rather to a very specific one, based on the fact that at least the western 
part of Lotharingia had belonged to his father and should never have remained 
part of the East Frankish realm. This is of course highly speculative, yet given 
Charles’  highly developed sense for history and legitimacy134 it may not be too 
far fetched to assume that these thoughts may have played a role in the creation 
of the dating formula. Be that as it may, Charles appears to have carried the same 
ambitions as his brothers, the main difference being the means he was able and 
willing to use.
The treaty of Bonn
As with Lotharingia, the context of Charles’  ambitions also plays a central role in 
the assessment of his last treaty135 with another ruler, Henry the Fowler, the treaty 
of Bonn concluded in November 921. The text of the treaty itself, preserved in the 
West Frankish version,136 is rather short, consisting of only four chapters. The first 
132 MGH Capit. II, N° 250, 191−192.
133 See chapter IV.2.
134 Koziol, Politics, e.g. 479−481 and 498.
135 While it is difficult to imagine that Charles did not meet other rulers between 899 and 921, the 
few sources we have remain silent. 
136 MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
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of them gives the time and place of the meeting, the second and third the recipro-
cal promises of an amicitia between the two kings, and the fourth names the wit-
nesses. Very much like the meeting at Cambrai, the meeting at Bonn—actually on 
the Rhine itself—was at the border between the regna of the rulers, demonstrating 
the equality of Charles and Henry. This equality is also portrayed in the text itself, 
addressing both kings with very similar titles: Charles is the domnus et glorio-
sissimus rex Francorum occidentalium, Henry the domnus et magnificentissimus 
rex Francorum orientalium, which emphasises that both rulers were considered 
as Frankish kings of the same rank.137 This negation of the difference between the 
Carolingian Charles and the non-Carolingian Henry has often been interpreted 
by scholars as a “defeat” for Charles who, by this treaty, would have had to give up 
any plans of restoring the old Frankish empire, as well as the claim of being supe-
rior to his East Frankish neighbour.138 This reading depends on two assumptions: 
that Charles indeed attempted to extend his realm in the east and that he did not 
acknowledge Henry as his equal.
In this context, Charles’  new title after the acquisition of Lotharingia has often 
been read as a sign of his imperial ambitions, with the rex Francorum expressing 
not only his claim on Lotharingia, but also on the Eastern realm.139 Herwig Wolf-
ram, on the other hand, pointed out that rex Francorum might indeed have had a 
different meaning. According to him, rex Francorum drew its meaning much less 
from Charlemagne than from the union of the old Carolingian core lands between 
Seine and Rhine, Francia. Read in this context, the new title would hence not 
express a claim on the Eastern realm but a “voluntary self-restraint.”140 Given the 
ambiguity of the new title, it is best to analyse whether Charles made any efforts 
to extend his rule over the East Frankish realm. Two episodes are most revealing 
about this issue. After the acquisition of Lotharingia, Charles successfully man-
aged to install his own candidate in the see of Strasbourg, thus securing the city 
against Conrad I,141 a policy that has been read as a sign that he attempted to add 
137 See also Ehlers, Anfänge, 30−31.
138 Voss, Herrschertreffen, 47, Schneidmüller, Lothringenpolitik, 17 (“Insgesamt gesehen war der 
Bonner Vertrag eine Niederlage Karls, der trotz hervorragender Titel Heinrich  I. und seinen 
 linksrheinischen Besitz anerkennen musste”), Brühl, Deutschland, 434.
139 In different degrees Tellenbach, Tradition 191; Schieffer, Rheinische Lande, 12−13; Folz, Idée, 
54−55; Mohr, Geschichte 15−16; Schneidmüller, Tradition, 132−134; Werner, Origines, 450; Brühl, 
Deutschland, 161; Bauer, Lotharingian; 17, Jarnut, Konrad, 270 and Schneider, Suche, 120. Ehlers, 
who first also followed this interpretation (Ehlers, Tradition), more recently promoted a different 
view. Ehlers, Geschichte, 21−22 and Anfänge, 26−27.
140 Wolfram, Herrschertitel, 123−124 and Ehlers, Anfänge, 26–27 and Geschichte, 21. On the various 
possible meanings of Francia see Brühl, Deutschland, 83−130, who provides a detailed study of 
the sources and also offers an overview of older studies. On the longevity of the usage of Francia 
for Lotharingia, see Ewig, Beobachtungen, 349−356; Goetz, Perception, 122 and Margue, Nous, 
397. As Lugge, Gallia, 55−56 has shown, Lothar II and Zwentibold were sometimes addressed as 
rex Francorum. Similar also Margue, Nous, 398, for Otto I and Henry II.
141 See above.
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Alsace, belonging to the East Frankish realm, to his rule.142 However, Alsace was 
one of the “Bruchlinien” mentioned by Jens Schneider,143 a region on the border 
between Lotharingia and the East whose status was ambiguous.144 Charles’  efforts 
to gain control over this region were hence based on a maximalist interpretation 
of the borders of Lotharingia and were not an endeavour to extend his rule over 
the East Frankish realm.
The second episode directly preceeds the treaty of Bonn and sees Charles at-
tacking in the area of Worms. According to the continuator of Regino’s chronicle, 
Charles, by this attack, wanted to usurp Alsace, the parts of Francia along the 
Rhine, and Mainz.145 The reliability of this account seems problematic. He mis-
dates the event to 923 and fails to put the attack in its proper context by claiming 
to have had insight into the king’s motivation for the attack. In fact, Charles’  cam-
paign was only the response to a preceeding intervention by Henry in Lotharing-
ian affairs. When Charles advanced against Reginar Longneck’s son Gislebert in 
late 919, according to Richer of Saint-Remi, the latter fled to Henry’s court.146 It 
seems safe to assume that early in 920, when Charles had been abandoned by the 
West Frankish counts, Henry supported Gislebert’s return to Lotharingia. Dur-
ing the same time he was furthermore involved in the succession of Liège, where, 
as Charles’  letter to the bishops of the realm claims, he pressured Archbishop 
Hermann of Cologne into ordaining Gislebert’s ally Hilduin as bishop.147 Hence, 
Charles’  advance against Henry was hardly due to an ambition to extend his rule 
over the East Frankish realm but a reaction to Henry’s attempts to increase his 
influence within Lotharingia during a moment of Charles being vulnerable. This is 
of course not to say that Charles might not have harboured any hopes to do so and, 
given how he acquired Lotharingia.148, it seems indeed highly likely that if such an 
opportunity had presented itself to him he would have seized it. Yet, despite any 
claims indicated by his new title, his actual policies do not betray any claims over 
more than Lotharingia.
The very circumstance that Charles made no attempt to extent his rule to the 
East does not mean that he did not claim a superior status to Henry based on 
his Carolingian heritage. As we have argued in the previous chapter,149 Charles 
possessed a strongly developed sense of legitimacy when it came to his own fam-
ily, yet this same sense did not carry over into a special emphasis of his heritage 
142 Schneidmüller, Lothringenpolitik, 14−1,5 n. 105.
143 Schneider, Suche, 108. See chapter III.2.1.4.
144 See also Zotz, Elsass.
145 Continuatio Reginonis 923, 157: Karolus Alsatiam et partes illas Franciae iuxta Rhenum usque 
 Mogontiam sibi usurpaturus usque Paternisheim villam iuxta Wormaciae hostiliter pervenit. Unde 
 fidelibus regis Heinrici Wormaciae coadunatis aliter, quam decuerat regem, aufugit. Charles’ at-
tack in the vicinity of Worms is also confirmed by Flodoard, Annales 920, 3.
146 Richer, Historiae I, c. 37−38, 71−73.
147 MGH Conc. VI, N° 2, c. 2, 45.
148 See below.
149 See chapter III.2.1.4.
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within royal diplomas in comparison to those of his predecessors. To determine 
how Charles perceived the non-Carolingian Henry, it is best to evaluate the ways 
Charles dealt with other non-Carolingian rulers before the treaty of Bonn. As we 
have seen, Charles had already allied himself with two of these rulers during the 
years of his fight against Odo, Emperor Lambert of Spoleto and Rudolf of Upper 
Burgundy. The entry made at Remiremont records Karolus rex iuuenis, Lanbertus 
imperator and Rodolfus rex, making, apart from the emphasis on Charles’  youth, 
no distinction between the three rulers.150 Furthermore, Charles’  contact to Em-
peror Berengar needs to be mentioned. A letter from Pope John X to Archbishop 
Hermann of Cologne concerning the succession at Liège indicates that Berengar 
intervened for Charles’  candidate Richer in front of Pope John X,151 most probably 
at Charles’  request even if the letter itself fails to mention this circumstance.152 Be-
rengar was a logical choice if Charles wanted someone to represent his interests at 
the papal court. John and Berengar entertained good relations with each other that 
had already resulted in an alliance between the two probably in late 914 and Beren-
gar’s coronation as emperor by the pope a year later.153 By the time of the dispute 
at Liège, both cooperated against a certain Hubert who appears to have been in 
conflict with the church of Rome.154 Berengar as a son of Louis the Pious’ daughter 
Gisela155 had Carolingian blood himself, yet in how far this influenced the relation 
between him and Charles stands open to debate—he does not appear in the ge-
nealogy of the Carolingians dictated by Charles to the canons of Compiègne.156 In 
any case, Berenger intervening in favour of Charles’  candidate indicates that the 
two of them were probably also on good terms with each other. Nothing further 
is known about this contact, yet it seems reasonable to assume that Berengar’s 
lack of a Carolingian father again did not considerably determine their relation. 
Finally, Charles’  handling of his own non-Carolingian predecessor Odo needs to 
be taken in consideration. As mentioned, there are only four mentions of Odo 
in Charles’  diplomas, in addition to a number of dating clauses early in his reign 
reading in successione Odonis (“in succession to Odo”).157 Three of these mentions 
are confirmations of diplomas issued by King Odo (Odo rex)158 while the fourth is 
to include Odo in a memorial service ordered by Charles.159 While some of these 
mentions were most likely due to the influence of Odo’s brother Robert, at least on 
one occasion Charles confirmed one of his predecessor’s diplomas without Robert 
150 Liber Memorialis Remiremont, fol. 11v, 21. 
151 MGH Conc. VI, N° 3, letter A, 54.
152 Zimmermann, Streit, 26.
153 Zimmermann, Papstregesten, N° 33, 11 and N° 38−40, 13.
154 MGH Conc. VI, N° 3, letter B, 56.
155 On Berengar’s family and career, see Feller, Exercice, 130−132.
156 Witger, Genealogia.
157 DDChS 13, 14, 19, 20 and 22−26.
158 DDChS 60, 75 and 105.
159 DChS 49, 109: …et ipsa die in memoriam nostri et Odonis regis atque Rotberti praedecessorumque 
eorum…
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being present.160 The Remiremont entry, Charles’  dealing with Berengar as well as 
his diplomas hence show no signs of Charles claiming any kind of superiority over 
non-Carolingian rulers. Charles dealing with Henry the Fowler as a peer seems to 
be in line with his general policy.
With the reading of the treaty of Bonn as a defeat for Charles dismissed, a new 
assessment based on the political circumstances can be attempted. For Charles, 
the treaty came at the end of a development which had started with the confronta-
tion with the Western nobles at Soissons in early 920. After they had finally come 
to a settlement, he moved to Lotharingia, coming to an accord with Count Gisle-
bert, who had taken the opportunity to have himself elected princeps in Charles’ 
absence. Charles then went on to attack Worms which was, according to Regino’s 
continuator, a futile attempt. The following year saw Charles active in Lotharingia 
again, neutralising Gislebert’s ally Count Ricuin of Verdun before concluding a 
truce with Henry.161 In the context of the unresolved conflict with Gislebert and 
his allies—shortly after the treaty of Bonn Charles again attacked the count162—
the amicitia with Henry gains new importance. First, Henry acknowledged that 
Lotharingia was under Charles’  rule,163 thus securing the regnum from further 
incursions of the East Frankish king. Second, Charles undercut Gislebert’s alli-
ance with Henry by making his own alliance with the East Frankish king.164 The 
treaty of Bonn, despite lacking any precise agreements about further cooperation, 
considerably increased Charles’  room for manoeuvre, allowing him to pursue an 
aggressive policy against Gislebert. Similarly, the treaty also allowed Henry to con-
centrate on his unresolved internal problems with Burchard of Swabia and espe-
cially Arnulf of Bavaria, who had not yet acknowledged Henry as king.165 However, 
the treaty should not be reduced to a mere tactical measure for both sides. Charles 
and Henry did indeed intend to cooperate on a wider scale. In 922, a synod assem-
bled at Koblenz, organised by the two kings.166 With Coblenz being located within 
Lotharingia, it seems that originally an assembly far larger than the one that actu-
ally took place had been intended, for only Archbishop Hermann of Cologne was 
present from Charles’  side. By the time of the synod, the rebellion of the West 
160 DChS 60 for Notre-Dame de La Grasse.
161 We turn to these conflicts in detail in chapter VI.2.
162 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7.
163 Brühl, Deutschland, 434.
164 On the bond created by an amicitia, see Althoff, Amicitia and Epp, Amicitia.
165 Büttner, Heinrich, 18−20.
166 MGH Conc. VI, N° 4, 57−74, here 68: Anno dominicae incarnationis DCCCCXXII apud Confluen­
tiam iussu venerabilium principum, Karoli videlicet et Heinrici regum reverentissimorum, congre­
gati sunt episcopi numero VIII: Herimannus Agrippinae archiepiscopus, Herigerus  Mogontiae ar­
chiepiscopus, Thiado Wirziburgensis, Liutharius Mimidanensis, Dodo Osnebruggensis, Richgauwo 
Wormaciensis, Rihwinus Strazburgensis, Vnwano Paderbrunnensis cum abbatibus aliisque sacri 
ordinis viris quam plurimis.
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Frankish nobles had probably already commenced, so that Charles and his allies’ 
focus was drawn away from the meeting.167
However, this rebellion also demonstrates the limits of the new cooperation 
between the two kings. Some time after Robert’s coronation, he and Robert met at 
the Ruhr, in turn concluding an amicitia.168 In the wake of this amicitia, it is proba-
ble that an entry in the Liber Memorialis of Remiremont was created, featuring not 
only Robert and Henry, but also King Rudolf II of Upper Burgundy,169 which dem-
onstrates how quickly Robert’s kingship was acknowledged by other rulers and 
reveals how well he was connected even beyond the borders of the West Frankish 
realm. Karl Schmid, based on a number of other entries in the Liber Memorialis, 
has managed to cast some light on the background of this amicitia. In the wake of 
the death of a certain Count Guntram 25th December 921, a considerable number 
of nobles from the West and East Frankish realms as well as Lotharingia appear to 
have met at Remiremont to memorate the deceased. Among these nobles, Schmid 
identified not only Robert’s son Hugh the Great, but also the sons of Richard the 
Justiciar as well as members of the Konradiner and other important East Frank-
ish noble families.170 If Schmid’s identifications are correct, Robert possessed in-
fluential allies at Henry’s court, most importantly members of the Konradiner 
family.171 The Konradiner in turn, as we have seen, had lost their leading position 
in Lotharingia when it had fallen to Charles172 and it seems likely that they now 
mediated between Henry and Robert to loosen the West Frankish control over 
the regnum. However, the strength of this network should not be overemphasised 
either. Henry did not come to Charles aid, although, according to Widukind, the 
latter had asked him for his support, sending him a relic of Saint Dionysos after the 
lost battle of Soissons,173 probably a reference to the treaty of Bonn where they had 
sworn their oaths on relics.174 Yet, neither did Henry intervene on Robert’s behalf. 
Thus, Henry’s treaty with Robert is strongly reminiscent of Arnulf acknowledg-
ing both Odo and Charles as rulers and in fact the amicitia between the two may 
167 MGH Conc. VI, N° 4, 57−58.
168 Flodoard, Annales 922, 12. On the identification of the river with the Ruhr, see Büttner, Heinrich, 
26, arguing for a meeting at the border between Lotharingia and the East Frankish realm.
169 Liber Memorialis Remiremont, fol. 6v, 9: …Einricus rex … Ruodulfus rex … Ruotbertus rex…
170 Schmid, Quellen, 130−138.
171 Schmid, Quellen, 132 and 136.
172 Chapter III.2.1.5.
173 Widukind, Res gestae I, c. 33, 45−46: Quando vero rex Renum transierat ad dilatandum super 
Lotharios imperium suum, occurrit ei legatus Karoli, et salutato eo verbis humillimis: ‘Dominus 
meus’, inquit, ‘Karolus, regia quondam potestate preditus, modo privatus, misit me ad te demand­
ans, quia nichil ei ab inimicis circumvento iocundius, nichil dulcius esse possit quam de tui magnif­
ici profectus gloria aliquid audire, fama virtutum tuarum consolari. Et hoc tibi signum fidei et veri­
tatis transmisit’ ; protulitque de sinu manum preciosi martyris Dionisii auro gemmisque inclusam. 
‘Hoc’, inquit ‘habeto pignus foederis perpetui et amoris vicarii…’ The episode is later repeated by 
Thietmar of Merseburg, Chronicon I, c. 23, 30, in a slightly modified version, making Henry sav-
ing Charles. On Thietmar’s depiction of Henry as Charles’ nepos, see Eckhardt, Funde, 14−19.
174 Schmid, Quellen, 141−142. MGH Const. I, N° 1, c. 2, 1.
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not have meant more than Henry recognising Robert as king. While the treaty of 
Bonn had not brought a new age of cooperation for Charles, it had at least secured 
Henry’s neutrality.
Thus, two different phases of Charles’  relations with other rulers can be dis-
tinguished: before and after he became sole ruler of the Western realm. Before 
898, as with Odo, the acknowledgment of his new rank by other rulers played 
a certain role, yet in contrast to Odo, this role was of rather minor importance. 
Charles’  own claim was strong enough that further legitimation was a bonus, not 
a necessity. Instead, his relations were marked by his need for actual material sup-
port, weakening his position in negotiations and forcing him to make significant 
concessions to his potential partners. However, once became sole ruler this image 
changes radically and Charles became the first West Frankish ruler since Charles 
the Bald who was able to exploit opportunities presented to him by conflicts be-
tween neighbouring rulers and their nobility. In this context, comparison with his 
brother Louis III, who had refrained from doing so, allows insight into the way the 
possibilities and limits of royal power in regard to relations to other rulers differed 
between the various rulers. Where his brother had had to take into considera-
tion the impact of his actions on the cooperation established between him and 
the other Carolingian kings, Charles was at liberty to pursue his own interests. 
However, at the same time Charles also missed out on the stabilising effects such 
cooperation could have had on his position. When the tide began to turn and his 
own rule was weakened by a number of conflicts with the nobles, it was Henry 
the Fowler who took the opportunity presented to him by intervening in Charles’ 
realm. Charles, as it seems, was very well aware of this problem and its potential 
effect on his own rule. His reaction was the treaty of Bonn, a treaty that aimed at 
preventing Henry from intervening in West Frankish affairs, but also at establish-
ing a new cooperation from which Charles, if need should arise, could draw fur-
ther support. Therefore, Bonn seems like an attempt to revive the period following 
the treaty of Fouron, increasing Charles’  room for manoeuvre in relations with 
his nobles while limiting his possibilities to exploit opportunities to extend his 
rule—a price he seems to have paid willingly, given that there is no indication he 
had ambitions to do so even before the treaty.
IV.5 Conclusion
A number of factors determined the possibilities and limits of royal power when 
dealing with other rulers. First, the strength of a ruler’s claim to the throne had 
a large impact on their relations with others. This is especially apparent in Odo’s 
case, as his claim’s weakness made it necessary for him to seek Arnulf ’s acknowl-
edgement as another source of legitimation to strengthen his position within the 
West Frankish realm. In this context, the support of the nobles for a ruler also 
played a crucial role. Charles the Simple, in need of allies, had to acknowledge 
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Arnulf ’s superiority in rank and had to make further concessions, just as Odo 
did. If a lack of support turned into open conflict between the king and the nobles, 
situations were created that gave other rulers the opportunity to intervene in these 
conflicts. This could of course work both ways: while the succession question in 
the West Frankish realm after Louis the Stammerer’s death, as well as the rebel-
lion against Odo and the conflict between Charles the Simple and Gislebert led to 
interventions from Louis the Younger, Arnulf, Zwentibold and Henry the Fowler, 
Charles the Simple profited from conflicts within Lotharingia and the East Frank-
ish realm to extend his rule over the neighbouring regnum. However, the success 
of such interventions depended not only on the weakness of the opposition, but 
most of all on the support the intervening ruler could muster himself. Charles 
was only able to acquire Lotharingia when a large number of nobles from the 
regnum turned to him. However, relations between the various rulers were not 
only marked by rivalry and attempts to extend their influence. On the contrary, 
the treaty of Fouron between Louis the Stammerer and Louis the Younger shows 
strong signs that it was aimed at a large scale cooperation, including the attempt 
to prevent nobles from seeking support in neighbouring kingdoms against their 
rulers. This very same cooperation was then realised under Louis III and Carlo-
man II against the threat posed by Boso of Vienne. However, while strengthening 
their position against Boso considerably, this alliance also had its downside, as it 
prevented Louis and Carloman from pursuing their interests in the western part 
of Lotharingia against Charles the Fat. Unhindered by such restrictions, Charles 
the Simple was able to acquire the regnum, yet he also lacked the support he could 
have drawn on from a similar alliance during his last years—a situation he tried 
to ameliorate with the treaty of Bonn. In the end, the necessity for such alliances 
depended on the support the king received from his nobles. If these relations were 
strong, such cooperation was unnecessary. If they were weak, they could serve the 
king in the ensuing conflicts.
V. The Viking problem
When Charles the Simple became king, Viking warbands had already been raiding 
Frankish shores for over a century. In the 790s, small groups had started ravaging 
trading centres and monasteries.1 The overall size of these groups started increas-
ing from the 840s onwards, soon ranging up to armies of several thousand men.2 
At the same time, the number of active groups increased, with the Vikings from 
then on attacking several places simultaneously and penetrating the continent 
deeper and deeper via the rivers while ranging on horseback into the countryside.3 
Instead of returning home after each campaign, they now remained in the country, 
erecting secure camps for their ships and themselves to pass the winter months, 
which indicates their high level of organisation.4 In the late 860s in England, one 
of these groups grew even more in strength, forming what is now known as the 
“Great Army.” When the resistance organised by King Alfred became stronger and 
the army suffered a defeat at Edington, this army turned towards the continent, 
arriving on the Scheldt in 879.5
However, one hundred years of ravaging and plundering also meant that there 
had been one hundred years of contact between the Northmen and the Franks. 
From the early 9th century onwards, Viking leaders were present at Frankish royal 
courts and pledged their allegiance to Frankish rulers.6 Almost all of them became 
Christian, baptism in combination with godparenthood not only serving to estab-
lish peace, but also to create a personal bond between the parties involved, put-
ting the baptised in an inferior position to his godfather.7 In most cases, these ties 
proved to be effective, with the respective Northmen becoming loyal supporters 
of the kings whose courts they had joined.8 However, these cases only represent a 
small part of the contacts that existed between the Vikings and the Franks: both 
sides treated with each other and exchanged emissaries, treaties were concluded 
1 The standard work on the Viking incursions is still Musset, Invasions. Since then (but also before) 
an abundance of studies have been published. Most important for our own work are Sawyer, Welt; 
D’Haenens, Invasions; Zettel, Bild; Searle, Kinship; Boyer, Vikings; Lund, Allies; Bauduin, Nor-
mandie; Baudin, Monde and Mohr, Wissen. Collections of articles include Bauduin, Fondations; 
Flambard Héricher, Progression and Pierre, Naissance. A good overview is offered by Coupland, 
Vikings.
2 For the number of ships reported by the sources, see Coupland, Vikings, 194. On the Viking ships 
and the number of men they carried, see D’Haenens, Invasions, 69−72 and Bill, Navires, 41. On 
the organisation of the Viking bands, see Mohr, Wissen, 198−204.
3 Coupland, Vikings, 195−196. A good example is the Loire, where Viking attacks are reported at 
Nantes in 843, at Tours in 853, Orléans in 856 and at Fleury in 865.
4 Musset, Invasions, 209.
5 Coupland, Vikings, 194−195. On the Great Army, see also Mestdagh, Vikingen and McLeod, 
Beginning.
6 Coupland, Poachers.
7 Lynch, Godparents, 169−192 and Coviaux, Baptême, 71−75.
8 Coupland, Poachers.
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and efforts were made to convert the Northmen.9 In fact, as Pierre Bauduin argues, 
the Northmen were increasingly integrated into Frankish society, with their lead-
ers entering into competition with the elites of the realm and these latter in turn 
becoming intermediaries between the Vikings and the king.10
The sheer extent of the Viking incursions meant that, over the course of the 
9th  century, dealing with them became one of the most important challenges 
faced by Frankish kings. Kings were presented with a number of options for ac-
tion. Campaigning against the Northmen was one of them,11 yet insufficient con-
sidering that the Vikings were often simultaneously active in different theatres, 
most importantly in the Western realm along the Loire and the Seine.12 This soon 
necessitated the delegation of defence to individual nobles who were put in charge 
of newly created marches protecting the rivers and the adjacent regions.13 One of 
them was along the Loire where Charles the Bald installed Robert the Strong as 
leader, providing him with the resources and authority to defend the valley inde-
pendently from the king.14 However, in both cases direct military actions seeking 
to encounter and defeat the enemy proved rather fruitless. The Northmen, aiming 
for profit and not for battle,15 preferred to avoid engagements by travelling through 
inaccessible areas and retreating when facing a hostile army. When it actually came 
to battle, victories were certainly won, yet proved insufficient due to the Northmen 
simply scattering and later regrouping.16 An alternative strategy was to prevent the 
Vikings from entering vulnerable areas, for example by occupying the river banks 
when a Viking fleet arrived or by blocking the river with fortifications.17 The last 
option the rulers had was not to fight the Northmen, but to use existing contacts to 
negotiate a tribute—a strategy that in fact turned out to be the most effective way 
to remove the Vikings from the realm.18 While this solution was unpopular among 
the churches who had to provide a large part of the sums paid to the Northmen, it, 
nevertheless, appears to have been a valid political option actually sought by the 
 9 Bauduin, Monde franc, esp. 225−341.
10 Bauduin, Monde franc, 297. More cautious Plassmann, Wirkmächtigkeit, 74−75, arguing that the 
integration was limited to the Viking leaders themselves and did not include those under their 
command. On early Viking settlements and their integration into the Frankish kingdoms, see 
Goetz, Landnahmepolitik. 
11 On the Carolingian armies mustered by the kings in defence of the Vikings, see Coupland, Army, 
54−63.
12 Searle, Kingship, 15−60, distinguishes between the Scheldt, the Loire, Brittany and the Seine. 
13 On the mostly negative interpretation of these measures by scholars, reading them as a sign of the 
weakness of royal power, see Kleinjung, Bedrohung.
14 Kleinjung, Bedrohung, 25. As Karl Ferdinand Werner, Untersuchungen V, 97−98, proposed, a sec-
ond march around Paris and along the Oise under the command of Heribert I of Vermandois may 
have been created by Odo.
15 Searle, Kingship, 15.
16 Coupland, Army, 66−69.
17 Coupland, Army, 63−66 and Coupland, Bridges.
18 Coupland, Tribute.
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rulers.19 Fighting and negotiating were thus closely connected to each other. If the 
former could not drive the Northmen from the realm, at least an advantage could 
be won over them that could be used when treating with them.20
These were also the strategies available to the West Frankish rulers succeeding 
Charles the Bald who were faced with the Great Army that had formed in Eng-
land over the course of the past decades and now turned to the continent. Louis 
the Stammerer and his sons, Charles the Fat, Odo and Charles the Simple all had 
to decide in which way they wanted to react to this incursion. In this regard, 
Fernand Vercauteren described a shift of responsibility for defence, or at least for 
the actual measures taken, from the various rulers towards the local nobility,21 a 
view that has been challenged by Simon MacLean for Charles the Fat.22 Meas-
ures taken by the king remained important and in the following two sections we 
will analyse these measures, their effectiveness and the role of the nobles in their 
implementation.
V.1 Viking incursions and royal measures in protection of the realm
V.1.1 Going on the offensive: Louis the Stammerer—Charles the Fat
Louis the Stammerer
During Louis the Stammerer’s reign, still preceding the arrival of the Great Army 
on the continent, Viking activities are only reported along the Loire where they 
had been installed since around 862.23 Despite the defence of the region falling un-
der the purview of the local marchio, Hugh the Abbot,24 in early 878 Louis crossed 
the Seine for a campaign against the Northmen. Hincmar’s report about the cir-
cumstances around the campaign casts some light on this decision. According 
to him, Louis’  intervention was not the result of royal initiative, but of a request 
for aid from Hugh the Abbot himself.25 Yet, the call for aid against the Northmen 
appears to have been only one of the reasons for Hugh’s appeal, in addition to 
19 Keller, Négociation. Both scholars rightly emphasise that tribute payments were not necessarily 
the result of Frankish weakness leaving the rulers negotiating them no other choice, but a valid 
political option.
20 See Abel, Danegeld, 184−186 for Alfred the Great’s dealings with Guthrun, aguing that “the key to 
Alfred’s successful peacemaking was a demonstration of military power sufficient to cow Guthrun 
into at least temporary submission.”
21 Vercauteren, Comment.
22 MacLean, Charles.
23 Vogel, Normannen, 347.
24 This circumstance is probably also the cause for Louis the Stammerer’s negative image in the 
Miracula S. Benedicti I, 86−87, noting that following his father’s death the Northmen encountered 
hardly any resistence while attributing the defense of the abbey to Hugh the Abbot.
25 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222: Ac [Hludouuicus rex], suadente Hugone abbate ac markione, per­
rexit ultra Sequanam, tam pro auxilio Hugonis contra Nortmannos quam et pro eo quod filii Goz­
fridi castellum et honores filii Odonis quondam comitis inuaserunt, ac quia Imino, frater Bernardi 
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the conflicts that had broken out with the sons of Gauzfrid and Emeno. The mul-
titude of problems occurring at the same time seems to have overstrained Hugh’s 
resources, necessitating Louis’  intervention in the region. Indeed, while Hincmar 
mentions nothing about any measures taken against the Northmen, he does re-
port that Louis solved the conflict with Gauzfrid, thus casting some light on the 
king’s priorities. Soon after, Louis received word that Pope John VIII had crossed 
the Alps. Wishing to meet with him, he left the Loire again.26 While his departure 
was certainly due to John’s arrival, it, nevertheless, appears that Louis considered 
the region secure enough to leave the defence to the local forces under Hugh. This 
impression is further strengthened when taking into consideration the measures 
the king initiated after the meeting with the pope at Troyes. Instead of returning to 
the Loire, he first met with Louis the Younger at Fouron before starting to prepare 
a campaign against Bernard of Gothia.27 For Louis, the Viking threat was of low 
priority, his actions revealing only that he was able to intervene if local defences 
were insufficient to deal with the current situation.
This image also persists during the period immediately following Louis’  death. 
The Annales Bertiniani report one campaign in the same region towards the end 
of 879, after the meeting between Louis and Carloman with Charles the Fat at 
Orbe: “When they returned home from their journey, it was reported to them that 
the Northmen who were in the Loire were devastating the land. And setting off 
immediately, they met them on the day of Saint Andrew and many of them were 
killed and even more drowned in the river Vienne and according to God’s will 
the Frankish army returned home victorious and safe.”28 There are a number of 
points to be made about this campaign. First, considering the young age of Louis 
and Carloman, it seems hardly likely that it was they who mobilised the army and 
led it into battle. As we have argued, just after Louis the Stammerer’s death the 
brothers were in the hands of the group around Hugh the Abbot, the same man 
who was in charge of the march along the Loire.29 The reaction to the Viking raids 
and the mustering of forces was hence most probably his and his allies’  doing. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note the timing of the campaign. Gauzlin and 
Count Conrad had already called Louis the Younger into the realm and only the 
sickness of the latter’s brother Carloman had prevented him from coming to the 
Western realm where, to complicate matters even more, Boso’s rebellion had al-
markionis, Ebrocensem ciuitatem usurpans, multas depraedationes circumcirca in illis regionibus 
exercebat, insuper et Eiricum more Nortmannico depraedari praesumpsit.
26 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222−223; Annales Vedastini 878, 43.
27 Annales Bertiniani 878, 230 and 879, 234. Before the campaign, the Northmen had advanced as far 
as Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire. Vogel, Normannen, 347−348.
28 Annales Bertiniani 879, 240: Cum quo apud Vrbam, antequam montem Iouis transiret, Hludouui­
cus et Karlomannus loqui perrexerunt.[…] ipsisque reuersis ab eodem itinere, nuntiatum est eis quod 
Nortmanni qui erant in Ligeri terreno itinere terras illas depraedabant; et statim moti in illas partes, 
in die missae sancti Andreae eos inuenientes, multos ex eis occiderunt et plures in Vencenna fluuio 
immerserunt, et exercitus Francorum Deo uolente cum uictoria incolomis remeauit.
29 See chapter II.2 and Offergeld, Reges pueri, 357−362.
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ready started. Given this background, it may well have been that the campaign was 
not only meant to deal with the threat posed by the Northmen—a task that Hugh 
had to fulfil in any case—but also to strengthen the position of Hugh’s group by 
demonstrating their ability to protect the realm. The Northmen at the Loire were 
probably the best target for such a purpose: a well-known threat, yet not one that 
was overly strong, given the low priority that Louis the Stammerer had attributed 
to dealing with them. In any case, this early campaign under Louis and Carlo-
man, like the one of their father, was probably rather limited, without any larger 
mobilisation of forces, a mere prologue to the challenges soon to be posed by the 
Great Army.
Louis III
When the first forces of the Great Army arrived on the continent in 879, they 
entered the Scheldt and installed themselves at Ghent to pass the winter, using 
this base to plunder the surrounding area,30 a group of them going even as far as 
besieging Reims, as one of Hincmar’s letters indicates.31 This explains the readi-
ness of the new West Frankish kings and the nobles around them to cooperate 
with Louis the Younger on this matter. The first sign of this cooperation followed 
directly on from the treaty of Ribemont in February 880, when Louis and his 
army, on the way back from the meeting, engaged Viking forces at Thiméon. 
While the reports of Hincmar, the Annales Vedastini and Regino of Prüm seem 
to indicate that this encounter was the result of chance rather than planning,32 
the Annales Fuldenses suggest the opposite. According to them, after Ribemont 
Louis the Younger turned his army to drive out the Northmen from the Scheldt.33 
This reading would explain why Hugh the Abbot was with the army and indicate 
that the Viking incursion at the Scheldt was perceived as a common threat that 
needed to be dealt with by joint forces. This view is further encouraged by the 
next campaign during the summer of the same year. In the wake of the large-scale 
30 Annales Vedastini 879, 44−45 and 880, 46. For further sources indicating the return of the Vikings, 
see Vogel, Normannen, 264–266.
31 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 23, 319. According to Schrörs, Regesten, N° 485, 587, n. 163, the letter dates 
to January 880.
32 Annales Vedastini 880, 46−47: Post haec Hludowicus parat redire in regnum suum, occurritque 
Nortmannis a praeda revertentibus. Et facta congressione apud Timiomum nobiliter eos vicisset, 
nisi contigisset Hugonem filium suum ibi ruere. Nam Godefridus rex Danorum illum interfecit. 
Quo mortuo omisit rex illos insequi. Multi quoque nobiles illius gentis ibi corruerunt, caeteri, qui 
evasere, rediere ad castra sua. Hugo quoque abbas fuit in illo proelio. Annales Bertiniani 880, 241: 
Et inueniens Hludouuicus in itinere Nortmannos, Domino opem ferente, magnam partem ex illis oc­
cidit exercitus suus, sed in Saxonia magnum dampnum de fidelibus suis per Nortmannos sustinuit. 
Regino, Chronicon 879, 115: Facta itaque pactione datisque sacramentis cum in regnum idem rex 
reverteretur, repente obviam habuit Nortmanorum innumeram multitudinem iuxta Carbonariam in 
loco, qui vocatur Thimiun, cu ingenti preda ad classem repedantem.
33 Annales Fuldenses (Mainz continuation) 880, 94: Rex Hludowicus […] postea in Galliam profectus 
filios Hludowici ad se venientes suscepit totumque regnum Hlotharii suae ditioni subiugavit. Inde 
ad expugnandos Nordmannos, qui in Scalta fluvio longo tempore residebant, convertit exercitum 
initoque certamine plus quam quinque milia ex eis prostravit.
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cooperation against Lothar II’s son Hugh in Lotharingia and Boso in Burgundy, 
the various rulers had also agreed to join forces against the Northmen installed 
at Ghent. This time, the major part of the forces appears to have come from the 
Western realm: Gauzlin and many others were ordered to advance against the 
Northmen. Arrived at the Scheldt, Gauzlin tried to coordinate his attack with the 
local forces. However, the manoeuver appears to have failed and the army was 
routed. Gauzlin now appears to have come to the conclusion that his remaining 
forces were insufficient to take any further measures and disbanded them, leav-
ing the north-east of the realm open to the Northmen.34 While the circumstance 
that both Western kings went south seems to indicate that fighting Boso was 
given priority over the Viking threat, the fact that one of the leading nobles of the 
realm led the army against the Northmen nevertheless indicates how seriously 
this campaign was taken.
Gauzlin’s defeat led to a change in these priorities. Louis III now returned to 
Francia, leaving Boso to his brother Carloman.35 It is interesting to note the change 
of tone in the sources from this moment on. The Annales Vedastini now empha-
sise the king’s role in gathering a new army and leading these forces against the 
Northmen.36 While this does not necessarily indicate a change in his relations to 
the nobles surrounding him—as Thilo Offergeld has shown, from the moment of 
their coronation, Louis and Carloman appear as independent, mature rulers in the 
narrative sources despite the continuing dominance of the nobles37—there, nev-
ertheless, seems to have been a significant change following Gauzlin’s defeat. In 
their extremely different reports of the battle of Saucourt, both Hincmar and the 
Annales Vedastini ascribe a crucial role to Louis’  leadership. According to Hinc-
mar, when the battle was developing in the Franks’ favour, it was “Louis himself 
[who fled] with his men […], though no one was pursuing them,” thus revealing 
the divine judgement.38 The Annales Vedastini, on the other hand, report that it 
was the king himself, who turned the flight of his men into a victory by bring-
ing them to stand and fight.39 While this certainly did not mean that Louis now 
34 Annales Vedastini 880, 47 and 48−49. For the coordinated attack on Hugh and Boso, see chapter IV.2.
35 Annales Vedastini 880, 49. On the raids following Gauzlin’s defeat, see Vogel, Normannen, 270−272.
36 Annales Vedastini 881, 50: Interim Hludowicus rex gravi dolore contristatus, videns regnum deleri, 
convocato exercitu praeparat se ad proelium.
37 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 381−382.
38 Annales Bertiniani 881, 244: De quibus non modicam partem occisis ceterisque fugatis, et ipse Hlu­
douuicus una cum suis retrorsum, nemine persequente, fugam arripuit, diuino manifestante iudicio 
quia quod a Nortmannis fuerat actum non humana sed diuina uirtute patratum extiterit. Transla-
tion by Nelson, Annals, 222.
39 Annales Vedastini 881, 50: Contra quos rex ire perrexit obviavitque eos in pago Witmau, in villa 
quae dicebatur Sathulcurtis, et commissum est proelium. Moxque Nortmanni fugam ineunt atque 
dictam villam deveniunt; quos rex insecutus est gloriosissimeque de eis triumphavit. Et patrata vic­
toria ex parte coeperunt gloriari suis hoc actum viribus et non dederunt gloriam Deo. Paucique 
Nortmanni ex dicta villa egressi, omnem exercitum vertit in fugam, pluresque ex eis, videlicet usque 
ad centum homines, interfecerunt; et nisi rex citius equo descendens locum resistendi et audaciam 
suis donaret, omnes turpiter ex eodem loco fugiendo abirent.
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acted completely on his own—according to Hincmar, soon after the battle Louis, 
urged by some of his advisors, constructed a fort at Estruy,40 indicating again the 
influence of the nobles around the king—his crucial role in the battle appears as a 
sign of increased responsibility in the affairs of the realm. The battle of Saucourt 
undoubtedly was a major success for Louis,41 demonstrating his ability to muster 
sufficient resources to successfully challenge the Northmen, yet it appears not to 
have led to any agreements with the Northmen, who now retreated to Ghent be-
fore turning to the Maas where they erected a new camp at Elsloo.42
Louis’  next campaign, this time not against the Northmen at the Scheldt, 
against whom he detached an army under Theoderic of Vermandois,43 led him 
across the Seine towards the Loire to expel the Northmen from his realm. The 
region should have been under the protection of Hugh the Abbot’s march. The 
king’s activity in this region may be explained by two reasons: First, like under 
Louis the Stammerer, the forces of the march may not have sufficed to deal with 
the Northmen and the Bretons at the same time, thus necessitating the king’s 
intervention. Second, the absence of Hugh the Abbot from the region, him be-
ing Carloman’s main advisor, may have led to a lack of leadership that was now 
compensated by Louis taking command himself. Instead of using force, Louis 
now opted for a diplomatic strategy and concluded an amicitia with the Viking 
leader Hasting.44 A number of factors may have contributed to this decision. 
Having split his forces, Louis’  army may simply not have been sufficiently large 
for a military encounter. In fact, it seems likely that Louis had intended to re-
inforce his troops by forming an alliance with the Breton leaders—according 
to Hincmar, meeting with them was also a reason for him to cross the Seine.45 
Finally, it seems that for him the Loire theatre was only of secondary importance 
to Louis. Having secured the Loire by turning Hasting and his men away from 
the region to aim for other regions at the sea,46 probably the Breton north coast,47 
Louis next seems to have planned to move again against the Northmen in the 
north-east who had again extended their raids into the Western realm. At the 
moment of his unexpected death, the nobles of Francia had already assembled an 
army ready for a campaign, an army that was now taken over by Louis’  brother 
Carloman, who left his own forces in Burgundy to continue the fight against 
Boso.48 It may have been due to this combination—a lack of resources to achieve 
40 Annales Bertiniani 881, 244−245.
41 On the perception of the Louis’ victory, see also Regino, Chronicon 883, 120 and the celebra-
tory text of the Ludwigslied. On this poem, see Fouracre, Context; Green, Ludwigslied; Schneider, 
Northmanni and Lebecq, Vikings.
42 Annales Vedastini 881, 50−51.
43 Annales Bertiniani 882, 246. 
44 Annales Vedastini 882, 52. Similar the Sermo in tumulatione SS Quintini, 272.
45 Annales Bertiniani 882, 246.
46 Annales Bertiniani 882, 247.
47 Vogel, Normannen, 351−352.
48 Annales Bertiniani 882, 246−247.
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a military solution combined with Louis’  focus on defending the Francia—that, 
in this case, he chose to opt for a seemingly purely diplomatic solution, allowing 
him to quickly return to the East.
Carloman II
In contrast to his brother’s, Carloman’s measures against the Northmen were 
strongly affected by his relations with the Northern nobles.49 According to Hinc-
mar, in September Carloman was still with the army that had been assembled 
for his brother’s next campaign against the Northmen.50 However, in November, 
when noting Hugh the Abbot’s embassy to Charles the Fat, he remarks that the 
latter’s “absence brought the utmost harm to this realm, since Carloman lacked 
the resources to mount resistance to the Northmen once certain magnates of this 
kingdom withdrew their support,” leaving the realm open for the Northmen who 
now attacked Laon and Reims.51 This would indicate that the nobles turned away 
from the king at some point between September and early November, leaving the 
king, according to the archbishop of Reims, without the necessary forces to de-
fend the realm. However, the Annales Vedastini report that in October Carloman 
moved against the Northmen who had installed themselves in the Condé, from 
where they ravaged up to the Somme.52 Carloman’s campaign without the sup-
port of these nobles lead to a victory at Avaux, helping to assert the gravity of 
Hincmar’s reproach against Hugh the Abbot.53 Carloman was by no means left de-
fenceless, but was able to challenge the Northmen. However, as both Hincmar and 
the Annales Vedastini note, the king’s victory did not put an end to the incursion. 
Carloman instead withdrew to Compiègne, leaving the Northmen to extend their 
ravaging up to the Oise. Hence, the threat posed by the king and his army was not 
sufficient to force the Northmen from the realm and he also appears either not to 
have pursued a diplomatic solution or failed to implement one.
Reinforcements brought by Hugh the Abbot reenabled Carloman to campaign 
again during the winter of 882/3, yet again without forcing the Northmen out of 
the realm or leading to successful negotiations while instead Saint-Quentin and 
Arras were plundered.54 The Northmen ravaging Flanders during the summer, in 
autumn 883 Carloman raised a new army to attack them in the Vimeux. This time 
the Northmen did not retreat but turned on the king both from land and from the 
river, forcing Carloman to quickly withdraw over the Oise and thus opening the 
49 See chapter II.2.
50 Annales Bertiniani 882, 247.
51 Annales Bertiniani 882, 249−250: Sed absentia illius in isto regno maximum detrimentum fecit, quia 
Karlomannus non habuit unde Nortmannis posset resistere, quibusdam regni primoribus ab ipsius 
auxilio se retrahentibus. Quapropter usque circa Laudunum castellum uenerunt, et quae in gyro 
ipsius castelli erant depraedati sunt et incenderunt, disponentes Remi uenire, indeque per Suessiones 
et Nouiomagum pergentes, ad praefatum castellum expugnatum redire et regnum sibi subicere.
52 Annales Vedastini 882, 52.
53 Annales Vedastini 882, 53; Annales Bertiniani 882, 250.
54 Annales Vedastini 882, 53 and 883, 53.
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river up to the Seine to them.55 The catastrophic outcome of the campaign led to a 
massive shift of power within the realm, both in regards to the relations between 
the different noble factions as well as those factions and the king. The report of the 
Annales Vedastini is straightforward: “Meanwhile, because the king was a juvenile, 
all of the magnates assembled at the palace of Compiègne to confer about what 
they should do.”56 In regard to the disaster of the campaign, Carloman, whatever 
his position might have been before, was now set aside and the nobles, or, as we 
have argued, the faction around Hugh the Abbot as well as Gauzlin, but not yet 
the nobles from Francia,57 took over. This points to the complexity of the situa-
tion. Without the support of the local nobility, the royal forces were not sufficient 
to deal with the Viking threat. This left two options: either to integrate the nobles 
who had been so far excluded from the circle around the king into the rule, or 
to change the strategy to address the Viking problem. In fact, they implemented 
both, negotiating a treaty with the Northmen that offered them a tribute of 12.000 
pounds of silver in exchange for them leaving the realm as well as an armistice 
until the payment was due58 and integrating the nobles from Francia into its im-
plementation.59 However, if they were now willing to set aside their rivalries, why 
would they not have continued to seek a military solution with their newly united 
forces? It is hard to imagine that such a solution was not brought up during the 
meeting at Compiègne; yet, it would seem that they had evaluated the probable 
outcome of such an endeavour and had come to the conclusion that they would 
fare better by seeking a diplomatic settlement. If this was the case, this reveals how 
powerful the Northmen had become and how royal power was now limited even 
if it could rely on the united support of the nobles.
Carloman’s role in these negotiations is difficult to ascertain. The report of the 
Annales Vedastini clearly states that the initiative for the change of course lay with 
the leading nobles. However, was Carloman really too young at that time not to 
fulfil his role as king? Examining this passage of the annals, Thilo Offergeld has 
pointed out that Carloman was already 17  years old and, hence, old enough to 
rule. According to him, exaggerating the king’s young age was a pretext to over-
rule him in this matter—up until that moment, Carloman is portrayed as able to 
rule and lead an army.60 Following Offergeld’s reading, this would mean that the 
aggressive strategy previously used against the Northmen was indeed the king’s 
choice, yet that after his failure to protect the North a shift had taken place in the 
circle around him, leading to him being overruled. Nevertheless, the king appears 
55 Annales Vedastini 883, 54.
56 Annales Vedastini 884, 55: Interim, quia rex iuvenis erat, omnes principes Compendio palatio con­
veniunt tractaturi, quid illis esset agendum.
57 See chapter II.2.
58 Annales Vedastini 883, 54 and 884, 55. Both entries report an assembly of the Frankish nobles and 
a mission of the baptised Viking Siegfrid to the Northmen (late 883 and early 884 respecitvely). 
This is certainly a duplication of the events. 
59 See chapter II.2.
60 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 396−397.
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to have been involved in the proceedings shortly afterwards. According to Regino 
of Prüm’s chronicle, upon Carloman’s death, despite having been paid the tribute, 
the Northmen returned to the Western realm arguing that they had concluded 
the treaty with the king and that his successor was to pay the same amount if he 
wanted them to leave.61 This points to a more central role of the king in the pro-
ceedings than the previous account of the Annales Vedastini indicates. It would 
seem that, since Carloman was considered as a partner in the deal, he had adapted 
his own course to that of the nobles and played his part in the negotiations. How-
ever, his position in regard to the nobles does not appear to have recovered en-
tirely. When the tribute for the Northmen was collected, the Franks assembled an 
army in case that the Northmen did not leave the realm despite having received 
the tribute. Command over the army was then given to Carloman, who followed 
the Northmen up to the moment they embarked. Yet, there is a slight change in the 
phrasing used by the Annales Vedastini describing these events. It was “the king 
and the Franks” who followed the Northmen and it were “those Franks who were 
with Carloman” who returned to their homes once the Northmen were gone.62 
The same phrasing is also used by the annals for Charles the Simple and the no-
bles supporting him during the fight against Odo, thus indicating the dominance 
of the circle around him.63 It would have been interesting to see how Carloman’s 
relation to the nobles might have developed from this point on, especially after the 
threat posed by the Northmen had been lifted from the realm. However, his death 
shortly afterwards meant not only that Charles the Fat now became ruler of the 
Western realm, but also that the Northmen immediately returned to the Western 
realm.
Carloman’s reign demonstrates the dependence of the king on the support of-
fered by the nobles in the case of his politics towards the Northmen. While he was 
able to assemble forces sufficient to challenge them in the field without the support 
of the nobles from the northern part of the realm, these forces, nevertheless, ap-
pear to have been too small to prevent the Northmen from their ravages into the 
realm and, if he had had such intentions, to improve his position in negotiations. 
Failures in protecting the realm could lead to a massive shift in the balance of 
power between the nobles and the king, which, in turn, could result in a takeover 
of responsibilities by the nobles around the king. At the same time, this takeover, 
and the subsequent change of strategy leading to a diplomatic solution, also re-
veal how limited military means actually were even if the nobility stood united. 
61 Regino, Chronicon 884, 122.
62 Annales Vedastini 884, 55−56: Tandem soluto tributo, mense Octobrio finiente adunantur Franci, 
ut, si Nortmanni inmutari fidem vellent, eis resisterent. Nortmanni vero sua castra incendunt atque 
ab Ambianis recedunt. Rex vero et Franci transito Hisa lento itinere eos insequuntur. Praedicti vero 
Dani iter agentes Bononiam veniunt ibique agentes consilium, quid sibi faciendum esset, pars illo­
rum mare transiit, atque pars Luvanium in regno quondam Hlotharii, ibique sibi castra statuunt ad 
hiemandum. Franci vero qui cum Karlomanno fuerant redierunt ad sua loca.
63 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 454−456.
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Seemingly, they estimated their chances to secure the realm by military means too 
small to pursue this strategy any further.
Charles the Fat
For Charles the Fat, these framework conditions differed considerably. First, the 
Northmen, upon leaving Carloman’s realm, had split into two groups, one sailing 
to England, the other one erecting a camp at Leuven and probably uniting with 
other Northmen who had, up until this moment, remained beyond the Scheldt,64 
thus reducing the threat they posed, at least to a certain degree. Furthermore, 
Charles could rely not only on West Frankish forces, but also on those from Lo-
tharingia, the East Frankish realm and Italy.65 However, at the same time, this also 
meant that he had to protect a much larger area and deal with a multiplying num-
ber of problems. Mobilising troops from one part of his realm to protect another 
meant that they had to operate far from their homes, putting a strain on sup-
plies and requiring difficult coordination. Charles’  first measures reveal the whole 
complexity of this situation. Although he was absent, he ordered forces from the 
Western realm and Lotharingia to move against the Northmen at Leuven.66 When 
these Northmen turned towards the Seine, another army was assembled, consist-
ing of forces from Neustria and Burgundy and put under the command of Ragen-
old of Maine,67 yet it dissolved after his death.68 In the absence of the emperor, the 
West Frankish nobles now initiated their own measures, constructing a fort at the 
Oise to block the river and putting it under the command of Count Aledramnus as 
well as fortifying Paris.69 The role of the emperor in these different actions is hard 
to grasp. While the Annales Vedastini clearly state that the early mobilisation and 
attack on the Northmen at Leuven was initiated by Charles, when it comes to the 
assembly of the second army under the command of Ragenold, they remain silent. 
The large-scale cooperation of forces from different regions under the command 
of a noble otherwise invisible in the sources, however, does seem to indicate that 
this was the emperor’s doing as well. On the other hand, the defensive measures 
taken after Ragenold’s death seem to have been taken at the initiative of the no-
bles—at least in the case of the fortification of Paris, the Annales Vedastini indicate 
Gauzlin was responsible.70
64 Annales Vedastini 884, 55−56. The presence of other Northmen beyond the Scheldt is also indi-
cated by the Annales Vedastini (884, 55), reporting that after the armistice had been concluded the 
Northmen devastating the north-east of the realm had ceased their attacks.
65 See MacLean, Kingship, 121, for Charles’ ability to mobilise forces across his various regna.
66 Annales Vedastini 885, 56−57; Regino, Chronicon 884, 122.
67 See chapter II.3.
68 Annales Vedastini 885, 57.
69 Annales Vedastini 885, 57−58. 
70 Annales Vedastini 885, 57−58. Simon MacLean, Kingship, 106, assumes that the construction of 
the fort at the Oise was done at Charles’ command. While Aledramnus, who was put in command 
of the fort, was certainly among the emperor’s important supporters in the Western realm (see 
chapter II.3), the sources do not mention any involvement from Charles in the matter.
272 V. The Viking problem
This interplay between measures initiated by local leaders and the emperor 
also characterises the events around the siege of Paris. While the defence of the 
city was led by Gauzlin and Odo, the emperor mobilised forces from his other 
regna to relieve the besieged. His first response to the Viking assault appears to 
have been quickly organised, with an army lead by Duke Henry arriving at Paris 
in spring 886,71 again revealing Charles’  ability to delegate the defence to trusted 
men if it seemed necessary to him. When the first campaign failed, in the late 
summer of 886 he himself led a second army to the Western realm, his presence 
indicating the importance he now attributed to the situation.72 Charles forces ap-
pear to have been of considerable size, strong enough to force the Northmen to 
abandon one of their camps and to withdraw their forces over the Seine. How-
ever, instead of attacking them, he initiated negotiations, agreed to pay a tribute 
and opened up Burgundy for them to spend the winter.73 Charles’  decision to 
negotiate has often been interpreted by scholars as a sign of his military weakness 
and related to his deposition a year later.74 However, Simon MacLean argues that 
there are no signs in the contemporary sources that Charles’  reputation had suf-
fered from this change of strategy. In fact, as he continues, the treaty must have 
been the result of a strategy discussed with the leading West Frankish nobles.75 As 
lack of military strength was apparently not the issue, there must have been other 
reasons for this decision. The Annales Vedastini report that negotiations were ini-
tiated because winter was approaching.76 Given the size of Charles’  army, supply 
would have become a serious problem during the following months,77 making it 
necessary to disband at least some of his forces, if not send the entire army home. 
Hence, negotiating might have been a necessity dictated by the circumstances, 
the only means to ensure the end of the siege if it had not been the emperor’s in-
tention from the beginning. In this context, it is worth pointing out that Gauzlin 
had already opened negotiations with one of the Viking leaders, Siegfrid, during 
the siege and concluded an amicitia.78 This group of Vikings seems not to have 
taken part in Charles’  treaty since they did not turn towards Burgundy but en-
tered the Oise,79 leaving the realm before the tribute had been delivered.80 Hence, 
71 Annales Vedastini 886, 59.
72 Annales Vedastini 886, 61−62; Regino, Chronicon 887, 125−126 and 127. On the composition of 
this army, containing contingents from Nevers, Tours, Auxerre, Orléans, Langres and Troyes, see 
MacLean, Kingship, 101.
73 Annales Vedastini 886, 62. Abbo, Bella II, v. 332−341, 90, is remarkably silent about these events, 
jumping directly from Charles’ arrival to the treaty itself. 
74 Musset, Invasions, 161; Schieffer, Karolinger, S. 184; Vercauteren, Comment and Bautier, Règne, 
140−157.
75 MacLean, Kingship, 56−58 and 107.
76 Annales Vedastini 886, 62: Indeque coeperunt, quia hiems imminebat, missi ad invicem discurrere, 
ut imperator pacem cum Danis faceret.
77 On the problem of supplying armies, see Leyser, Warfare, 45−47.
78 Annales Vedastini 886, 59−60.
79 Annales Vedastini 886, 62−63.
80 Annales Vedastini 887, 63.
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paying off the Northmen was considered a valid option by at least some of the 
leading West Frankish nobles—support Charles could count on when opening 
negotiations.
The special situation of Charles the Fat’s reign, with the emperor ruling over 
all of the Carolingian regna, reveals three layers of measures that dealt with the 
Viking threat. In the wake of royal absence from the West, the defence organised 
by the local nobility surfaces much more than in the previous periods. In this 
context, the case of the fortress constructed at the Oise is of particular interest 
since command over it was given to Count Aledramnus.81 In the early 880s, Ale-
dramnus and his brother, Count Theoderic of Vermandois, controlled a block of 
honores north of Paris and repeatedly appear in the sources as leaders of opera-
tions against the Northmen, indicating that they were key figures in the defence 
of the region.82 This development was continued under Odo when Theoderic’s 
honores were passed on to Heribert I of Vermandois, who subsequently often ap-
pears as one of the leaders of, as Karl Ferdinand Werner phrased it, the Oise line.83 
At the same time, both of them, as well as Heribert later on, can be seen in close 
contact with the emperor,84 thus revealing how closely linked these different layers 
of organisation actually were. In support of the local defence, Charles furthermore 
mobilised troops from other parts of his realm, delegating command to suitable 
commanders while he was needed elsewhere. The top layer, finally, consisted of 
Charles’  direct intervention with even greater forces. While there was certainly no 
lack of effort made in the defence of Paris, its outcome reveals the limits of such 
purely military measures. Even with the resources of the entire empire at his dis-
posal, forcing the Northmen to leave the realm appears to have been impossible, 
making a diplomatic solution preferable to Charles and the leading nobles of the 
West Frankish realm.
81 Annales Vedastini 885, 57−58.
82 MacLean, Charles, 86−89 and MacLean, Kingship, 106−107.
83 Werner, Untersuchungen V, 97−98 with n. 40, followed by Bauduin, Normandie, 112−113. When 
assessing Heribert’s role as local commander of the newly created march to protect Paris, Werner 
may indeed have overestimated the count’s position. While Heribert certainly held the respective 
counties, his leadership in the defence against the Northmen appears questionable. The only occa-
sion that Heribert is actually mentioned in this context is in 900, when he joined Charles the Sim-
ple, Robert and Richard at the Oise to discuss the next campaign (Annales Vedastini 900, 82: Rex 
vero cum Rothberto et Richardo atque Heriberto coepit sermocinari de Nortmannis, quid agerent.). 
His presence there can also be explained by him being one of Charles’ most important support-
ers and does necessitate a special role in the defence. Indeed, there are no signs in the sources on 
which such an interpretation could be based. Werner is right to point out the independent actions 
of his son Heribert II, yet all of these examples fall under the reign of Raoul who, in contrast to 
Charles, was often absent from the Francia. Hence, while under Raoul such a command is plausi-
ble, it hardly seems to have been necessary under Charles, the king being able to intervene himself 
most of the time.
84 See chapter II.3.
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V.1.2 Strategies of containment: Odo
Odo appears as the diametrical opposite to Charles the Fat, a ruler whose re-
sources were mostly based on his Neustrian possessions, with limited support 
from the nobility and a legitimacy deficit. Odo’s first campaigns reveal the restric-
tions placed on him by these structural problems. While his victory against the 
Northmen at Montfauçon boosted his reputation considerably, resulting in Arnulf 
inviting him to a placitum and acknowledging him as king,85 this battle appears 
not to have had any major impact on the activities of the Northmen. Meaux was 
besieged and burnt down, its remainders serving as base for the Northmen over 
the summer.86 In the meantime Odo fell back on a defensive strategy, using his 
army to protect Paris from the advancing Northmen without initiating any further 
measures against them.87 At this point, his lack of offensive action may have been 
due to his need to stabilise his reign: from his defensive position at Paris he moved 
to Reims to be crowned with a crown sent by Arnulf while early in the next year 
he went to Aquitaine to treat with Ramnulf of Poitiers and receive his submis-
sion.88 This does not mean that Odo completely abandoned the defence against 
the Northmen. When he moved to Aquitaine, the Annales Vedastini report that 
he only took a few men with him—which may indicate that he left his army in the 
North to monitor Viking activities—and, furthermore, that “he hastened back to 
Francia” because of them.89 However, at the same time he seems to have been un-
able to prevent the Northmen from entering the Loire where they now devastated 
“Burgundy, Neustria and a part of Aquitaine without encountering resistance.”90 
The measures Odo took against the Northmen upon their return to the Seine 
mark the beginning of a slightly adjusted approach to the Viking problem. While 
he moved against them, he opened negotiations and bought their withdrawal from 
the city, making them turn towards Brittany.91 Over the course of the past years, 
especially during the siege of Paris, Odo must have been able to closely study the 
85 Annales Vedastini 888, 65: Sed dum illi haec agerent, contigit Odoni regi per Dei misericordiam 
inopinata victoria. Nam die nativitatis sancti Iohannis baptistae cum parvo exercitu Danorum ex­
ercitum obviavit super Axonam fluvium commissoque proelio mox victor extitit. Quae victoria non 
modicam illi contulit gloriam. Post haec ab Arnulfo convocatur ad placitum. See also chapter IV.3.
86 Annales Vedastini 888, 66.
87 Annales Vedastini 888, 67: Circa autumni vero tempora Odo rex adunato exercitu Parisius venit, 
ibique castra metati sunt prope civitatem, ne iterum ipsa obsideretur. Nortmanni vero per Maternam 
in Sequanam regressi indeque navigantes et iter per terram facientes, Luvam fluvium ingressi, circa 
eius littora sedem sibi firmant. Odo vero rex Remis civitatem contra missos Arnulfi perrexit, qui ei 
coronam, ut ferunt, misit, quam in aecclesia Dei genitricis in natale sancti Brictii capiti impositam, 
ab omni populo rex adclamatur.
88 Annales Vedastini 889, 67.
89 Annales Vedastini 889, 67: Aquitanios itaque rex ex parte receptos, festinavit propter Nortmannos 
redire in Franciam. 
90 Annales Vedastini 889, 67: Dani vero more suo Burgundiam, Neustriam atque partem Aquitaniae, 
nullo resistente, igne et ferro devastant.
91 Annales Vedastini 889, 67−68.
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Northmen and come to a realistic assessment of the options he now had in regard 
to their strength and his own resources, preferring to act defensively rather than 
to attack and to seek diplomatic solutions when possible.
This more careful approach to the Viking threat also becomes visible over the 
course of the following year when the Northmen returned to the Seine, splitting 
in two groups, one entering the Oise, the other under Hasting operating at the 
Somme. Odo appears to have fancied standing a better chance against these weaker 
forces, as he tried to attack a part of the first group before again falling back to his 
defensive strategy, assembling an army at the Oise to prevent the Northmen from 
roaming deeper into the realm.92 While this strategy had its advantages, effectively 
protecting a large part of the realm by limiting Viking mobility, it also had its 
drawbacks as it revealed Odo’s incapacity to drive them away from the areas they 
were currently threatening. This resulted in a conflict of interests with the local 
nobles, as demonstrated by the case of Abbot Rodulf of Saint-Vaast, who now con-
cluded an agreement with Hasting, allowing the latter to circumvent Odo.93 While 
Rodulf changed his mind shortly afterwards and instead attacked the Northmen, 
the case, nevertheless, reveals how problematic Odo’s strategy was. It was prob-
ably also due to the pressure placed on him by this event that during the follow-
ing year Odo made new offensive efforts, trying to deal with the various Viking 
groups. The results were hardly encouraging. While he managed to deprive one 
group of their plunder (although without actually being able to pin them down, 
possibly forcing them into Lotharingia),94 his attempt to attack a second group at 
Amiens led to his army being put to flight.95 These campaigns reveal the dilemma 
of Odo’s situation. Containing the Northmen was the best strategy, yet one that 
needed the support of the local nobility, support that appears to have been increas-
ingly uncertain, especially in regard to the conflicts breaking out over the course 
of the following year. This lack of support from the local nobility was probably why 
Odo now reverted back to an offensive strategy, a decision that was facilitated by 
the Northmen splitting up their forces. However, at the same time, the Northmen 
avoided open battle: they moved through almost impassable terrain and scattered 
92 Annales Vedastini 890, 68: Brittanni vero viriliter suum defensavere regnum atque afflictos Da­
nos Sequanam redire compulerunt. Imminente vero festa omnium sanctorum Dani per Sequanam 
Hisam ingressi Noviomagum petunt ad statuenda sibi castra hiemalia. Illis vero qui per terram iter 
agebant occurrit rex Odo circa Germaniacum; sed propter loci incommoditatem nil eis damni intulit. 
Nortmanni vero coeptum iter peragentes castra sibi adversus civitatem statuunt. Alstingus autem 
cum suis Argova super Sumnam sedem sibi firmavit. Odo vero rex adunato exercitu super littora 
Hisae fluminis resedit, ne regnum libere devastarent.
93 Annales Vedastini 890, 69: Alstingus vero per dolum pacem fecit cum Hrodulfo abbate, ut libere 
posset ire quo vellet. Praedictus vero Alstingus die sollempnitatis sancti Iohannis ewangelistae venit 
adversus castrum sive monasterium sancti Vedasti. Hrodulfus vero abbas timens, ne multitudo qui 
Noviomum erat cum eis adveniret, et insidias timens—quod etiam Alstingus mandaverat—populum 
retinuit, sed cognita veritate post eorum discessum multum doluit. Frequentibus vero incursionibus 
exterruit eos, nec ausi sunt postea ita adversus praedictum venire castrum.
94 Annales Vedastini 891, 69−70. 
95 Annales Vedastini 891, 70.
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when pinned down, only to regroup soon after while at the same time exploiting 
any opportunity offered to them. In the end, the withdrawal of the Northmen was 
not brought on by Odo’s measures, but by a famine in Francia.96
Odo’s caution surfaces again four years later when the Northmen returned to 
the Seine. At this point, his attention was still turned to the conflict with Charles 
the Simple, a circumstance that the author of the Annales Vedastini does not fail to 
remark on: “And because the king busied himself with other affairs, he increased 
the great evil coming on him and the realm.”97 Abbo of Saint-Germain went even 
further, accusing Odo of not caring at all and neglecting “the sheep sent to him 
by Christ,” thus forsaking his own honour.98 While Abbo’s harsh critique certainly 
was an overstatement, Odo indeed only became active again during the following 
year when he tried, without success, to attack a group returning from their raid. 
The group appears to have been rather small since “for fear of the size of [Odo’s] 
army” they retreated into the Seine.99 However, Odo’s general assessment of his 
chances against them appears to have remained unchanged. From the Seine, the 
Northmen ravaged over the course of the summer, apparently again without en-
countering much resistance. Later that year, Odo, while now having pacified the 
realm and hence being able to give the Viking threat his full attention, neverthe-
less decided not to challenge the Northmen but to, as in 889, conclude a treaty 
“to ransom the realm.”100 While this last treaty has often astonished scholars who 
attribute its conclusion to Odo being weakened by sickness101—an explanation 
that would be backed by his death following soon after—it appears to be in line 
with the earlier measures taken by Odo. He had mostly favoured a defensive strat-
egy, attacking only splinter groups while paying off larger armies without seeking 
battle. The Northmen returning to the Seine appear to have soon increased in 
 96 Annales Vedastini 892, 72.
 97 Annales Vedastini 896, 78: Ac per idem tempus iterum Nortmanni cum duce Hundeo nomine 
et quinque barchis iterum Sequanam ingressi; et dum rex ad alia intendit, magnum sibi et regno 
malum accrescere fecit.
 98 Abbo, Bella II, 110, v. 587−595:
 Rex audit, nec curat, Odo; per verba respondit.
 O, quam responsi facinus! Non ore dedisti
 Tale tuo. Demon certe proprium tibi favit.
 Non tua mens procurat oves Christo tibi missas.
 Longius ille tuum forsan nec curet honorem.
 Haec ubi fata receperunt probitate neglecti,
 Exultant hilares, barcas agitantque per omnes
 Gallia quis amnes fruitur, terram pelagusque
 In dicione tenent, totum tutore ferente.
 99 Annales Vedastini 897, 78: Post haec usque Mosam in praeda exierunt, nullo sibi resistente. A 
praeda vero illis revertentibus occurrit regis exercitus, sed nil profecerunt. Verum Nortmanni ad 
naves reversi, timentes multitudinem exercitus, ne obsiderentur, in Sequanam redierunt, ibique toto 
demorantes aestate praedas agebant, nullo sibi resistente.
100 Annales Vedastini 897, 79: Nortmanni vero iam in multitudine fidentes omnes reliquias regni ferro 
et igne devastant. Unde rex misit ad eos, regnum redimere volens; et facto placito super Ligerem 
hiemandi gratia pergunt.
101 For example Vogel, Normannen, 375. Last Offergeld, Reges pueri, 444.
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strength, shifting the balance of force in their favour. Odo, given the limitations of 
his resources, always carefully weighed his options. As the military ones seemed 
too risky, he chose the diplomatic solution.
V.1.3 Return to the old strategies: Charles the Simple
Charles the Simple abandoned the caution shown by Odo and reverted back to 
the approaches shown by his brothers, trying to attack the Northmen. When they 
returned from the Loire, where they had passed the winter, Charles mustered 
an army and pursued them. While the Annales Vedastini describe the size of his 
forces as a “small army,” it seems to have been strong enough to be considered a 
serious threat by the Northmen who, after a first encounter that left many of them 
wounded, averted further contact by once again marching through barely passable 
terrain.102 Similarly, it may have been due to his return to Francia after his cam-
paign into Lotharingia over the summer that they chose to pass the winter in Bur-
gundy where they were defeated by Richard the Justiciar and forced back to the 
Seine.103 Furthermore, Charles also appears to have been able to pin them down to 
the river since the Annales Vedastini only report further raids in November 899, 
when Charles had to deal with Baldwin II of Flanders, who taken possession of 
Péronne.104 This observation makes it possible to draw some conclusions about the 
balance of power between the king and the Northmen. Charles’  army, if the ac-
count of the Annales Vedastini is not to be completely dismissed, was rather small. 
Yet, at the same time, it was strong enough to be considered a serious threat by the 
Northmen, who only started to move again when Charles had to turn his army 
away from them. Apparently, the Viking forces Charles had to deal with in Francia 
were not as strong as the ones Odo had faced in the preceding years. Unfortu-
nately, the narrative sources remain silent about any groups leaving the army, but 
it seems possible that a part of the Northmen had either not returned to Francia 
from the Loire in 898 or had left the realm over the course of the winter. Hence, 
Charles’  room for manoeuvre appears to have increased considerably, especially 
when he was able to join his forces with those of Robert, Richard and Heribert 
in early summer 900 when they met at the Oise to deal with the Northmen re-
maining there.105 However, at this point, his attention was drawn away from the 
102 Annales Vedastini 898, 79−80: Nortmanni vero verno tempore rediere ad naves, vastatam Aqui­
taniae partem atque Neustriam, insuper plurima eversa castra, interfectis habitatoribus. […] Post 
haec rex Karolus cum exercitu parvo Nortmannis a praeda revertentibus in pago Vitmau iuxta 
quandam... insecutus, aliquibus suorum interfectis plurimisque vulneratis, Nortmanni more solito 
loca inoportuna tenentes rediere ad naves.
103 Annales Vedastini 898, 80. For Richard’s battle at Argentueil see also Chronicon S. Benigni Divi-
onensis, 113; Annales S. Columbae Senonensis 899, 104; Chronicon S. Petri Vivi Senonensis, 70. 
See Vogel, Normannen, 381, n. 2 for further references.
104 Annales Vedastini 899, 81.
105 Annales Vedastini 900, 81−82.
278 V. The Viking problem
Northmen once again when the conflict with Robert broke out. Hence, Charles, 
during these early years of his reign, appears to have been capable of dealing with 
the Viking threat, yet, like his predecessors, still did not possess the resources to 
force the Northmen to leave the realm for longer periods of time. Whether coop-
eration with Robert and Richard would have changed the balance of power in his 
favour has to remain open. However, the cooperation of these nobles points also to 
another observation. During these early years, nothing indicates that Charles at-
tempted to negotiate with the Northmen. Yet, since Robert, Richard and Heribert 
provided forces for the return to the rather offensive strategy previously mainly 
shown by his brothers, this seems to indicate that they supported this strategy 
and might even point to them being reluctant to negotiate, as Odo so often had 
preferred to do.
With the end of the Annales Vedastini, only small traces of the Viking incur-
sions and the royal measures to keep them in check remain.106 Edward the El-
der’s victories over the Northmen in 909 and 910 probably led to an increase in 
Viking activity on the Continent around the same time.107 Burgundy appears to 
have been targeted in 910, when the abbey of Saint-Colombe of Sens was forti-
fied108 and Bishop Madalbert of Bourges was killed by the Northmen.109 This in-
cursion was probably the prelude to the campaign of 911, which lead to the battle 
of Chartres and the subsequent treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte. While a number 
of sources mention the battle,110 the only one providing further detail is Dudo of 
Saint-Quentin to whose account we will turn shortly. What seems to be clear from 
these sources is the leading role of both Robert of Neustria and Richard the Jus-
ticiar (as well as, according to Dudo, Ebalus Manzer of Poitiers)111 in the victory. 
The participation of the first two seems certain since there is also a letter pre-
served demonstrating their efforts to coordinate their forces before the battle.112 
None of these sources provide any indication about Charles’  involvement in the 
campaign. However, the question is which form such an involvement would have 
taken. Louis the Stammerer, when crossing the Seine, only reacted to a call from 
Hugh the Abbot, Louis  III’s intervention in the area also included negotiations 
106 Vogel, Normannen, 384, argued that the absence of reports concerning the Northmen most likely 
indicates that they remained on the continent, since otherwise there would be records of their 
movements. While this is certainly possible, the silence of the sources may equally indicate that 
they turned to Britain or Britanny.
107 McNair, Development, 72.
108 Annales S. Columbae Senonensis 910, 104. 
109 Annales Masciacenses 910, 169. It may be that the report of the Gesta Pontificum Autissiodoren­
sium (I, 195) of a battle between Bishop Geran of Auxerre and the Northmen refers to this incur-
sion as well.
110 Among others: Annales S. Columbae Senonensis 911, 104; Chronicon S. Petri Vivi Senonensis, 70; 
Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 14, 407.
111 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 21, 160−161 and c. 24, 164.
112 Bibl. commun. Chartres, ms. 92, fol. 38v. Catalogue Chartres, 48: Rotbertus comes et dux Manas­
sae Richardo comiti salutem. Scitote quoniam fuimus perrecti contra Normannos, sed non inven­
ientes regressi sumus Parisius mittentes ad vos et requirimus utrum vos necne venieris ad nos.
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with the Bretons. In fact,  Robert appears to have been quite capable of defending 
the Loire on his own. Probably in 903, Tours was attacked and burnt down by 
Vikings113 while from 915 onwards the Loire again appears to have been penetrated 
by the Northmen who used the river mainly for raids into Brittany.114 This latter 
group was likely the same one that Robert fought in 921 before ceding Brittany 
and the pagus of Nantes to them in return for the conversion.115 On none of these 
occasions do the sources report any involvement from Charles’  side, the last one 
even seems to indicate that Robert enjoyed some liberty when it came to negotiat-
ing peace deals.116 This liberty was nothing new.117 Already Robert the Strong had 
negotiated a tribute payment with a group of Northmen allied with the Breton 
Salomon118 and also Hugh the Abbot appears to have concluded a treaty with-
out the king, baptising a number of Northmen.119 At least on the latter occasion, 
Charles the Bald appears to have given his consent only afterwards. Furthermore, 
as we have seen, also Gauzlin, in absence of Charles the Fat, negotiated an agree-
ment with Siegfrid, one of the Viking leaders besieging Paris, paying him a tribute 
for agreeing to an amicitia. Just like in the former two cases, also Robert may 
have intended to ask for Charles the Simple’s confirmation of the deal. Thus, in 
the case of the campaign leading to the battle of Chartres, it seems likely that 
while Robert and Richard were in charge of the forces, they, nevertheless, acted in 
Charles’  name and probably with him an overseeing role.120 As we have argued in 
the previous chapter, based on one of Robert’s private charters,121 it appears that 
Robert acted on the king’s behalf when fighting the Northmen. If this was indeed 
the case, the campaign leading to the battle of Chartres would be an example of 
how Charles was able to coordinate forces from different parts of his realm in an 
attempt to organise an appropriate response to the incursion. Charles’  ability to do 
this would be confirmed if the diplomas issued in June 914 during a couple of days 
are indeed the signs of a campaign against the Breton march in the wake of the 
113 Chronicon Turonese Magnum, 107. The editor also makes mention of a note in a tenth-century 
manuscript at the library of Tours, reading: Anno incarnactionis dominiciae DCCCC III, II kalen­
das Julii, missa videlicet Sancti Pauli apostoli, regnante Karolo filio Hludovici Balbi, post obitum 
domni Odonis regis in anno VI, et Rotberti abbatis anno XV, iterum succensa est venerabilis basili­
ca Sancti Martini Turonis cum XXVIII aliis ecclesiis ab Heric et Baret Nortmannis cum toto castello 
et burgis. On the Viking incursions and Tours, see Gasnault, Tombeau and Noizet, Chanoines.
114 Vogel, Normannen, 400−401.
115 Flodoard, Annales 921, 6.
116 Sassier, Hugues, 82. 
117 On negotiations between Frankish nobles and Northmen in general, see Neifeind, Verträge, 
43−45.
118 Annales Bertiniani 862, 89−90.
119 Annales Bertiniani 876, 206.
120 It was common practice for Carolingian kings to delegate military commands to leading nobles. 
Scharff, Gott, 277−283.
121 Dufour, Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 47, 181−186 (11th November 912), 184: Domnus Rotbertus 
[…] gloriosus abbas necnon et comes, propter diversa regnorum Francię atque Neustrię negotia, 
quibus a rege prepositus erat, ab urbe Turonica fere per biennium defuisset… On this charter, see 
also Guyotjeannin, Notice and Guillot, Formes, 83, n. 101. See chapter III.2.3.
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breakdown of order in Brittany due to a Viking incursion, with the participation 
of forces from Neustria and Burgundy.122
While the examples of 900, 911 and 914 demonstrate Charles’ ability to mobi-
lise and coordinate forces in defence of the realm, on another occasion he does 
not seem to have been able to do this as easily. Flodoard’s account in the Historia 
Remensis Ecclesiae concerning the Hungarian invasion of Lotharingia reports that 
Charles’ call to arms was only answered by Archbishop Heriveus of Reims.123 As 
we have argued above, Flodoard’s report appears to have been grossly exaggerated 
and constructed in a way to portray Heriveus in the best light possible.124 Never-
theless, it would appear that, on this occasion, the response to Charles’ call was 
only a limited one. His first call would undoubtedly have gone to his Lotharingian 
supporters and only after that to his West Frankish men because the Hungarian 
attack came from the east. Indeed, Flodoard only speaks of the “great men of the 
Franks” (proceres Francorum) failing to respond, a designation that does not neces-
sarily include the nobles from Lotharingia.125 It may even be the case that Heriveus 
joined the king’s forces early on not because he had been called, but out of his own 
interest since the church of Reims had property in Lotharingia.126 Be that as it may, 
Flodoard’s report remains unsatisfactory, not even reporting whether the king’s 
measures against the Hungarians were crowned with success or resulted in failure.
However, military campaigns were not the only means the king used to protect 
his realm from the Northmen. As we have mentioned above, the Anglo-Saxon 
chronicle reports a Viking war leader in England, Earl Thurcetel, preparing for a 
venture into the West Frankish realm with the consent and aid of King Edward.127 
In this context, Charles’  marriage with Edward’s daughter Eadgifu takes on a new 
meaning, namely that of an alliance between the two kings in the shadow of the 
Viking incursions which prevented Edward from giving further aid to Northmen 
aiming for Charles’  regnum. This marriage reveals that Charles was willing to fol-
low other ways than his predecessors, to break out of the old patterns of military 
122 See chapters III.1.1 and III.2.3.
123 Flodoard, HRE IV, 14, 407.
124 See chapter III.3.
125 Flodoard, HRE IV, 14, 407. At least in his annals Flodoard draws a clear line between Franks 
and Lotharingians. For example Flodoard, Annales 920, 2: …pene omnes Franciae comites regem 
suum, Karolum, […] reliquerunt. Opposed to 4: ...Giselberto, quem plurimi Lotharienses princi­
pem, relicto Karolo rege, delegerant ordinavit. And 922, 10: Franci Rotbertum seniorem eligunt… 
Versus Flodoard, Annales 922, 10: Lotharienses quidam regrediuntur ad sua, quidam cum Karolo 
pergunt. And 11: Rotbertus filium suum, Hugonem, in regnum Lotharii mittit cum aliquo Franco­
rum agmine… as to Flodoard, Annales 922, 11. Hugo, acceptis obsidibus a quibusdam Lothariensi­
bus, ad patrem remeavit.
126 For example Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 388. Archbishop Fulk to Archbishop Hermann of Cologne: 
Intimat preterea res quasdam Remensis ecclesie in ipsius parochia perverso iure a quibusdam per­
vasoribus possideri.
127 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, MS A, 916, 66: 7 þy ilcan geare for Þurcytel eorl ofer sæ on Froncland 
mid þam mannum þe him gelæstan woldon mid Eadweardes cynges friþe 7 fultume. See chap-
ter III.2.2.2.
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campaigns and paying tribute by thinking further ahead and depriving at least 
some Northmen of their base and hence hampering their raids into his realm.
Thus, Charles dealt with the Viking threat on several levels. In terms of military 
measures, he appears to have been able to mobilise sufficient forces to challenge 
the Northmen and pin them down. If necessary, he was able to rely on forces from 
the entire realm, revealing the full extent of his possibilities. However, at the same 
time, these large scale operations also reveal his limitations: carrying them out 
depended on the cooperation of the leading nobles. If one of them stood against 
him, his ability to defend the realm suffered a serious blow, not only because he 
then was missing part of his support, but also because, as in the case of Baldwin, 
he needed to shift his attention away from the Northmen and concentrate on the 
nobles opposing him. As under his predecessors, military operations appear to 
have yielded mixed results at best and were not able to achieve a durable solution. 
It is altogether more interesting that Charles appears to have come to that same 
conclusion and tried to pursue new strategies. Depriving the Northmen of their 
bases in England was one of these means. Another was the adoption of a new dip-
lomatic strategy, to which we will now turn.
V.2 Diplomatic solutions
V.2.1 Dudo’s De moribus et actis primorum Normanniae ducum
Raising armies and trying to defeat the Northmen were only one means of deal-
ing with the Viking threat. Another one, seemingly much more effective, was to 
come to an agreement with them. As we have seen above, apart from Louis the 
Stammerer, each of the kings concluded treaties with the Northmen, involving 
the payment of a tribute for the safety of the realm.128 Charles the Simple is not 
reported to have made such payments, yet given the absence of narrative sources 
for almost 20 years of his reign, this is hardly surprising, and it cannot be taken 
as evidence that Charles’  politics differed from those of his predecessors. In fact, 
Charles concluded at least one treaty with the Northmen, the treaty of Saint-Clair-
sur-Epte, which was probably agreed upon in the wake of the battle of Chartres in 
911 and followed by the settlement of the Vikings in Normandy. The main source 
for these events is Dudo of Saint-Quentin’s work De moribus et actis primorum 
Normanniae ducum,129 a highly problematic narrative account of the foundation of 
the duchy of Normandy. Dudo belonged to a Frankish cultural milieu, had strong 
links to a church in the old Carolingian heartlands130 and seems to have been 
128 A concisive account of the treaties between Northmen and Francs is provided by Neifeind, 
 Verträge. As he (Verträge, 22) has pointed out, none of these are preserved in written form.
129 Lair, De moribus.
130 Labande, Historiographie, 759−760 and Duby, Ordres, 108 argue for Reims. Shopkow, World, 
argues for Liège.
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strongly influenced by Bishop Adalbero of Laon to whom he dedicated his work.131 
A canon at Saint-Quentin, he was sent by Albert of Vermandois as an  ambassador 
to  Richard I, for whom he then served as deacon. After Richard’s death, he served 
his son and successor Richard II as chaplain and chancellor. Thus, he was inte-
grated in the Norman court and acquainted with its procedures.132 Richard I had 
commissioned the De Moribus, and the commission was renewed after his death 
in 996 by his son Richard II and half-brother Raoul, count of Ivry. The first version 
was probably drafted between 996 and 1015, with a revision following afterwards.133 
Dudo used written accounts, first of all Flodoard’s Annales, but his chief inform-
ants were members of the ducal family: Raoul of Ivry, Richard I’s half-brother, the 
duchess Gunnor and probably also Archbishop Robert.134
Dudo’s De moribus was criticised vehemently by Henry Prentout, who  described 
him as “Poète et rhéteur, amateur de pittoresque, voilà trois défauts  impardonnables 
chez un historien; ajoutons-y le goût du délayage, le besoin de raconter en six 
pages ce qui pouvait se dire en quelques lignes, la manie d’ introduire dans sa 
narration des dialogues, des discours…”135 Since then Dudo has been treated more 
kindly by scholars136 who have revealed the ideological background of De moribus 
as a lineage-story of the Dukes of Normandy.137 While this emphasis on the literary 
character of Dudo’s work in general has shifted the focus away from the question 
of how far his account is based on historical events,138 the problem has not been 
 forgotten entirely by scholars, leading to very different assessments.139
An interesting case study which serves to shed some light on this problem is 
Pierre Bouet’s on Dudo’s depiction of the Viking Hasting, the main character of 
De moribus ’  first book. He argues that none of Hasting’s actions were invented 
by Dudo. In fact, allusions to most events Dudo has Hasting participate in can 
be found in other sources. However, Dudo not only changed the chronology, but 
also used Hasting as a symbolic figure of wrongdoing by ascribing the devastation 
caused by other Viking leaders such as Oscar, Siegfrid, Björn, Ragnar and Hun-
deus to him.140 This, of course, renders his whole account extremely problematic as 
a source of hard facts. But we should not rely on the case of Hasting to discern the 
131 Duby, Ordres, 108−112 and Bauduin, Normandie, 64.
132 Baudiun, Normandie, 63−64.
133 Bauduin, Normandie, 64. Contrary to Bauduin, the poetry in the Historia Normannorum appears 
not to have been added later on but to have been part of the original design. Pohl, Dudo, 254.
134 Bauduin, Normandie, 64−66 and Searle, Kinship, 65−66 and 93−97. On her, see also Van Houts, 
Countess. On Dudo’s written sources, see also Shopkow, World, 24−25.
135 Prentout, Étude, 19−20.
136 See the studies of Labande, Historiographie.
137 Davis, Normans, 50−62; Bates, Normandy, XIV−XVII; Searle, Fact, 119−137 and Kinship, 61–67; 
Jordan, Role, 53−62; Lifshitz, Dudo, 101−120 and Shopkow, History, 68−63.
138 Shopkow, World, 19−20. 
139 See Bouet, Négociations, 90, in favour of Dudo being a critical historian and hence a valuable 
source versus Bauduin, Normandie, 62−63, according to whom these expectations are too high.
140 Bouet, Hasting, 216−217. A comparison of Dudo’s account with other sources is also offered by 
Prentout, Étude, 48−59 and 64−82.
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reliability of the entire account of De moribus. Did Dudo apply the same technique 
to the main character of his second book, Rollo? According to Dudo’s account, 
Rollo first appears in the Frankish world when he installs himself at Walcheren,141 
an event that probably reflects the arrival of the Great Army from England in 
879.142 His subsequent move to the Scheldt and the occupation of Condé during 
the winter143 are also reported by the Annales Vedastini for the years 880−882, re-
ferring to an incursion led by Siegfrid and Gottfrid.144 Count Reginar being cap-
tured by Rollo on this occasion undoubtedly stems from Regino’s account, who 
reports the same for a certain count Eberhard in 880.145 The following turn of Rollo 
towards the Seine, dated to 876 by Dudo,146 also finds a double correspondence in 
the contemporary sources. For the very same year the Annales Bertiniani note the 
arrival of about 100 Viking ships entering the river 16th September,147 although in 
accordance with the following events described by Dudo more match the advance 
of the Northmen on Paris in 885.148 In reaction to the incursion, the Franks are 
then said to have gathered an army under the command of Ragenold and to have 
sent Hasting to treat with Rollo149—Ragenold is also named as the Frankish leader 
by the Annales Vedastini150 while Hasting is undoubtedly a reference to Siegfrid, 
who was sent to deal with the Northmen attacking Amiens the year before.151 Even 
an allusion to the mockery of Dudo’s Northmen can be found in the Annales, 
namely at Leuven in 885.152 Rollo’s march on and siege of Paris, including the death 
of Ragenold,153 are equally well known from other sources,154 although Rollo does 
not appear in them. Thus, like Hasting, Dudo’s Rollo appears to be constructed 
out of several other, often unknown Viking leaders raiding the Francia during the 
870s and 880s. The general tenor of this construct, however, is diametrically op-
posed to that of Hasting. Dudo’s description of Rollo raiding into Burgundy and 
along the Loire preceding the battle of Chartres for example can also be traced in 
the contemporary Frankish sources.155 Yet, Dudo adds some new aspects that por-
tray Rollo, although still a pagan, in the best light possible: “Some of his men went 
141 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 9, 149. Our analysis follows the ones provided by Prentout, Étude and 
Christiansen, Dudo.
142 Annales Vedastini 879, 44−45. Christiansen, Dudo, 189, n. 145. 
143 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 9, 150.
144 Annales Vedastini 880−882, 46−53. Prentout, Étude, 163–167 and Christiansen, Dudo, 190, n. 151.
145 Regino, Chronicon 881, 117. Prentout, Étude, 166.
146 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 11, 151−152.
147 Annales Bertiniani 876, 207. Christiansen, Dudo, 190, n. 156.
148 Annales Vedastini 885, 57.
149 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 13, 154−155.
150 Annales Vedastini 885, 57. See also chapter II.3.
151 Annales Vedastini 884, 55. 
152 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 13, 154−155. Annales Vedastini 885, 56−57. Christiansen, Dudo, 191, n. 165.
153 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 14−16, 155−158.
154 Annales Vedastini 885−886, 56−63, and Abbo, Bella. See Christiansen, Dudo, 192, n. 171 and 172 
for further details.
155 See chapter V.1.3, n. 108 and 109.
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to Burgundy; they sailed up the Yonne to the Saône, laying waste the lands next 
to the rivers everywhere as far as Clermont, and pushed on into the province of 
Sens, and returned to meet Rollo at Saint-Benoît, ravaging everything. However, 
on seeing the monastery of Saint-Benoît, Rollo refused to defile it, nor would he 
allow that province to be despoiled, for Saint Benedict’s sake.”156 Even the battle of 
Chartres is reinterpreted, since in Dudo’s presentation it is not a defeat but rather 
a non-victory in which Rollo ordered a tactical retreat.157 As Eric Christiansen puts 
it: Rollo was Dudo’s “Viking Aeneas, following a destiny first laid down by Vergil 
for the Roman precursor,” developing through baptism “into a Clovis, benefactor 
of the churches and divinely-sanctioned conqueror.”158
V.2.2 The treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte
Dudo’s technique of rearranging and relabelling his sources while mixing them 
with actual events makes his account of the treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte highly 
problematic, which means that each term needs to be evaluated in the context of 
other sources. According to Dudo, the terms agreed upon consisted of a donation 
of the land between the Epte and the sea, to be held in perpetuity as personal prop-
erty, as well as Brittany to live from since their new lands had been left uncultivated 
for a long time. Rollo then swore an oath of fealty by placing his hands between 
those of the king and in turn received Charles’  daughter Gisela as his wife. The 
ceremony was to be concluded by Rollo kissing the foot of the king, however, as he 
was unwilling to do so, he ordered a warrior to act in his stead. Instead of kneeling 
down, the warrior remained standing, raised Charles’  foot to his lips and kissed it, 
causing the king to fall on his back.159 Directly connected to the treaty was Rollo’s 
baptism which took place some time after the meeting at Saint-Clair-sur-Epte.160
156 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 21, 161: Sui autem in Burgundiam pergentes, perque Ionam in Sigonam 
navigantes, terrasque amnibus affines usque Clarum­Montem undique secus devastantes, Seno­
nis provinciam invaserunt, atque cuncta depopulantes ad Sanctum Benedictum contra Rollonem 
revenerunt. Videns autem Rollo monasterium Sancti Benedicti, illud contaminare noluit, nec 
praedari illam provinciam propter sanctum Benedictum permisit. Translation by Christiansen, 
Dudo, 42.
157 Dudo, De moribus  II, c.  23, 162: Rollo vero, more soliteo constanter irruit super illos atque, in 
primo apparatu belli, superavit, fortiter dimicans illos. … Cernens autem se Rollo inter utrumque 
exercitum stare, seque non praevalare suosque decrescere, transiens per medium illorum, coepit ab 
eis declinare, ne praeoccuparetur morte.
158 Christiansen, Dudo, XIX. On the origins of the historical Rollo, see Douglas, Rollo; Musset, 
Origine and Renaud, Vikings, 47−55.
159 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 28, 168−169 and c. 29, 169. On this kiss, see Hattenhauer, Aufnahme, 
22−37 and Bauduin, Rituel. Both admit that this ritual could have taken place, but disbelieve the 
form reported by Dudo, a position that we share.
160 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 30, 170.
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In general, baptism seems to have been a prerequisite for a treaty between 
Carolingians and Northmen.161 And, in fact, Flodoard notes that Christianisation 
was part of the agreement.162 The conversion itself is well documented and has 
been made subject of a study by Olivier Guillot.163 Here, two sources are central, 
a letter from Archbishop Heriveus of Reims to his colleague, Wido of Rouen164 
and another one from Pope John X to Heriveus.165 Both letters are part of an ex-
change originating at Rouen, in which Wido first seems to have asked the other 
archbishop what to do with the Northmen who, despite having been baptised, 
repeatedly fell back on their pagan habits. Heriveus then brought the matter to 
John X and, having received his reply, composed his advice in form of 23 chapters. 
It is hardly surprising that the conversion of the Northmen did not come without 
difficulties and took at least several years. As Guillot has emphasised, this was an 
evolutionary process, and, in the end, a successful one.166
Flodoard also mentions another part of the treaty: a donation of land, several 
pagi by the sea devastated by the Vikings, as well as the city of Rouen and all its 
dependencies.167 This is further confirmed by a royal diploma issued in 918, indi-
cating that a part of the possessions of the abbey of Croix-Saint-Ouen in Mérezais 
at the Eure had earlier been given to Rollo and his companions.168 Lucien Musset 
has tried to reconstruct the borders of the territories ceded to the Vikings and de-
duced that they were constituted more or less by the rivers Bresle, Epte, Eure and 
Avre in the east and south, while nothing is known about the western frontier.169 
The devastation of this area as described by Flodoard cannot be doubted, given 
the frequency of the Viking incursions of the preceding decades.170 According to 
Jacques Le Maho, during the early years of Odo’s reign, due to this constant threat, 
161 On the role of baptism in Franco−Viking relations, see Lynch, Godparents, 169−192 and Coviaux, 
Baptême, 71–75.
162 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 14, 407.
163 Guillot, Conversion.
164 BNF lat. 4280 A fol. 102−106. Referred to by Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 14, 407.
165 Zimmermann, Papsturkunden, N° 38, 65−67 (JL 3553).
166 Guillot, Conversion, 104.
167 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 14, 407.
168 DChS 92. On the possessions of Croix-Saint-Ouen see Bauduin, Normandie, 124−125
169 Musset, Considérations, 404−405. See 406−407 for more detail since the frontier did not follow 
the run of the rivers. The river Bresle as frontier is deduced from a meeting between Charles, Her-
ibert II of Vermandois and William Longsword in 927 at Eu (Flodoard, Annales 927, 39). Musset 
seems to assume that it had been chosen for the meeting because it was situated at the frontier. 
Frontier meetings were common between parties of equal standing (for royal meetings, see Voss, 
Herrschertreffen, 39−64). Making the Bresle the frontier therefore requires that Heribert II and 
William Longsword considered each other as equals, something that we cannot prove. The Eure is 
deduced from Charles’ diploma of 918 (DChS 92) and the proximity of Croix-Saint-Ouen to the 
river. The Avre can only be traced as frontier from 935 onwards. The only safe deduction seems to 
be the Epte, which is given not only by Dudo, but also by Flodoard (Annales 923, 16).
170 For an account, see Bauduin, Normandie, 97−99 and Le Maho, Seine, 21−23. Against this view, 
arguing for a strong continuity among the local population, see Bates, Normandy, 11 and McNair, 
Politics, 310.
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Rouen was transformed into a “ville-refuge.”171 The fortifications supposedly were 
restored and a large part of the rural population sought refuge there, while the do-
mains they had abandoned fell under royal control.172 If this was indeed the case, 
this would undoubtedly have facilitated the treaty concluded between Charles and 
Rollo. Royal control over a large part of the territory, as well as its deserted state, 
would have ensured that the interests of Frankish nobles were hardly affected and 
the abandoned villages could then have been occupied by the Northmen, if they 
had not already done so.173
The cession of land is commonly assumed to have been tied to another condi-
tion, the protection of the Seine from further Viking incursions by Rollo and his 
men.174 The basis for this assumption is Charles’  diploma of 918 which states that 
the monks of Saint-Germain were given the land of Croix-Saint-Ouen, “apart 
from the parts which we have given to the Northmen at the Seine, that is to say 
Rollo and his companions, for the protection of the realm.”175 However, the phras-
ing “for the protection of the realm” is rather ambiguous. While it may indeed in-
dicate that Rollo was charged with preventing other Northmen from entering the 
Seine, it may as well simply be a phrasing used to legitimise the ceding of land per 
se—to protect the realm from Rollo himself.176 This question leads us to examine 
what role Rollo played within the political hierarchy of the realm from this point 
onwards.177 For Karl Ferdinand Werner, Rollo was made count of Rouen and, 
the pagus being part of Neustria, put under the jurisdiction of Robert.178 Pierre 
Bauduin, on the other hand, interprets Rollo as a marchio in his own, who was 
171 Le Maho, Installations, 157. Critical on Le Maho’s assumption that Odo had a hand in 
this  development Bauduin, Normandie, 110−111, pointing out that the royal hand in these 
 developments is hardly reflected by the sources.
172 Le Maho, Installations, 158−159 and 161−164.
173 Le Maho, Seine, 27−32, proposes that already before 911 the territory between the sea and the 
Andelle had been ceded to another group of Northmen as part of Charles’ treaty with Hundeus. 
However, his argumentation is based on a lost source probably used by Dudo and on a hoard 
found at Saint-Pierre-des-Fleurs which is brought in connection with the account of the Annales 
Vedastini. The latter, however, do not give the slightest indication that land had been ceded at that 
moment. Furthermore, it appears doubtful that Charles at that moment—he had sought refuge in 
Lotharingia—would have been able to make anything else but promises. If such a cessation had 
been agreed upon, it would have had to be made by Odo. The hoard definitely confirms Viking 
presence at that moment, but this does not necessarily mean that it had been with royal consent. 
Werner, Origines, 442 and Bauduin, Normandie, 111 argue for a Viking occupation of the regions 
at the mouth of the Seine from about 900. In fact, despite the devastation, there appears to have 
been a strong continuity in terms of settlement and the new settlers were soon integrated into the 
existing structures. Musset, Essai, 97−102.
174 See for example Bauduin, Normandie, 133−134.
175 DChS 92, 211: … praeter partem ipsius abbatię quam annuimus Normannis Sequanensibus, vide­
licet Rolloni suisque comitibus, pro tutela regni.
176 See also Searle, Rivalries, 203−204 and Searle, Kingship, 43.
177 In favour of an immediate integration: Lot, Fidèles, 177−185; Brühl, Deutschland, 395−398; Bates, 
Normandy, 149−150 and Neveux, Normandie, 29−33.
178 Werner, Observations, followed by McKitterick, Frankish Kingdoms, 237 and Sot, Historien, 216. 
Against this reading, see Helmerichs, Princeps.
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installed by Charles to act as counterweight to Robert.179 Both readings assume 
that in the wake of the treaty Rollo had become a fully integrated member of the 
Frankish nobility. Yet, Charles’  diploma does not refer to him as comes or marchio 
but plainly as Rollo. The same is also true of the main narrative source of the time, 
the writings of Flodoard, who is usually very precise about the application of ti-
tles. As Eleanor Searle points out, for him Rollo and his son William Longsword 
are “chieftain [princeps] of the Norse,” but never comes.180 Concerning the integra-
tion of Rollo into the structures of the realm, we should also take the actual con-
tent of the diploma into consideration. Pierre Bauduin argues that the land was 
given to Rollo in alodo et in fundo (“as an allod and property”), a phrasing that 
implies the unconditional and permanent character of the donation.181 However, 
these expressions are only applied by Dudo182 and not, as Bauduin seems to im-
ply, by Charles’  diploma. Hence, the legal foundations of the ceding are entirely 
unknown. From what the sources are able to tell us, it seems that Rollo’s position 
in the realm was in fact far less formalised than often assumed. This is not to say 
that Rollo did not become or had not already become integrated into Frankish 
society. Indeed, he was no stranger to the leading nobles of the adjoining coun-
ties. Several years before 911 he had already taken a woman called Poppa183 as his 
companion who had given birth to his son William. According to Dudo, Poppa 
was the daughter of a certain Berengar, possibly an Unruoching.184 Following the 
tradition of the Annals of Jumièges however, Poppa was the daughter of Count 
Wido of Senlis and sister to Bernard.185 The question of her heritage has yet to be 
answered,186 but, as Pierre Bauduin has emphasised, the important point is that 
by this relation Rollo was introduced into the Frankish networks of alliances and 
parentage.187
These networks lead to the final part of Dudo’s report of the treaty of Saint-
Clair-sur-Epte, namely the marriage between Rollo and Charles’  daughter Gisela. 
Marrying his daughter off to Rollo would certainly have tied the latter even more 
strongly to the king than his conversion and the donation of land. Yet, was Rollo 
really important enough to enter into a marriage alliance with Charles? Dudo 
certainly does his best to portray Rollo as an all-powerful Viking warleader. Yet, 
the political reality appears to have been rather different. When Charles opened 
179 Bauduin, Chefs normands, 189.
180 Searle, Kinship, 45. McNair, Politics, 312, questions the existence of a count of Rouen even before 
the Norman settlement. 
181 Bauduin, Chef normands, 182. Translation by Christiansen, Dudo, 49.
182 See chapter V.2.2, n. 159.
183 On her see Keats-Rohan, Poppa and Bauduin, Normandie, 129−132.
184 Dudo, De Moribus  II, c.  16, 157. Merlet, Origine, 551−552. On the Unruochings see Werner, 
Adelsfamilien, 133–137.
185 Annales de Jumièges 912, 51.
186 Nelson, Normandy, 11−12, argues against Poppa’s existence based on the unreliability of Dudo’s 
account.
187 Bauduin, Normandie, 132.
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negotiations with the Northmen after the battle of Soissons, his principal target ap-
pears to have been Ragenold, the leader of the Vikings at the Loire. When he reacted 
to Charles’  call, Flodoard reports that was joined “by many from Rouen”188—Rollo 
is not mentioned at all. Later that year, these Northmen from Rouen concluded 
a treaty with Heribert  II of Vermandois, Archbishop Seulf of Reims and other 
Frankish nobles, granting them more land beyond the Seine which was confirmed 
by King Raoul shortly afterwards.189 Flodoard does not mention Rollo either at 
this point or during the following year, although the Northmen he speaks of are 
clearly from Rouen.190 Even when these Northmen broke the treaty the follow-
ing year, Flodoard again only calls them “Northmen from Rouen,” again without 
mentioning Rollo191 and continues to do so for the subsequent campaign against 
them.192 Only when Raoul directly attacked the Northmen within their territory 
is Rollo finally mentioned, this time as their princeps, sending troops from Rouen 
in support of a praesidium threatened by the Frankish army.193 Flodoard’s account 
seems to indicate that Rollo’s control over the Northmen at Rouen was rather 
limited at this point, that he was only one leader among others and that these 
others were able to operate independently from him.194 Viking armies were hetero-
geneous groups, consisting of numerous warbands under their own leaders who 
had joined for some time, but could always fall apart again to pursue their own 
188 Flodoard, Annales 923, 15: Interea Ragenoldus, princeps Nordmannorum qui in fluvio Ligeri ver­
sabantur, Karoli frequentibus missis jampridem excitus, Franciam trans Isaram, conjunctis sibi 
plurimis ex Rodomo depraedatur.
189 Flodoard, Annales 923, 17−18.
190 Flodoard, Annales 924, 19: Anno DCCCCXXIIII incipiente, fit exactio per Franciam pecuniae 
collaticiae, quae Nordmannis pacto pacis daretur… 24: Nordmanni cum Francis pacem ineunt 
sacramentis per Hugonem et Heribertum comites, Seulfum quoque archiepiscopum, absente rege 
Rodulfo, ejus tamen consensu terra illis aucta, Cinomannis et Baiocae pacto pacis eis concessae. 
That this Ragenold was not included in these negotiations becomes apparent from another pas-
sage: Ragenoldus cum suis Nordmannis, quia nondum possessionem intra Gallias acceperat, ter­
ram Hugonis inter Ligerim et Sequanam depopulatur. (Flodoard, Annales 924, 24−25).
191 Flodoard, Annales 925, 29: Nordmanni de Rodomo foedus quod olim pepigerant irrumpentes…
192 Flodoard, Annales 925, 30−31: Nordmanni usque ad Noviomagum praedatum veniunt, et sub­
urbana succendunt. Castellani cum suburbanis egredientes Nordmannos repellunt, sternunt quos 
poterant, partem suburbii liberant. Baiocenses interim terram Nordmannorum, ultra Sequanam, 
depraedantur. Quo comperto, Parisiaci et ipsi quoque, cum quibusdam fidelibus Hugonis, filii Rot­
berti, et quorumdam castellorum oppidanis, partem quamdam pagi Rotomagensis qui possideba­
tur a Nordmannis, cis Sequanam depopulati sunt, villis succensis, pecoribus abductis, nonnullis 
etiam Nordmannorum interfectis. Heribertus comes interea, cum paucis Francorum, quia parum 
adhuc herbae inveniebatur equis, transitum Nordmannis prohibendi gratia, super Isaram residebat. 
Nordmanni, terrae suae cognita vastatione, in sue festinant redire.
193 Flodoard, Annales 925, 31: Rodulfus interea de Burgundia revertitur in Franciam, et ut se ad bel­
lum contra Nordmannos praeparent Francis banno denuntiat. Heribertus igitur, expeditione coepta 
contra Nordmannos, cum militibus Remensis aecclesiae, Arnulfus quoque comes et ceteri maritimi 
Franci praesidium quoddam Nordmannorum aggrediuntur; quo etiam Rollo, princeps eorum, mille 
Nordmannos, praeter ipsius inhabitatores oppidi, ex Rodomo transmiserat.
194 Similar also Eleanor Searle, Rivalries, 208−213, who extends the argument of a weak Rollo and 
William Longsword into the 940s.
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goals.195 Hence, it seems plausible to assume that early on, Rollo’s position among 
the Northmen now settling around Rouen was not a dominant one and that his 
rise over the other leaders only took place when their new home was threatened 
by the Frankish forces and he took charge of the defence.
If Rollo’s position among the Northmen was indeed a weak one, a marriage to 
Charles’  daughter appears rather unlikely. Of course, such a marriage would not 
have been unprecedented. In 882, the Viking leader Gottfrid, upon concluding 
a treaty with Charles the Fat, was not only ceded territory in Frisia in return for 
becoming a Christian, but also married to a Carolingian princess, the illegitimate 
daughter of Lothar  II and Waldrada.196 Yet, this same case also underlines why 
Dudo’s account is so problematic when it comes to the marriage: Gottfrid’s bride 
was called Gisela. It would be absolutely clear that Dudo was appropriating Gott-
frid’s career for his image of Rollo if the genealogy dictated by Charles to the can-
ons of Compiègne did not mention a Gisela among his own daughters.197 While it 
is impossible to tell whether Dudo’s account is correct or not, we have to refrain to 
point out that the marriage was rather unlikely.
Hence, the treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte appears to have consisted of two 
main parts: the cession of land, centred on Rouen; and the Christianisation of 
the Northmen. Given that the treaty was concluded in the wake of the victory at 
Chartres and Rollo’s apparently weak position amongst the Northmen up until 
the early 920s, it seems doubtful that becoming Christian should have been the 
only condition for the grant of land. Settling the Northmen at Rouen, controlling 
the lower Seine and access not only to Paris but also to the river systems leading 
deep into the realm, put Rollo’s Northmen in a position from where they could 
block the river to other invaders. At the same time, strong personal bonds were 
created by means of baptism and the grant, which tied the Viking leader close to 
Charles and his supporters. There was a risk that the Northmen would break the 
treaty and return to their old habits, yet at the same time this risk appears to have 
been calculable. The battle of Chartres had proven that West Frankish forces were 
now sufficiently strong to defeat the Northmen while Rollo himself was too weak 
to disturb the balance of power within the realm. Hence, it seems plausible that 
protecting the realm was indeed part of treaty.
V.2.3 Using an old solution in a new way
Saint-Clair-sur-Epte was not the first treaty concluded between the Franks and the 
Northmen. After the death of Charles the Bald, five are recorded by the sources. 
195 Keller, Négotiation, 103.
196 Annales Vedastini 882, 51−52; Annales Fuldenses (Mainz continuation) 883, 100.
197 Witger, Genealogia, 303.
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When dealing with the Northmen along the Loire, Louis III concluded an amici-
tia with the Viking leader Hasting, making them leave the realm.198 After Car-
loman II’s disastrous campaign of 883, the nobles took over and negotiated the 
payment of a tribute for the withdrawal of the Northmen.199 Charles the Fat, hav-
ing arrived with a large army to lift the siege of Paris, did the same, additionally 
opening Burgundy for them to pass the winter.200 Odo dealt with them twice, pay-
ing a tribute for their withdrawal from the realm,201 and the second time (similarly 
to Charles the Fat) giving them access to the Loire as well.202 These treaties reveal 
a remarkably consistent pattern. First of all, they were all aimed at removing the 
Northmen from the realm. This diplomatic strategy proved remarkably success-
ful, yet only helped to bring short- to mid-term relief. For example, Carloman II’s 
untimely death lead to the immediate return of the Northmen to Francia who 
claimed that the treaty just concluded had lost its validity with the king’s death. 
Similarly, Odo’s first treaty only lasted for a short period, for the Northmen re-
turned to the realm after having been repulsed by the Bretons. Second, all of these 
treaties appear to have been concluded under very similar circumstances. When 
Charles the Fat bought off the Northmen, he did so because the upcoming winter 
season rendered the continuation of the campaign impossible. Louis III’s treaty 
with Hasting appears to have been concluded because the king had split up his 
army, leaving him with insufficient forces. Similarly, Odo fell back on diplomatic 
solutions because he estimated himself too weak to militarily expel the Northmen. 
Finally, Carloman II’s treaty was the consequence of his disastrous defeat. In all of 
these cases, the rulers had reached the limits of their military capacities, rendering 
them incapable of achieving their goal of removing the Northmen from the realm 
by means of force. Saint-Clair-sur-Epte was different to these treaties in every re-
spect. Negotiated during a moment of military superiority, it was not aimed at 
making the Northmen leave, but at making them stay and protect the realm. The 
treaty was not without precedents. The treaty concluded between Charles the Fat 
and Gottfrid after the siege of Asselt appears to have been quite similar: apart from 
marrying into the Carolingian family, Gottfrid was also baptised and given control 
over Frisia.203 Yet, even this treaty was the consequence of having to abandon the 
siege because of supply problems and a disease outbreak in the Frankish camp.204 
Hence, Saint-Clair-sur-Epte appears as a conscious decision to try a new strategy 
in dealing with the Viking problem, a strategy that apparently paid off for the next 
decade. According to Flodoard, the Northmen only broke their part of the bar-
198 Annales Vedastini 882, 52.
199 Annales Vedastini 883, 54 and 55. See chapter V.1.1.
200 Annales Vedastini 886, 62. See chapter V.1.1.
201 Annales Vedastini 889, 67−68.
202 Annales Vedastini 897, 79.
203 Annales Vedastini 882, 51−52; Annales Bertiniani 882, 247−248; Regino, Chronicon 882, 119−120; 
Annales Fuldenses (Mainz continuation) 882, 98−99. On Gottfrid and Frisia, see also Coupland, 
Poachers, 108−112, and Besteman, Danish rule. 
204 Leyser, Warfare, 44−45.
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gain in 923, and this was only because they were then incited to do so by Charles 
himself.205
Such a change in policy raises the question of which role of the nobles around 
the king played in its prevalence. Geoffrey Koziol argues that the treaty prima-
rily reflects Charles’  own policy towards the Northmen, pointing out the alliances 
the king concluded in 897 and 923.206 However, these two examples are extremely 
problematic. On both occasions, Charles was in a desperate situation, having lost 
most of his supporters whilst facing overpowering enemies. Only under these cir-
cumstances did he reach out to the Northmen as potential allies. As soon as he be-
came king, the measures he took in the defence of the realm against the Northmen 
did not differ from those of his predecessors. Robert, on the other hand, is por-
trayed by Koziol as having been a resolute enemy of the Northmen and opposed to 
any treaty with them.207 Yet, Robert concluded a treaty extremely similar to Saint-
Clair-sur-Epte in 921 with the Northmen at the Loire, granting them Brittany and 
the pagus of Nantes in return for their conversion.208 More importantly, Robert 
was directly involved in the proceedings at Saint-Clair-sur-Epte where he acted 
as Rollo’s godfather209 and thus became the personification of the bond between 
the Northmen and the Franks. If Robert had indeed opposed the treaty, Charles 
would certainly have taken this position himself—he had done this already earlier 
in the case of Hundeus.
Yet, Hundeus’ case points to some other changes in the attitude of leading no-
bles towards the Northmen. Archbishop Fulk had harshly condemned Charles’ 
205 Flodoard, Annales 923, 16−17: Itta fluvio transito, ingressus est terram, quae dudum Nordmannis 
ad fidem Xρisti venientibus, ut hanc fidem colerent et pacem haberent, fuerat data;[…] ipsi Nor­
dmanni pacem quam pepigerant, propter promissiones Karoli, qui eis latitudinem terrae pollicitus 
fuerat, infregere, caedibus et igne devastat.
206 Koziol, Charles, 364 and Koziol, Politics, 433−439. To these two occassions, Koziol furthermore 
adds the attacks of the Northmen along the Loire in 898 and 921, assuming that they were at least 
partially initiated by Charles. As for 898, Odo himself had directed the Northmen to the Loire 
when he concluded a treaty with them during the previous year. Whether this meant that they 
were free to plunder the region does not become clear from the account of the Annales Vedastini, 
yet the treaty has strong parallels with the one concluded by Charles the Fat in 886 who opened 
Burgundy to the Northmen besieging Paris. But even if this was not the case, the Northmen may 
have considered the treaty rendered invalid by Odo’s death as they had done after Carloman’s. As 
for 921, again no source indicates Charles’ involvement. Given the problems with the Frankish 
nobles of the previous year, it seems indeed very unlikely that Charles would launch such an attack 
on Robert at this very moment. In the same manner Brunterc’h, Archives 1, 332, also argues that 
the treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte was Charles’ doing, “les grands et au premier chef Robert se sont 
alors écartés devant le roi.” Brunterc’h’s position is based on the phrasing of DChS 92, showing 
“que c’est Charles le Simple et lui seul” who had ceded the land to Rollo and his compagnions. 
While it is correct that the phrasing of the diploma only refers to Charles himself, we should not 
forget that, with the diploma being issued by the king, it only tells the reader about the way Charles 
wanted the treaty and his role in it to be remembered, not the actual political circumstances.
207 Koziol, Politics, 435−437.
208 Flodoard, Annales 921, 6. 
209 Dudo, De moribus II, c. 30, 170. Dudo’s account seems to be confirmed by a diploma of Duke Rich-
ard I (DDN 3, 18th March 968, 3: memoria avi me Roberti patrisque mei bone memorie  Willelmi.).
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alliance with the Northmen,210 seemingly opposing any dealings with “the enemies 
of God.” However, after Fulk’s death his successor Heriveus appears to have pur-
sued a programme of converting the Northmen, seemingly even preceding the 
treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte, as is apparent from Flodoard’s Historia Remensis 
Ecclesiae: “[Heriveus] vigorously laboured towards the appeasement and the con-
version of the Northmen, until finally, after the battle which Robert fought against 
them at Chartres, they started to receive the Christian faith…”211 It seems that by 
the early 900s a strong lobby had developed within the circle of the most im-
portant nobles around the king who now supported the very ideas the treaty of 
Saint-Clair-sur-Epte stood for. Within the context of the possibilities and limits of 
royal power, Charles’  options for dealing with the Viking threat had increased in 
comparison to his predecessors.
V.3 Conclusion
When dealing with the Vikings, the cooperation of the nobles played a central 
role for the rulers, although in military matters it was far from decisive. Carlo-
man’s and Odo’s victories were won by small armies while Carloman’s second 
campaign ended in disaster despite him now being supported by Hugh the Ab-
bot; and Charles the Fat, although he probably had the largest army of this time 
at his disposal, chose to negotiate instead of fighting. In any case, the results of 
seeking direct confrontation were mostly limited when it came to securing the 
realm against the Northmen—even Louis III’s victory of Saucourt only lead to a 
temporary shift of Viking activity to Lotharingia. One way to deal with this prob-
lem was a defensive strategy aimed at containing the Northmen in a specific area, 
as practised by Odo. Here however, the support and cooperation of the nobles 
became indispensable, as Odo’s attempts failed when Abbot Rodulf opened pri-
vate negotiations. When it came down to making the Northmen actually leave the 
realm, negotiations with the Northmen proved to be far more successful than the 
use of force. Yet, apart from Odo, the rulers appear to have reverted back to this 
strategy only under specific circumstances. Hasting, with whom Louis  III con-
cluded an amicitia, operated along the Loire, which was apparently only consid-
ered a secondary theatre of war by the king. Carloman’s treaty with the Northmen 
was the result of the nobles taking over after a disastrous campaign. Charles the 
210 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 384−385: Karolo regi suo scribens indignatur valde sibi perlatum, quod 
pravis quorundam consiliis vellet idem rex se sociare Nordmannis, ut illorum auxilio ad regni decus 
obtinendum iuvari posset. […] Sciatis enim, quia, si hoc feceritis et talibus consiliis adquieveritis, 
numquam me fidelem habebitis, sed et, quoscumque potuero, a vestra fidelitate revocabo et cum 
omnibus coepiscopis meis vos et omnes vestros excommunicans eterno anathemate condempnabo.
211 Flodoard, HRE  IV, c.  14, 407: De Nordmannorum quoque mitigatione atque conversione valde 
laboravit, donec tandem post bellum, quod Rotbertus comes contra eos Carnotenus gessit, fidem 
Christi suscipere ceperunt concessis sibi maritimis quibusdam pagis cum Rotomagensi, quam pene 
deleverant, urbe et isdem subiectis.
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Fat may have chosen to pay tribute to the Northmen because he probably would 
have run into severe problems in supplying his army. Odo, on the other hand, 
acting mainly defensively, seems to have considered negotiations an important 
part of his strategy to protect the realm from further incursions. In general, the 
rulers appear to have enjoyed the support of the nobles when negotiating—or, as 
Carloman’s example demonstrates, may have even been forced by them to enter 
into them. However, Charles the Simple renouncing Odo’s cautious strategy and 
returning to the more aggressive approach, as previously shown by his brothers 
and Charles the Fat, was supported by the leading nobles of his realm, among 
them also Odo’s brother Robert. It seems that there were limits on how far the 
nobles were willing to accept negotiations as an essential part of the measures 
taken against the Northmen and that these limits had been reached under Odo. 
The cooperation of these nobles with Charles also points to another observation: 
similar to his predecessors, Charles the Simple was able to coordinate large-scale 
operations. That Charles was not in military command of at least the campaign 
in 911 did not mean that these men acted on their own accord, but that Charles 
had delegated the task of defending the realm to them, similar to Gauzlin under 
Louis III and Carloman or Henry under Charles the Fat. It was also due to their 
support that Charles was able to implement a distinctive change in strategy. The 
treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte, negotiated from a position of strength in the wake 
of a major military victory, was no longer aimed at having the Northmen leave the 
realm, but at their settlement and conversion.

VI.	 Conflicts,	rebellions	and	the	role	of	trust
Over the past decades, the way conflict situations are interpreted has significantly 
changed. Conflicts are no longer read as a sign of the weakness of the medieval 
state, but acknowledged as an important part of the existing social order and a 
common experience.1 For example, Charlemagne’s reign was, as Janet Nelson 
phrases it, “one goddamned crisis after another.”2 In fact, conflicts between noble 
factions competing with each other or the king was one of the driving forces of 
politics throughout the entire Carolingian period.3 This change in reading is di-
rectly linked to the importance now attributed to social ties. Within conflicts, the 
opponents were usually not strangers to one another, but, as members of the same 
noble society, connected to each other by a complex system of social relations, 
which made solving the conflicts much more a question of social interaction than 
of legal dispute.4 Equally important, both parties were also part of larger social 
networks, networks they could manipulate to their own benefit “by mobilising 
groups that could be formed on the basis of kinship, lordship, common residence, 
association with a cult centre […] or other social ties”5 since these ties were often 
considered more important than the question of whether a claim was legally justi-
fied or not.6
The first section of this chapter focuses on two ways in which these social ties 
determined the possibilities and limits of royal power in conflict situations, an-
alysing the way they influenced the rulers’  strategies of bringing the respective 
conflicts to an end. Firstly, it is worth emphasising again that only a very limited 
number of nobles had direct access to the ruler.7 These nobles constituted the links 
between the ruler and his opponents, thus enabling communication between the 
opposing parties at any given time. Furthermore, they participated in the decision-
making process at court,8 meaning that they were able to directly influence the way 
the king addressed the conflict in question. Secondly, since the studies of Gerd 
Althoff, the existence of certain rules, or rather norms,9 in the dealings between 
king and nobles has been generally accepted by scholars.10 These norms, although 
never written down but commonly only referred to in very general terms, con-
stituted a framework when it came to deciding upon actions.11 Thus, in conflicts, 
 1 Goetz, Mediävistik, 194−195.
 2 Nelson, Difference, 172.
 3 Goldberg, Struggle, 8.
 4 Patzold, Konflikte, 199−200.
 5 White, Feuding, 258.
 6 Keller, Begrenzung, 86.
 7 Althoff, Verwandtschaft, 196−197.
 8 See Introduction.
 9 Buc, Review, 253. 
10 Althoff, Spielregeln. For the impact and discussion of the concept see Kamp, Macht, esp. 1−10.
11 Kamp, Macht, 4.
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these norms constituted a common ground which allowed the opposing parties 
to come to terms with each other.12 In the interpretation of these norms there 
certainly was room for manoeuvre,13 yet it was common for both kings and nobles 
to overstep these boundaries,14 which, in turn, led to an atmosphere of mistrust.15
In modern research, trust as a concept and the role it played in medieval rule 
have received surprisingly little attention, and only recently German scholars have 
paid it particular attention.16 Trust, or rather, interpersonal trust17 (given that Car-
olingian rule was primarily based on relations between individuals), is defined as 
an expectation concerning the future behaviour of another person. This expecta-
tion serves as a basis for one’s own decisions in regard to actions which may be in-
fluenced by the other person, taking into consideration the risk that the other may 
indeed act differently but assessing this risk as minor.18 Thus, when deciding about 
future actions, trust narrows down one’s options by providing a guideline which 
12 Althoff, Königsherrschaft.
13 Patzold, Konflikte and Inter pagensium.
14 Buc, Krise.
15 Kamp, Macht, 10−11; Reynolds, Trust, 2−3; Frevert, Vertrauen, 28−29.
16 Hirschbiegel, Nahbeziehungen, 48−76, provides a detailed overview. The importance of trust (and 
mistrust) as a political ressource has recently been demonstrated by Timmer, Vertrauen for the 
late Roman republic. The importance of trust throughout the middle ages has been questioned 
by Luhmann, Vertrauen. He argues that the medieval society, being one organised in rather small 
groups which were characterised by a natural and emotional familiarity, had no need for prag-
matically and politically oriented trust. In this, he is followed by Weltecke, Gab es Vertrauen, who 
proposes that it had only become possible to take the risk of trusting when institutional frame-
works provided by economy and politics developed, which created a general sense of security 
which allowed indivuals to operate more freely than during earlier times. Against Luhmann, see 
Weinfurter, Lehnswesen, 448; against Weltecke, see Althoff, Einführung, 250, and Hirschbiegel, 
Nahbeziehungen, 69−72, who argue for trust being a general phenomenon throughout the times, 
a position we share.
17 Reemtsma, Vertrauen, 35. Different (though closely connected to) from social trust, which de-
scribes the general readiness to trust other people. Putnam, Bowling Alone, 136. Interpersonal 
trust can further be divided into cognitive trust, which is based on former experiences with the 
other person, and affectional trust, which primarily rests on emotions. Cook and Gerbasi, Trust, 
223−224. The latter mostly occures in very close relationships (Cook and Gerbasi, Trust, 219−220 
and Hardin, Conceptions, 3−4). When talking about (interpersonal) trust, we refer to cognitive 
trust.
18 See Althoff, Einführung, 249, Frevert, Vertrauen, 8−9 and Hirschbiegel, Nahbeziehungen, 54−56, 
with further references. Very similar to the concept of trust is the concept of confidence. Follow-
ing Luhmann, Familiarity, 97−99, like trust also confidence is defined as an expectation about the 
future which may be disappointed. However, different from trust, confidence leaves the individual 
no choice since the risk that the future will develop in a different way than expected is minimal 
while the individual at the same time has no choice about not being confident. This definition still 
leaves some room for interpretation: according to Luhmann, this kind of confidence also applies 
to politics; citizens have no other choice than being confident that politicians will do anything to 
avert war (to quote one of his examples). This has been criticised by Reemtsma, Vertrauen, 38−39, 
who argues that citizens in fact do have a choice by choosing to change their leaders. He proposes 
a more restrictive approach, offering the example of natural laws: since humans have no influence 
on them and the risk of them failing being practically non-existent, humans have no choice but to 
be confident that they apply.
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helps to predict the behaviour of other people.19 According to Jan Hirschbiegel, 
interpersonal trust depends on four prerequisites which cover the different layers 
between an individual and the community in which it is embedded: first, a gen-
eral readiness to trust someone else; second, a specific readiness to trust a person 
which is based on one’s experiences with this person and their reputation; third, 
the so-called structural trust, that is to say the framework provided by the social 
groups the individuals are part of; and fourth, systemic trust, which is defined by 
the social, cultural, religious, political or otherwise impersonal frameworks char-
acterising society as a whole.20
In regard to Carolingian rule and our own study, the second point is of par-
ticular interest since it refers to a certain dynamic in the development and loss of 
trust, a dynamic which could be influenced by the ruler’s actions. These actions 
do not only have an impact on the degree of trust between the ruler and the par-
ticular noble involved, but also on the way he was perceived, that is to say how 
trustworthy he was considered to be by other nobles.21 Actions, even if they were 
only directed at a single noble, could damage the trust between the ruler and wider 
circles of the nobility and thus lead to a crisis of trust, potentially threatening his 
rule in general. Scholars have identified two dimensions which determine how an 
individual’s trustworthiness is perceived: first, their competence or reliability in 
performing a certain task or action in an appropriate manner and second, their 
integrity, honesty and commitment to take other parties’  interests into consid-
eration.22 In the first chapter we argued that the rebellion against Odo in 892 was 
in part due to a crisis of trust. One of the examples brought forward was the case 
of Baldwin, who refused Odo’s offer regarding the return of his deceased cousin 
Rodulf ’s abbeys when the king requested him come to court and rely on the royal 
generosity. This refusal aptly illustrates the nature of this crisis: it was rooted in 
doubts about Odo’s integrity as a king. Yet, there is also an example of a crisis of 
trust caused by lack of competence: when the nobles took over from Carloman II 
in late 883, this was the consequence of his disastrous campaign against the North-
men in the Vimeux23—Carloman was seemingly still trusted as far as his behav-
iour conformed to societal norms; yet, he was not trusted when it came to leading 
against the threat posed by the Northmen.
This brings us to the following sections of this chapter, which revolve around 
the role of trust in the case of rebellion. While conflicts usually developed over 
changes within the hierarchy of nobles, often revolving around the distribution of 
19 Luhmann, Vertrauen, 23−24; Marzano, Confiance, 53−54 and Weltecke, Gab es Vertrauen, 73. 
Against the pure rational choice approach pursued, for example, by Harding, Trust, Marzano 
rightly emphasises the non-rational aspects of trust such as the unconditional trust of children.
20 Hirschbiegel, Nahbeziehungen, 60−61.
21 On third-party effects of trust relations, see Burt and Kneez, Kinds and Hardin, Trust and Trust-
worthiness, 139−142.
22 Cook and Gerbasi, Trust, 222−223.
23 See chapters II.3 and V.1.1.
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honores, questions of rank and—directly connected with these two—political in-
fluence at the royal court,24 the parties involved accepted the ruler’s final authority. 
However, this changed in Odo’s case, when Fulk and his allies crowned Charles 
the Simple king. They questioned the former’s right to rule and attempted to re-
place him with another king—in other words, they rebelled.25 Régine Le Jan has 
described these rebellions as signs of a crisis of royal power, ascribing them to the 
reaction of the noble elites to royal policies attempting to interfere with what they 
perceived as their natural privileges.26 While there certainly was a crisis of royal 
power, at least in the case of the rebellion against Odo’s there appear to have been 
other reasons too—not least a lack of trust in him. In addition to the rebellion 
against Odo, Western Francia, from the death of Charles the Bald to the end of the 
reign of Charles the Simple, saw two more such attempts to replace the ruler, with 
Boso being crowned in opposition to Louis III and Carloman II; as well as Robert 
of Neustria’s rebellion against Charles the Simple.27
In the second section of this chapter, conflict situations are analysed in regard 
to the kings’ actions and whether these actions may have contributed to a loss of 
trust in the respective rulers by wider circles of the nobility. However, royal actions 
could not only damage a ruler’s reputation but also help in building trust. This 
could be done in a number of ways: creating kinship was one means, concluding 
an amicitia another,28 and symbolic actions could also be used in such ways.29 The 
third section of this chapter deals with a special type of these symbolic actions 
which are closely tied to conflict situations: rulers aiming to do justice in various 
ways by making use of capitularies, judicial assemblies and restorational acts. Do-
ing justice allowed the king and the magnates to cooperate and thus to strengthen 
the bond tying them together since justice was spoken in consensus.30 By doing 
so, they legitimised the existing social order as well as the position of the various 
protagonists within the hierarchy.31 This last point emphasises the inherent sym-
bolical power of pronouncing justice. The king, receiving his realm from God, 
was responsible for its welfare and order which made him the supreme judge. The 
ideal of ruling was identical with doing justice, that is to say, respecting the law, 
being a judge and fighting injustice.32 Thus, doing justice could be used as a tool to 
legitimate rule and a means to restore lost trust in the king. Finally, the last section 
24 Keller, Begrenzung, 84−86; Goldberg, Struggle, 10.
25 On the terminology of conflicts, see Brunner, Gruppen, 14−39. 
26 Le Jan, Élites, 419.
27 Since the nobles did not aim to replace Carloman as a king in 883 but recognised his position, we 
refrain from categorising these events as rebellion.
28 Weinfurter, Lehnswesen, 448. 
29 The results of a congress held at Münster in 2004 on the subject are published in Frühmittelalter-
liche Studien 39 (2005). In this context it is worth noting that the congress was organised around 
the assumption that symbolic actions had an impact on building trust (Althoff, Einführung, 248). 
30 Krah, Herrschaft, 325. 
31 Le Jan, Justice, 149.
32 Oudart, Roi.
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deals with the rebellions breaking out against Louis the Stammerer’s sons in 879 
and against Charles the Simple in 922, analysing them in regard to the role trust in 
the king played in their emergence.
VI.1	 Solving	conflicts:	The	role	of	interest	groups
A perfect example of how nobles present at the royal court could influence the 
outcome of conflicts between nobles and the king is provided by the case of Count 
Gauzfrid and Louis the Stammerer. Probably early in 878, Count Gauzfrid’s sons 
seized the stronghold and honores of the deceased Count Odo from his son. In 
response, Hugh the Abbot requested Louis the Stammerer’s aid against them.33 
The conflict appears to have been quickly resolved. “Some of the royal counsel-
lors who were friends of [Gauzfrid]”34 mediated between him and the king. Gauz-
frid and his sons presented themselves at the royal court, returned the stronghold 
and honores and received both of them back by a royal grant. In return, Gauzfrid 
brought a group of Bretons into the service of the king. A number of observations 
can be made here. First, the problem leading to the conflict between Gauzfrid and 
the king was not actually his usurpation of property, but the fact that he had cir-
cumvented the royal prerogative of controlling the distribution of honores. Once 
Gauzfrid acknowledged the position of the king, the conflict could be resolved. 
Second, the crucial role of Gauzfrid’s connections at court can be discerned. Karl 
Ferdinand Werner was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that one of these con-
nections was Gauzfrid’s brother, Gauzlin.35 Seemingly, Gauzlin’s influence at this 
point of his career was strong enough to outweigh any opposition presented at 
court by the connections of Count Odo’s son, which made the entire matter a 
question of acknowledging Louis’  own interest, something that was acceptable 
for Gauzfrid.
The same mechanism, namely the influence of a powerful group of nobles at 
court, can also be discerned in another conflict during Louis the Stammerer’s 
reign, although with the opposite effect. Early in his reign, Bernard of Gothia and 
his brother Emeno became embroiled in conflict with the king, the former pre-
venting Archbishop Frotar of Bourges from entering his city36 and the latter seizing 
Évreux and devastating the surrounding country.37 Both were excommunicated at 
33 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222. On Count Odo, see Levillain, Essai, 174−177. On this request, see also 
chapter II.1 and V.1.1.
34 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222: Sed miserante Domino aliquantulum [Hludouuicus rex] conualescens, 
satagentibus quibusdam consiliariis suis et amicis Gozfridi, uenit ad eum isdem Gozfridus, adducens 
secum filios suos, ea conditione ut castellum et honores quos inuaserant Hludouuico regi redderent et 
postea per concessionem illius haberent. Tunc Gozfridus partem de Brittonibus ad regis fidelitatem 
conuertit.
35 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 24, 324. Werner, Gauzlin, 417. 
36 MGH Epist. VII, N° 149, 126. On this conflict see also Oexle, Bischof, 202−204.
37 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222.
300	 VI.	 Conflicts,	rebellions	and	the	role	of	trust
the synod of Troyes,38 and Bernard at least lost his honores, which were distrib-
uted amongst Louis the Stammerer’s supporters;39 he also became the target of a 
military campaign organised by the king.40 In 880, after Louis’  death, the Annales 
Fuldenses note Bernard’s submission,41 which happens to be also his last appear-
ance in the sources. Apparently, the conflict was resolved by means of force. If 
negotiations did take place, they failed.
All this is surprising since it seems that the highest circles responded with sym-
pathy to Bernard’s cause and this support could have been used to come to terms 
with the king, as in Gauzfrid’s case.42 Frotar’s own position at Bourges was a rather 
difficult one. Starting off as bishop of Bordeaux, Frotar had abandoned his see in 
flight from the Northmen, first transferring to Poitiers, then to Bourges.43 These 
transfers had been highly disputed. Frotar found a backer in Charles the Bald44 
and Pope John,45 yet his case was still open in 878 when it was discussed again at 
the synod of Troyes.46 Bernard could use this dispute as an argument for his own 
case and, indeed, he defended his actions by claiming that he wanted to prevent 
Frotar from opening Bourges to the enemies of the king.47 Pope John VIII, while 
certainly not agreeing with Bernard’s measures, appears at least not to have been 
biased against him. In a letter from June 878, he did ask Bernard to keep his vas-
sals from hindering Frotar and to wait for the judgement of the synod; yet he ad-
dressed him as “[our] beloved son Bernard, most noble marchio,” thus indicating 
that Bernard still enjoyed his favour.48 Only afterwards did John change his posi-
tion and request Bernard several times to present himself with some of his men to 
be judged at the synod.49
In contrast to the pope, Hincmar appears to have remained sympathetic to Ber-
nard’s cause until the very end. The archbishop appears to have despised Frotar, 
38 Annales Bertiniani 878, 222; MGH Epist. VII, N° 142, 122.
39 Annales Bertiniani 878, 229−230. On the circle receiving the Bernard’s honores, see chapter II.1.
40 Annales Bertiniani 879, 234: [Hludouuicus] uolens ire in partes Augustiduni ad comprimendam 
rebellionem Bernardi markionis, usque ad Trecas perrexit.
41 Annales Fuldenses (Mainz continuation) 880, 95.
42 On the role of mediators in conflict situations between nobles and the king, see Kamp, Friedens-
stifter, 125−128.
43 Annales Bertiniani 876, 204.
44 DChB 409 (13th July 876) names Frotar Biturignesis aecclesiae archiepiscopus.
45 MGH Epist. VII, N° 14, 12−13: De quorum numero quia Frotharius, Burdegalensis dudum antistes, 
ut testatur vestra fraternitas, extat, necessario duximus eundem virum alii ecclesię pręponendum 
et incardinandum, Bituricensi videlicet, quę et vacans esse nobis denuntiata est, et tanti viri digna 
regimine, ne per minus idoneum rectorem salubre salvarum animarum desit ei pręsidium et nos 
econtra ingentis culpę involvamur annexu, si tanto urguente discrimine tantę minus consulamus 
ecclesię, propugnatori hanc probabili minime committentes.
46 Annales Bertiniani 878, 227.
47 MGH Epist. VII, N° 135, 119: Relatu videlicet hominis pontificio nostro nuntiatum est, quod Frothar­
ius venerabilis episcopus civitatem Beturicam inimicis vestri senioris domni Hludouuici gloriosi regis 
tradere maluerit, ideo illi ipsam contendere studueras.
48 MGH Epist. VII, N° 155, 129: Dilecto filio Bernardo nobilissimo marcionum. 
49 MGH Epist. VII, N° 135, 118−119.
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who had supported the primacy of Archbishop Ansegisus of Sens against his own 
claim, and denounced him as a lickspittle.50 For him, Frotar was the Archbishop 
of Bordeaux, not of Bourges.51 His opposition to Frotar may be the reason why 
he seems to have taken a favourable position towards Bernard. He certainly did 
not actively support him for a letter to Gauzlin clearly shows that he did in fact 
want Bernard’s endeavour to end.52 Yet it is remarkable that he omits Bernard’s 
excommunication from his account at the proceedings at Troyes, noting only the 
distribution of his honores during a meeting between Louis and the group around 
Hugh the Abbot.53
Like Gauzfrid, Bernard’s and Emeno’s most important connection at court was 
Archchancellor Gauzlin, their uncle.54 In his letter, Hincmar urged Gauzlin to in-
fluence Bernard to cease his efforts,55 which indicates the existence of a closer rela-
tion between the two. Probably not long after, Gauzlin and Bernard appear to have 
acted together in Burgundy where they are recorded as having visited the abbey 
of Saissy together.56 The failure of this connection to secure a settlement with the 
king was undoubtedly directly related to Gauzlin’s rivalry with the group around 
Hugh the Abbot which managed to dominate the circle around the king approxi-
mately at the same time as Bernard’s and Emeno’s excommunication.57 This con-
clusion is confirmed by Hincmar’s comments on the matter, which indicate that 
Emeno was excommunicated at the instigation of certain bishops and with the 
king’s backing,58 which is certainly a reference to Hugh and his allies. The rivalry 
between the two groups and the outcome of the conflict reveal the mechanisms 
active at the royal court. Louis acted in concord with a group of nobles power-
ful enough to outweigh Bernard’s support. Louis himself might have accepted a 
settlement with Bernard—in a diploma for the church of Barcelona issued after 
50 Annales Bertiniani 876, 202: Et cum imperator et legati apostolici satis egerint ut absolute archiepis­
copu reponderent se oboedituros de primatu Ansigisi sicut apostolicus scripsit, aliud nisi ut praedic­
tum est responsum ab eis extorquere non potuit, excepto quod Frotarius Burdegalensis episcopus, 
quoniam a Burdigala ad Pictauis indeque ad Bituricum fauore principis contra regulas se contuilt, 
per adolationem respondit quod imperatori placere cognouit.
51 Annales Bertiniani 878, 227: …Frotario Burdegalensi episcopo… On Hincmar’s objections to 
 episcopal transfers, see Sommar, Hincmar.
52 Flodoard, HRE III, c. 24, 324: Gozlino pro Bernardo, nepote ipsius, qui seditionem contra regem 
 moliri ferebatur, hortans, ut ab hac intentione studeat eum revocare et ut ipse Gozlinus pro nullo 
carnali  affectu a recta via declinet. See also below.
53 Annales Bertiniani 878, 229−230.
54 Emeno and Bernard were the sons of Gauzlin’s sister Bilechildis. Flodoard, HRE III, c. 24, 324 with 
Annales Bertiniani 878, 222. Werner, Gauzlin, 406. On the Rorgonid family, see Werner, Adels-
familien, 137−142.
55 Annales Bertiniani 878, 227.
56 Translatio S. Baudelii, 111: Interea accidit ut memorabilis Gothorum princeps Bernardus cum avun­
culo suo Gauzleno tunc inclito abbate, futuro autem episcopo, idem monasterium adventaret.
57 See chapter II.1.
58 Annales Bertiniani 878, 228: Et post excommunicatinem Hugonis, Hlotharii filii, et Iminonis ac 
 complicum eorum, uim facientibus quibusdam episcopis, et consentiente rege…
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Bernard’s excommunication he is still depicted as “our marchio”59—yet this group 
undoubtedly blocked any attempt made in this direction. This would also explain 
why Bernard ignored the summonings to the synod of Troyes: faced with the 
growing opposition against him, he probably feared his was an already lost cause.
Powerful interest groups at court which blocked the resolution of a conflict can 
also be made out under Charles the Simple. According to the Annales Vedastini, 
early in 899 Count Baldwin II of Flanders invaded Péronne “against the will of the 
king.”60 The wording chosen here seems to indicate that before Baldwin had taken 
up arms, he had claimed at least this town at court, yet been refused by Charles. 
The fate of Péronne appears to have been closely related to that of Saint-Quentin. 
Again according to the Annales Vedastini, Saint-Quentin had belonged to the son 
of one of Odo’s closest supporters, Count Theoderic of Vermandois, before it was 
captured by Baldwin’s brother Rodulf.61 Odo had reacted to this capture by plan-
ning an attack not only on Saint-Quentin but also on Péronne,62 a circumstance 
that led Karl Ferdinand Werner to the assumption that the latter had also belonged 
to Theoderic’s son.63 If this assumption is correct, this would explain why Charles 
refused Baldwin’s request. At some moment after Odo had taken Saint-Quentin, it 
ended up in the hands of Count Heribert I of Vermandois,64 either after the latter 
had abandoned Charles and submitted to Odo or after Charles had become sole 
king. Given that it seems most likely that Baldwin would have renewed his claim 
when the honores were about to be redistributed, it does appear probable that it 
was Charles who granted them to his close supporter Heribert. However, Baldwin 
and Heribert had already been enemies before, possibly because of Rodulf ’s death 
at Heribert’s hands. When the Frankish nobles assembled after Odo’s death to put 
Charles back on the throne, Baldwin abstained from appearing in person, sending 
only a legation, according to the Annales Vedastini because of Heribert’s presence 
at the royal court.65 Charles granting Heribert the honores was undoubtedly the 
consequence of their close relationship66 and served to secure royal control in the 
area. At the same time however, this same relation also blocked Charles from ac-
commodating Baldwin if he did not want to estrange Heribert.
This relation probably also explains the aggressiveness of Charles’  strategy 
against Baldwin. Saint-Vaast was quickly besieged and Baldwin’s men defend-
ing the castrum, after having been excommunicated, were forced to give up the 
59 DLS 17 (9th September 878, Troyes), 55: …Bernardus marchio nostro...
60 Annales Vedastini 899, 81: Balduinus vero contra regis voluntatem Perronam invasit, sed sub celer­
itate amisit.
61 Annales Vedastini 895, 77.
62 Annales Vedastini 895, 77 and 896, 78.
63 Werner, Untersuchungen V, 89, followed by Schwager, Graf, 29.
64 Werner, Untersuchungen V, 91−92.
65 Annales Vedastini 898, 79: Balduinus vero propter Heribertum venire distulit, attamen missos diri­
git, qui regi innotescerent se illi fidelem esse, sicut dignum erat.
66 See chapters I.2.2. and III.2.1.1.
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abbey.67 Baldwin, in turn, appears to have attempted to strengthen his position by 
seeking help outside the realm from Zwentibold, who, after Charles’  campaign 
into Lotharingia during the previous year, had only concluded an armistice with 
the king and was likely to need allies if the hostilities were renewed.68 This con-
nection would explain why Baldwin was present at Cambrai when Charles and 
Zwentibold met a little after the fall of Saint-Vaast. However, if Baldwin had ex-
pected actual support from Zwentibold he was to be disappointed. Zwentibold’s 
own political problems inside Lotharingia encouraged him to conclude a peace 
treaty with Charles and Baldwin was consequently forced to submit to the king, 
reconcile with Heribert, give up Saint-Vaast69 and return further property to the 
church of Noyon.70
This defeat, however, did not prevent Baldwin from renewing his efforts. Dur-
ing the following year he approached Charles to try to regain his lost honores. Yet, 
this time he was opposed not only by Heribert, but also by Archbishop Fulk,71 
hence by two of Charles’  most important supporters. After Baldwin’s submission 
at Cambrai, Charles had granted Saint-Vaast to the archbishop, who, in turn, had 
traded it with Count Altmar for Saint-Medard of Soissons.72 Fulk was, nonethe-
less, undoubtedly concerned by Baldwin’s approach: should Charles return Saint-
Vaast to the count, his deal with Altmar would undoubtedly be revoked. While 
Charles had tightened his control over the north-east of the realm by giving the 
abbey to one of his most trusted advisors, he had also strengthened the opposi-
tion against Baldwin at his court and thus he had limited his options for coming 
to a lasting agreement with the count even more. The circumstance that Baldwin, 
despite facing such powerful opposition, nevertheless made this attempt, points 
to an important factor in his relations to the king. It seems unlikely that he would 
have made the effort to approach Charles if he had not imagined the chance of 
having his honores returned to him, especially since he had already made a similar 
attempt during the previous year. His chances of achieving a positive outcome set 
aside, his attempts, nevertheless, indicate that his relation with the king was better 
than the ongoing conflict might otherwise convey. Despite having lost Saint-Vaast 
in the previous encounter, Baldwin hence still appears to have been confident that 
67 Annales Vedastini 899, 81.
68 See chapter IV.4.
69 Annales Vedastini 899, 81.
70 DChS 2, 3: Deprecatus est etiam quatinus res […] quamque Balduinus comes inique quondam mo­
liebatur auferre… The diploma misses a dating line, yet the restoration of property estranged by 
Baldwin indicates that it was probably issued at this moment. The property had already been an issue 
in 892, when Archbishop Fulk mentioned them in a letter to Baldwin (Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 7, 397).
71 Annales Vedastini 900, 81−82: Balduinus vero perrexit ad ipsum placitum, volens sibi regem re­
blandiri, ut terram, quam ei tulerat, redderet. Cumque hoc contradiceret Fulcho atque Heribertus… 
More detailed Regino, Chronicon 903, 149−150: Quod Balduinus aegre ferens misit ad iam dictum 
episcopum [Fulk] Winemarum, obsecrans, ne honores, quos hactenus tenuerat atque possederat, ipse 
cupiditate ductus sibi usurparet; insuper etiam ingentia dona pollicitus est, si eius ope et interventu 
prefatam possessionem optinere posset. Sed cum episcopus minime assensum preberet…
72 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 10, 402. See also Annales Vedastini 899, 81.
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there was a chance that Charles would act in his best interest—in other words, he 
trusted the king.
However, Charles’  second refusal may have overstrained this trust, since only 
a couple of days later Baldwin’s men murdered Fulk.73 Surprisingly, this murder 
did not result in an escalation of the conflict, but was followed by a settlement be-
tween Charles and the count. Only the actual murderers were excommunicated by 
a synod under Fulk’s successor Heriveus74 while Baldwin himself received Saint-
Bertin, an abbey he had previously claimed for himself,75 from the hands of the 
king.76 This complete change in policy can be explained by a number of factors. 
Fulk’s death had weakened the opposition against Baldwin at court and provided 
Charles with Saint-Bertin, an abbey that Baldwin had also attempted to bring un-
der his control. Furthermore, Fulk’s murder led to political turmoil and the crisis 
with Robert of Neustria.77 Confronted with Robert, Charles could probably not 
afford a conflict with Baldwin; at the same time, he needed to grow his basis of 
support in order to stabilise his rule. Therefore, compensating Baldwin was a ne-
cessity, the logical consequence of the political circumstances, and reveals how 
changes in the circle around the king could open up new options. However, the 
settlement should not be read as Charles finally yielding to Baldwin. While the 
count did receive Saint-Bertin, he had to give up his claim on Saint-Vaast, which 
remained in the hands of Count Altmar.78
Whereas the conflict between Charles and Baldwin was again marked by the 
presence of strong interest groups at the court blocking an earlier agreement, its 
prehistory, the conflict between Baldwin and Odo, demonstrates the importance 
of trust between king and noble as a determining factor. After the death of Abbot 
Rodulf of Saint-Vaast and Saint-Bertin, the monks of the Saint-Vaast had sent 
Count Ecfrid to the king to enquire after his will. However, only some days later, 
at the instigation of a certain Everbert, instead of waiting for Odo’s response, they 
invited Rodulf ’s cousin Baldwin to take over their abbey,79 thus pre-empting the 
royal will. This, and not the actual control of the abbey, now became the central is-
sue. After having arrived at Saint-Vaast, Baldwin turned to the king, asking for his 
consent, not only to hold Saint-Vaast, but also Rodulf ’s other abbey, Saint-Bertin.80 
73 Annales Vedastini 900, 82; Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 10, 402−403; Regino, Chronicon 903, 149−150; 
Folcwin, Gesta Abbatum S. Bertini Sithensium, c. 98, 624.
74 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 10, 403: Denique Winemarus, eius interemptor, ab episcopis regni Francorum 
cum suis complicibus excommunicatus et anathematizatus insuper insanabili a deo percussus est vul­
nere ita, ut computrescentibus carnibus et exundante sanie vivus devoraretur a vermibus et, dum prop­
ter immanitatem fetoris nullus ad eum accedere posset, miserrimam vitam miserabili decessu finivit.
75 See below.
76 Folcwin, Gesta Abbatum S. Bertini Sithensium, c. 98, 625: Baldwinus autem post haec abbatiam 
optinuit regia donatione.
77 See chapters III.2.1.1 and III.2.1.2.
78 Hermann, Untersuchungen, 82.
79 Annales Vedastini 892, 70−71.
80 Annales Vedastini 892, 71; Folcwin, Gesta Abbatum S. Bertini Sithensium, c. 98, 624.
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According to the Annales Vedastini, Odo responded “that first [Baldwin] should 
let [Odo] assume power over his property that God had given to him and come 
to him, confident to find him in benign mood.”81 This phrasing seems to indicate 
that Odo, while insisting on his royal prerogative of controlling the distribution of 
honores, was nevertheless willing to acknowledge Baldwin’s claim and proposed 
a solution that strongly resembles the settlement between Louis and Gauzfrid.82 
However, Baldwin refused this proposal and the king’s subsequent attempts to 
negotiate a settlement failed,83 with the count’s interest in acknowledging Odo’s 
prerogative seemingly having been very limited. According to the annals, Bald-
win’s legation to Odo was only the result of Everbert’s counsel while, after Odo 
had refused him, all further attempts to negotiate appear to have originated at the 
royal court.84
As we have argued, Baldwin’s position appears to point to a deeper problem 
with Odo’s rule at this moment, namely the existence of a strong sentiment of mis-
trust against the king within the nobility.85 Baldwin’s refusal to come to court, to 
give up control over Saint-Vaast and to rely on the royal generosity indicates that 
he did not trust Odo to protect his interests, that is to say, to acknowledge his claim 
over his cousin’s honores. This view was probably reinforced by developments at 
Rodulf ’s other abbey, Saint-Bertin. While the monks of Saint-Vaast had opted for 
Baldwin, those at Saint-Bertin turned to Odo upon hearing that the count had 
claimed their abbey in order to express their opposition. Supported by Archbishop 
Fulk, they obtained the right to elect their new abbot, with their choice falling 
on Rodulf ’s predecessor—the very same Fulk.86 Meanwhile, Baldwin’s position at 
Saint-Vaast was probably also not as strong as he would have liked it to be. As the 
initial legation under Count Ecfrid shows, there was a party among the monks of 
Saint-Vaast whose loyalty towards Baldwin was questionable and who instead fa-
voured a royal decision on the matter, thus providing an opening for Odo, should 
he wish to deny Baldwin’s claim. If Baldwin had already harboured doubts about 
Odo’s intentions, the development at Saint-Bertin had certainly not improved his 
hopes that, should he give up control over Saint-Vaast, the king would grant him 
the abbey.
Probably around the same time as the conflict for Rodulf ’s abbeys was devel-
oping, Odo appears to have attempted to install his ally Altmar as count of Poi-
tiers, which led to a confrontation with the Ramnulfides and thus diverted a part 
81 Annales Vedastini 892, 71: Odo vero rex respondit, ut sineret illum prius esse potestativum de suo, 
quod Deus illi concessit, et veniret ad se, fidens benignum erga illum se inventurum fore.
82 Another example for this practice is the restitution of estranged possessions to the pope by Wido 
of Spoleto in 882 at an assembly at Ravenna under Charles the Fat, only to receive them back im-
mediately after. Dümmler, Geschichte III, 186 and 218−219.
83 Annales Vedastini 892, 71.
84 Annales Vedastini 892, 71.
85 See chapter I.2.3.
86 Folcwin, Gesta Abbatum S. Bertini Sithensium, c. 98, 624.
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of the royal attention away from Baldwin.87 In addition, Baldwin was able to win 
further support from one of Odo’s own relatives, his uncle Adalelm’s son Walker, 
who the king had entrusted with the castrum of Laon.88 Hence, for Baldwin, tak-
ing up arms against the king seemed to be the preferable option, especially if he 
considered Odo to be unreliable in his promises.
Once Baldwin started to act hostile towards Odo, the king initiated a number of 
measures against the count. The first half of these measures consisted in creating 
new channels of communication which not only served to continue to negotiate, 
but also to increase moral pressure on Baldwin through the threat of excommuni-
cation. This task was performed by Archbishop Fulk, who, together with a number 
of his suffragans, advised Bishop Dodilo of Cambrai to get in contact with the 
count89 and, after this attempt as well as a letter of himself on the same subject,90 
had failed, organised a synod where Baldwin’s excommunication was decided up-
on.91 Fulk’s involvement was certainly due to Baldwin falling under his spiritual 
jurisdiction as archbishop of Reims. Yet, there was probably more to it. Fulk and 
Baldwin had been allied against Odo in 88892 and appear to have maintained this 
connection over the course of the years—when Fulk himself rebelled against Odo 
shortly after, this alliance was renewed. Odo might have aimed to use this con-
nection to mediate an agreement with Baldwin while hoping that their rivalry 
for Saint-Bertin would prevent the archbishop from siding with Baldwin. In any 
case, Odo underestimated Fulk’s own political agenda: the archbishop suspended 
Baldwin’s excommunication,93 thus easing the pressure placed on the count. Odo’s 
second measure aimed at isolating Baldwin from his allies. Laon was taken and 
Walker captured and executed.94 After this was done, Odo made an attempt to 
attack Baldwin directly in Flanders, yet was outmanoeuvred and forced to with-
draw.95 The further development of the conflict was determined by the creation 
of new alliances and their dissolution, which strongly influenced the balance of 
power. Fulk’s rebellion drew Odo’s focus away from him and enabled Baldwin 
and his brother Rodulf to go on the offensive and take Saint-Quentin96 when Odo 
was forced back over the Seine by Zwentibold’s intervention.97 However, when the 
alliance broke and Charles’  supporters opened negotiations with Odo, the latter 
87 See below.
88 Annales Vedastini 892, 72; Regino, Chronicon 892, 139.
89 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 6, 391.
90 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 7, 396−397.
91 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 7, 397. The account of the Annales Vedastini 892, 71 (Post haec Balduinus 
castrum refirmat et parat se ad resistendum. Episcopi vero illum excommunicaverunt.) is mislead-
ing. On the synod see also Schröder, Synoden, N° 8, 116−122. See chapter I.2.1.
92 Annales Vedastini 888, 65. See also chapter I.1.4.
93 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 7, 397.
94 Annales Vedastini 892; Regino, Chronicon 892, 139−140.
95 Annales Vedastini 892, 71−72.
96 Annales Vedastini 895, 77.
97 Annales Vedastini 895, 76.
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immediately turned back against Baldwin and besieged Saint-Vaast.98 The attack 
was accompanied by the renewal of negotiations, this time with Odo’s brother, 
Robert, serving as mediator.99
These events cast some further light on the relations between Odo and Baldwin. 
When the king arrived at Saint-Vaast, Baldwin’s men, who garrisoned the fort and 
the abbey, asked for peace and offered hostages while sending envoys to the count 
to ask for his orders. In the meantime, since the return of the envoys took more 
time than anticipated, Odo asked the gates to be opened and occupied both places. 
When Baldwin’s envoys finally arrived, accompanied by Robert, the king ordered 
his men to leave the fort and return it to the count’s men.100 Commonly this is 
interpreted as the conclusion of peace, with an agreement over Baldwin’s posses-
sion of Saint-Vaast.101 Yet, no such peace is actually recorded and Baldwin’s sub-
mission only appears to have taken place in 897.102 In addition, Odo’s next plans 
were to attack Baldwin’s brother Rodulf at Saint-Quentin and Péronne.103 It is of 
course possible that Odo and Baldwin had made their peace at that moment and 
that Rodulf acted independently of his brother.104 Nevertheless, we may propose a 
different reading: Odo had occupied Saint-Vaast on the condition that he would 
leave it once Baldwin’s will was known. It was a question of trust to open the gates 
to the king, who then went to pray and listened to a mass at the tomb of Saint 
Vedast. Considering Baldwin’s mistrust of Odo’s behaviour, the king’s vacation of 
Saint-Vaast would not have been the consequence of a peace with Baldwin, but a 
trust-building measure, to demonstrate his integrity. Handing Saint-Vaast back to 
Baldwin’s men would then not have meant that Odo accepted the count’s claim 
but that he now pursued a strategy of re-establishing trust in his person.
However, making peace was complicated by Baldwin and his brother 
Rodulf having occupied honores belonging to Odo’s supporters, most notably 
 98 Annales Vedastini 895, 76.
 99 Annales Vedastini 895, 77. See also chapter II.4.
100 Annales Vedastini 895, 76−77: Odo vero rex Corbeiam venit indeque Atrebatis castrumque seu 
monasterium sancti Vedasti obsidione vallavit. Sed miseratus Christianitati noluit eum bellando 
capere. Homines vero Balduini, videntes ei non posse resistere, pacem petunt, obsides regi dant, ad 
sauum dirigunt seniorem, ut, quid illis agendum sit, insinuet. Et dum moram facit his qui missus 
fuerat, rex iussit sibi aperiri portas, ingressusque monasterium seu castellum ad limina perrexit 
sancti Vedasti coramque eius sepulchro humi prostratus devotissime oravit ac uberrime flevit, inibi 
etiam missam audivit, gratias agens Deo. […] Missi vero Balduini regressi cum Rotberto egerunt ea 
quae senior illorum iussit. Statimque rex iussit illis reddi claves castelli omnesque suos iussit exire, 
et ita homines Balduini recipere ipsum castrum.
101 E.g. Kienast, Vasallität, 478; Offergeld, Reges pueri, 439.
102 Annales Vedastini 897, 79: Balduinus etiam Rothberto faciente venit ad regem; quem rex honori­
fice suscepit, et de omnibus quae iusserat illi rex satis illi fecit, et ita remisit eum rex ad sua.
103 Annales Vedastini 895, 77: Rex vero ab Atrebatis disponit ire ad Sanctum Quintinum et Perronam. 
Nam Sancti Quintini castrum, per noctem tradendo eum abintus, tulerat Rodulfus filio Theoderici.
104 Up until this point however, Baldwin and Rodulf appear to have been close to each other: In 892, 
Baldwin left Saint-Vaast to his brother to defend it (Annales Vedastini 892, 71). In 895, they left 
Charles’ side together to ally themselves to Zwentibold (Annales Vedastini 895, 76).
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Saint-Quentin, honores they now had to give up.105 Rodulf in particular appears 
to have been opposed to this, which led the negotiations to fail.106 Only when Odo 
had taken Saint-Quentin and Péronne from Rodulf ’s men and Rodulf himself 
had been killed by Heribert I,107 was a final accord between the king and Baldwin 
mediated by Robert.108 The solution they agreed upon appears to have been in di-
rect response to the initial problems which had led to the outbreak of the conflict. 
Baldwin came to the court—something he had previously avoided doing—and 
was honourably received. Then he “satisfied the king in everything he ordered him 
to do,”109 which is undoubtedly a reference to returning Saint-Vaast to the king, 
thus acknowledging Odo’s royal prerogative to control the distribution of the hon-
ores. The Annales Vedastini do not mention that Odo then granted the abbey to 
Baldwin, yet from their report for 899 it becomes clear that the count remained 
in possession.110 Odo’s success in asserting his interests was certainly due to his 
military superiority after Baldwin had isolated himself from his allies and Odo 
had come to terms with Charles and his supporters. Furthermore, Rodulf ’s death 
had solved the problem of another party blocking a resolution due to their own 
interests. Finally however, a crucial role fell to Robert’s mediation. He represented 
a new communication channel trusted by both parties and was seemingly able to 
restore Baldwin’s trust in the king. Trust, like the presence of interest groups at 
the royal court, hence played a decisive role in the capacities of a ruler to resolve a 
conflict by means of negotiation.
VI.2 Rulers and nobles: Breaches of trust
In all the cases presented so far, the kings do seem to have had limited direct in-
terests in the conflicts. If any such interests are visible at all, they appear to have 
been focused on maintaining control over the distribution of the honores in ques-
tion. At the root of these conflicts were the efforts of individual nobles to extend 
their influence which thus infringed on this royal prerogative or clashed with the 
interests of powerful noble groups at the royal court. If peaceful resolutions were 
blocked, this was either due to the influence of these groups or due to a lack of 
trust in the king by the opposing party. However, there are also those cases to 
consider in which the initiative appears to have rested mainly with the ruler him-
105 See chapter I.2.5.
106 Annales Vedastini 896, 77: Odo rex placitum cum suis fidelibus habuit, volens partem regni, quam 
eius fideles tenuerant, Karolo concedere. Sed Rodulfus comes omne illud placitum disrupit.
107 Annales Vedastini 896, 78.
108 Annales Vedastini 897, 79: Balduinus etiam Rothberto faciente venit ad regem; quem rex honori­
fice suscepit, et de omnibus quae iusserat illi rex satis illi fecit, et ita remisit eum rex ad sua.
109 See chapter VI.1, n. 108.
110 Annales Vedastini 899, 81: Karolus rex obsedit castrum Sancti Vedasti, et habitatoribus excom­
municatis omnibus, hi qui ipsum castrum tenebant missos dirigunt ad Balduinum et, quamvis non 
voluntarie, obsides regi dederunt, dato spatio ad sua exportanda.
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self, be it because he wanted to pursue his own interests or because he was under 
the impression that the circumstances forced him to intervene with the current 
order. One of these conflicts arose over the control of the county of Poitiers after 
the death of Ramnulf II on 5th August 890.111 Ramnulf had left an illegitimate son, 
Ebalus Manzer,112 as his heir.113 The latter’s claim appears to have been acknowl-
edged by Odo since Ebalus was able to donate property to Saint-Martin of Tours 
for the sake of his father’s, his uncles’  and his own soul, immediately receiving 
said property back in precarium along with the villa of Doussay in the pagus of 
Poitiers and another vicaria on 10th October 891,114 an exchange that hardly could 
have taken place without the king’s consent even if he does not appear in the char-
ter issued on that occasion. The matter, however, was complicated by the claim of 
Count Altmar, whose father Emenon had previously held the city.115 According to 
Ademar of Chabannes, Odo did indeed grant Poitiers to Altmar after Ramnulf ’s 
death.116 However, given that Ebalus Manzer and Odo were still on good terms in 
October 891, it seems that this did not happen immediately after Ramnulf ’s death, 
but probably in late 891 or early 892. Since in the charter recording his donation to 
Saint-Martin of Tours Ebalus only describes himself as “Ebalus, as yet blossoming 
in youthful age” without giving any title,117 it would indeed appear that the count-
ship had remained vacant from Ramnulf ’s death up until Altmar’s appointment 
as count.
However, the succession at Poitiers cut deep into the structures of Odo’s rule. 
Altmar was related to Odo and was one of his close associates.118 Hence, the grant 
can be seen as a sign of royal favour resulting from this close relation. Yet, at the 
same time Ebalus Manzer himself was also very well connected at court, with his 
uncle Ebolus119 being the abbot of Saint-Denis and Odo’s archchancellor.120 Thus, 
satisfying Altmar’s claim meant that Odo estranged another one of his close 
 supporters since Ebolus and his brother Gauzbert now entered into conflict with 
the king.121 This act probably damaged Odo’s reputation as a ruler who could be 
111 Chronicon sancti Maxentii Pictavensis, 371. Different Regino, Chroncon, 892, 140 (Post haec 
in Aquitaniam profiscitur contra Ramnulfum et fratrem eius Gozbertum et Ebolum abbatem de 
sancto Dionisio et alios nonnullos, qui eius imperiis obtemperare rennuebant, ut eorum insolentiam 
reprimeret.), indicating that Ramnulf was still alive in 892. 890, however, is to be prefered, see 
Auzias, Aquitaine, 440 with n. 71 and Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXIV with n. 1.
112 On Ebalus Manzer, see Prell, Comtes, 37−42.
113 Ademar, Chronicon III, c. 21, 141.
114 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 227−233. On the history and role of this villa, see Depreux, Dimension, 
357−359.
115 Ademar, Chronicon III, c. 21, 141. Kienast, Vasallität, 461 with n. 1631.
116 Ademar, Chronicon III, c. 21, 141.
117 Recueil Eudes, 230: …ego Ebolus, juvenili adhuc aetate florens… See also Favre, Eudes, 146.
118 On Odo and Altmar, see chapter II.4.
119 Ramnulf and Ebolus were brothers. Regino, Chronicon 892, 140 with Annales Vedastini 892, 73.
120 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXIII−XXV. Ebolus last appears in DOdo 27 (15th July 891), with  Anskeric 
appearing as his successor only in DOdo 30 (30th September 892).
121 Annales Vedastini 892, 72; Regino, Chronicon 892, 140.
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trusted by demonstrating that proximity to the king was not sufficient to protect 
one’s interests. The situation became even more complicated when William the 
Pious, another one of Ramnulf ’s relatives with whom he had entertained a close 
relation,122 was also drawn into the ensuing conflict. According to Ademar of Cha-
bannes, upon his death Ramnulf had entrusted his son Ebalus to William’s close 
friend Gerald of Aurillac, who, in turn, brought him to William.123 It may have 
been due to this opposition including some of the most important Aquitanian no-
bles that Odo revoked his previous decision to grant Poitiers to Count Altmar and 
instead entrusted his brother Robert with the city’s defence.124 The wording used 
by Abbo of Saint-Germain, who is the only source reporting about this event, may 
indicate that Robert was not made count of Poitiers but only temporarily installed 
up until a settlement between the different parties could be reached. Be it as it may, 
this new decision in turn led to a conflict with Altmar, who attacked Odo’s forces 
and then rushed to take Poitiers.125 Within a short period of time, Odo had thus 
estranged not only one, but two of his close supporters. If Odo’s previous decision 
to disinherit Ebalus Manzer had already been perceived as a breach of trust, this 
one probably deepened the mistrust against him even more.
Odo’s reaction to the opposition appears to have been delayed by the evolv-
ing conflict with Baldwin II of Flanders, which kept him in Francia up until au-
tumn 892 before he engaged in a campaign to manage the problems south of the 
Loire.126 The sources make no mention of negotiations, yet, it may be that, at least 
in William’s case, Odo had hoped for a peaceful settlement. According to Abbo of 
Saint-Germain, the king only deprived William of his honores after their armies 
had met at the opposing shores of a river without engaging,127 possibly indicating 
that up until this moment he had intended to come to terms with William yet had 
been rejected by the count. While Ebolus and Gauzbert were quickly killed,128 the 
122 Ademar, Chronicon III, c. 21, 141: …Rannulfus […] habuit amiciciam cum propinquo suo Wil­
lelmo, comite Arvernis… For William’s and Gerald’s close relation, see for example Vita Sancti 
Geraldi Auriliacensis I, c. 34, 182.
123 Ademar, Chronicon III, c. 21, 141: Hac de causa [Rannulfus] a rege Odono potius timore quam 
honore honorabatur, dumque regalem aulam assiduaretur, veneno nectus, in extremis sancto Ger­
aldo, ibi tunc presenti, parvulum filium suum Eblum commisit tutantum. … Regressusque a palatio 
sanctus Geraldus, clam subductum filium Rannulfi a Pictavis, Willelmo comiti Arvernis credidit 
nutrendum, cui consanguineus erat. On Ademar’s claim that Odo had poisoned Ramnulf II, see 
Werner, Ademar, 312−314, who argues for a later invention.
124 Abbo, Bella II, 106, v. 545−546:
Nam libuit regi dare propugnacula fratri
Rotberto Pictavis, Ademaro tamen haud sic.
125 Abbo, Bella II, 106, v. 535−538 and 106−108, v. 546−547.
126 On the moment of the campaign and the royal itinerary, see Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 132−138, 
convincingly arguing against Favre, Eudes, 141−148, who argued for two campaigns, the first one 
taking place in summer 892.
127 Abbo, Bella II, 108, v. 548−553.
128 Annales Vedastini 892, 73. Abbot Ebolus was killed 2nd October 892. Molinier, Obituaires I, 274 
and 327 and Bautier, Recueil Eudes, XXV with n. 1.
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conflict with William continued, the count, in turn, killing Odo’s ally Hugh, who 
had been granted William’s honores.129
However, over the course of 893, a settlement was found not only with William 
but also with Altmar. This was probably due to two political developments which 
shifted the balance of power against Odo. First, early in 893 Fulk and his allies 
crowned Charles the Simple as king, thereby directly threatening Odo’s right to 
rule. Second, in the wake of this rebellion, William and Altmar concluded an al-
liance, joining up with Richard the Justiciar to take advantage of the situation.130 
Given that Altmar had taken control of Poitiers (which was also claimed by Ebalus 
Manzer), this alliance may seem surprising since it indicates that William had 
acknowledged Altmar’s position and, hence, disregarded his protégé’s interests. 
Undoubtedly, this had been made possible by the deaths of Abbot Ebolus and 
Gauzbert and might have been facilitated if Altmar, in turn, guaranteed Ebalus 
access to his father’s property in the region. Thus, political pressure on Odo in-
creased considerably and the king decided to appease his opponents. William 
gained the abbey of Saint-Julien of Brioude by a royal grant131 whereas Altmar was 
again confirmed as count of Poitiers132 and resumed his position within the circle 
around Odo shortly after,133 acts that served to strengthen the bond between these 
nobles and the king and that probably were also aimed at restoring trust in Odo 
because they demonstrated that he was willing to do his opponents justice and 
to make generous grants to restore peace. While Altmar regained his position in 
the circle around the king, William’s future position is more difficult to discern. 
It seems that he at the very least remained neutral over the course of the next 
years, even if he displayed a rather self-confident attitude.134 The alliance between 
him and Altmar probably broke soon after. The Vita Geraldi reports a number of 
clashes between the count and Gerald of Aurillac, with William coming to the 
latter’s aid;135 while in 902 William probably supported Ebalus Manzer’s return to 
Poitiers which forced Altmar out of the city.136 However, for the time being Ebalus 
Manzer’s interests appear to have once again been disregarded, undoubtedly be-
cause the deaths of his uncles had deprived him of his support. In a private charter 
issued in 897, Robert granted the villa of Doussay to the canons of Saint-Martin 
129 Abbo, Bella II, 108, v. 551−561.
130 Annales Vedastini 893, 73−74: Post pascha Domini Fulcho archiepiscopus et Heribertus comes 
assumentes Karolum regem cum omni exercitu disponunt ire contra Odonem regem, veneruntque 
contra eos Richardus, Willelmus et Hadamarus, habueruntque exercitum copiosum. See chapter 
I.2.5.
131 See chapter I.2.5.
132 Kienast, Vasallität, 464.
133 DOdo 50 (after 15th October 893), granting Saint-Hilaire of Poitiers to Bishop Egfred of Poitiers 
at the request of fideles nostri ac marchiones, dilecti Hrobertus scilicet atque Adamarus (192). See 
also chapter II.4.
134 See chapters II.4 and III.2.3.
135 Vita Sancti Geraldi Auriliacensis I, c. 35, 182−184; c. 36, 184−186; c. 38, 186−188.
136 Chronicon S. Maxentii, 68: Anno DCCCCII. Pictavis nocte ingreditur Eblus. William supporting 
Ebalus Manzer on this occasion is also assumed by Auzias, Aquitaine, 450.
312	 VI.	 Conflicts,	rebellions	and	the	role	of	trust
of Tours,137 the very same villa that had been given in precarium to Ebalus Manzer 
in 891. In the conflict evolving around the succession at Poitiers, Odo’s early deci-
sions appear to have been motivated firstly by wanting to protect the interests of 
a noble close to him and secondly by trying to reverse his mistake. Both times he 
violated the interests of members belonging to his inner circle and therefore be-
trayed the trust placed in him as ruler that being close to him meant that he would 
act according to their interests. These actions were probably as badly received by 
them as by the rest of the nobility and thus contributed to the general loss of trust 
that was part of the rationale of the rebellion against him.
This same failure to take into consideration how his actions were perceived 
by the nobles also marks the behaviour of Charles the Simple in his conflict with 
Count Gislebert. The first sign of this conflict is the diploma recording the sec-
ond assembly of Herstal in June 919, which notes a judgement of the scabini of 
the royal palace in favour of Archbishop Roger and which returned the abbey of 
Saint-Servais of Maastricht, “previously unjustly taken from this church by means 
of violence by Count Reginar and his son Gislebert” to the church of Trier.138 At 
this point, the conflict around Saint-Servais already had a long prehistory, with 
its possession repeatedly changing from Reginar to the church of Trier and back, 
each time marking how the political influence of the rivalling parties had changed 
at the royal court.139 Like Odo’s grant of Poitiers to Count Altmar, the restoration 
of Saint-Servais to the church of Trier also meant the interests of a close supporter 
by the king were being protected. The reasons why Charles turned against Gisle-
bert, who, some years earlier, still figured prominently among his supporters,140 are 
difficult to determine. Following Richer’s description of Gislebert,141 scholars often 
assume that the conflict was the result of Gislebert’s ambition to become king142 
or dux of Lotharingia,143 or at least to increase his political room for manoeuvre 
in the context of the coronation of Henry the Fowler in the East Frankish realm 
which had taken place shortly before.144 His political ambition seems certain. As 
137 Dufour, Recueil Robert et Raoul, N° 40 (27th March 897).
138 DChS 100 (13th June 919), 230: …sed violentia Rageneri comitis et filii ejus Giselberti a predicta 
Treverensi ecclesia jam olim esset injuste ablata.
139 See chapter III.2.1.4.
140 DChS 84 (19th January 916), see chapter III.2.1.7.
141 Richer, Historiae I, c. 35−36, 70−71: Hic [Giselbertus] cum esset clarissimo genere inclitus, et Hein­
rici Saxonię ducis filie Gerbergę matrimonio vel coniugio nimium felix, in nimiam pre insolentia 
temeritatem preceps ferebatur, in disciplina militari ex audatia nimius, adeo ut quodcumque in­
evincibile, appetere non metueret […] Talis itaque in regem nimia animositate ferebatur. Parisot, 
Royaume, 631, is undoubtedly correct in dating Gislebert’s return to Lotharingia to the first half 
of 920 since Flodoard (Annales 920, 4, see below, chapter VI.2, n. 145), reports that during this 
time Gislebert was chosen princeps by a part of the Lotharingian nobility. He is also correct in 
refusing Henry’s role as mediator since he and Charles were enemies at the time.
142 Boshof, Lotharingien, 146.
143 Parisot, Royaume, 624; Sassier, Hugues, 81; Koziol, Politics, 426.
144 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, 203.
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Flodoard reports, during the period of Charles’  problems with the West Frankish 
nobles after the assembly of Soissons in January 920, Gislebert was elected princeps 
by Lotharingian nobles,145 seemingly after he had created a network of support by 
distributing honores among them if Richer is to be believed.146
Gislebert’s ambitions to recover at least his father’s position at court147 and in 
particular his rivalry with the church of Trier certainly played a central role in the 
conflict between him and the king. Yet, in regard to its development, it appears 
to be too limiting to attribute the outbreak and the development of the conflict 
solely to these ambitions, for this fails to take Charles’  own interests into proper 
consideration. The assembly at Herstal demonstrates how much support Charles 
was able to muster at that moment against Gislebert: five bishops and twelve 
counts,148 among them Count Sigard from Gislebert’s own sphere of influence149 
and Otto, the son of Count Ricuin of Verdun, who had married Gislebert’s half-
sister Cunigunde,150 which probably indicates that his father also did not oppose 
the king’s course. Just how powerful this network was becomes apparent from 
Charles’  success. Gislebert was soon also excommunicated151 and, according to 
Richer, chased out of the realm to Henry the Fowler’s court.152
Of course, the fact that Charles was prepared at that moment does not necessi-
tate that he had taken the initiative in the conflict. Yet, the further development of 
the relations between him and Gislebert nevertheless betrays that the conflict was 
at least as determined by Charles’  interests as by the counts. Gislebert, who had 
probably returned from his exile during the first half of 920 when Charles had to 
deal with the nobles of the Western Francia, was subdued and restored to a part of 
his honores.153 However, once peace had been restored, Charles started to advance 
against Gislebert’s former allies. Bishop Hilduin of Liège, who had supported the 
count, was replaced by a Matfriding, Abbot Richer of Prüm.154 Next came Henry 
the Fowler, with whom Charles, after an encounter at Worms,155 concluded first an 
145 Flodoard, Annales 920, 4: …Giselberto, quem plurimi Lotharienses principem, relicto Karolo rege, 
delegerant… On Flodoard’s use of princeps, see Jacobsen, Titel.
146 Richer, Historiae I, c. 36, 71: Meditabatur quoque regis abiectionem admodum, ac plurimum id 
 pertractabat apud eos qui in Belgica potiores videbantur non quidem Rotberto, sed sibi regnum 
 affectans, sua quoque principibus pene omnia distribuens. Et maiores quidem prediis et ędibus 
egregiis inclite donabat, mediocres autem auri et argenti talentis efficaciter illiciebat. Fit itaque 
multorum ex Belgica cum eo consensus.
147 See chapter III.2.1.7. 
148 DChS 100. See chapter III.2.1.7. For the identifications, see Parisot, Royaume, 626 with n. 2.
149 Parisot, Royaume, 634.
150 See chapter III.2.1.7.
151 MGH Conc. VI, N° 2, 45.
152 Richer, Historiae I, c. 37−38, 71−73.
153 Richer, Historiae I, c. 38−39, 72−73. Richer’s claim that Gislebert only returned to Lotharingia 
after a few years is rendered impossible by Flodoard’s report that Charles pursued him in Lothar-
ingia over the course of winter 921/922. See below.
154 On the succession at Liège, see Zimmermann, Streit and chapters III.2.1.8 and IV.4.
155 Continuatio Reginonis 923, 157; Flodoard, Annales 920, 3; Flodoard, Annales 921, 6.
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armistice and then a peace treaty ensuring at least his future neutrality.156 Last on 
the list was Count Ricuin of Verdun, who appears to have switched his support 
over to Gislebert, but now lost a number of fortified places to Charles before he 
submitted and was re-accepted into the king’s favour.157 With Gislebert now iso-
lated, Charles renewed the hostilities, chasing him and Ricuin’s son Otto over the 
course of the winter up until Lent 922.158
In either of these cases, Gislebert may have been the initiator and not Charles. 
Yet, in regard to Charles’  activities, this seems rather improbable. Gislebert’s suc-
cess was tied to the crisis of Charles’  reign, a crisis that had passed by September 
921 and resulted in his submission. After his submission, his position had fur-
ther deteriorated, which made it even more unlikely that a renewal of the conflict 
would result in a success for him. This only changed when the rebellion against 
Charles broke out, forcing the king to concentrate his forces in the West against 
Robert and his supporters.159 However, this was only after hostilities between the 
king and the count had already been renewed. Therefore, it seems indeed safe to 
assume that the initiative had rested with Charles. Gislebert made use of this op-
portunity to improve his position by allying himself with the rebels.160 However, 
soon afterwards, he abandoned them again when he came to an agreement with 
the king, as indicated by a charter he issued 25th August 922.161 The charter, con-
firming the exchange of property between a certain Guntbert and Gislebert’s ab-
bey of Stavelot, was signed by him as “dux Gislebert, count and abbot.”162 A private 
charter does not necessarily reflect the position of the king, especially one which 
was issued during times of conflict. Yet, the dating line of this charter reads “in 
the 11th year of the reign of the most pious lord, King Charles,”163 indicating that 
Gislebert and the king had indeed come to an agreement. The concurrence of the 
count acknowledging Charles once again as his king, honouring him as “most pi-
ous” (piissimus) while calling himself dux, further gives rise to the conclusion that 
Charles, confronted with the rebellion, had sought refuge in appeasing Gislebert 
by this time granting him what he desired: the position as Lotharingia’s leading 
noble. Gislebert, given that Charles had already broken the earlier settlement, was 
probably wary of the king by now, yet his doubts were probably overcome by the 
156 Flodoard, Annales 921, 6; MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2. See chapter IV.4.
157 Flodoard, Annales 921, 5−6; Richer, Historiae I, c. 27, 65. For the connection between Charles’ 
advance against Ricuin and the conflict with Gislebert, see also Ewig, Rheinlande, 207.
158 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7.
159 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7−8.
160 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8: Quem insecutus Hugo cum ceteris pugnatorum duobus milibus usque 
Mosam, Giselbertum Lothariense obvium habuit; cum quo a patre, qui eum prosecutus fuerat et 
super Axonam in pago Laudunensi sedebat, ad colloquium revocatus revertitur.
161 Halkin and Roland, Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 55, 132−133. See also chapter III.2.1.7.
162 Halkin and Roland, Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 55, 133: Gilebert dux, comes et abbatis, qui 
hanc precariam manu propria firmavit et firmare rogavit et jussit scribi.
163 Halkin and Roland, Recueil Stavelot-Malmédy I, N° 55: …anno XI regni domni Karoli piissimi 
regis…
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gains he could make through the new agreement. However, this peace did not hold 
either. For the second half of 922 Flodoard notes only a single campaign, namely 
Charles besieging Gislebert’s castrum of Chièvremont and Hugh the Great hur-
rying to its relief and receiving hostages from Gislebert after its rescue.164 Because 
Gislebert’s ambitions had been satisfied by Charles in the previous settlement and 
because the count himself was apparently considered so untrustworthy and weak 
by Hugh that he had to provide hostages, it again seems safe to attribute the re-
newal of the conflict to the king, despite the fact that he already faced the rebellion.
Hence, the conflict between Charles and Gislebert appears to have been, pos-
sibly initiated, but certainly twice renewed by the king. Who was the driving force 
behind these actions? Charles’  allies, most of all the church of Trier and the Mat-
frid family and their rivalry with Reginar’s son, certainly played an important 
role. Yet, it seems safe to assume that neither of them opposed the first settlement 
with Gislebert. Archbishop Roger and Count Matfrid both accompanied Charles 
at Bonn when he concluded the treaty with Henry the Fowler165 and the former 
continued to serve as royal archchancellor at least up until June 922.166 Further-
more, Roger and Gislebert cooperated in 923 when they invited Henry the Fowler 
to come to Lotharingia.167 As the rivalries between them do not seem to have 
constituted an insurmountable obstacle to a settlement of the conflict, the source 
for its constant renewal appears to have been with Charles himself. The support 
Charles was able to gain against Gislebert indicates that his reasons were initially 
widely accepted by the nobles of the realm. Therefore, it seems improbable that 
the outbreak of the conflict would have been badly perceived by the majority of 
the nobles supporting Charles’  rule. However, it appears that Charles considered 
the subsequent settlements with Gislebert mere temporary arrangements which 
would gain him time to strengthen his position before attacking again. As trust 
is a matter of being predictable and reliable, each renewal of the conflict prob-
ably undermined the trust Charles enjoyed among the nobles, or at least among 
those already harbouring doubts against him. Faced with the rebellion, Charles, 
like Odo, tried to improve his position by coming to terms with his opponent. Un-
like Odo however, he then broke these settlements and thus further damaged his 
reputation instead of trying to restore trust in himself by keeping his side of the 
bargain and displaying himself as a reliable ruler.
164 Flodoard, Annales 922, 11: Rotbertus filium suum, Hugonem, in regnum Lotharii mittit cum aliquo 
Francorum agmine, protper Capraemontem, Gisleberti castrum, obsidione liberandum, quod Karo­
lus premebat obsessum. Quo comperto, Karolus obsidionem relinquit, et Hugo, acceptis obsidibus a 
quibusdam Lothariensibus, ad patrem remeavit.
165 MGH Const. I, N° 1, 1−2.
166 Roger makes his last appearance in DChS 121 (15th June 922), which is also the last diploma is-
sued by Charles.
167 Flodoard, Annales 923, 18.
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VI.3 Speaking justice: Symbolic acts
While royal actions could undermine the relations between the king and the 
 nobles when they were perceived as violations of the existing norms, rulers could 
also aim to strengthen trust by performing acts of justice. The most striking re-
cords of kings actively trying to do justice are certainly the capitularies, “legislative 
texts that recorded the decisions reached by kings in discussion with their lead-
ing men, and communicated them to a wider political community.”168 Among the 
West Frankish kings ruling after the death of Charles the Bald, only Carloman II 
appears to have issued any capitularies. The first was issued 22nd February 883 at 
Compiègne,169 comprising only three very short chapters on robbery. The second 
capitulary followed about a year later in March 884 at the assembly of Ver170 and 
this time not only added a lengthy introduction but also extended the chapters, 
again mostly on robbery, to fourteen. Most of these chapters contain nothing new 
but only repeat old capitularies on how to pursue and judge robbers,171 quick ex-
communication being the most important measure. The lack of capitularies dur-
ing the late Carolingian era has often been interpreted as a sign of institutional 
weakness.172 This view has recently been challenged, not at least by Steffen Patzold, 
who argues that capitularies did not serve to uphold order by recording texts of 
normative significance but that instead they were meant to create order by in-
structing people to behave in a moral way and thus prevent arising conflict.173 Even 
if this new reading might be considered as going too far in negating the legal char-
acter of the capitularies, it, nevertheless, becomes apparent that there seems to 
have been more to these texts than mere collections of newly drafted laws.
As François Bougard has observed, the capitularies issued in Italy towards the 
end of the 9th century became more and more formulaic and repetitive in nature; 
he argues that their function was not only pragmatic, but also symbolic. In regard 
to new kings, capitularies seem to have been drafted less to ensure justice was 
done in practice, but to restate the moral foundations of traditional kinship and to 
demonstrate an intention of good government.174 Hence, it is not surprising that 
Charles the Bald, for example, issued two capitularies shortly after the had taken 
over the Italian realm175 for both served to strengthen his rule there. Carloman’s 
capitularies were not issued at the beginning of his reign in 880 but three years 
168 MacLean, Legislation, 395. See also Ganshof, Recherches; Geiselhart, Kapitulariengesetzgebung; 
Pössel, Authors.
169 MGH Capit. II, N° 286, 370−371.
170 MGH Capit. II, N° 287, 371−375.
171 Dümmler, Geschichte III, 231.
172 MacLean, Legislation, 396.
173 Patzold, Normen, 349−350. For the debate around the nature and purpose of capitularies, see 
furthermore Schneider, Bedeutung; Schneider, Schriftlichkeit; Bühler, Wort; McKitterick, Her-
stellung; Bougard, Justice; Mordek, Kapitularien.
174 Bougard, Justice, 25−29 and 52. 
175 MGH Capit. II, N° 220 and 221, 98−104.
 VI.3 Speaking justice: Symbolic acts 317
later. However, the first one was issued about half a year after Carloman had taken 
over the northern part of the realm in succession to his brother Louis, at a moment 
when the Northern nobles had already turned away from him and withheld their 
support against the Northmen.176 The second, more impressive capitulary was is-
sued at exactly the same moment, when an accord between Carloman and the 
nobles had finally been reached. Thus, both were issued at moments when Carlo-
man needed to present himself in the best light, confirm his willingness to rule as 
his predecessors had done—in fact, the second capitulary is full of references to 
them177—and to establish order and justice in the realm. Interpreted in this con-
text, the main intent of these capitularies was therefore much less to ensure justice 
was done on the ground.178 Instead they served to create the image of a king who 
was aiming to bring order to the realm in cooperation with the nobles around him 
at a moment when his own rule was or had been challenged by parts of the nobil-
ity. In short, they were issued to build trust in Carloman.
Where capitularies dealt with general problems, kings also delivered justice 
in person. Judicial assemblies are the most obvious example, although records of 
them are quite rare.179 From Louis the Stammerer, Louis III and Charles the Fat in 
the Western realm none are preserved, of Carloman II we have one,180 from Odo 
three181 and from Charles the Simple four.182 From Charles the Bald’s reign, by way 
of comparison, only five have been preserved,183 meaning that, compared to the 
length of the reigns, the number of such judicia remained more or less unchanged. 
176 See chapters II.2 and V.1.1.
177 MGH Capit.  II, N°  287, 372. For example Ch. 1: Volumus itaque, ut palatium nostrum more 
praedecessorum nostrorum et Dei cultu et regali honore, sed et religionis habitu et unanimitatis 
concordia atque pacis ordine stabiliatur et in eodem palatio nostro pax praedecessorum nostrorum 
sanctionibus servata per omne regnum nostrum exequenda proferatur. 2: Decernimus igitur, […] 
ut, secundum quod in capitulis antecessorum continetur, legali multetur iudicio tripla composi­
tione peracta cum dominico banno. 3: Quodsi ausu temerario venire contempserit, vi ad nostram 
praesentiam adducatur subdendus praedecessorum nostrorum sanctionibus. 4: Placuit etiam nobis 
et fidelibus nostris, ut, quicumque infra regnum nostrum aliquid rapuerit aut depraedatus fuerit, 
omnia in triplum componat et bannum dominicum persolvat et insuper publicam poenitentiam 
inde faciat, sicut in capitulari antecessorum continetur.
178 Offergeld, Reges pueri, 380, argues that the capitularies, being issued so shortly in succession and 
with both dealing with the same problem, probably had hardly any effect at all on the ongoing 
problems of the realm.
179 Nelson, Dispute Settlement, 52. See also Wormald, Making, 70−76. The rarity however only refers 
to judicial assemblies recorded by royal diplomas. On the other hand, those mentioned by private 
charters are rather abundant. Hence, the lack of such assemblies in royal diplomas is no indicator 
for a breakdown of the judicial system. See also Bougard, Justice (Settimana), 153 for Charles the 
Fat’s reign in Italy.
180 DCmII 50.
181 DOdo 30. The other two judicial assemblies known from Odo’s reign are not recorded by royal 
diplomas. Bautier noted one under DOdo 19, yet the only source referring to it is a private charter 
issued some time after. The other one is noted by the Annales Vedastini (892, 72) and the chroni-
cle of Regino of Prüm (892, 139−140) and deals with the death sentence against Odo’s relative 
Walker. On the implications of this problem, see below.
182 DDChS 84, 89, 100 and 112.
183 Depreux, Absence, 11 with n. 37, refering to DDChB 40, 228, 236, 258 and 314.
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However, if these numbers are compared to those of diplomas issued by the differ-
ent rulers, a trend towards an increasing number of judicial assemblies per num-
ber of diplomas is noticeable for Charles the Simple: 4 out of 120 diplomas, or 
3.3%, make note of them compared to 5 out of 468, or 1%, for Charles the Bald.184 
This increase in regard to the overall number of issued diplomas points towards 
the importance Charles attributed to these assemblies. This is an interesting ob-
servation, given that, according to Richer’s description of Charles’  character, one 
of the king’s two faults was to neglect his jurisdictional duties.185 Of course Richer 
is a rather problematic source, yet this same reproach also surfaces in a chapter of 
the acts of the synod held at Trosly in 909 by Archbishop Heriveus and his suf-
fragans.186 In this chapter, phrased as a mirror for princes and probably meant for 
Charles to read,187 the importance of jurisdiction is especially emphasised.188 Be-
ing close to Charles, Heriveus, in particular, would have been very well aware of 
the king’s flaws and shortcomings and the chapter can hence be read as a direct 
response to these.
In this context, it is worth making some further comments. Especially during 
Odo’s reign, judicial acts are often only referred to by sources not originating at 
the royal court, but by regional ones. A very interesting example of this is the 
notice of a local placitum held in April 890 at Nîmes.189 The notice narrates that 
Bishop Gibert of Nîmes had approached Odo, asking him to intervene in a con-
flict between his church and a certain Genesius, who, according to the bishop, 
had usurped the villa of Bizac, which had been given to the church by a woman 
called Bligardis about twelve years earlier; the notice further adds that Genesius, 
in order to obtain a confirmation of his claim from the count, had forged letters 
by the king. Odo had then tasked Count Raymond of Nîmes with investing the 
matter, which, in turn, led to said placitum. For the reigns following the death of 
Charles the Bald, this is the only time that such a case is reported. Does this mean 
that Odo was the only king to be approached by nobles from distant regions who 
sought royal justice in such cases? This seems rather unlikely and there are indeed 
some traces of, if not identical, at least similar cases. For example, in 916, Charles 
184 Depreux, Absence, 11 for Charles the Bald’s numbers.
185 Richer, Historiae I, c. 14, 50: Duplici morbo notabilis, libidinis intemperans, ac circa exsequenda 
iuditia paulo neglegentior fuit.
186 Schmitz, Konzil, 187; Sassier, Royauté, 200. For the synod, see, next to the works of Schmitz, also 
Schröder, Synoden, N° 29, 189−196.
187 Schmitz, Konzil, 176.
188 MGH Conc. V, N° 58, c. 2, 507−511. For example: Tanta quippe debet esse rex pręditus virtutis et 
iustitę auctoritate, ut iniustum vel malum aliquid molientes solo intuitu formidolosę maiestatis 
dissipet, ne ad meditatum facinus progredi audeant. […] Regale vero ministerium specialiter est 
populum dei gubernare et regere cum ęquitate et iustitia et, ut pacem et concordiam habeant, stu­
dere. […] Unde oportet, ut ipse, qui iudex est iudicum, causam pauperum ad se ingredi faciat et 
diligenter inquirat, ne forte illi, qui ab eo constituti sunt et vicem eius agere debent in populo, iniuste 
aut negligenter pauperes oppressiones pati permittant.
189 DOdo 14. Cartulaire Nîmes, N° 5, 10−13. For the dating to 890 and not 892, see Bautier, Recueil 
Eudes, 66−67.
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the Simple was approached by Abbot Acfred of San-Esteban of Bagnoles at whose 
request he issued a diploma confirming the possessions of his abbey.190 However, 
Bagnoles was in dispute with the abbey of Saint-Polycarpe over some property 
that was now confirmed by Charles’  diploma as belonging to the former.191 Like in 
the case of Bishop Gibert, an ecclesiastical institution distant from the royal court 
hence sought out the king in a judicial dispute. Furthermore, we may also point 
out the conflict between Count Erlebald of Castriciensis and the church of Reims, 
which resulted in the count trying to seek out Charles yet being killed before he 
was able to meet him.192 Another noble, albeit this time one close to Charles,193 ap-
proached the king to obtain justice. These examples indicate that Odo’s case was 
in fact not special in its nature, but only due to the circumstance that sources have 
been preserved making note of it. This circumstance leads to the cases when royal 
diplomas did make note of royal judicial decisions. The loss of diplomas certainly 
contributes to the overall low number of such references, yet cannot solely explain 
them. Instead, it would seem that the royal chancellery only went through the 
effort of drafting a diploma under very particular circumstances, which would 
signal the special importance of these cases and their recordings for the rulers.
Carloman  II’s judicium is referred to by one of his earliest diplomas, issued 
12th January 881 at a villa Caciacum.194 The diploma reports that Carloman, at 
the request of Bishop Abbo of Nevers, restored the villa of Cours to the bishop’s 
church after having held a “general council” (commune consilium) with the “great 
and first men of our palace,” which is most probably a reference to a judgement 
made at the royal court by a judicial assembly.195 The first point to note is the mo-
ment the diploma was issued. In January 881, about nine months had passed since 
the assembly of Amiens where the West Frankish realm had been divided be-
tween Carloman and his brother Louis,196 so the assembly took place already well 
into Carloman’s reign. However, the diploma recording the judgement is only the 
second one preserved from Carloman’s reign, the first one having been issued 
in 30th November 880.197 A rather long time had passed until Carloman actually 
started delivering diplomas. The timing, however, appears to be tied to an actual 
change in politics. Despite the partition of the realm, from Amiens onwards, the 
two brothers had always remained together, meeting with the East Frankish rul-
ers at Gondreville and then campaigning against Lothar II’s son Hugh as well as 
190 DChS 85.
191 For this dispute, see Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 34−36.
192 Flodoard, Annales 920, 2−3. 
193 See chapter III.2.1.7.
194 DCmII 50. On the villa, see Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III et Carloman II, XLVII.
195 DCmII 50, 127: Agentes itaque commune consilium cum proceribus atque primoribus palatii nos­
tri… See also Bautier’s commentary to the diploma, 126.
196 Annales Bertiani 880, 241.
197 DCmII 49.
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Boso.198 Louis left Carloman in the South to celebrate the holiday at Compiègne 
only a short time before Christmas.199 The deliverance of diplomas begins at about 
the same moment when Carloman actually started to be the only king around,200 
marking the starting moment of his sole reign. In this context, the judicial as-
sembly gains a new weight. Very much like capitularies, such assemblies served 
to strengthen the king’s legitimacy and his bond with the nobility,201 they were, 
following François Bougard, a recurring “ritual of auto-affirmation.”202 Like his 
later capitularies in the North, the assembly can be seen as a demonstration of 
Carloman’s willingness to actively bring justice to the realm in cooperation with 
his leading nobles at the beginning of his reign—a means to strengthen trust in his 
rule. In addition to such thoughts, there also might have been a second reason be-
hind this assembly. As Robert-Henri Bautier has proposed, the property restored 
to the church of Nevers might have previously been in the hands of Boso.203 Hence, 
the restoration was not only a symbol of justice, but also a sign that Carloman was 
willing to distribute Boso’s honores among those who supported him. In this con-
text, another of Carloman’s diplomas is of interest. In May 881, he again restored 
property, this time to the church of Orléans.204 This property, the villae of Chautay, 
Germigny-sur-Loire and Marzy, formed a block with the villa of Cours restored at 
the judicial assembly and probably belonged to Boso as well,205 thus emphasising 
Carloman’s message to the nobles. These are of course only assumptions since, 
apart from the location of the villae in the Berry and the Nivernais (within the 
vicinity of Boso’s power base), there is no actual evidence that they had been held 
by Boso before.
Like Carloman, Odo also held a judicial assembly early in his reign, at some 
point before 22nd March 890.206 It dealt with the appeal of a certain Ricbert, who up 
to this point had held property belonging to Saint-Martin of Tours. This property 
had originally been rented out by the monks to the archbishop of Tours, who had 
bequeathed it to his relative Ricbert. Ricbert, in turn, appears to have maltreated 
his coloni, who took legal action against him. In a local judicial assembly under the 
198 Annales Bertiniani 880, 242: Inde Compendium redientes, ibi Pascha Domini celebrauerunt, et 
post haec per Remum et Catalaunis iuitates ad placitum condictum mediante Iunio apud Gundulfi 
uillam obuiam suis sobrinis uenerunt. […] In quo placito communi consensu inuentum est ut ispi 
reges Hludouuici quondam filii ad Attiniacum redirent cum scara Hludouuici Germaniae regis, et 
Hugonem Hlotharii iunioris filium impeterent. […] Indeque cum hoste […] praedicti reges […] in 
Burgundiam uersus Bosonem per mensiem Iulium a Trecas ciuitate perrexerunt…
199 Annales Vedastini 880, 49.
200 Charles the Fat, who had joined Louis and Carloman against Boso, had already returned to Italy. 
Annales Bertinaini 880, 243.
201 MacLean, Legislation, 399.
202 Bougard, Justice (Settimana), 153.
203 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III and Carloman II, XLVI.
204 DCmII 53.
205 Bautier, Recueil Louis II, Louis III and Carloman II, XLVI.
206 DOdo 19, although Bautier points out that there was not necessarily a diploma recording the 
judgement.
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provost of Suèvres, the priest and archtreasurer Berno and the scholarum magister 
Odalricus of Saint-Martin, at the request of these coloni, Ricbert had been ordered 
to restore the property to the abbey. Ricbert’s appeal to Odo failed, instead the 
king confirmed the previous judgement in accord with his brother Robert and 
“other nobles residing in the vicinity”207 and furthermore condemned Ricbert to 
compensate the monks by handing over some property (which, in turn, he was 
allowed to keep until his death). Hence, this judicial assembly appears to have had 
a very local character, as it not only revolved around a centre of Robertian power, 
but also invoked his brother and local nobles.208 The impression that this assembly 
was indeed only of minor political importance for Odo is furthermore emphasised 
by the circumstance that it appears not to have been recorded by a royal diploma, 
but was only afterwards referred to by a private charter noting the execution of the 
judgement.209
Another of Odo’s judicial assemblies is also referred to only later on. A  diploma 
issued for the abbey of Montiéramey210 notes a royal placitum held at Verberie where 
the three archbishops Fulk of Reims, Walter of Sens and Wido of Rouen, together 
with the bishops Dido of Laon, Honoratus of Beauvais and Riculf of Soissons, had 
investigated the case of the monk Aginus who claims, against  Montiéramey, the 
abbey of Saint-Sauveur of Alfa for himself. While this assembly was certainly more 
important than the previous one for Saint-Martin of Tours, the question remains 
why Odo only referred to it in a diploma issued 30th  September 892, in which 
he confirmed the judgement. At this moment, Odo’s reign had  entered a critical 
stage, as the king was in conflict with a number of powerful nobles: Baldwin II of 
Flanders, the Aquitanian nobles supporting Ebalus Manzer and probably at this 
point Count Altmar as well. As we have argued, at this moment Odo was facing 
a severe crisis of trust, which directly led to directly to the rebellion around Fulk. 
Odo was in dire need of rebuilding lost trust and the diploma confirming the 
judgement in favour of Montiéramey may have been his intended means for this, 
as it would show him as king who acted in concord with his nobles, enforcing 
justice within his realm.
This image depicted in Odo’s diploma can also be found in some of Charles the 
Simple’s. His first recorded judicial assembly dates to 19th January 916 and  revolves 
around the abbey of Süsteren.211 The abbey had originally been given by Arnulf 
to the priest and artist Siginand,212 who, in turn, appears to have asked to pass 
on Süsteren to the abbey of Prüm while keeping it as a precarium.213  Zwentibold 
207 DOdo 19, 85: …caeteri pernobiles in circuitu residentes…
208 On parties in judicial conflict participating in such assemblies as judges, see Nelson, Dispute Set-
tlement, 53−54.
209 Favre, Eudes, pièce justificative N° IV, 239−242.
210 DOdo 30 (30th September 892).
211 DChS 84.
212 DA 85.
213 DZ 2.
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had then confirmed this donation, and left Süsteren with Siginand, but it was to 
revert to Prüm upon his death.214 However, after that, according to Charles’  di-
ploma, Süsteren had “in unjust and violent efforts of the powerful been taken from 
him.”215 Charles, “after many and almost countless reclamations without effect”216 
now used the occasion to submit the case to an assembly at Herstal with the par-
ticipation “of the entire realm, of bishops, counts and proceres as well as judges of 
varying power and a conventum of all the nobles, all of them our fideles,”217 sub-
sequently naming them—four bishops, fourteen counts and seventeen others.218 
Following their judgement, he then restored Süsteren to Prüm. Unfortunately, the 
sources do not reveal the identity of those powerful men who had managed to 
bring the abbey into their possession.219 However, the message of the diploma was 
not only a demonstration of how Charles was willing to do justice in accord with 
the nobles around him, but also, and probably more importantly, a display of the 
powers backing him in this case. Thus, the diploma became a very concrete po-
litical statement, showing how close he had become to the Matfrid family, whose 
member Richer had become abbot of Prüm. Both, the display of power as well 
as the alliance with the Matfrid family, indicate that the opponent was someone 
with considerable political weight. And indeed, Charles’  intervention appears not 
to have been the end of the conflict between this unknown party and Prüm, al-
though it has to remain open when it resurfaced. In 949, Otto the Great again dealt 
with the problem, copying Charles’  diploma in large parts, including the phrasing 
about the general assembly and adjusted only the name of the place and the names 
of participants.220
Three years later, this display of power and cooperation was repeated, again 
at Herstal.221 This time it was the church of Trier to which, by judgement of the 
“scabini of our palace and by attestation of all of our fideles,”222 the abbey of Saint-
Servais, previously given to the church by Arnulf, was restored. This time the 
adversary is noted: Reginar Longneck and his son Gislebert are said to have un-
justly and violently taken the abbey from the church.223 The naming of Reginar 
and Gislebert is not the only difference from the previous diploma however. Mark 
214 DZ 2.
215 DChS 84, 189: …pontentiorum injusto violentoque conamine ei ablata est.
216 DChS 84, 189: …post multas et pene innumeras reclamationes sine effectu…
217 DChS  84, 189: …habito generali placito apud Haristallium, in conventu totius regni, tam epis­
coporum quam comitum et procerum ac judicum diversarum potestatum omniumque conventu 
nobilium, cunctorum fidelium nostrorum…
218 See chapter III.2.1.7.
219 On the hypothesis of Wisplinghoff, Untersuchungen, 464, that these had been men close to 
 Gislebert, see chapter  III.2.1.7. Also Koziol, Politics, 515, sees the judgement in the context of 
Gislebert.
220 DOI 111.
221 DChS 100 (13th June 919).
222 DChS 100, 230: … scabinorum palatii nostri et attestatione omnium fidelium nostrorum…
223 DChS 100: …sed violentia Rageneri comitis et filli ejus Giselberti a predicta Treverensi ecclessia jam 
olim esset injuste ablata.
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Mersiowsky may have gone too far by denying the charter the character of a royal 
diploma and calling it a Gerichtsurkunde;224 however, the diploma is certainly dif-
ferent from a normal royal diploma. The list of witnesses, featuring five bishops, 
twelve counts and eighteen scabini, is not included in the narratio this time, but 
added to the end of the charter. Furthermore, the diploma is sealed with a special 
seal225 and lacks the royal monogram.226 In fact, about a month later, Charles is-
sued another diploma confirming the judgement of Herstal,227 indicating that the 
first diploma had not been drawn up with the same intention as the one from 
916. Nevertheless, the assembly as such and its record certainly were symbols of 
Charles’  power at this moment and a signal to his supporters that he had their 
interests at heart—a means to improve trust in his rule.
The detailed naming and the number of the nobles partaking in these two judi-
cial assemblies is what makes these two different from the two others recorded by 
Charles’  diplomas. The first of these other diplomas228 records the petition of Rob-
ert of Neustria for his abbey Saint-Denis 28th May 917, requesting that Charles 
returned the villa of Lagny-le-Sec, which had been granted to the abbey by King 
Dagobert229 but then had been “unjustly taken from them and for a long time been 
possessed by others.”230 Charles, acknowledging the justness of his reclamation231 
and following the judgement of bishops, counts and others of his optimates232 then 
restored the villa to Saint-Denis. However, the importance of the diploma in fact 
does not lie in the judgement, but in the way it is constructed around the relation 
between Charles and Robert. The latter is the “dearest demarcus and our most 
loyal [fidelis] Robert,” later furthermore noted as “Abbot Robert, our kinsman.”233 
Finally, the diploma also adds the installation of a prayer service, not only for 
Charles, but also for Robert.234 The judgement in favour of Saint-Denis is only 
an addition to this demonstration of proximity between the king and the mar-
chio, which shows how Charles was correcting very old injustice for his closest 
supporter. Read in this way, the diploma recording the judgement was a political 
statement similar to the two assemblies of Herstal: it was a demonstration of the 
support the king enjoyed at this very moment, yet one focused on the relation 
between Charles and Robert.
224 Mersiowsky, Urkunde, 227.
225 Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XLIX, according to Mersiowsky, Urkunde, 227, a “Gerichtssiegel.”
226 See Schieffer, Kanzlei, table 11.
227 DChS 103 (9th July 919).
228 DChS 89.
229 In fact it appears to have been King Theuderic III who granted the villa Lagny-le-Sec to Saint-
Denis (DMerov 131).
230 DChS 89, 201: …injuste ei abstracta fuerat et longo tempore ab aliis possessa…
231 DChS 89, 201: Cujus petitionibus atque justis reclamationibus ac deprecationibus faventes…
232 DChS 89, 201: …per judicium episcoporum ac comitum, necnon et aliorum optimatum nostrorum
233 DChS 89, 201: …demarcus carissimus ac fidelissimus noster Rotbertus… and …abba Rotbertus, 
consanguineus noster…
234 DChS 89, 201: …ita tamen ut quamdiu advixerimus pro stabilitate salutis nostrę et consanguinei 
nostri Rotberti abbatis septem specialium salmorum melodiam cotidie decantent…
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The last judicium noted by one of Charles’  diplomas took place in September 
921.235 This time, it was the brother of his deceased wife Frederuna, Bishop Bovo 
of Châlons, who informed him that some property had been estranged from his 
church. At the request and following the judgement of a number of his fideles, his 
counts and bishops,236 Charles then restored said property. Like the diplomas re-
cording the judicia of Herstal, this one adds the names of the fideles participating 
in the judgement: the counts Hagano, Helgaud and Raoul de Gouy, as well as the 
bishops Abbo of Soissons and Stephen of Cambrai—most of them belonging to 
the group of nobles which had formed around Charles in the last years before the 
final rebellion of 922.237 If the judgement recorded by the diploma was meant as a 
demonstration of power, it was a rather inept one. The number of participants was 
so small that it would undoubtedly have been reasonable to do without naming 
them and leave it to the general terms of fideles, counts and bishops that are also to 
be found in the diploma recording the judgement for Robert. Given that it would 
have been easily possible to do so, it seems as if the reference to them was in-
deed intentional. What mattered was not their number, but their names: they were 
meant to be seen. As we have argued, from September 920 onwards, seven months 
after the assembly of Soissons, Hagano’s appearance in royal diplomas changed 
significantly, now acting together with other nobles, seemingly in an effort to in-
tegrate him in the network of the nobles around Charles.238 Hagano appearing in 
this diploma was another step in this direction, showing him acting together with 
other nobles and taking part in the judicial procedures at court. Like the previous 
ones, also this last diploma recording a judicium was hence an important political 
statement by Charles.
However, judicial assemblies and their recordings were only one part of the 
king doing justice. As Philippe Depreux has pointed out, royal diplomas dealt 
with a number of judicial problems very similar to the decisions taken at these 
assemblies, such as settling disputes and restoring unjustly withdrawn freedom 
or, most importantly, property.239 Up until Odo’s reign, a surprising number of 
these latter went to the church of Autun.240 Louis the Stammerer, at the request 
of Bishop Adalgarius and Count Theoderic the Chamberlain, restored the villa 
of Bligny-sur-Ouche, which previously had been passed over to the count of Au-
tun.241 Louis’  diploma was copied by Carloman  II, replacing only the property 
restored, the villa of Teigny.242 Again, it saw Adalgarius and Theoderic acting 
235 DChS 112 (20th September 921). 
236 DChS 112, 268: Cujus petitioni libentissime faventes deprecantibus et adjudicantibus fidelibus nos­
tris, comitibus nostris atque episcopis…
237 See chapters III.2.1.7, III.2.1.8 and III.2.2.
238 See chapter III.2.2.
239 Depreux, Absence, 10.
240 DLS 29, DDCmII 49 and 68, DDOdo 21 and 35. For Boso, see Charmasse, Cartulaire Autun II, 
N° 1, 85−86. DProv 17 is a forgery, see Bautier, Receuil Eudes, CXLIV−CXLVI.
241 DLS 29 (23rd January 879).
242 DCmII 49 (30th November 880).
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together, this time supported by the new count of Autun, Richard. The first two 
also appeared together, assisted by Count Ansgar of Oscheret, in Carloman’s sec-
ond restoration, this time of the villa Marigny.243 The diplomas reveal how well 
connected Adalgarius was within the elite of the nobility, as he not only acted with 
one of the central figures of Louis the Stammerer’s and Carloman  II’s reign—
Theoderic the Chamberlain244—but was also able to obtain restitutions from the 
honores belonging to the count of Autun with the support of that very same count. 
Moreover, after Louis’  death Adalgarius had belonged to Boso’s supporters, and 
even became his archchancellor.245 Seemingly, this had not damaged his position 
within the West Frankish elite. Under Odo, Adalgarius continued to use his influ-
ence to obtain restitutions for his church, albeit with differing results. At his re-
quest, Odo returned Congy, Servigny and Savigny, held by the noble lady Emma, 
to the church of Autun,246 yet when the lady presented royal diplomas confirming 
her claim to the domains, Odo, after he had consulted his fideles, returned the 
property to her, and decided that she was to hold them until her death when they 
should finally fall back to the church.247 Adalgarius, who pursued an aggressive 
course by using his influence at court to increase the wealth of his church even 
if his claim was not entirely justified, finally is also revealed by Odo’s other res-
toration to him. With the support of Odo’s brother Robert and by presenting a 
number of charters as evidence for his claim, he obtained the villa of Tillenay.248 
While the diploma itself is genuine, apparently the evidence brought forward on 
this occasion by Adalgarius appears to have been forged.249 Geoffrey Koziol argues 
that this circumstance was actually known by Odo who decided to ignore it to tie 
Adalgarius, one of the key players in Burgundy, closer to him250—the bishop later 
even became his new archchancellor. Yet, even if this was not the case, the restora-
tions obtained by Adalgarius reveal how a key figure of politics could use his con-
nections to influence the royal judgement in his favour.
Similar to Adalgarius, Bishop Geilo of Langres also seems to have profited 
from his connection to Charles the Fat to increase the wealth of his church by 
receiving not only grants, but also by having property restored. On three occa-
sions he managed to have honores restored, the abbeys of Moutier Saint-Jean251 
and Saint-Seine,252 as well as the villa of L’Ormeau.253 However, powerful nobles 
using their connections to influence royal justice was only one half of the story. 
243 DCmII 68 (6th March 883).
244 See chapters II.1 and II.2.
245 See chapter II.2.
246 DOdo 21.
247 DOdo 22.
248 DOdo 35.
249 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, CXLI–CLIII.
250 Koziol, Politics, 359−361.
251 DChF 129.
252 DChF 153.
253 DChF 147.
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The first diploma restoring an abbey to the church of Langres—the second one 
being an exact word-by-word copy—uses some exceptional language to describe 
the situation. According to the diploma, the abbey had been “taken away [from 
the church of Langres] in tyrannical and sacrilegical temerity of the principes as 
well as in known presumption without any respect for the allmighty God” and 
later adds that this had been done by violent means.254 This was far from the other 
wording usually used in diplomas restoring property which, if at all, normally only 
pointed out that said property had been unjustly taken away.255 While the diploma 
was written by a West Frankish scribe, probably from Langres,256 it nevertheless 
seems that it was drawn up in the royal chancellery since there is a broad consist-
ency between its arenga as well as parts of the formulae with two other diplomas 
issued for the church of Dijon, which would indicate that the scribe must have 
either known them or used a common template.257 Hence, the diploma transmits a 
very clear message originating at the royal court on the willingness of the emperor 
to protect the interests of those who supported him. However, the question is to 
whom this message was addressed. Both diplomas for the church of Langres us-
ing these phrasings were not issued in the West Frankish realm, but in the East, at 
Lorsch and Schlettstadt. On both occasions, nothing in the sources indicates the 
presence of a larger assembly of nobles other than those who usually were with 
the king. Hence, were these diplomas meant especially for Geilo, as a sign of the 
strength of the relations between him and Charles? Given the number of restitu-
tions made by Charles to West Frankish institutions—apart from the three for the 
church of Langres he also restored property to those of Lyon,258 Châlons259 and 
the abbey of Saint-Vincent of Mâcon260—it seems reasonable to assume that the 
restitutions were indeed aimed at a wider audience also in the Western realm and 
supposed to build trust in the emperor by demonstrating his efforts to further the 
interests of those loyal to him.
In using this strategy, he certainly was not alone. The last restitution made by 
Carloman II, also for the church of Châlons, transported a very similar message. 
Delivered 13th March 884 at Compiègne, therefore at the same time he had issued 
his second capitulary, he restored the abbey of Saint-Sulpice to the church.261 The 
254 DChF  129, 207: …quorundam principum tyrannica sacrilegaque temeritate atque inlicita 
 praesumptione sine omnipotentis Dei respectu substractae fuissent… and …quod quorundam prin­
cipum tyrannica  sacrilegaque temeritas per violentiam abstulerat…
255 For example DChF 150, 242: …iniuste abstractas fuisse… and DChF 151, 243: …aliquas res iniuste 
ablatas…
256 Kehr, Urkunden Karls III., 184 and 206; Mersiowsky, Urkunde, 179−180.
257 Kehr, Urkunden Karls III., referring to DDChF 117 and 118.
258 DDChF 123, 150 and 151. Another diploma notes the restoration of property to the church of 
Reims (DChF  106). Since it was issued before Charles became ruler over the West Frankish 
realm, we omit it here.
259 DChF 150.
260 DChF 151.
261 DCmII 76.
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way the diploma depicts Bishop Berno, its petitioner and recipient, is most strik-
ing. He is not only the one “who from the beginning of our reign excelled, being 
most useful and loyal to us in council and aid,” but also the one who “decided to 
remain within this same loyalty.”262 This loyalty was then rewarded by what ap-
pears to have been a longstanding problem for the church of Châlons, to have the 
abbey of Saint-Sulpice returned to it. Already back in 859 and again in 875, Charles 
the Bald had restored the same abbey to the church, then held by a certain Ber-
nard and a certain Geoffrey respectively, yet both times under the reservation that 
Saint-Sulpice remained with its current holders up until their death.263 This same 
reservation was now also renewed by Carloman, this time for a certain Rothard. 
While Charles the Bald’s diplomas betray nothing about Bernard and Geoffrey, 
Carloman’s reveals a bit more about Rothard, who appears as “our vasallus and 
judge.”264 Was it possible that on all three occasions the kings or their local rep-
resentatives had lain hands on Saint-Sulpice to grant it to their own followers? If 
this was indeed the case, Carloman’s diploma, despite the reservation, would be a 
symbol of how far for his closest followers, those who remained loyal to him, he 
was willing to correct injustice even caused by himself—undoubtedly the best way 
build trust while starting into the new era of his reign.
Similarly, Odo’s first restoration265 also coincides with one of the crucial mo-
ments of his reign, the great assembly at Orléans in June 889 where nobles from 
Septimania and Aquitaine were present. The villa of Doussay, apparently a large 
estate to which twenty other villae were dependent, was restored to the monks of 
Saint-Martin of Tours.266 Unfortunately, no diploma confirming the restoration 
has been preserved, the only trace of Odo’s act being a private charter issued by 
Ebalus Manzer 10th October 891.267 According to this charter, it had been Charles 
the Bald who had originally restored the villa to the monks, yet “after a long time, 
[it was] maliciously usurped by Magenarius, after him unjustly held by his son Os-
bert, but then again, during the reign of Lord King Odo, at the city of Orléans, in 
the presence of his proceres, restored to us.”268 This same language was also applied 
in Odo’s other preserved restoration, this time for the church of Narbonne,269 not-
ing that fiscal property that had been bestowed to the church for a long time and 
262 DCmII 76, 198: … qui nobis in principio regni nostri et consilio et auxilio satis proficuus et fidelis 
extitit atque in eadem fidelitate perseverare decrevit…
263 DDChB 212 and 381.
264 DCmII 76, 198: …vasallus et judex noster Rothardus…
265 DOdo 9.
266 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, 228.
267 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, Appendice III, 227−233.
268 Bautier, Recueil Eudes, Appendice  III, 231−232: …post multum tempus, Magenarius dolo 
usurpavit et, post eum, filius ejus Osbertus, injuste tenuit, sed rursus, domni Odonis regis imperio, 
Aurelianis civitate, nobis restitutam in praesentia suorum procerum…
269 DOdo 24.
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unjustly usurped by the comital power was now being returned by the king.270 
Hence, it seems safe to assume that Odo’s restoration for Saint-Martin also em-
phasised him as a ruler who corrected ancient injustice and protected the interests 
of those close to him.
Like his predecessors, Charles the Simple used restitutional acts to portray 
himself as a king who brought justice to his supporters in crucial moments of his 
reign. One of his first diplomas, issued at the request of Bishop Lambert of Liège 
for his church on 26th September 894, spoke of parts of the fisc of Arches in the 
Porcien which had been taken from said church by “force of arms and violence,”271 
but were now restored by Charles, who had just been acknowledged by Arnulf as 
king and had returned with Lotharingian forces to the West. The two assemblies 
of Tours-sur-Marne in 899 and 922 also saw restitutions. In a diploma for the 
abbey Notre-Dame of La Grasse, Charles not only confirmed a large number of 
specific properties, but also those which had been estranged from the abbey.272 The 
diploma was in large parts a copy of one of Charles the Bald;273 but Philippe Lauer 
remarked that this particular phrase had been significantly changed from reliqua 
quae ibi collatae fuerunt (“the remaining [property] which then had been bestowed 
[to them]”) to reliqua quae ibi ablatae fuerunt (“the remaining [property] which 
then had been taken away [from them]”).274 This change certainly had been inten-
tional, demonstrating to those present at the assembly how Charles was willing 
to protect the interests of those who supported him. However, the actual impact 
of this phrase was certainly minimal. La Grasse could use Charles’  confirmation 
in their favour, yet if they did, they still had to present evidence that the disputed 
property had indeed belonged to them. In contrast to this diploma where the resti-
tution of property was only one phrase at the end of a long list of confirmations and 
hence hardly the centre of attention, the diploma issued in 922 was drafted around 
this very act. This time the monks of Saint-Thierry of Reims approached Charles 
and presented the king a diploma of Charles the Bald confirming them in the pos-
session of the domain of Marzelle, protesting that “their living had been unjustly 
withdrawn from them.”275 Charles, who acknowledged their protest as justified, by 
his power then returned the villa to them.276 With Robert’s army encamped only a 
few miles away, Charles once again tried to build trust by portraying himself as a 
just king who protected the church in its need and corrected injustice.277
270 DOdo 24, 112: Fiscos vero qui sunt in Biterrensi comitatu sancto Paulo confessori a longo tempore 
collatos et a potestate comitali injuste usurpatos plenissime reddidimius…
271 DChS 5, 6: …quod vi atque violentia sibi ac ecclesiae sue fuissent ablate…
272 DChS 20, preserved as original.
273 DChB 340.
274 DChS 20, 39 with n. b. Lauer, Recueil Charles III, 37, n. 2.
275 DChS 115, 273: …reclamantes victui eorum injuste eam esse subtractam...
276 DChS 115, 273: Quorum reclamationem cognoscentes veram esse, potestate nostra prefatam villam 
eis reddidimus…
277 In this context it is worth pointing out another diploma issued at the first assembly of 
 Tours-sur-Marne, DChS  24 (6th June 899). In this diploma Archbishop Arnust of Narbonne 
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However, this highly symbolic potential of restitutional acts may not only have 
served to strengthen royal rule by building trust with the receiving party, but at 
times also have been considered a breach of trust by a third one. Among the first 
diplomas issued by Charles the Simple at Richard the Justiciar’s request was one 
for Bishop Herfrid of Auxerre and his church, which restored the villa of Cravant 
sur l’Yonne.278 As we have argued, Richard tried to channel the contact between the 
local Burgundian nobility and the king, installing himself as the only mediator.279 
In doing so, he also presented himself as the only means to obtain justice from the 
king, as demonstrated by this restoration, which was obtained at his intervention. 
However, in 902, Charles did not only interact directly with Herfrid—that is to 
say without Richard being present—he also again restored property to Herfrid’s 
church, this time the villa of Mailly-sur-l’Yonne which had been “once unjustly 
taken away.”280 By doing so, Charles hence not only circumvented Richard, but also 
demonstrated to the Burgundian nobles that he himself was in fact still the source 
of justice and not Richard, thus further adding to the attack on Richard’s position. 
In front of this background, it is probably not surprising that, once Richard had 
returned to court a few years later, Charles again restored property at Richard’s 
request, this time to Saint-Martin of Autun,281 and thus again confirmed Richard 
as the authority who was to be addressed if royal justice was needed.
Hence, doing justice was a highly symbolic tool used by the rulers to strengthen 
their position by building trust in moments of political change and turmoil. 
 Carloman II’s capitularies are the most prominent examples, with the second one 
being issued at the heights of the difficulties between him and the nobility from 
the northern part of the realm. Similarly, the only reference to a judicial assembly 
in one of Odo’s diplomas dates to September 892 when Odo’s reign was shaken by 
the conflicts in Aquitaine and with Baldwin II of Flanders. As it seems, these rul-
ers made use of judicial acts to portray themselves as just rulers, acting in accord 
with the nobles around them to bring order to the realm and thus to build trust in 
their rule. This image changes to some extent under Charles the Simple. He used 
judicial acts as well—most importantly the late diploma for the monks of Saint-
Thierry of Reims in the context of the second assembly of Tours-sur-Marne—to 
is shown complaining about incursions of lay officials within his diocese (DChS 24, 49: …quod 
in sua parrocia seu, in cunctis episcopiis qui in suffragio ipsius positi sunt gravissima, quedam 
contra jura  canonum atque instituta legum increverit consuetudo, adeo ut comites atque judices 
seu ministri  illorum sacerdotes Domini sive reliquos ecclesie ministros ad placitum suum violenter 
ducere et  fidejussores tollere atque eos more laicorum distringere presumant…). Charles reacted to 
this complaint, among other measures, by protecting the clerics of the archdiocese from coercive 
measures as well as the jurisdiction of lay officials. While not a restorational act, its message con-
cords with the later one for the monks of Saint-Thierry of Reims.
278 DChS 31 (after 30th June 900). DChS 33 (30th June 900) restores the mint to the church of Autun. 
However, this passage appears to be an interpolation. Bautier, Recueil Eudes, CLII, n. 1.
279 See chapters III.1.2 and III.2.3.
280 DChS 42 (14th March 902), 92: …holim injuste a pręfata ecclesia abstractum…
281 DChS 59 (8th August 908).
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demonstrate that he was a ruler who corrected old injustice for those loyal to him. 
Yet, the most prominent examples for such acts, the judicial assemblies of Herstal, 
which predate these events, emphasise not so much the justice of the king than 
the wide support Charles enjoyed. The diplomas issued on these occasions were 
undoubtedly symbols of royal justice, yet, more importantly, they were symbols of 
royal power directed against the king’s opponents. While the number of diplomas 
recording judicial assemblies is rather small, those making note of restitutions is 
far bigger. Much more than in the former, in the latter the influence of the recipi-
ents becomes visible, with a number of nobles enjoying a particularly close posi-
tion to the ruler which benefitted them numerous times. Charles the Fat especially 
appears to have used restitutional acts to tie West Frankish nobles to himself. Yet, 
restitutional acts were at times also used for the symbolic value inherent to them, 
issued at moments of particular political importance to transport the image of a 
ruler who protected the interests of and brought justice to those loyal to him.
VI.4 Against the king: Questioning the right to rule
Rebellions against the ruler were nothing uncommon in the Frankish world, even 
if they differed in motivation and scope. The first rebellion to be examined here is 
the one which developed over the succession of Louis the Stammerer and led to 
the coronation of Boso of Vienne. According to Hincmar, the rebellion was due 
to the ambitions of Boso’s wife Ermengard: “She declared that, as the daughter of 
the emperor of Italy and the one-time fiancée of the emperor of Greece, she had 
no wish to go on living unless she could make her husband a king.”282 Regino of 
Prüm, on the other hand, notes that “[Boso] disregarded the adolescent sons of 
Louis [the Stammerer], disdaining them as if they were of inferior birth because 
on Charles’  order their mother had been spurned and repudiated.”283 Despite the 
differences in the accounts, an important observation can be drawn from them: 
both describe Boso as the central figure of the rebellion. This becomes even more 
evident when we also take the rest of their accounts in consideration:284 285
282 Annales Bertiniani 879, 239: Interea Boso, persuadente uxore sua, quae nolle uiuere se dicebat, 
si, filia imperatoris Italiae et desponsata imperatori Greciae, maritum suum regem non faceret… 
Translation by Nelson, Annals, 219.
283 Regino, Chronicon 879, 114: [Boso] pro nihilo ducens adulescentes filios Ludowici et velut dege­
neres despiciens, eo quod iussu Caroli eorum genitrix spreta atque repudiata fuerit. Translation by 
MacLean, History, 180.
284 Annales Bertiniani 879, 239: [Boso] […] partim comminatione constrictis, partim cupiditate il­
lectis pro abbatiis et uillis eis promissis et postea datis, episcopis illarum partium peruasit ut eum 
in regem ungerent et coronarent. Translation by Nelson, Annals, 219.
285 Regino, Chronicon 879, 114: Denique nonnullos episcopos partim minis partim suasionibus in 
societatis foedera colligit et Lugdunum ingressus ab Aureliano eiusdem urbis metropolita et aliis 
pontificibus in regem super prefatum Burgundiae regnum inunguitur…
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Annales Bertiniani 879 Regino, Chronicon 879
So Boso persuaded the bishops of those parts to 
anoint and crown him king. He had partly brow-
beaten them by threats and partly won them 
over because they were greedy for the abbeys 
and estates he promised them, and which he 
gave them afterwards.284
Partly by persuasion and partly through threats 
[Boso] rallied several bishops to make alliance 
with him and after he had entered Lyon he was 
anointed as king of Burgundy by Aurelian, met-
ropolitan of that same city, and some other 
bishops.285
According to both accounts, not only was Boso the driving force behind the rebel-
lion, but there also was no stronger opposition against Louis III and Carloman II. 
Indeed, it was Boso himself who had to rally support to be crowned king. From 
these accounts, it would appear that the rebellion was not due to the young kings 
infringing on what Boso had perceived to be his privileges, but the result of his 
(or, according to Hincmar, his wife’s) ambitions. However, Regino’s report cor-
responds with Boso’s electio in which Boso claimed that after Louis the Stam-
merer’s death the throne had become vacant due to the lack of suitable persons.286 
Boso disputed the existence of legitimate kings per se. This leads us to the second 
important observation: the rebellion did not break out as the result of a crisis of 
trust in the brothers and their rule (as did the one against Odo287), but because 
Boso wanted to become king himself.288 This was not a rebellion against Louis and 
Carloman, it was “Boso’s rebellion.”
This impression is further strengthened when analysing the support Boso was 
able to rally. As Robert-Henri Bautier, based on the witness list of Boso’s electio, 
has demonstrated, this support originated in the east and south-east of the realm, 
including the archbishops of Aix, Arles, Lyon, Vienne, Tarentaise and Besançon 
along with a number of their suffragans as well as Abbot Geilo of Tournus.289 Of 
these men, only four can be traced at Louis the Stammerer’s court: Archbishop 
Aurelian of Lyon, Bishop Adalgarius of Autun, Bishop Lambert of Mâcon and 
Abbot Geilo.290 Of these, Aurelian and Geilo were connected to Boso who had 
previously intervened on their behalf. Hence, at least among the higher clergy, 
Boso’s support rested mostly on men who do not appear to have been taking part 
in royal politics. It is probable that some of them hoped to increase their influence 
on the affairs of the realm by being close to the new king. After the coronation, the 
archbishops of Vienne and Arles as well as the bishops of Valence and Grenoble 
can be seen at Boso’s court.291 However, key positions at Boso’s new court were 
occupied by men who had already been influential under Louis the Stammerer. 
286 MGH Capit. II, N° 284 C, 368: …idoneas personas […] non invenientes… See chapter I.1.1.
287 See chapter I.2.3.
288 See also Bautier, Origines, 49−50, who points out that Boso’s declaration of Mantaille shows no 
signs of any territorial restrictions but was aimed to demonstrate his claim for the entire realm.
289 Bautier, Origines, 50−51.
290 DDLS 19, 20, 26, 27, 29 and 33. See chapter II.1.
291 DDProv 20 (Vienne), 21 (Arles), 22 and 24 (Valence) as well as 25 (Grenoble).
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Aurelian crowned Boso,292 Adalgarius became the new archchancellor and Geilo 
was promoted to bishop of Langres.293 This may not be much of a surprise since 
Boso could hardly ignore important nobles such as these when it came to distrib-
uting honours and honores. Yet, at the same time, this limited the possibilities of 
advancement for his other supporters which makes it rather doubtful whether this 
was indeed the dominating motivation behind their support. In fact, it seems that 
Boso’s network was extremely fragile, with several of these men soon defecting 
from his side and turning to Carloman, most notably Adalgarius294 and Geilo,295 
but also the bishops of Marseille296 and Valence.297 From the small support Boso 
enjoyed among those previously influential at Louis the Stammerer’s court as well 
as the circumstance that their reintegration under Carloman’s rule was apparently 
unproblematic, it would appear that their decision to take part in Boso’s rebellion 
was less motivated by a rejection of Louis the Stammerer’s sons or their political 
ambition, but by their personal relation to Boso and the promises and threats he 
made, as stated by Hincmar and Regino.
This underlines the importance of Boso’s motives for the rebellion even more. 
On these motives, Stuart Airlie has brought forward an intriguing explanation. 
Boso was related to the Carolingian family in multiple ways. He was married to 
the daughter of Emperor Louis II, Charles the Bald had married his sister Richilde, 
his aunt Theutberga had married Lothar II. According to Airlie, Boso, also being 
showered with offices by Charles the Bald, had been turned “into what we might 
call an honorary Carolingian,”298 going even as far as to speculate that Charles 
might have considered naming Boso as his successor.299 However, with Charles’ 
death, Boso’s extraordinary position changed. Boso remained one of the central 
men of the realm, yet his position was nowhere near as exalted as before.300 With 
Louis the Stammerer’s succession further deepening the division among the rival-
ling noble groups, the pressure on Boso’s position, which was based on his rela-
tions to the king and the other nobles, increased even further. According to Airlie, 
it was this threat that caused Boso’s rebellion: “He had risen spectacularly high. He 
had nowhere to go but down.”301
The character of Boso’s rebellion and of his support for it had a significant 
impact on Louis  III’s and Carloman  II’s capacity to handle it. First, if Airlie’s 
292 Regino, Chronicon 879, 114.
293 See chapter II.1.
294 DCmII 49.
295 DCmII 56.
296 DCmII 72.
297 DCmII 85.
298 Airlie, Nearly Men, 32−34, quotation 33. On Boso’s earlier career, see also Lauranson-Rosaz, 
Francia, 317−320.
299 Airlie, Nearly Men, 34.
300 Airlie, Nearly Men, 34. See chapter II.1. for a detailed study and Fried, Boso for an analysis of 
Boso’s relations to the pope.
301 Airlie, Nearly Men, 35.
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explanation is accepted, this means that their rule was not challenged by a larger 
group of nobles who questioned their right to rule, but by a single man who feared 
the loss of his political position and activated his personal connections to tackle 
the issue. This entails that his supporters were not principally opposed to the 
brothers’  rule and that their turning away from Boso and rehabilitation under 
the brothers’  regime was possible. This is a very strong contrast to the opposition 
Odo encountered, which even endured considerable military setbacks. Second, 
in terms of opposition against Louis and Carloman, Boso’s rebellion, despite his 
ability to muster a large number of nobles in his support, was rather limited and 
fragmented.302 The groups of nobles who had dominated Louis the Stammerer’s 
politics remained largely intact and now supported Louis III and Carloman II in 
suppressing Boso’s revolt, providing them with sufficient resources to overcome 
the rebels. While it still took two years of siege to capture Boso’s stronghold of 
Vienne,303 nothing indicates that the rebellion posed as much of a challenge to 
Louis and Carloman as Fulk and his allies posed for Odo. Finally, Boso’s rebellion 
occurred at a moment when the Carolingian monopoly on the throne was still un-
challenged304 and stirred up an alliance of the Carolingian rulers as a response.305 
Boso, in contrast to Charles the Simple against Odo, could not hope to win further 
support from rulers outside the West Frankish realm. His position remained iso-
lated while Louis and Carloman could rely on the help of their peers to take out 
the rebellion.
While the rebellion Louis III and Carloman II faced differed considerably from 
the one Odo had to deal with, the one against Charles the Simple appears to have 
been the result of a development rather similar to the one that had brought him 
to the throne. In chapter  III we have emphasised the cooperation and support 
Charles enjoyed from important members of the nobility even during the crisis 
of 920 and up into the rebellion. However, this emphasis should not distract from 
the fact that his relations to an increasing number of nobles were deteriorating, 
swelling the ranks of an opposition forming against him. As argued, the aim of 
this opposition was at first not to question his right to rule, but to press him for a 
change of policy, as parts of the nobility had already attempted to do in early 920 at 
the assembly of Soissons. This only changed over the course of 922 when Charles 
evaded negotiations with the opposition led by Robert and his son Hugh. From 
this moment on, key members of the circle around him, like Count Heribert II of 
Vermandois and Bishop Abbo of Soissons, turned away from him, which indicates 
how much he had lost the trust of even the nobles closest to him. The conflict with 
Gislebert may serve to help to explain the development of this crisis of trust, yet 
this reading is not unproblematic. The reasons for the outbreak of the conflict and 
302 On the fragmentation of his support see, Bautier, Origines, 49−50 and Castelnuovo, Élites, 
383−392.
303 Annales Bertiniani 880, 243 and 882, 247.
304 Airlie, Semper fideles, 139−140.
305 See chapter IV.2 and MacLean, Response.
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Charles’  role in it are far from certain. Charles renewed the conflict twice, yet the 
second time the rebellion had already taken its course while the first time also only 
occurred in the period after the assembly of Soissons. Hence, while the renew-
als of the conflict may serve to explain the deterioration of the relations with the 
other nobles, they cannot explain its cause. This only changes if we assume that 
the behaviour demonstrated by Charles over the course of the conflict was not an 
isolated occurrence but to a certain degree symptomatic in situations when he felt 
that his interests were at stake.
As demonstrated, favouring Hagano certainly did not mean that Charles did not 
listen to other nobles either. Yet, Hagano’s special proximity to the king combined 
with his origin outside the circles of the West Frankish nobility were perceived as 
infringement on the privilege of the leading nobles to counsel Charles, based not 
on their personal relation to him, but on their prestige and rank. Elevating men 
of his own choice to advisors may have been rooted in Carolingian tradition306, 
yet at least in the late Carolingian era it posed considerable problems307, as a num-
ber of similar cases demonstrate. Geneviève Bührer-Thierry has analysed the re-
proaches in the Mainz continuation of the Annales Fuldenses308 against Charles the 
Fat’s closest councillor, his archchancellor Bishop Liutward of Vercelli.309 As with 
Hagano, the Mainz author attacked Liutward because of his (supposedly) humble 
origins, being elevated by the ruler, and only by the ruler instead of by right of 
rank, to his side.310 Again, similar to Hagano, Liutward was furthermore accused 
of being extremely familiar with Charles the Fat311 and even, according to Regino 
of Prüm, of being the emperor’s only councillor.312 To this example we might add 
the reproaches against Zwentibold, who, again according to Regino, was blamed 
for listening to advisors who were not noble and even to women.313 Reproaches of 
306 Le Jan, Élites, 418 and Royauté, Introduction, 12−13. See also Airlie, Bonds and Innes, Govern-
ment, 86. Falkowski, Contra Legem, 235, on the other hand argues for the right of the high nobles 
to partake in the decision to elevate a man.
307 Innes, Government, 86 points out that even under Charlemagne such elevations were often dis-
ruptive. Similar Airlie, bonds, 197−199, for Louis the Pious’ reign.
308 Annales Fuldenses (Mainz Continuation) 887, 105: Qui priscis temporibus, id est ex quo rex in 
Alamannia constitutus est, quendam de suis ex infimo genere natum nomine Liutwartum supra 
omnes, qui erant in regno suo, exaltavit, ita ut Aman, cuius mentio facta est in libro Hester, et 
nomine et dignitate praecelleret. Ille enim post regem Assuerum erat secundus, iste vero prior im­
peratori et plus quam imperator ab omnibus honorabatur et timebatur…
309 For Liutward, see Keller, Sturz and MacLean, Kingship, 178−191.
310 Bührer-Thierry, Conseiller, 113−115.
311 Bührer-Thierry, Conseiller, 115−116 and 119−121.
312 Regino, Chronicon 887, 127: Et primo quidem Liudwardum episcopum Vercellensem, virum sibi 
percarum et in administrandis publicis utilitatibus unicum consiliarium, obiecto adulterii crimine, 
eo quod reginae secretis familiarius, quam oportebat, inmisceretur, a suo latere cum dedecore 
 repulit.
313 Regino, Chronicon 900, 148: Dum haec in Germania aguntur, inter Zuendibolch et primoribus 
regni inexpiabilis oritur dissensio propter assiduas depredationes et rapinas, quae in regno fiebant, 
et quia cum mulieribus et ignobilioribus regni negotia disponens honestiores et nobiliores quosque 
deiciebat et honoribus et dignitatibus expoliabat.
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such violations of the nobles’  prerogative to counsel the king are thus revealed as 
a central argument when it came to defining “bad kingship.”314
After Soissons, Charles adjusted his policy by attempting to publicly integrate 
Hagano into the noble hierarchy. From this point of view, Soissons was a compro-
mise that suited the interests of the king, who was to keep his intimate at court. 
However, in his efforts to provide Hagano with a position that would allow him 
to gain the acknowledgement of the other nobles and to occupy the position at 
the king’s side, Charles probably went too far. Flodoard reports that Robert’s 
son Hugh started to advance on Laon because Charles had granted the abbey 
of Chelles, belonging to Charles’  aunt Rothild who also happened to be Hugh’s 
mother-in-law, to Hagano.315 Charles choosing Chelles may have been motivated 
by his relation to Rothild: Taking the abbey from his aunt, he may have hoped not 
to inspire any more discontent among the nobles. Seemingly, however, he had un-
derestimated the weight of Rothild’s connection to the Robertians, as well as the 
amount of dissatisfaction that had already accumulated at this point.
Yet, Chelles probably was only the tip of the iceberg. After Hugh’s advance, 
Flodoard’s account is full of hints about the position Hagano now occupied. After 
the outbreak of the conflict, Hagano’s “accomplices” took the fortress of Eper-
nay.316 Richard the Justiciar’s son Hugh the Black, when just about to join Robert, 
encountered “200 men who were with Hagano”317 who were about to plunder pos-
sessions of the church of Reims. Flodoard’s wording is rather ambiguous: were 
these Hagano’s own men or were these forces Hagano had been able to raise from 
contacts he had made over the past years? In any case, the report seems to indicate 
that Hagano had now risen to a position from where he was able to contribute to 
the war effort. Furthermore, at Laon Hagano appears to have amassed some treas-
ures that were distributed by Robert after he taken the city.318 Combined with the 
grant of Chelles, these passages indicate that Charles had indeed tried to furnish 
Hagano with the resources necessary to enter the highest ranks of the nobility. 
Yet, even if this was not the case, it seems that Charles’  relation to Hagano was 
still perceived as especially close. Flodoard uses strong indicators to describe this 
relation. “Because of his love for Hagano,”319 he tells us, Charles departed Laon, 
314 Nelson, Bad Kingship, 19.
315 Flodoard, Annales 922, 7−8: Karolo denique Laudunum regresso, Hugo, filius Rotberti, post Pascha 
supra Vidulam venit, ubi, apud villam Finimas, Herivei archiepiscopi fideles cum quibusdam Fran­
ciae comitibus obvios habuit. Quo cum eisdem super Axonam in pagum Laudunensem profecto 
propter praedictum Haganonem, cui rex abbatiam Rothildis, amitae suae, socrus autem Hugonis, 
dederat, nomine Calam, Karolus cum Heriberto et Haganone clam Laudunum egressus, ob Haga­
nonis amorem, hujus causa timoris trans Mosam profectus est.
316 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9: …et castrum Sparnaci direptum est ab Haganonis complicibus.
317 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9: Hugo interea, filius Richardi, ad Rotbertum veniens ducentos circiter ex 
his, qui cum Haganone erant, obvios habuit in villas episcopii Remensis abeuntes praedari.
318 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9−10: Audito denique quod hi qui cum Rotberto erant Laudunum captum 
haberent, et thesauros Haganonis, qui inibi erant, dispertiti essent…
319 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8: ob Haganonis amorem.
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evading the encounter with Hugh. After Laon had fallen to Robert, “Charles to-
gether with Hagano” hurried to retake the city.320 Soon after, again “with Hagano”, 
he retreated over the Meuse.321 For Flodoard, Hagano was always with Charles, he 
accompanied the king on all occasions, he was his support and his downfall. The 
same image can also be found in Folcwin’s report, although much more com-
pressed: “Confirmed in his reign, [Charles] elevated a certain Hagano, whose 
lineage and nobility were unknown to the Franks, esteeming him over everyone 
else and calling upon him in council in a more familiar way than the others. The 
Franks, seeing this, not lightly endured this unknown man’s friendship; and they 
were incensed against the king about this and they strove to attack him at the royal 
city of Laon.”322 Folcwin simplifies the events by omitting the assembly of Soissons, 
yet the key message is the same as Flodoard’s: Charles’  efforts to integrate Hagano 
in the noble hierarchy had not been enough to pacify the nobles because at the 
same time he had failed to resolve the other issue at stake, namely to normalise the 
relations with his intimate.323
Charles’  adherence to his relation to Hagano reveals a distinctive obstinacy 
in pursuing his own interests despite the resistance demonstrated by the nobles 
and the threat this resistance constituted for his rule. This appears to be the same 
obstinacy as revealed by his renewals of the conflict with Gislebert. ‘Obstinacy’ 
is perhaps too strong a word, but certainly the years of fighting against Odo had 
already been marked by a characteristic persistence, as Charles faced constant 
setbacks yet also made constant efforts to gain new allies.324 During these early 
years the circle of nobles supporting Charles and leading the rebellion against Odo 
played an important role. Charles’  final act however—turning to Hundeus and 
his Northmen—took place after these nobles had submitted to Odo. Thus, the 
alliance with the Northmen was probably Charles’  own decision in his efforts to 
prolong the fight against his opponent. Although this alliance had triggered Arch-
bishop Fulk to harshly criticise Charles, threatening him to end his support and to 
320 Flodoard, Annales 922, 10: Karolus cum Haganone Laudunum contendit.
321 Flodoard, Annales 922, 10: Et cum cotidie, copiis Rotberti crescentibus, decrescerent Karoli, clam 
tandem secendes cum Haganone trans Mosam proficiscitur.
322 Folcwin, Gesta Abbatum S. Bertini Sithensium, c. 99, 625: Qui confirmatus in regno, quendam 
Haganum, cuius genus et nobilitas ignorabatur a Francis, super omnes diligendo extulit et hunc 
familiarius ceteris sibi consiliarium ascivit. Quod videntes Franci, non leviter ignoti hominis amici­
tias tulerunt; regique ob hoc infensi, insidias ei in Lugduno regia civitate tetenderunt.
323 In this context, it is worth mentioning an anomaly within Charles’ diplomas. From 31st May 
922 (DChS 115) onwards, a certain Hagano appears as royal notary, replacing Gauzlin, who had 
become bishop of Toul (Lauer, Recueil Charles III, XXV). It has been suggested that this Hagano 
is identical with Charles’ intimate (Koziol, Politics, 468). Given that we know nothing about 
Hagano’s past and education, this is certainly a possibility. However, it seems rather improbable 
that there was no other man within the royal chancellery (still led by Archbishop Roger of Trier) 
to be up to the task and we therefore argue that the matching names are a mere coincidence.
324 See chapters I.2.5 and I.2.6.
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excommunicate him,325 Charles, in a very similar situation in 923, reverted back 
to this strategy. When after the battle of Soissons he was not only abandoned by 
his Lotharingian forces but his negotiations with Heribert II of Vermandois, Arch-
bishop Seulf of Reims and other important nobles of the Western realm also failed, 
he again appears to have sought support among the Northmen, both from the 
Loire and the Seine.326 The decision to turn to the Northmen certainly reveals how 
desperate his situation was at that point, yet it again also demonstrates Charles’ 
determination to pursue his interests to the last, with total disregard for any con-
sequences this might have on his relations with the nobles. This persistence in 
pursuing his interests may also be what Richer alluded to when, in his characteri-
sation of Charles, he attributed to the king “a lack of self-control over his lusts.”327 
Gerhard Schmitz and Yves Sassier have also noted this as a strong theme in the 
already mentioned second chapter of the acts of the synod of Trosly328 where it is 
emphasised that only someone who was able to control himself could legitimately 
rule over others.329 It is of course impossible to tell whether this reproach for a lack 
of self-control and the persistence shown by Charles had the same roots, yet it is 
tempting to assume that both were connected.
If this persistence was indeed symptomatic of Charles’  behaviour, it may serve 
to explain the crisis of trust against him leading to the rebellion. This crisis cer-
tainly evolved over time and culminated further throughout the rebellion up until 
Charles was captured by Heribert II of Vermandois. Its full extent is revealed in the 
aftermath of the battle of Soissons. Robert had been killed, yet the primates of the 
realm, among them Heribert II and Archbishop Seulf of Reims, continued to deny 
Charles’  right to rule, rejecting his request to be reacknowledged by them, turning 
instead to Robert’s son-in-law Raoul, son of Richard the Justiciar, on whom they 
325 Flodoard, HRE IV, c. 5, 384−385: Karolo regi suo scribens indignatur valde sibi perlatum, quod 
pravis quorundam consiliis vellet idem rex se sociare Nordmannis, ut illorum auxilio ad regni decus 
obtinendum iuvari posset. […] Sciatis enim, quia, si hoc feceritis et talibus consiliis adquieveritis, 
numquam me fidelem habebitis, sed et, quoscumque potuero, a vestra fidelitate revocabo et cum 
omnibus coepiscopis meis vos et omnes vestros excommunicans eterno anathemate condempnabo.
326 Flodoard, Annales 923, 14: Karolo dehinc Heribertum comitem, Seulfum archiepiscopum, cet­
erosque regni primates multis legationibus ut ad se revertantur exorat; quod illi renuentes, pro 
Rodulfo in Burgundiam transmiserunt, qui ocius cum multa suorum manu illis occurrit. Auditoque 
Franci quod Karolus ad se venire Nordmannos mandasset, ne illi conjungerentur, inter Karolum 
atque Nordmannos super Isaram fluvium cum Rodulfo medii resederunt. And 15: Interea Ragenol­
dus, princeps Nordmannorum qui in fluvio Ligeri versabantur, Karoli frequentibus missis jampri­
dem excitus, Franciam trans Isaram, conjunctis sibi plurimis ex Rodomo, depraedatur.
327 Richer, Historiae, I, 14, 50: Duplici morbo notabilis, libidinis intemperans, ac circa exsequenda 
iuditia paulo neglegentior fuit.
328 Schmitz, Konzil, 187; Sassier, Royauté, 200. For the synod, see along with the works of Schmitz 
also Schröder, Synoden, N° 29, 189−196.
329 MGH Conc. V, N° 58, c. 2, 508: Debet itaque rex primo vitam suam aequo moderamine regere et, 
ut quidam sapiens ait, refrenare libidinem, spernere voluptates, iracundiam tenere ac ceteras animi 
pestes a se repellere. Tunc vere rex dici et alios digne poterit regere, cum ipse improbissimis dominis 
dedecori aut turpitudini parere desierit.
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called to become their new king.330 While at the outbreak of the rebellion Charles 
still had the support of some parts of the nobility, at its end he was so deeply mis-
trusted that even the death of his opponent could not convince the nobles to treat 
with him again.
Yet, there is a problem with this explanation. Given that Charles’  persistence 
can be already made out at the beginning of Charles’  reign, it would seem likely 
that this behaviour would have marked his entire rule. However, early on, in the 
wake of the turmoil caused by Archbishop Fulk’s murder and a couple of years 
later when Richard the Justiciar was replaced by Robert of Neustria at court, 
Charles’  actions instead betray a great degree of political flexibility. A settlement 
with Baldwin II of Flanders was sought and Robert was finally successfully inte-
grated into the rule. After this, the diplomatic evidence indicates strong support 
for Charles’  rule among the nobles throughout the reign up until the beginning of 
the rebellion. If it was indeed Charles’  persistence that caused the deterioration of 
his relations with the nobles, during the years preceding Soissons a development 
must have taken place that either strengthened this trait or lifted restrictions that 
so far had ensured that its effects on his relations to the nobles remained rather 
limited. This change would most likely have taken place in Charles’  direct vicinity, 
in the circle of men and women in direct contact with him and with influence on 
his actions. Frederuna’s death in 917 and Hagano’s rise are both conveniently close 
to explain such a change,331 yet given the lack of evidence they—like any other pos-
sible explanations—are mere speculation.
Be that as it may, Charles, like Odo in 892, appears to have lost the trust of the 
nobles. However, unlike Charles, Odo had managed to suppress the revolt against 
him. Superiority in resources certainly played a crucial role here, enabling him 
step by step to bring his opponents’  possessions under his control and finally force 
them to surrender to him.332 At first, Charles’  forces may have been sufficient to 
reach a stalemate with Robert’s army, as can be seen from the development of the 
first campaign where neither side tried to attack the other.333 Yet, while Charles’ 
and Robert’s armies were encamped in close proximity to each other, Robert’s 
allies were able to deal Charles’  position a serious blow by taking Laon while his 
330 Flodoard, Annales 923, 14. 
331 Hagano’s influence on Charles is similarly depicted by Koziol, Politics, 469, who assumes “that 
Hagano was telling Charles what Charles already deeply believed…”, thus strengthening Charles’ 
belief in his heritage and his enmity towards Robert of Neustria.
332 Annales Vedastini 897, 77. See chapter I.2.7.
333 Flodoard, Annales 922, 8−10: Quo comperto, Karolus, Mosa retransmissa, cum nonnullis qui 
ad se venerant Lothariensibus, villas Remensis aecclesiae depraedari necnon incendere coepit… 
Rotbertus igitur, super Maternam fluvium […] procedit obviam: quem subsequens Karolus cum 
Lothariensibus Maternam transiit… Rotbertus etiam, praefato Rodulfo cum Burgundionibus 
veniente, fluvium transiens subter Sparnacum, non longius tribus leugis ab exercitu Karoli castra 
metatus est. […] Hinc Rotbertus apud Calmiciacum, et Karolus circa Remis castra metati sunt.
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own army appears to have suffered from frequent defections.334 This constant loss 
of support seems to have shifted the balance of power more and more against 
Charles, which explains why in 923 he attempted to take Robert by surprise before 
his opponent was able to fully muster his forces.335 Yet, military superiority was 
only one of the reasons for Odo’s success. As we have argued, Odo also managed 
to restore trust in him when he returned Saint-Vaast to Baldwin II of Flanders in 
895 and used a seemingly highly regarded mediator, his brother Robert. Charles 
also made such efforts yet these efforts failed—probably because of their innate 
character.
The aim of the second assembly of Tours-sur-Marne was to demonstrate that 
Charles was still king and willing to act as one, protecting the Church and re-
warding loyalty.336 His diploma for the monks of Saint-Thierry issued at the same 
occasion showed him correcting old injustices.337 However, these measures prob-
ably failed to address a central part of the problem. Based on Charles’  diplomas, 
Geoffrey Koziol has attempted to describe Charles’  understanding of his posi-
tion as a king. “He creates an image of monarchy […] in which a ruler stands 
‘gloriously’ apart from and above margraves, listening graciously as they come 
before the royal majesty to present their entreaties, ‘craving on bended knee’.”338 
This analysis is not unproblematic. First, the formula describing petitioners ap-
proaching Charles on their knees is used only on very rare occasions.339 Second, 
this language is also used by Charles’  predecessors and hence nothing particularly 
special.340 And third, Koziol at the same time dismisses the more frequent refer-
ences to consensus in Charles’  diplomas341 as mere “elements in the display of 
royal majesty,” arguing that for Charles they were simply “components of ceremo-
nial of kingship that displayed a kingdom’s proper order under a king’s protect-
ing, beneficent majesty.”342 Accordingly, no one would have been able to claim the 
334 Flodoard, Annales 922, 9−10: Audito denique quod hi qui cum Rotberto erant Laudunum captum 
haberent […] Karolus cum Haganone Laudunum contendit. Lotharienses quidam regrediuntur 
ad sua quidam cum Karolo pergunt. […] Et cum cotidie, copiis Rotberti crescentibus, decrescerent 
Karoli, clam tandem secedens cum Haganone trans Mosam proficiscitur.
335 Flodoard, Annales 923, 13: Karolus cum suis Lothariensibus inducias, quas nuper a Rotberto ac­
ceperant, infringentibus Mosam transiens ad Atiniacum venit et, antequam Rotbertus suos fideles 
adunare potuisset, super Axonam insperate ubi Rotbertum sub urbe Suessonice sedere compererat, 
adiit; et in crastinum, die dominica, hora iam sexta praeterita, Francis dehinc illa die proelium 
non sperantibus, plurimis quoque prandentibus, Karolus Axonam transiit, et super Rotbertum cum 
armatis Lothariensibus venit.
336 See chapter III.1.3. 
337 See chapter VI.3. 
338 Koziol, Politics, 513.
339 DDChS 71, 79 and 99.
340 As Koziol indicates earlier on, the formular goes back to Charles’ predecessors. Koziol, Politics, 
486 with n. 104, referring to DCmII 78, 79, 80, 81, 88 and 93bis as well as DChF 119, 120 and 154. 
For further criticism on Charles’ references to his ancestors and the Gelasian doctrine, see chap-
ters III.1.3 and III.2.1.5.
341 Such expressions can be found for example in DDChS 10, 49, 53, 56, 57, 88, 89, 109 and 114.
342 Koziol, Politics, 513.
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right to counsel the king because of his birth or office—these positions were to be 
given by Charles and him only.343 Yet, as we have shown, Charles held contact with 
a large number of nobles throughout his reign, carefully treating them according 
to their ranks and integrating them into his rule.344 Hence, references to consensus 
need to be taken as serious expressions of the way Charles ruled. Nevertheless, 
Koziol’s description of the image created in Charles’  diplomas cannot simply be 
dismissed. His description of the image of distance between the ruler and the no-
bles depicted in the diplomas is accurate.
As Laurent Feller has observed, in 919 a new feature appears in Charles’  di-
plomas which tied royal grants to the loyalty of the recipient.345 This is a feature 
that also appears in the diplomas issued at Tours-sur-Marne. The diploma issued 
for Bishop Guigo’s church of Girona referred to the great loyalty shown by the 
bishop before granting him the remnants of the royal fisc.346 On the other hand, 
the Tours-sur-Marne diplomas lack any references to consensus. They only show 
Bishop Guigo approaching the king, to make requests to Charles’  royal majesty.347 
Even the restoration of property to the monks of Saint-Thierry saw only Charles 
deciding about the justness of their cause: “Acknowledging their claim to be true, 
through our power we return them said villa with everything belonging to it.”348 
Hence, Charles’  message in these diplomas was clear: loyal service was to be re-
warded, but providing this reward was only his own choice.
Hereby, he differed from Odo and his brother Carloman, who issued diplomas 
under similar circumstances.349 Odo’s diploma from September 892, which noted 
the previous judgement against the monk Aginus, shows the king acting in front 
of and in accordance with his fideles. Abbot Erkanger of Montiéramey is said to 
have approached Odo “in the presence of our fideles.” Odo further confirms the 
judgement made by the bishops at the royal placitum of Verberie, again noting to 
have acted “with the consens of our fideles.”350 This is similar to Carloman’s ca-
pitulary from 884, which was delivered at the moment of the reintegration of the 
nobles from the northern part of the realm and, while emphasising his position 
343 Koziol, Politics, 513.
344 See chapter III. 
345 Feller, Exercice, 142−143. Feller names DDChS 99, 102 (a forgery) and 111.
346 DChS 120, 285: Supra quae praefato episcopo Wigoni suaeque eclesiae […] pro remdio animae nos­
trae ac genitorum nostrorum, ob nimiam etiam fidelitatem quam illum erga nos cernimus habere, 
largimur perpauca nostrae regali jure competentia potestati…
347 For example DChS 116, 274−275: Idcirco noverit […] quoniam accedens ante presentiam nostram 
venerabilis presul Gerundensis ecclesię, Guigo nomine, expetiit a nostra mansuetudine ut… Cujus 
petitionem benigne suscipientes, concedimus…
348 DChS 115, 273: Quorum reclamationem cognoscentes veram esse, potestate nostra prefatam villam 
eis reddidimus cum omnibus ad eam pertinentibus.
349 See chapter VI.3.
350 DOdo 30, 134: Quodcirca noverit […] quoniam, adiens celsitudinem nostram, quidam monachus, 
Aginus nomine, qui cellam quam Sadrevertus abbas a serenissimo pie recordationis Karolo im­
perarore decertaverat, ante presentiam fidelium nostrorum, repetiit. […] Cujus [abbas Erchenerius] 
petitionem ratam invenientes, una cum consensu fidelium nostrorum, id fieri decrevimus…
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as king,351 also shows him acting together with those around him.352 This point 
is further stressed by the diploma issued only a few days later, which restored 
the abbey of Saint-Sulpice to the church of Châlons at the request of its bishop, 
Berno. While the diploma emphasises Berno’s loyalty in council and aid,353 it also 
informs that the king acted at the “suggestion and request” of two others of his 
fideles, Bishop Angelwinus of Paris and Count Theoderic of Vermandois, two of 
the leading nobles who had previously distanced themselves from his rule.354 Like 
Odo, Carloman too, facing a severe crisis of his rule, stressed his cooperation with 
the nobles. Compared to this, the message Charles sent with the diplomas issued 
at Tours-sur-Marne was most likely the wrong one.355 If he wanted to restore trust 
in him, he needed to demonstrate not only that he was willing to act as a king, 
but to act in accordance with those around him, by listening to their counsel. Just 
how central this point had become is further demonstrated by the only diploma 
preserved by Robert, issued in January 923. As Geoffrey Koziol has noted,356 this 
diploma addresses this exact same subject by replacing the common address “to 
the faithful of the church of God and of ourself ” (fideles eccelsiae Dei et nostri ) 
with “Let it remain known to the sageness of all our faithful, that is, the leading 
men of the Franks…”357 In contrast to Charles, Robert thus portrayed himself as 
someone who cooperated with the nobles, listening to their sage counsel. This was 
undoubtedly a direct response to the former’s failed policy.
Yet, despite Charles’  shortcomings in addressing the reproaches brought 
against him by the nobles, questioning his right to rule appears to have been a 
difficult decision for the nobles. Robert’s diploma, although it makes references 
to the rebellion by claiming that he had become king “because of indespensa-
ble reasons,”358 fails to go into any further detail and carefully avoids to name 
Charles at all, thus becoming “an embarrassed reflection on the circumstances 
that had brought Robert to the throne.”359 Furthermore, some time after Charles 
351 See chapters II.2 and VI.3.
352 MGH Capit. II, N° 287, 371: Karlomannus gratia Dei rex omnibus venerabilibus episcopis, abbati­
bus, comitibus, iudicibus omnibusque sanctae Dei ecclesiae et nostris fidelibus. Cum ad palatium 
Vernis anno dominicae in carnationis DCCCLXXXIV, anno autem regni nostri quinto, indictione 
secunda, mense Martio convenissemus et pars fidelium nostrorum nobiscum, placuit, ut quaedam 
statuta sacrorum canonum necnon quaedam capitula antecessorum nostrorum renovarentur…
353 DCmII 76, 198: …qui nobis in principio regni nostri et consilio et auxilio satis proficuus et fidelis 
extitit…
354 …hoc idem quoque cum eo suggerentibus et deprecantibus fidelibus nostris, venerabili scilicet An­
gelwino Parisiorum episcopo et Teuderico comite valde nobis dilecto.
355 See also Görich, Misstrauen, who demonstrates that symbolic actions could fail in building trust 
when relations were dominated by mistrust and one of the parties acted under certain convic-
tions which blocked the right choice of symbolic actions.
356 Koziol, Robert, 250−251.
357 DRoI 1, 8: Notum autem manet sagacitati omnium fidelium nostrorum, procerum scilicet Francorum, 
qualiter per divinam clementiam, causis necessariis existentibus, omnium favore principum ad regni 
gubernacula moderanda regie majestatis sceptra suscepimus. Translation by Koziol, Robert, 250.
358 See chapter VI.4, n. 357. Own translation.
359 Koziol, Robert, 249.
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had been captured, a synod under the new archbishop Seulf took place at Reims, 
condemning the participants of the battle of Soissons to a harsh penitence of three 
years.360 Besides Seulf, the bishops Abbo of Soissons, Adelelm of Laon, Stephen of 
Cambrai, Adelelm of Senlis and the newly ordinated Airard of Noyon were pre-
sent, thus a mixture of Robert’s and Charles’  former supporters,361 as well as leg-
ates from the other bishops of the archdiocese of Reims. Interestingly, the synod 
makes no differentiation between the men who had followed Charles and those 
who had followed Robert, treating them exactly the same way. Worries among 
the clergy about a new war among the nobility may indeed have played a role in 
the decision,362 yet, nevertheless, one might wonder why Robert’s supporters—the 
very same who after his death still refused Charles and called for Raoul—would 
have agreed to be placed on the same level with their opponents. Like Robert’s 
diploma, the notice reporting the synod refrains from bringing forward any re-
proaches against Charles. This silence points towards an underlying problem for 
the nobles opposing Charles. Whatever the accusations against him might have 
been, questioning his right to rule meant to rebel against the legitimate king. As 
Wojciech Falkowski’s study shows, at least south of the Loire, the division among 
the nobility whether Charles’  deposition had been legitimate or not continued 
to exist at least up until his death in 929.363 But even in the North the question 
of Charles’  kingship remained to be a problem. When his captor Heribert II of 
Vermandois entered into conflict with King Raoul in 927, he used this kingship 
as a political lever, threatening Raoul’s position by reinstalling Charles and let-
ting the Northmen pay their allegiance to him.364 During the following year, al-
though according to Flodoard under the pressure of the Northmen, other counts 
and bishops followed their example.365 The episode was only short-lived as Charles 
was returned to his prison by Heribert as soon as his dispute with Raoul had been 
settled,366 yet it reveals that the idea of Charles being king was still vivid enough to 
be exploited politically. What was the nature of this power behind Charles’  claim 
to the throne? As we have argued, Charles’  Carolingian descent had been a pow-
erful argument when used against Odo who was lacking this kind of legitimacy. 
After Raoul’s death in 936, it was Robert’s son Hugh the Great who, instead of 
360 On the penitence, see Schröder, Synoden, 215.
361 See chapters III.2.1.7, III.2.3 and III.3. 
362 Eckel, Charles, 127; Lauer, Robert, 13.
363 Falkowski, Contra legem, 229−233. See also chapter III.3.
364 Flodoard, Annales 927, 39−40: At Heribertus Karolum de custodia ejecit secumque in pagum 
Veromandinsem, scilicet ad Sanctum Quintinum, deduxit. […] Karolus igitur cum Heriberto col­
loquium petit Nordmannorum, ad castellum quod Auga vocatur, ibique se filius Rollonis Karolo 
committit et amicitiam firmat cum Heriberto.
365 Flodoard, Annales 928, 41: Filius tamen Heriberti, Odo, quem Rollo habebat obsidem, non redditur 
illi, donec se committit Karolo pater cum aliis quibusdam Franciae comitibus et episcopis.
366 Flodoard, Annales 928, 43: Hugo et Heribertus ad Heinricum, colloquii causa, proficiscuntur; in­
deque revertentes, obviam pergunt regi Rodulfo. Rursusque Heribertus se illi committit, iterum 
redacto sub custodia Karolo.
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taking the crown for himself, recalled Charles’  own son Louis IV from England to 
succeed on his father’s throne.367 The only argument speaking in favour of Louis 
was, very much like in his father’s case, his Carolingian heritage. This was prob-
ably what Charles could rely on most—his undeniable claim, for the legitimacy 
of his kingship was based on his descent. The fact that the nobles nevertheless 
decided to oppose him is less of a sign that this idea had faded, but points towards 
the degree of the loss of trust in Charles.
VI.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have emphasised the role of two factors in the relations between 
the king and the nobles: the existence of powerful groups of influence and the ne-
cessity for the king to be trusted by the nobles who supported his rule. In conflict 
situations, either factor could limit the options of the king when deciding upon a 
strategy. Thus, Charles the Simple, when dealing with Count Baldwin II of Flan-
ders, faced the same problem as his father Louis the Stammerer against Bernard of 
Gothia, for his closest allies prevented him from finding a peaceful arrangement 
with his opponent. In both of these cases, the nobles in question were rivals of 
those in conflict with the king, either for influence at the royal court or for the 
contested honores. Thus, it became impossible for the rulers to find a settlement 
with their opponents that did not at the same time violate the interests of their 
supporters. While in Louis the Stammerer’s case the conflict was finally resolved 
by the superiority in resources the king and his allies were able to muster, leading 
to Bernard’s deposition, in Charles’  case it was the removal of the nobles blocking 
a solution that opened the way for the final settlement.
However, such a settlement required a certain degree of trust between all the 
parties involved. As the case of Odo and Baldwin shows, the lack of trust could 
have a similar effect as the presence of rivalling groups dominating the circle 
around the king. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to come to terms 
with each other, although this time not from the king’s perspective, but from the 
perspective of the noble who appears to have deeply mistrusted Odo. There were 
ways to overcome such obstacles: for example, Charles the Simple chose to recom-
pense Count Gislebert by finally elevating him to a position similar to his father 
Reginar’s, something he had refrained from doing up until that moment. This of-
fer must have been too tempting for Gislebert to resist, although he, after Charles 
had already broken an earlier agreement, had no reason to trust the king. Odo, 
on the other hand, finally resolved his conflict with Baldwin by a combination of 
military superiority and trust-building measures, which made the count finally 
admit to the royal prerogative to control the distribution of honores.
367 Flodoard, Annales 936, 63.
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A loss of trust, such as it is visible in the case of Odo and Baldwin, was not 
per se necessarily problematic, at least not as long as it remained an isolated case. 
However, it could become an issue if the mistrust against the king spread within 
the nobility, especially if it reached the inner circle around the king with the most 
powerful nobles and his closest advisors, that is to say, when it developed into a 
severe crisis of trust. The decades around the turn from the 9th to the 10th century 
saw a number of such crises: when Carloman II suffered a disastrous defeat against 
the Northmen in 883, the nobles appear to have mistrusted his ability to deal with 
the Viking threat to a such degree that they took the matter into their own hands, 
although without denying Carloman’s right to rule, still acknowledging him as 
king. On the other hand, in the cases of Odo and Charles the Simple, the crises 
of trust appear not to have evolved due to a lack of trust in their capacities to deal 
with a specific problem, but because of what the nobles perceived as transgressions 
against the norms of kingship. The conflicts we have analysed in this chapter either 
betray already existing mistrust of singular nobles against their king or were cases 
of royal actions that were probably perceived as “bad kingship” by wider circles 
of the nobility, undermining their trust in the rulers and all occurring around the 
same time the rebellions against the rulers were developing.
While this proximity in time is unproblematic in Odo’s case since his conflict 
with Baldwin as well as the one arising over the succession at Poitiers368 predate the 
rebellion against him, in Charles’  case the connection between his actions against 
Gislebert and the loss of trust in him causes some problems. While the conflict 
started before the deterioration of his relations with ever larger parts of the nobil-
ity, at least until the outbreak of the rebellion he appears to have had considerable 
support against the count. In any case, his last renewal of the conflict only took 
place when he was already fighting the rebels and thus cannot have contributed to 
the crisis. However, these actions are likely to have been symptomatic for Charles’ 
behaviour also in other situations, betraying an obstinacy when it came to pursu-
ing his interests against those of the nobles around him. This obstinacy can, for ex-
ample, also be seen in his adherence to his intimate Hagano. After Soissons he did 
come to terms with the nobles and made efforts to publicly integrate Hagano into 
the noble hierarchy. The agreement they had found was a compromise, protecting 
the royal interest of keeping Hagano at court as well as the interest of the nobles, 
who would not accept an outsider close to the king. Yet, while Charles provided 
Hagano with the honores linked to an elevated position at court and thus aimed 
to integrate him further into the highest ranks of the nobility, he failed to address 
the second main issue the nobles had had with his intimate: his overly close rela-
tion with the king. In his persistence to keep Hagano close to him, Charles did not 
meet the expectations of the nobles arising from the previous agreement. Whether 
it were his actions against Gislebert or his policy in the case of Hagano, Charles 
368 For more examples of Odo’s actions that probably were probably perceived as breaches of the 
norms, see chapter I.2.3.
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failed to present himself as a reliable ruler who had the interests of the nobles at 
heart and thus undermined their trust in him.
Trust could be built by symbolic measures as in particular ways of doing jus-
tice. For example, Carloman  II’s second capitulary was issued after his defeat 
against the Northmen, just at the very moment when an agreement with nobles 
from the North had been reached. This is hardly a coincidence since at the same 
time he also issued a diploma recording a royal judgement in favour of one of his 
supporters—one example of how references to judicial assemblies were used by 
the various rulers to demonstrate the royal will to do justice in cooperation with 
the nobles. Finally restorational acts also fall within this category. While less fre-
quent, if the occasion presented itself, like the references to the judicial assemblies, 
they were issued to portray how a ruler was bringing justice to those supporting 
him, remedying old injustice and thus strengthening trust in him. However, while 
the protection of the interests of those close to the ruler by royal justice was a 
characteristic common to the acts of all rulers, there was also a second character-
istic in which Charles the Simple’s acts differed from those of his predecessors. 
While Carloman and Odo emphasised their cooperation with the nobles, in his 
later acts Charles failed to so. The diplomas recording the judgements of Herstal, 
with their long lists of participants, are certainly reminiscences to the royal co-
operation with the nobility. Yet, especially Charles’  last restorational act issued at 
Tours-sur-Marne for the monks of Saint-Thierry of Reims, at a moment when the 
rebellion was already in full progress, is of a different nature. While still stressing 
the power of the king to bring justice, it focuses on the loyalty of the recipients to 
the king and not on his cooperation with them. In an atmosphere of deep mistrust 
against Charles, this was undoubtedly the wrong message. Trust could not be built 
by calling upon unconditional loyalty as a king’s prerogative, but only by demon-
strating the willingness to integrate the nobles into the rule and therefore to allow 
them a certain degree of control over the royal politics by their participation in the 
decision-making process, especially since this participation was perceived as one 
of their most important privileges by the leading nobles of the realm.

Conclusion
Charles the Simple became king of the West Frankish realm because a strong op-
position had formed against his predecessor Odo. The Robertian had, despite his 
efforts, failed to fully integrate his early opponents into his rule. Once Odo’s reign 
started to suffer from a severe crisis of trust, these men acted as a rallying point for 
others. For this opposition, Charles possessed an advantage over Odo that made 
him an ideal candidate to replace the Robertian: his Carolingian blood. In a world 
in which the idea of Carolingian kingship was still prevalent, Charles’  descent 
could be used as a powerful argument in the political discourse. This did not entail 
that Odo was to be disposed as a king. It merely meant that with Charles there now 
existed an alternative for all those discontent with the Robertian’s rule. Both of 
them, Charles and Odo, were now kings, acknowledged by their peers as well as by 
the nobles, and even acknowledging each other. Thus, Charles’  succession to Odo 
presents itself as a pragmatic solution to the conflict between the different parties, 
which took the fragile position of Odo and the weakness of a claim his brother 
Robert might have had to follow him on the throne into consideration.
Royal power being the result of the interaction between the king and the no-
bles, the king’s ability to manipulate the network of nobles around him can be 
used as a means to measure the possibilities and limits of said power. Charles’ 
early years reveal certain limitations to this ability: close to him were those who 
had already supported him during the years of the fight with Odo. However, at the 
same time, the presence of these nobles hindered the full integration of power-
ful men like Robert of Neustria or Richard the Justiciar. They did acknowledge 
Charles as king and cooperated with him initially, yet did not belong to his inner 
circle, which was dominated by those early supporters. This led to a fragile balance 
which ended only after the murder of Archbishop Fulk, and thereby the creation 
of a vacuum of power at the royal court that was filled first by Richard and then by 
Robert. A ruler not being able (or willing) to act against the interests of a powerful 
group of nobles was nothing new however. When his father Louis the Stammerer 
attempted to create his own basis of power after the death of Charles the Bald, the 
leading nobles of the realm forced him to abandon his plans and to rule with them 
instead. These men then created networks which dominated royal politics over the 
next few years, up until the reign of Charles the Fat.
This does not mean that the rulers were unable to promote nobles of their 
choosing. The presence of men like Count Robert of Troyes under Carloman II 
or the fidelis Robert under Charles the Simple indicates that there was room at 
court for men who drew their importance from their personal relation to the king. 
However, these men needed to be accepted by the other nobles already present 
in the circle around the king. In fact, in most cases nobles whose influence in-
creased under the various rulers either appear to already have had connections 
to the circle dominating the court or soon created such contacts. This pattern is 
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also revealed during the rule of Charles the Fat. The emperor certainly did make 
efforts to install men of his own choosing in the West Frankish realm, yet in most 
cases his choice fell on men like Odo and Bishop Geilo of Langres, both of whom 
had strong connections to the networks that had dominated politics under Louis 
the Stammerer and his older sons. This kind of policy, while it limited the pool of 
choices, also had distinctive advantages. These men were not only well connected 
among the local nobility and thus ideal candidates to serve as power brokers for 
the rulers, they were also well connected among those nobles already present at 
court, thus facilitating their integration into the hierarchy there.
This latter point was especially problematic. Not only Charles the Simple early 
in his reign, but also Odo had to cope with the problem of having to integrate dif-
ferent groups of nobles into his rule. Like Charles, Odo also was supported by a 
distinctive group of nobles, nobles who, after he had become king, occupied the 
innermost layer of the circle around him. Accepting new nobles into this circle 
meant that adjustments to the existing hierarchy had to be made, necessarily lead-
ing to conflicts between the interests of those already present and those newly 
joining. For both Odo and Charles, this posed a problem almost impossible to 
solve since their closest supporters already occupied the positions the men who 
were to be newly integrated into the rule claimed for themselves. Odo’s efforts fi-
nally failed, contributing the rebellion breaking out against him. Charles was more 
successful, winning room for manoeuvre although only through the death of one 
of his most important supporters, Archbishop Fulk.
Indeed, for large parts of his reign, Charles the Simple demonstrated a remark-
able capacity to mediate between the interests of the individual nobles and his 
own. The integration of the Lotharingian nobility meant that a completely new 
group of nobles—or better, several new groups—had to be integrated into the cir-
cle around the king. Charles not only managed to find a balance between these 
different groups, to deal with their rivalries and use them to his advantage when 
pursuing his goals within Lotharingia, but he also managed to do this without 
neglecting the interests of the West Frankish nobles at his court. Concerning the 
latter, he increased his efforts and kept especially Robert of Neustria close at his 
side, thus making sure that the necessary adjustments to the hierarchy at court 
were accepted by the West Frankish nobles and found the general consent. Simi-
larly, when a group of new nobles rose to influence at the royal court around 920, 
Charles appears to have managed this transition without creating major discon-
tent among the other nobles. Again, however, it is worth noting that most of the 
nobles added to the circle around the king on these occasions were already well 
established and often connected to those already present at the royal court. Never-
theless, adjustments to the existing hierarchy had to be made and Charles appears 
to have succeeded in implementing them in cooperation with the circle of nobles 
around him. Charles’  capacity in these matters becomes especially evident when 
comparing his success with the problems his brother Carloman encountered once 
he had taken over the rule in the northern part of the realm. Early on, Carloman 
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failed to take the interests of these nobles into consideration and to make the nec-
essary adjustments to the circle around him, which led them to withdraw from 
court and left Carloman with only very limited means to deal with the Viking 
threat.
If necessary, it was certainly possible to rule without the support or even against 
important nobles and their networks—at least for a certain time. In the early 900s, 
when Charles the Simple was faced with Robert’s opposition, he managed to cre-
ate a counterweight against the marchio by forging new alliances and extending 
his own basis of support. However, situations like this one were extremely unstable 
and needed a certain amount of political flexibility if new developments occurred 
that shifted the balance of power. In Carloman’s case, his defeat against the North-
men brought the final change. In Charles’, it was his conflict with Richard the Jus-
ticiar that made it necessary to finally satisfy Robert’s claim to occupy a position at 
court adequate to his position within the noble hierarchy of the realm.
Situations like this were also extremely dangerous because they provided other 
rulers with the opportunity to intervene on the behalf of the ruler’s opponents. 
Thus, Odo’s own vulnerability in the conflict with Charles was exploited by Ar-
nulf and Zwentibold while Charles’  conflict with Count Gislebert was followed 
by activities of Henry the Fowler in Lotharingia. Of course, this also worked the 
other way round. Charles the Simple intervened twice in Lotharingia when parts 
of the local nobility were looking for allies against their ruler (or, in 911, against 
the possibility of a king from the rivalling Konradiner family) outside the borders 
of the regnum—the second time with success, due to the support he could muster 
among the local nobles. Louis the Stammerer had attempted to avert such situa-
tions by concluding a treaty with Louis the Younger which prohibited interven-
tions of this kind. This worked rather well when soon after his death Boso had 
himself crowned king, which led to the creation of a system of alliances among 
the Carolingian rulers aimed at crushing the rebellion. However, at the same time, 
this same system of alliances made it impossible for Louis  III and Carloman II 
to effectively pursue their interests in Lotharingia. Charles the Simple appears to 
have been well aware of the advantages and disadvantages of this system. When 
his rule started to become unstable towards the early 920s, he attempted to revive 
the old cooperation by initiating a new one with Henry the Fowler. While much 
less effective than the earlier alliances, this cooperation at least secured Henry’s 
non-intervention after the rebellion had broken out against Charles.
However, while such situations of instability existed during certain periods, 
for most of the time Charles the Simple appears to have enjoyed the support of at 
least large parts of the nobility. This is especially evident from his policy towards 
the Northmen. Charles was, very much like his predecessors, able to muster large 
armies consisting of contingents from the various parts of his realm. However, 
this ability should not be confused with military success on the battlefield: large 
armies were as little guarantee for victory as small ones were for defeat. Nor should 
it be confused with the capacity to secure the realm solely by military means, as 
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this was a task at which none of Charles’  predecessors had succeeded. However, 
it does demonstrate that the nobles supported Charles’  strategy of dealing with 
the Viking threat. This had not always been the case under his predecessors: after 
Carloman’s disastrous campaign against the Northmen, the nobles around him 
enforced a diplomatic solution. Similarly, the local nobles allowed the Northmen 
to move freely in exchange for their own safety, thus undermining Odo’s defen-
sively oriented strategy which was aimed at containing the raiders rather than 
defeating them. The support of the nobles in Viking matters not only becomes 
evident in the military measures, but also in diplomacy. Negotiating deals with 
the Northmen was known as an effective means to remove them from the realm 
and it was frequently used by the West Frankish rulers. As such, Charles’  treaty 
of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte followed their example, containing elements already used 
by his predecessors. Nevertheless, being concluded in the wake of major military 
victory, it marked a distinctive change in strategy which could only have been 
implemented in accordance with the leading nobles.
Charles was able to raise forces from different parts of the realm, yet this ability 
very much depended on the cooperation of a small number of nobles. Forces from 
Neustria and Burgundy, led by Robert of Neustria and Richard the Justiciar, the 
two men who controlled large parts of these regions, won the battle of Chartres. 
The existence of powerful nobles like these two was nothing new. Men like them 
had risen before through their connections with the rulers and by royal will and 
consent. Boso, to name but one example, had been one of them. Under Louis the 
Stammerer and his older sons, Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin had dominated the 
politics of the realm together with their networks. As long as the rulers were able to 
secure the cooperation of these men, this was even an advantage since these pow-
erful nobles served as perfect conduits of royal power. Thus, the decreased range 
of royal travels that can be noted for Charles the Simple’s reign in comparison 
to his predecessors did not mean that the regions now not visited anymore were 
outside the range of royal power. Especially in Burgundy, previously a region with 
manifold royal contacts to the local nobility and repeated royal presence, Richard 
the Justiciar now served as an intermediary and power-broker for the king.
Yet, while Robert and Richard undoubtedly played a key role in Charles’  reign, 
his dependency on them appears to have been much smaller than those of Louis 
the Stammerer and his sons on the alliances around Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin. 
The circles around Charles’  father and brothers appear to have consisted almost 
exclusively of members of these alliances, with a strong tendency to also absorb 
those who the kings themselves had elevated into their networks. This changed 
over the course of Charles the Fat’s reign, leading to a politically fragmented 
 nobility which supported different claimants to the throne after his death. This 
condition persisted over the course of Odo’s reign into the one of Charles the Sim-
ple, contributing to the rebellion against the former and causing Charles’  initial 
problems with Robert. Yet, at the same time, at least for Charles this fragmentation 
also provided him with more room for manoeuvre after the death of Archbishop 
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Fulk. His power was not solely dependent on the cooperation of Robert or Richard 
(though their cooperation greatly increased his options), it was also and mainly 
founded on a network of less powerful nobles, first from the Francia, then also 
from Lotharingia. Here, Charles forged links by marriage and patronage. Wigeric 
certainly owed his promotion to count of the palace to his marriage to Charles’ 
niece, as did Count Erlebald, who married one of Charles’  daughters. Richer of 
Prüm and Charles’  former notary Gauzlin became bishops because Charles aimed 
at promoting men of his choice to important positions. Bishop Stephen of Cam-
brai and Count Ricuin of Verdun regained influence at the royal court which they 
had lost under Louis the Child. These ties helped Charles to keep the balance of 
power within the realm.
In the end, Charles was deposed because he failed to maintain the good rela-
tions not only with the most powerful men of the realm, but also with those other 
nobles. At the core of this development was a crisis of trust in Charles, whose 
actions in the late 910s started to transgress the boundaries of what was politi-
cally possible and opportune. Charles, like Odo in 892, was not trusted anymore 
because he violated the interests of the nobles while pursuing his own. This loss 
of trust went deep, estranging even those nobles from him who had previously 
belonged to his most important supporters. This situation was exacerbated by an-
other development. In contrast to the early years of his reign, the fragmentation 
of the leading ranks of the nobility had been overcome. While this did not mean 
that another system of alliances had been created that dominated royal politics, it 
did mean that the old rivalries that had shaped politics within the realm around 
900 had come to an end. Over the course of Charles’  reign, Robert, who served 
as rallying point for the rebels, had forged links to other leading nobles, including 
the family of Richard the Justiciar and Count Heribert II. These links now became 
active, drawing more and more of Charles’  supporters over to the rebels.
At first, the rebellion was certainly not aimed at Charles’  deposition and Rob-
ert’s elevation to the throne. Charles’  claim to the throne was still a strong one 
and the question of whether to deny his right to rule deeply divided the nobility. 
Indeed, it seems much more likely that the goal of the opposition was to take 
control of the royal politics, with Charles remaining king. It was Charles’  own 
refusal to negotiate that initiated the escalation of the conflict. This refusal was in 
line with his persistence to pursue his own interests to the detriment of those of 
the nobles during the last years of his reign, even if it meant bending or breaking 
earlier agreements—a persistence that led to the creation and intensification of the 
crisis of trust in him. The possibilities and limits of royal power in the late Carolin-
gian age were defined by the cooperation of the nobles and Charles, by neglecting 
this need to create consensus while overemphasising his royal will and majesty, 
deprived himself of the foundations of his rule.
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The prevalent image of the late Carolingian age is one of decline and 
fall. Charles III the Simple’s (893/898−923) rule, which has hardly 
received any scholarly attention since the late 19th century, is per-
ceived to have been the classic example of this development. En-
throned by rebels as well as cast down by a rebellion he is said to 
have been a weak ruler, powerless in the face of the ambitions of the 
nobles of the West Frankish realm. Yet, what do “weak” and “power-
less” mean? In modern scholarship, early medieval rule is understood 
not as a question of command and obedience but as the result of 
cooperation between rulers and nobles. Thus, royal actions, such as 
the defence of the realm against the Northmen, interactions with 
other rulers or in regard to conflicts with or between the nobles, 
are reflections of the relations between the ruler and the circle of 
nobles around him. A ruler’s power therefore depended on his abil-
ity to integrate the most powerful nobles into his rule, to mediate 
between their interests and to create consensus over the course of 
action. Based on this view, a new assessment of Charles the Simple’s 
rule, the circle of nobles around him, the actions taken by him and 
thus his royal power is provided in this study, with the rules of his 
predecessors since the death of Charles the Bald in 877 serving as a 
basis for comparison.
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